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
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


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THUCYDIDES' HISTORY

OF

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.



• THE HISTORY  
OF  
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR,  
BY  
THUCYDIDES.

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,  
FROM THE TEXT OF ARNOLD,  
COLLATED WITH BEKKER, GÖLLER, AND POPPO.

BY THE  
REV. HENRY DALE, M. A.,  
HEAD MASTER OF THE NEW PROPRIETARY SCHOOL, BLACKHEATH, AND LATE DEAN  
OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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## P R E F A C E.

THE object of this volume is to give a version of the original so strictly faithful as to be of service to the classical student; while the style, though perfectly simple and unpretending, may contain nothing so opposed to the idiom of our own language as to deter the general reader who may wish to know exactly what the Greek historian wrote. To gain both these ends, however, except in a limited degree, is perhaps scarcely possible in translating an author like Thucydides; whose style is frequently so very obscure, as regards the meaning, and so totally different, as regards the form and arrangement of his narrative, from what we are accustomed to in our own writers of history. It may be well therefore to say, that wherever the two parts of the object I have mentioned seemed incompatible, the latter, as the less important, has been sacrificed to the former; particularly in the earlier part of the work, where the student naturally stands most in need of every help that can be given him. With this explanation, I venture to hope that the present version may be found, in not a few passages, to answer the end proposed better than any of those which preceded it. The very great additions which within the last few years have been made to our knowledge of the original, may reasonably exempt the expression of such a hope from the charge of arrogance. And though want of leisure, arising from more pressing occupations, has prevented my deriving all the benefit I might have done from the works of more learned laborers in the same field, yet even an imperfect acquaintance with the annotations of such scholars as

have recently edited Thucydides, could scarcely fail to give me a decided advantage over earlier translators. To one of those scholars, especially, I am bound most thankfully to acknowledge my very great obligations; though his eye is, alas! closed to such expressions of gratitude. It was under the personal instruction of Dr. Arnold that I had the happiness to make my first acquaintance with the language of his favorite author; and his annotations upon the work have never long been out of my hands, since they were first published. The text of his last edition is what I have adopted for this translation; and I have sometimes felt compelled to borrow the very words with which he rendered a difficult passage; for when his version was meant to be literal, it seemed almost impossible to change it without sacrificing some part of the sense. The very few notes, too, which were compatible with the form and design of the volume, are in many cases only extracts from, or references to, his more copious illustrations of the text: though the views of other editors, particularly of Haack, Bekker, Göller, Poppo, and Bloomfield, are also quoted on doubtful passages, where my mind was not quite made up, with respect either to the best reading, or the most probable interpretation. With such valuable aids at my command, my task might well have been executed far better than it is. But such as it is, I commit it very humbly to the judgment of the public; more particularly of those who are acquainted with the original, and will therefore be best able to appreciate the difficulties which a translator of Thucydides has to encounter.

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# THUCYDIDES.

## BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they warred against each other; having begun from its very outset, with the expectation that it would prove a great one, and more worthy<sup>1</sup> of relation than all that had been before it; inferring so much, as well from the fact that both sides were at the height of all kinds of preparation for it, as also because he saw the rest of Greece joining with the one side or the other, some immediately, and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest movement that ever happened among the Greeks, and some part of the barbarians, and extending, as one may say, even to most nations of the world. For the events that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient,<sup>2</sup> it was impossible, through length of time, to ascertain with certainty; but<sup>3</sup> from such evidence as I am led

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "most worthy—of all," etc.; but this use of the superlative, though one of the most common idioms of the Greek language, has not been naturalized in our own; notwithstanding Milton's well-known imitation of it, in which he makes Adam the "goodliest of all *his sons* since born, The fairest of *her daughters* Eve."

<sup>2</sup> As he refers, I think, to his own actual investigations on the subject, there seems no reason for giving to ἦν the hypothetical force, as translators have generally done. The same remark applies to the use of the same verb in the first sentence of chap. 22, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίθειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεύσαι ἦν; and the truth of it appears to be confirmed by the expression ἐπιπόνως δὲ εὐρίσκετο in the same chapter.

<sup>3</sup> The relative ὧν is referred by some to σκοποῦντι, by others to πιστεύσαι; and in either case it would seem but an ordinary instance of attraction; though Arnold thinks that "neither of these expressions can be admitted." I have preferred the latter, both because the participial clause might very naturally be inserted in this parenthetical way; and from reference to a very similar passage in the beginning of chap. 20, Τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα εὗρον, χαλεπὰ δὲ παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεύσαι. Schäfer, as quoted by Göller, supplies ἐξ from the antecedent clause.—



to trust, on looking back as far as possible, I do not think they were great, either with respect to the wars or otherwise.

2. For it is evident, that what is now called Hellas, was not of old inhabited in a settled manner; but that formerly there were frequent removals, and that each tribe readily left the place of their abode, being forced by such as were from time to time more numerous. For as there was no traffic, and they did not mix with one another without fear, either by sea or land; and they each so used what they had as but barely to live on it, without having any superfluity of riches, or planting their land (because it was uncertain when another should invade them, and carry all away, especially as they had not the defense of walls); and as they thought that they might any where obtain their necessary daily sustenance, they made little difficulty in removing: and for this cause they were not strong, either in greatness of cities, or other resources. And the best of the land was always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessaly, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of the Peloponnese (except Arcadia), and of the rest of Greece whatsoever was most fertile. For through the goodness of the land, both the power of some particular men growing greater caused factions among them, whereby they were ruined; and withal they were more exposed to the plots of strangers. Attica, at any rate, having through the poverty of the soil been for the longest period free from factions, was always inhabited by the same people. And this which follows is not the least evidence of my assertion, that it was owing to its migrations that Greece did not equally increase in other parts. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of the rest of Greece, the most powerful of them retired to Athens, as to a place of security; and becoming citizens at a very early period, made the city still greater in the number of inhabitants; so that afterward they even sent out colonies into Ionia, as Attica itself was not able to contain them. 3. And to me the weakness of ancient times is not a little demonstrated by this too. Before the Trojan war, Greece appears to have done nothing in common; and, as it seems to me, the whole of it had not as yet even this name; nay, before the time of Hellen, the son of

*Ευρύβαλεις* seems here to express simply a *result*, without implying any thing of its fortuitous nature, as it more commonly does.

Deucalion, it does not appear that this appellation existed at all; but that in their different tribes, and the Pelasgian to the greatest extent, they furnished from themselves the name [of their people].<sup>1</sup> But when Hellen and his sons had grown strong in Phthiotis, and men invited them for their aid into the other cities; from associating with them, separate communities were now more commonly called Hellenes:<sup>2</sup> and yet not for a long time after could that name prevail among them all. And Homer proves this most fully; for, though born long after the Trojan war, he has nowhere called them all by that name, nor indeed any others but those that came with Achilles out of Phthiotis; who were the very original Hellenes; but in his poems he mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor again does he speak of barbarians; because neither were the Hellenes, in my opinion, as yet distinguished by one common term in opposition to that. The several Hellenic communities, then, who in the different cities understood each other's language, and were<sup>3</sup> afterward all so called, did nothing in a body before the Trojan war, through want of strength and mutual intercourse. Nay, even for this expedition they united [only] because they now made more use of the sea. 4. For Minos was the most ancient of all with whom we are acquainted by report, that acquired a navy: and he made himself master of the greater part of what is now the Grecian sea; and both ruled over the islands called Cyclades, and was the first that colonized most of them, having expelled the Carians, and established his own sons in them as governors; and, as was natural, he swept piracy from the sea as much as he could, for the better coming in to him of his revenues. 5. For the Grecians in old time, and of the barbarians both those on the continent who lived near the sea, and all who inhabited islands, after they began to cross over more commonly to one another in ships, turned to piracy,

<sup>1</sup> i. e., there were different tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the predominant one, called by their different names, instead of being all comprehended under one, as they were afterward. Or it may refer to the gradual formation of such general names even at that early period, by one tribe extending its own appellation to others.

<sup>2</sup> For a striking instance of such a change in the language of a barbarian people at a much later period, I may refer to the inhabitants of the Amphiloichian Argos, of whom Thucydides says, II. 68, ἐλληνίσθησαν τὴν νῦν γλῶσσαν τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ξυνοικησάντων· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφίλοχοι βάρβαροί εἰσιν.

<sup>3</sup> See Arnold's note on this difficult passage.

under the conduct of their most powerful men, with a view both to their own gain, and to maintenance for the needy; and falling upon towns that were unfortified, and inhabited like villages,<sup>1</sup> they rifled them, and made most of their livelihood by this means; as this employment did not yet involve any disgrace, but rather brought with it even somewhat of glory. This is shown by some that dwell on the continent even at the present day, with whom it is an honor to perform this cleverly; and by the ancient poets who introduce men asking the question of such as sail to their coasts, in all cases alike, whether they are pirates: as though neither those of whom they inquire, disowned the employment; nor those who were interested in knowing, reproached them with it. They also robbed one another on the continent; and to this day many parts of Greece live after the old fashion; as the Locri Ozolæ, the Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and those in that part of the continent. And the fashion of wearing arms has continued among these continental states from their old trade of piracy. 6. For the whole of Greece used to wear arms, owing to their habitations being unprotected, and their communication with each other insecure; and they passed their ordinary life with weapons, like the barbarians. And those parts of Greece which still live in this way, are a proof of the same mode of life having also formerly extended to all. Now the Athenians were the first who laid down their armor, and by a more easy style of life changed to greater luxury. And the elders of their rich men no long time ago ceased wearing from delicacy linen tunics, and binding up a knot of the hair on their heads with a tie of golden grasshoppers. Whence also this fashion prevailed for a long time with the elders of the Ionians, from their affinity to them. But on the contrary a moderate style of dressing, and according to the present mode, was first used by the Lacedæmonians; and in other respects their wealthier men most conformed themselves in their living to the common people. And they were the first who stripped themselves, and undressing in public, smeared themselves with grease,<sup>2</sup> in their gymnastic exercises. And formerly even at the Olympic games the combatants contended with girdles round their middle; and it is

<sup>1</sup> i. e., in an open and straggling manner. Compare his description of Sparta, to which the term was still applicable, chap. 10.

<sup>2</sup> The rude original of the κηρώμα in later times.

not many years since it ceased to be so. Nay even now among some of the barbarians, and especially those of Asia, prizes for boxing and wrestling are given, and they wear girdles when they contend for them. And in many other respects also one might show that the ancient Greeks lived in a manner similar to the barbarians of the present age.

7. Of the cities, again, such as were founded most recently, and when there were now greater facilities of navigation, having greater abundance of wealth, they were built with walls on the very shores; and occupied isthmuses, with a view both to commerce and to security against their several neighbors: whereas the old ones, owing to the<sup>1</sup> long continuance of piracy, were built further off from the sea, both those in the islands and those on the mainlands; (for they used to plunder one another, and all the rest who lived by the sea without being seamen); and even to the present day they are built inland.

8. And the islanders especially were pirates, being Carians and Phœnicians. For it was these that had colonized most of the islands. And this is a proof of it:—When Delos was purified by the Athenians in the course of this war, and all the sepulchers of those who had died in the island were taken up, above half were found to be Carians; being known by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the manner in which they still bury. But when the navy of Minos was established, there were greater facilities of sailing to each other. For the malefactors in the islands were expelled by him, at the same time that he was colonizing most of them. And the men on the sea-coast, now making greater acquisition of wealth, led a more settled life; and some of them even surrounded themselves with walls, on the strength of growing richer than they had before been. For through desire of gain, the lower orders submitted to be slaves to their betters; and the more powerful, having a superabundance of money, brought the smaller cities into subjection. And being now more in this state of things, some time after they made the expedition against Troy.

9. And Agamemnon appears to me to have assembled the armament because he surpassed the men of that day in power, and not so much because he took the suitors of Helen bound

<sup>1</sup> Göller reads *ἀντισχοῦσαι* instead of *ἀντισχοῦσαι*, which he pronounces inexplicable, and interprets it thus, "Veteres urbes ob latrocinia, postquam diu et resisterunt et perduraverunt, longius a mari conditæ sunt."

by their oaths to Tyndarus. It is said too by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the most certain accounts by tradition from their forefathers, that Pelops first acquired power by the abundance of riches with which he came from Asia to men who were in needy circumstances; and although a new-comer, yet gave his name to the country;<sup>1</sup> and that afterward still greater power fell to the lot of his descendants, as Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the Heraclidæ, and Atreus was his mother's brother, and Eurystheus, when going on the expedition, intrusted Mycenæ and the government to Atreus, on the ground of their connection; (he happened to be flying from his father on account of the death of Chrysippus): and when Eurystheus did not return again, they say that at the wish of the Mycenæans themselves, through their fear of the Heraclidæ, and also because he appeared to be powerful, and had courted the commons, Atreus received the kingdom of the Mycenæans and all that Eurystheus ruled over; and that so the descendants of Pelops became greater than those of Perseus. And I think that Agamemnon, from having received this inheritance, and from being strong in his navy also at the same time to a greater extent than others, assembled and made the expedition not so much by favor as by fear. For he appears to have both come himself with most ships, and to have furnished them for the Arcadians besides; as Homer has also shown, if he is sufficient authority for any one,<sup>2</sup> and also, in [his account of] the transmission of the scepter, he has mentioned that he "O'er numerous islands and all Argos ruled." Now, as he lived on the mainland, he would not have been master of islands, except those that were adjacent (and those would not be numerous), if he had not also had some naval force. And we must conjecture by this expedition, what was the character of those before it.

10. And as to Mycenæ having been a small place, or if any town in those times appear now to be inconsiderable, this would be no certain proof to rest upon, for disbelieving that the armament was as large as the poets have said, and as report prevails. For if the city of the Lacedæmonians were laid desolate, and the temples and foundations of the public buildings were left, I think that when a long time had passed by,

<sup>1</sup> Or more literally, "gave occasion to the naming of the country after him."

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "sufficient to prove it to any one."

posterity would have great disbelief of their power in proportion to their fame. (And yet they occupy two of the five divisions of the Peloponnese, and take the lead of the whole of it, and of their allies out of it in great numbers. Still, as the city is neither built closely, nor has sumptuous temples and public buildings, but is built in villages, after the old fashion of Greece, it would have an inferior appearance) Whereas if the Athenians were to suffer the same fate, I think their power would be conjectured, from the appearance of the city to the eye, to have been double what it is. It is not therefore right to be incredulous, nor to look at the appearance of cities rather than their power; but to think that that expedition was greater indeed than any that were before it, but inferior to those of the present day; if on this point again we must believe the poetry of Homer, which it is natural that he, as a poet, set off on the side of exaggeration; but, nevertheless, even on this view it appears inferior. For he has made it to consist of twelve hundred ships, those of the Boeotians carrying 120 men, and those of Philoctetes 50; meaning to show, as I think, the largest and the least; at any rate he has made no mention of the size of any others in the catalogue of the ships. And that they all were themselves rowers and fighting men, he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes. For he has represented all the men at the oar as bowmen. And it is not probable that many supernumeraries would sail with them, except the kings and highest officers; especially as they were going to cross the open sea with munitions of war; and, on the other hand, had not their vessels decked, but equipped, after the old fashion, more like privateers. Looking then at the mean of the largest and the smallest ships, they do not appear to have gone in any great number, considering that they were sent by the whole of Greece in common.

11. And the reason was not so much scarcity of men as want of money. For owing to difficulty of subsistence, they took their army the smaller, and such only as they hoped would live on the country itself while carrying on the war; and when on their arrival they were superior in battle (and that they were so is evident, for they would not else have built the fortifications for their camp), they appear not even then to have employed all their force, but to have turned to the cultivation of the Chersonese, and to piracy, for want of

food. And in this way the Trojans, owing to their being scattered, the more easily held out<sup>1</sup> by open force those ten years; being a match for those who successively were left behind. But if they had gone with abundance of food, and in a body had continuously carried through the war, without foraging and agriculture, they would easily have conquered them in battle, and taken the place; since even though not united, but only with the part that was successively present, they held out against them. Now by pressing the siege, [I say], they would have taken Troy both in less time and with less trouble; but through want of money both the undertakings before this<sup>2</sup> were weak, and this itself, though more famous than the former, is shown by facts<sup>3</sup> to have been inferior to its fame, and to the present report of it, which has prevailed by means of the poets.

12. For even after the Trojan war Greece was still moving about, and settling itself;<sup>4</sup> so that it could not increase its power by remaining at rest. For the return of the Greeks from Troy, having taken place so late, caused many revolutions; and factions, generally speaking, arose in the states; in consequence of which men were expelled, and founded cities. For those who are now called Boeotians, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, settled in what is now called Boeotia, but was before called the Cadmean country. (Though there was a division of them in this country before, some of whom also joined the expedition against Troy.) And the Dorians in the eightieth year took possession of the Peloponnese with the Heraclidæ. And Greece having with difficulty, after a long time, enjoyed settled peace, and being no longer subject to migrations, began to send out colonies; and the Athenians colonized Ionia, and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and some places in the rest of Greece.<sup>5</sup> But all these places were founded after the Trojan war.

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, keeping the field, and not merely fighting from their walls.

<sup>2</sup> The *plural* pronoun in the Greek is used with reference to τὰ Τρωϊκά, the common term to signify the Trojan war.

<sup>3</sup> Or, "inferior in the facts."

<sup>4</sup> *i. e.*, it was not yet settled.—*Arnold*. The old reading, μετακίετο, would mean, "was changing its place of abode."

<sup>5</sup> The term "Greece" is here used in its widest sense, as including all countries that had a Greek population.

13. Now when Greece was becoming more powerful, and acquiring possession of money still more than before, tyrannies, generally speaking, were established in the cities, from the revenues becoming greater; whereas before there had been hereditary kingly governments with definite privileges; and Greece began to fit out navies, and they paid more attention to the sea. Now the Corinthians are said first to have managed naval matters most nearly to the present fashion, and triremes to have been built at Corinth first in Greece. And Aminocles, a Corinthian shipwright, appears to have built four ships for the Samians also. Now it is about three hundred years to the end of this war from the time that Aminocles went to the Samians; and the most ancient sea-fight with which we are acquainted was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. And from that too it is about two hundred and sixty years to the same period. For the Corinthians, having their city situated on the isthmus, had always possessed an emporium; as the Greeks of old, both those within the Peloponnese and those without, had intercourse with each other by land more than by sea, through *their* country: and they were very rich, as is shown even by the old poets; for they gave the title of "wealthy" to the place. And when the Greeks began to make more voyages, having got their ships they put down piracy; and rendered their city rich in income of money, as they afforded an emporium both ways. And the Ionians afterward had a large navy in the time of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and Cambyses his son; and while at war with Cyrus, commanded the sea along their coast for some time. Polycrates also, tyrant of Samos, in the time of Cambyses, having a strong fleet, both made some other of the islands subject to him, and took Rhenea and dedicated it to the Delian Apollo. And the Phocaeans, while founding Massalia, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

14. These were the strongest of their navies. But even these, though many generations after the Trojan war, appear to have used but few triremes, and to have been still fitted out with fifty-oared vessels, and long boats, as that fleet was. And it was but a short time before the Median war, and the death of Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were possessed in any number by the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans. For these were the last navies



worth mentioning established in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes: as the Æginetans and Athenians, and whoever else had any, possessed but small ones, and of those the greater part fifty-oared vessels; and it was only lately that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when at war with the Æginetans, and when the barbarian was also expected, to build those very ships with which they fought him by sea; and these were not yet decked throughout.

15. Of such a [deficient] character then were the navies of the Greeks, both the ancient ones and those which were built afterward. And yet those who paid attention to them obtained the greatest power, both by income of money and dominion over others: for they sailed against the islands, and subdued them; especially those who had not a sufficient extent of country. But as for war by land, from which any *power*<sup>1</sup> was acquired, there was none. Such as did arise, were all against their several neighbors; and the Greeks did not go out in any foreign expeditions far from their country for the subjugation of others. For they had not ranged themselves with the chief states as subjects; nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord, on fair and equal terms, make common expeditions; but it was rather neighboring states that separately waged war upon each other. But it was for the war carried on at an early period between the Chalcidians and Eretrians, that the rest of Greece also was most generally divided in alliance with one side or the other.

16. Now to others there arose in other ways obstacles to their increase; and in the case of the Ionians, when their power had advanced to a high pitch, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, having subdued Croesus and all within the Halys to the sea, marched against them, and reduced to bondage their cities on the mainland, as Darius afterward did even the islands, conquering them by means of the fleet of the Phœnicians.

17. As for the tyrants, such as there were in the Grecian cities, since they provided only for what concerned themselves, with a view to the safety of their own persons, and the aggrandizement of their own family, they governed their cities with caution, as far as they possibly could; and nothing me-

<sup>1</sup> From the position of the *καὶ* here, it seems intended only to make the following word more emphatic; as it is often used, before *verbs* especially; an instance of which occurs in the very next sentence, *δοοὶ καὶ ἐγείνοντο*.

morale was achieved by them; [indeed nothing], except it might be against their own several border states. [I speak of those in old Greece], for those in *Sicily* advanced to a very great degree of power. Thus on all sides Greece for a long time was kept in check; so that it both performed nothing illustrious in common, and was less daring as regards individual states.

18. But after the tyrants of the Athenians and those in the rest of Greece (which even at an earlier period<sup>1</sup> was for a long time subject to tyrants), the most and last, excepting those in *Sicily*, had been deposed by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after the settlement of the Dorians, who now inhabit it, though torn by factions for the longest time of any country that we are acquainted with, yet from the earliest period enjoyed good laws, and was always free from tyrants; for it is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end of this war, that the Lacedæmonians have been in possession of the same form of government; and being for this reason powerful, they settled matters in the other states also;) after,<sup>2</sup> I say, the deposition of the tyrants in the rest of Greece, not many years subsequently the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and Athenians. And in the tenth year after it, the barbarians came again with the great armament against Greece to enslave it. And when great danger was impending, the Lacedæmonians took the lead of the confederate Greeks, as being the most powerful; and the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, determined to leave their city, and having broken up their establishments,<sup>3</sup> went on board their ships, and became a naval people. And having together repulsed the barbarian, no long time after, both those Greeks who had revolted from the king, and those who had joined in the war [against him], were divided between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. For these states respectively appeared the most powerful; for the one was strong by land, and the other by sea. And for a short time the confederacy held together; but afterward the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, having quarreled, waged war against each other with their allies: and of the rest of the Greeks, whoever in any

<sup>1</sup> i. e., than the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> A common force of *δέ* after a long parenthesis.

<sup>3</sup> Or, "having removed their furniture," the word meaning just the reverse of *κατασκευάζομαι*. Bloomfield connects it with *ἐς τὰς ναῦς*.

quarter were at variance, now betook themselves to these. So that, from the Persian war all the time to this, making peace at one time, and at another war, either with each other or with their own revolting allies, they prepared themselves well in military matters, and became more experienced from going through their training in scenes of danger.<sup>1</sup>

19. Now the Lacedæmonians did not treat<sup>2</sup> as tributaries the allies whom they led, but only took care that they should be governed by an oligarchy, in accordance with their own interest; whereas the Athenians had in course of time taken ships from the states [in *their* league], except the Chians and Lesbians, and had commanded all to pay a tribute in money. And their own separate resources for this war were greater than when before they had been in their fullest bloom with their entire alliance.

20. Such then I found to be the early state of things, though it is difficult to trust every proof of it in succession. For men receive alike without examination from each other the reports of past events, even though they may have happened in their own country. For instance, the mass of the Athenians think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton; and do not know that

<sup>1</sup> "Their field of exercise was not the parade, but the field of battle."  
—Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> The full force of the Greek could not I think be expressed here (or in the next chapter, *τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν*), without this change of the participle into the verb, the original verb of the sentence following in a subordinate clause. This is by no means an uncommon construction, and Kühner might have added more numerous, and perhaps more apposite examples to the single one by which he illustrates it, viz. Soph. El. 345, *ἑλοῦ γε θάτερ', ἢ φρονεῖν κακῶς, ἢ τῶν φίλων φρονούσα μὴ μνήμην ἔχειν*, i. e., *ἢ τῶν φίλων μὴ μνήμην ἔχουσα (εὖ) φρονεῖν*. His rule is as follows: "Although the Greeks make great use of the participle to express the accidental accompaniments of an action, and thus distinguish it from that action itself, yet this is sometimes reversed; the principle action is expressed in the participle as a mere accompaniment, while the accompaniment assumes the character of the principal verb of the sentence." Gr. Gr. Jelf 705. 2. In Matthiæ there is not any notice of the construction that I am aware of. The same participle *έχοντες*, is used in precisely a similar manner, chap. 144, *τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα*: "if we treated them as independent when we made the treaty:" and by Xenophon, Anab. I. 8. 22, *καὶ πάντες δὲ οἱ τῶν βαρβάρων ἄρχοντες μέσον ἔχοντες τὸ αὐτῶν ἡγούντο*: "occupied the center—when they led them on."

Hippias held the government as being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, and Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. But Harmodius and Aristogiton having suspected that on that day, and at the very moment, some information had been given to Hippias by their accomplices, abstained from attacking him, as being forewarned; but as they wished before they were seized to do something even at all hazards, having fallen in with Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it is called, while arranging the Panathenaic procession, they slew him. And there are many other things also, even at the present day, and not such as are thrown into oblivion by time, of which the rest of the Greeks too have not correct notions; as, that the kings of the Lacedæmonians do not vote with one vote each, but with two; and that they have a Pitænensian Lochus; which never yet existed. With so little pains is the investigation of truth pursued by most men; and they rather turn to views already formed.

21. If, however, from the proofs which have been mentioned any one should suppose that things were, on the whole, such as I have described them; instead of rather believing what either poets have sung of them, setting them off in terms of exaggeration, or historians have composed, in language more attractive<sup>1</sup> to the ear than truthful, their subjects admitting of no proof, and most of them, through length of time,<sup>2</sup> having come to be regarded as fabulous—and if he should consider that, allowing for their antiquity, they have been sufficiently ascertained from the most certain data; he would not be mistaken in his opinion. And though men always think the war of their own times to be the greatest while they are engaged in it, but when they have ceased from it, regard earlier events with more admiration; yet, to such as look at it from the facts themselves, this war will evidently appear to be greater than those.

22. And as for what they severally advanced in speaking, either when about to go to war, or when already in it, it was hard to remember the exact words of what was said; both for myself, with regard to what I heard in person, and for those who reported it to me from any other quarters: but as I thought that they would severally have spoken most to the purpose on

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "for listening to;" in reference to the public recitation which, in ancient times, was the ordinary mode of publishing works of literature.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "having won their way to the fabulous."

the subjects from time to time before them, while I adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was really said, so have I recorded it. But with regard to the *facts* of what was done in the war, I did not presume to state them on hearsay from any chance informant, nor as I thought probable myself; but those at which I was personally present, and, when informed by others, only after investigating them accurately in every particular, as far as was possible. And it was with labor that they were ascertained; because those who were present in the several affairs did not give the same account of the same things, but as each was well inclined to either party, or remembered [the circumstances.] Now, for hearing it recited, perhaps the unfabulous character of my work will appear less agreeable: but as many as shall wish to see the truth of what both *has* happened, and *will* hereafter happen again, according to human nature—the same or pretty nearly so—for such to think it useful will be sufficient. And it is composed as a possession forever, rather than as a prize-task to listen to at the present moment.

23. Now, of former achievements, the greatest that was performed was the Median; and yet that had its decision quickly, in two battles by sea and two by land. But of this war both the duration was very long, and sufferings befell Greece in the course of it, such of it as were never matched in the same time. For neither were so many cities ever taken and laid desolate, some by barbarians, and some by the parties themselves opposed in the war; (some, too, changed their inhabitants when taken;) nor was there so much banishing of men and bloodshed, partly in the war itself, and partly through sedition. And things which were before spoken of from hearsay, but scantily confirmed by fact, were rendered not incredible; both about earthquakes, which at once extended over the greatest part of the world, and most violent at the same time, and eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than was on record of former times; and great droughts in some parts, and from them famines also; and what hurt them most, and destroyed a considerable part—the plague. For all these things fell upon them at once along with this war: which the Athenians and Peloponnesians began by breaking the thirty years' truce after the taking of Eubœa. As for the reason why they broke it, I have first narrated their grounds of complaint

and their differences, that no one might ever have to inquire from what origin so great a war broke out among the Greeks. For the truest reason, though least brought forward in words, I consider to have been, that the Athenians, by becoming great, and causing alarm to the Lacedæmonians, compelled them to proceed to hostilities. But the following were the grounds of complaints openly alleged on either side, from which they broke the truce, and set to the war.

24. Epidamnus is a city situated on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian Gulf; bordering upon it are the Taulantii, a barbarian people of Illyria. It was planted by the Corcyræans, but the leader of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidus, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, who,<sup>1</sup> according to the ancient custom, was invited for this object from the mother city. There were also some of the Corinthians, and of the rest of the Doric nation, who joined in the colony. In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but having for many years together, as is reported, been torn by factions arising from a war made upon them by the neighboring barbarians, they were brought low, and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But the last thing which had taken place before this war was, that the commons had driven out the nobles, who, having retired, were plundering those in the city both by land and sea, in conjunction with the barbarians. The Epidamnians that were in the town, being hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, praying the Corcyræans not to stand by and see them perish, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the character of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect. 25. So the Epidamnians, finding that there was no relief for them from the Corcyræans, were at a loss how to settle the present affair; and sending to Delphi, inquired of the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians, as their founders, and try to obtain some aid from them. He answered, that they should deliver it to them, and make them their leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and according

<sup>1</sup> The conjunction *ὅτι* in this and similar passages merely serves to call for the reader's attention. "In compliance, *you must know*, with the ancient custom."—*Arnold*.

to the advice of the oracle, gave up their city, declaring how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them; and entreated that they would not stand by and see them destroyed, but help them. And the Corinthians undertook their defense, both on the ground of equity (as thinking the colony no less their own than the Corcyræans'), and also for hatred of the Corcyræans; because, although they were their colony, they slighted them. For they neither gave<sup>1</sup> to them the customary privileges in their general religious assemblies, nor to any individual Corinthian,<sup>2</sup> when performing the initiatory rites of sacrifice, as their other colonies did; but despised them, as they were both equal in wealth to the very richest of the Greeks at that time, and more powerful in resources for war, and sometimes prided themselves on being even *very far* superior in their *fleet*; and on the ground of the Phœacians, who were famous in naval matters, having before lived in Corcyra. And on this account too they prepared their navy with the greater spirit, and were not deficient in power; for they had 120 triremes when they began the war. 26. The Corinthians therefore, having complaints against them for all these things, gladly proceeded to send the aid to Epidamnus, not only telling whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sending a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and their own citizens; which succors marched by land to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, for fear of the

<sup>1</sup> The verbs in this and the two following sentences are in the original participles, depending on *παρημέλουν*, to be understood from the preceding sentence. Literally, "for they did so by neither giving," etc.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed the interpretation which Gölle and Arnold give to this disputed passage, viz., that the words *Κορινθίῳ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ* depend upon *διδόντες*; and that the singular number is introduced with reference to any *single* Corinthian who might be present at a sacrifice in Corcyra, and ought therefore, according to the usual practice of Greek colonies, to be selected for the honorable office of performing the introductory ceremonies; in contradistinction to the marks of respect that should have been shown to the citizens of the mother-country in a more general manner, when the colonists met them at any of their public festivals. Bloomfield makes the dative depend upon *προκαταρχόμενοι*, and explains it as signifying "in the person of" or "by the agency of" but does not give any instance of its being so used elsewhere. His objection to Gölle's interpretation, as dropping the force of the *πρό*, has no weight, as is proved by Arnold's quotation from Diodorus, *προκατάρχεσθαι πολέμου*, and Gölle's reference to the *ambiguous* use of the more common form *κατάρχεσθαι*; which might have led Thucydides to prefix the *πρό* for the sake of clearness. For a later opinion on this passage, see note p. 540.

Corcyraeans, lest they should be hindered by them in their passage by sea. The Corcyraeans, on finding that the settlers<sup>1</sup> and the garrisons were come to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered up to the Corinthians, were very angry; and sailing immediately thither with twenty-five ships, and afterward with another fleet, commanded them, by way of insult, both to recall those whom they had banished (for the exiles of the Epidamnians had come to Corcyra, pointing out the sepulchers of their ancestors and their kindred to them, on the plea of which they begged that they would restore them), and to dismiss the garrison sent thither by the Corinthians and the settlers. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to them. Whereupon the Corcyraeans went against them with forty ships, together with the banished men, with a view to restore them; taking with them the Illyrians also. And sitting down before the city, they made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when they did not obey them, the Corcyraeans proceeded (the place being an isthmus) to besiege the city.

27. Now the Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus of its being besieged, immediately began to prepare an army; and at the same time prepared a colony to Epidamnus, and that any one who would might go on a fair and equal footing; and that if any one should not be willing to join the expedition immediately, but still wished to have a share in the colony, he might stay behind on depositing fifty Corinthian drachmas. And there were many both that went, and that paid down the money. Moreover, they begged the Megareans to convoy them with some ships, in case they might be stopped in their passage by the Corcyraeans; and they prepared to sail with them with eight, and the citizens of Pale, in Cephalaria, with four. They also begged the Epidaurians, who furnished five, the citizens of Hermione one, the Træzenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. The Thebans and Phliasians they asked for money; and the Eleans both for money and empty ships: while of the Corinthians themselves there were getting ready thirty ships, and three thousand heavy armed.

<sup>1</sup> Properly, "the inhabitants," i. e., those who were sent to inhabit the town.



28. Now when the Corcyræans heard of this preparation, they went to Corinth in company with some Lacedæmonian and Sicyonian ambassadors, whom they took with them, and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and settlers that were in Epidamnus, as they had nothing to do with the place. But if they laid any claim to it, they were willing to submit to trial<sup>1</sup> in the Peloponnesus before such cities as they should both agree on; and to whichever of the two parties it should be decided that the colony belonged, they should retain it. They were willing also to refer their cause to the oracle of Delphi. But they told them not to proceed to war; else they would themselves also, they said, be forced by their violence to make very different friends from those they already had, for the sake of gaining assistance. The Corinthians answered them, that if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would consult on the matter; but till that was done, it was not right that the Epidamnians should be besieged, while *they* were appealing to justice. The Corcyræans replied, that if the Corinthians too would withdraw the men they had in Epidamnus, they would do so; or they were also content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to make a treaty till the cause should be decided.

29. The Corinthians did not listen to any of these proposals; but when their ships were manned, and their confederates had come, having first sent a herald to declare war upon the Corcyræans, they weighed anchor with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy-armed, and set sail for Epidamnus to wage war against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus, the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come to Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the temple of Apollo, at the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent forward a herald to them to forbid their sailing against them; and at the same time were manning their ships; having both

<sup>1</sup> "To submit the quarrel to a fair discussion;" "to offer satisfaction by negotiation." "In their disputes with one another the several Greek states acknowledged one common public law, like our law of nations, to which they held themselves amenable; and before they appealed to arms, it was considered due to their common blood and common religion, to try to settle their differences by a reference to the principles of this law."—*Arnold*.

undergirded the old ones, so as to make them sea-worthy, and equipped the rest. When the herald brought back from the Corinthians no peaceable answer, and their ships were manned, to the number of eighty sail (for forty were besieging Epidamnus), they put out against them, and formed their line, and engaged them : and the Corcyræans won a decided victory, and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. It happened likewise the same day, that those too who were besieging Epidamnus reduced it to surrender, on condition that they should sell the strangers, and keep the Corinthians in bonds, till something else should be determined.

30. After the battle, the Corcyræans having set up a trophy on Leucimna, a promontory of Coreyra, slew the other prisoners they had taken, but kept the Corinthians in bonds. Subsequently, when the Corinthians and their allies, after being vanquished at sea, were gone home, the Corcyræans were masters of the whole sea in those parts, and sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and wasted part of the territory ; and burned Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished both money and shipping to the Corinthians. And most of the time after the battle they were masters of the sea, and continued sailing against and ravaging the allies of the Corinthians ; until,<sup>1</sup> on the return of summer, the Corinthians sent ships and an army, in consequence of the distress of their allies, and formed an encampment on Actium, and about Chimerium in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and such other states as were friendly to them. The Corcyræans also formed an encampment in opposition to them, on Leucimna, both for their ships and land-forces. And neither party sailed against the other ; but remaining in opposite stations this summer, at the approach of winter they then each retired homeward.

31. Now the whole of the year after the sea-fight, and the succeeding one, the Corinthians, being indignant about the war with the Corcyræans, were building ships, and preparing with all their might a naval armament, drawing together rowers both from the Peloponnese itself and the rest of Greece, by the inducement of the pay they gave. And the Corcy-

<sup>1</sup> The reading retained by Bekker, Göller, and others, *περίοντι τῷ ὀπέι*, is supposed to signify, "during the remainder of the summer." For the arguments in favor of each reading, see the notes of Göller, Arnold, and Bloomfield.

ræans, on hearing of their preparations, were alarmed; and being in alliance with none of the Greeks, and not having enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedæmonians, they determined to go to the Athenians, and make alliance with them, and endeavor to obtain some assistance from them. And the Corinthians, on hearing this, went themselves also to Athens on an embassy, to prevent the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans being an impediment to their concluding the war as they wished. And an assembly having been convened, they came to controversy; and the Corcyræans spoke as follows:—

32. "It is but just, Athenians, that those who without any previous obligation, either of great benefit or alliance, come to their neighbors, as we now do, to beg their assistance, should convince them in the first place,<sup>1</sup> if possible, that they ask what is even expedient; but if not that, at any rate what is not injurious; and in the second place, that they will also retain a lasting sense of the favor: and if they establish none of these points clearly, they should not be angry if they do not succeed. But the Corcyræans have sent us with a conviction that, together with their request for alliance, they will show that these points may be relied on by you. Now the same policy has happened<sup>2</sup> to prove inconsistent in your eyes, with regard to our request, and inexpedient, with regard to our own interest at the present time. For having never yet in time past voluntarily become the allies of any party, we are now come to beg this of others; and at the same time we have, owing to it, been left destitute with regard to the present war with the Corinthians; and what before seemed our prudence, viz. not to join in the peril of our neighbor's views by being in alliance with others, has turned out now to be evident folly and weakness. In the late sea-fight, indeed, by ourselves and single-handed we repulsed the Corinthians. But since they have set out against us with a larger force from

<sup>1</sup> This is perhaps the most convenient way of rendering the phrase *εὐχριστά μὲν*, when used, as it so often is, to draw attention to what appears the *best* thing of *all*, with *εἰ δὲ μή* following for the *second* best, and answering to *εἰ δυνατόν*, sometimes expressed, but much more generally implied, in the former part of the alternative. Latin writers translate them by "*maxime quidem*" and "*sin minus*."

<sup>2</sup> The participle *ὄν* is understood here, just as *ὄντων* is, I. 120. 7. See Jelf. Gr. Gr. 694, obs. 1.

the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we see ourselves unable to escape by our own power alone; and at the same time our peril is great, if we are subjugated by them; we must beg assistance both from you and every one else: and it is pardonable, if we venture on a course contrary to our former non-interference, [which was practiced] not from any evil intention, but rather from an error of judgment.

33. "Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our request will be honorable to you in many respects; first, because you will be granting the assistance to men who are injured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow the obligation with testimony [to the fact]<sup>1</sup> that would, as far as possible, be always remembered; and [lastly], we are in possession of a navy the largest except yours. And consider what good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, than if that power, the addition of which to yours you would have valued above much money and favor, come of its own accord, offering itself without dangers and expense; and moreover affording, in the eyes of the world at large, a character for goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation; and to yourselves, strength; all of which advantages together have fallen to the lot of few indeed in the whole course of time: and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring safety and honor on the men whose aid they invoke, no less than to receive them. And as for the war in which we should be useful, if any of you do not think that it will arise, he is deceived in his opinion; and does not observe that the Lacedæmonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war; and that the Corinthians have power with them, and are hostile to you, and are now first subduing *us* with a view to attacking *you*, that we may not stand with each other in common hostility to them; and that they may not fail to gain one of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen themselves. But it is our business, on the contrary, to be beforehand with them, by *our* offering and *your* accepting the alli-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., "The fact of their having been preserved from such imminent peril will be the most enduring record of the obligation under which you have thereby laid them." Göller explains *καταδείξας* as being "a metaphor taken from laying up money in a bank, that it may be drawn out afterward with interest."

ance; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their plots against us.

34. "But should they say that it is not just for you to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony, if well treated, honors its mother-country; but if wronged, is estranged from it; for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to be on the same footing with those who are left at home. And that they wronged us, is evident; for when challenged<sup>1</sup> to a judicial decision respecting Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute the charges by war rather than by equity. And let what they are doing to us, their kinsmen, be a warning to *you*, that you may both avoid being seduced by them, through any false pretense; and may refuse to assist them, if they ask you in a straightforward manner: for he who incurs the fewest regrets from gratifying his enemies would continue in the greatest safety.

35. "But neither will you break the treaty with the Lacedæmonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. For it is mentioned in it that whichever of the Grecian states is in alliance with no other, it has permission to go to whichever side it may please. And it is hard if these shall be allowed to man their ships both from the confederates, and moreover from the rest of Greece also, and especially from your subjects, while they will exclude *us* both from our proposed alliance, and from assistance from any other quarter; and then consider it an injustice if you are persuaded to what we request. But much greater fault shall *we* find with you, if we do *not* persuade you. For us who are in peril, and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject; while these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, you will be so far from restraining that you will even overlook their gaining additional power from your dominions; which you should not do; but should either stop their mercenaries drawn from your country, or send succor to us also, in whatever way you may be persuaded; but it were best of all to receive us openly, and assist us. And many, as we hinted at the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you; but the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See note on I. 27. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Göller observes that we should have expected *εἰσὶν* here, rather than *ἔσταν*; but the construction is confused, and the imperfect *ἔσταν* is to be

(which is the surest bond), and those not weak, but able to harm such as have stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and not a land alliance that is offered to you, the loss of it is not the same; but it were best, if possible,<sup>1</sup> to allow no one else to possess ships; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have him for your friend.

36. "And whoever thinks that these things which we have urged are indeed expedient, but is afraid that through being persuaded by them he would break the treaty; let him know that his fear, being attended by strength, will cause greater alarm to his enemies; but that his confidence in not having received us, being powerless, will be less formidable to his foes who are strong; and also, that it is not about Corcyra more than about Athens too that he is deliberating; and that he is not providing the best for her, when for the war that is coming, and all but here, he hesitates, from present considerations, to receive a country which is made either a friend or a foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil]. For it lies well for the voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily, so as both to prevent a navy from coming thence to the Peloponnesians, and to help on its way a fleet from these parts to those; and in other respects it is most advantageous. But the shortest summary,<sup>2</sup> both for general and particular statements, from which you may learn not to give us up, is the following: There being<sup>3</sup> but three navies worth mentioning among the Greeks, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians, if you allow

referred to *ὑπείπομεν*, rather than to *ἀποδείκνυμεν*. "We say, what we said before, namely, that we had both the same enemies."—*Arnold*.

<sup>1</sup> Arnold says that "the infinitive moods *εἶναι* and *εἶναι* depend upon a verb understood, which is to be borrowed from the preceding clause: for *οὐκ ὁμοία* is the same thing in sense as *οὐκ ὁμοίως ξυμφέρει*; from whence the verb *ξυμφέρει* is to be tacitly repeated with what follows." That some such impersonal verb is understood is very probable; but is not *οὐκ ὁμοία* rather equivalent to *οὐκ ὁμοίως ἀξυμφορὸν ἐστι*? "Not merely the same as it would be in the case of a land alliance, but much greater." Compare two expressions in I. 143. 3, 4, *καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα εἶναι—καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐσται Πελοποννήσου μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν* κ. τ. λ.

<sup>2</sup> This is Poppe's interpretation of the passage, and it is perhaps impossible to express its full meaning more literally. He considers *τοῖς ξύμμασι* and *ἐκαστον* as neuters.

<sup>3</sup> I have followed the explanation of those who suppose the conjunction *δέ* to be placed in the apodosis of the sentence. Göller and Poppe supply *ἵστε* from the preceding *μάθοιτε*.

two of these to come together, and the Corinthians bring us under their power first, you will have to fight at sea with both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians; but if you receive us you will be able to contend against them with the greater number of ships on your side."<sup>1</sup> Thus spoke the Corcyraeans; and the Corinthians after them as follows.

37. "Since these Corcyraeans have made their harangue, not only about receiving them, but also to show that *we* are acting unjustly, and *they* are unfairly attacked; it is necessary that we too should first touch on both these points, and so proceed to the rest of our speech; that you may know more certainly beforehand the ground of our request, and may with good reason reject their petition. Now they say that it was from regard to *prudence* that hitherto they accepted the alliance of no party: whereas they adopted this practice for villainy, and not for virtue; but from wishing to have no ally or witness in their unjust deeds, nor to be put to the blush by calling him to their aid. And their city also, lying in a self-sufficient position, makes them judges of the injuries they inflict on any one, rather than that there should be judges appointed by agreement; because, while they very seldom sail from home to their neighbors, they very frequently receive others, who of necessity touch there. And herein consists the specious shunning of confederacies, which they have put forward; not that they may avoid committing injustice with others, but that they may commit them by themselves; and that wherever they have the power, they may act with violence; and where they escape observation, they may take unfair advantage; and if in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put to the blush. And yet, if they were, as they say, honest men, the more impregnable they were to their neighbors, the more manifestly might they have shown their virtue, by giving and taking what was just.

38. "But neither to others nor to us are they of such a character; but although our colonists, they have all along revolted from us, and are now making war upon us; saying that they were not sent out to be ill-treated. But *we* say that neither did we settle them there to be insulted by them, but to be

<sup>1</sup> Gölter reads *ἡμετέρας*, making it depend upon *πλείους*, like *πολλῶ* in the phrase *πολλῶ πλείονες*, "with more ships by ours"—i. e., with all the advantage in point of number that our ships would give you. Arnold thinks Bekker right in retaining the old reading.

their leaders, and to be properly respected by them. Our other colonies, at least, honor us, and we are very much beloved by our colonists; and it is evident, that if we are pleasing to the greater part, we should not, on a right view of the case, be displeasing to these alone; nor do we attack them unbecomingly,<sup>1</sup> without being also signally injured by them. Even if we were in the wrong, it had been honorable for them to have yielded to our humor; but disgraceful for us to have done violence to their moderation: but through pride, and power of wealth, they have both acted wrongly toward us in many other things, and with regard to Epidamnus, which belonged to us, when it was ill-treated they did not claim it; but when we went to its assistance, they took it by force, and keep it.

39. "And they say, forsooth, that they were before willing to have it judiciously decided: but with regard to this, it is not the man who proposes it with superiority,<sup>2</sup> and in safety, that should be considered to say any thing; but that man, who puts alike his actions and words on the same footing,<sup>3</sup> before he enters on the struggle. But as for these men, it was not before they besieged the place, but when they thought that we should not put up with it, that they also advanced the specious plea of a judicial decision. And they are come hither, not only having themselves done wrong there, but now requesting *you* also to join them, not in alliance, but in injury; and to receive them, when they are at variance with us. But then ought they to have applied to you, when they were most secure; and not at a time when *we* have been injured and *they* are in peril; nor at a time when you, though you did not share their power then, will now give them a share of your aid; and though you stood aloof from their misdeeds, will incur equal blame from us; but they ought long ago to have communicated their power to you, and so to have the

<sup>1</sup> i. e., as we *should* do, if we were not signally injured by them. Götter takes the *ἐπιστρεφόμεν* in a more general sense, as expressing the habitual policy of the Corinthians. "Neque solemus bellum inferre indigno majoris patriæ modo, nisi insigni injuria cogimur."

<sup>2</sup> A secondary meaning of *προκαλεῖσθαι*, very common when it is not followed by an accusative of the person with *ἐς*. See II. 72. 3, 5; 73. 1; 74. 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., who does not say one thing and do another. Poppo takes *ἰσὺν* in the sense of "equity:" "eum, qui factis pariter atque oratione æquitatem retinet."



results also in common. [As,<sup>1</sup> however, you have had no share only in the accusations brought against them, so you should not participate in the consequences of their actions.]

40. "That we ourselves, then, come with accusations on proper grounds, and that these are violent and rapacious, has been proved: and that you could not with justice receive them, you must now learn. For if it is said in the treaty that any of the states not registered in it may go to whichever side it please, the agreement was not meant for those who go to the detriment of others; but to any one who, without withdrawing himself from another, is in need of protection; and who will not cause war instead of peace to those who receive him, ([as they will not do<sup>2</sup>] if they are wise;) which would now be your case, if not persuaded by us. For you would not only become auxiliaries to these, but also enemies to us, instead of being connected by treaty; for if you come with them, we must defend ourselves against them without excepting you. And yet you ought, if possible, to stand aloof from both parties; or if not that, on the contrary, to go with *us* against them; (with the Corinthians, at any rate, you are connected by treaty; while with the Corcyræans you were never yet so much as in truce;) and not to establish the law, that we should receive those who are revolting from others. For neither did *we*, when the Samians had revolted, give our vote against *you*, when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided in their votes, as to whether they should assist them; but we openly maintained the contrary, that each one should punish his own allies. For if you receive and assist those who are doing wrong, there will be found no fewer of your allies also who will come over to us; and you will make the law against yourselves, rather than against us.

41. "These, then, are the pleas of right which we have to urge

<sup>1</sup> "These words, which are wanting in the text of most of the best MSS., have been omitted by Bekker, and inclosed in brackets by Gölle. Dr. Bloomfield defends them, except the single word *μόνον*, which he gives up as unintelligible."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> There is a confusion in the expression, and the words *ἐἰ σωφρονούσι* have really nothing to do with the sentence as it is actually expressed, which is suggested as it were parenthetically to the writer's mind, but which he did not set down in words; if written at length it would run thus: "The benefit of the treaty was intended for such only as should not involve those who received them in war (as, if you are wise, you will take care that these men do not involve you)."—*Arnold*.

to you, sufficiently strong according to the laws of the Greeks; and we have the following advice, and claim on you for favor, which, being not enemies so as to hurt you, nor on the other hand, such friends as to be very intimate with you, we say ought to be repaid to us at the present time. For once, when you were in want of long ships for the war with the Æginetans, before that with the Medes, you received from the Corinthians twenty ships. And this service, and that with regard to the Samians, namely, that it was through us that the Peloponnesians did not assist them, gave you the mastery of the Æginetans, and the chastisement of the Samians: and it took place in those critical times in which men, when proceeding against their enemies, are most regardless of every thing besides victory.<sup>1</sup> For they esteem him a friend who assists them, even though he may before have been an enemy; and him a foe who opposes them, though he may have happened to be a friend; nay they even mismanage their own affairs for the sake of their animosity at the moment.

42. "Thinking then of these things, and each younger man having learned them from some one older, let him resolve to requite us with the like, and not deem that these things are justly urged, but that others are expedient in case of his going to war. For expediency most attends that line of conduct in which one does least wrong. And as for the coming of the war, frightening you with which the Coreyræans bid you commit injustice, it lies as yet in uncertainty; and it is not worth while, through being excited by it, to incur a certain enmity with the Corinthians, immediate, and not coming; but rather it were prudent to remove somewhat of our before existing suspicion on account of the Megareans. For the latest obligation, when well timed, even though it may be comparatively small, has power to wipe out a greater subject of complaint. And be not induced by the fact that it is a great *naval* alliance that they offer you. For not to injure your equals is a power more to be relied on, than, through being buoyed up by momentary appearances, to gain an unfair advantage by a perilous course.

43. "We then, having fallen under the rule which we pro-

<sup>1</sup> Or, "in comparison with victory."

<sup>2</sup> Referring to these words of the Coreyræans, *δταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιῶζη χωρίον προσλαβεῖν*. κ. τ. λ. Chap. 36. 1.

pounded ourselves at Lacedæmon, that every one should punish his own allies, now claim to receive the same from you ; and not that you, after being benefited by our vote, should harm us by yours. Make us then a fair return ; knowing that this is that very crisis in which he that helps is most a friend, and he that opposes, a foe. And for these Corcyræans, neither receive them as allies in spite of us, nor help them in doing wrong. By thus acting, you will both do what becomes you, and advise the best for yourselves." To this effect then did the Corinthians also speak.

44. Now the Athenians, after hearing both sides, when an assembly had been<sup>1</sup> even twice held, in the former rather admitted the arguments of the Corinthians ; but in the one held the next day they changed their minds, and determined, not indeed to make an alliance with the Corcyræans, so as to have the same enemies and friends (for if the Corcyræans had desired them to sail against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken by them) ; but they made a defensive alliance, to succor each other's country, should any one go against Corcyræ, or Athens, or their allies. For they thought that, even as it was, they should have the war with the Peloponnesians ; and they wished not to give up Corcyræ to the Corinthians, with so large a navy as it had, but to wear them out as much as possible against each other ; that both the Corinthians and the rest who had navies might be in a weaker condition when they went to war with them, if it should be necessary to do so. And at the same time the island appeared to them to lie well in the line of voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily.

45. With such a view of the case, the Athenians admitted the Corcyræans into alliance ; and when the Corinthians had departed, they sent ten ships to assist them. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimón, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epiclees. They charged them not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyræ, and threaten to land, or against any of the places belonging to them ; but in that case to prevent them to their utmost : and this charge they gave them with a view to not breaking the treaty. So the ships arrive at Corcyræ.

<sup>1</sup> The great importance of the subject prevented their deciding in a single day.

46. But the Corinthians, when they had made their preparations, set sail against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. There were ten of the Eleans, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots seven and twenty, of the Anactorians one, and of the Corinthians themselves ninety. In command of these there were different men for the different forces according to their states, and of the Corinthians, Xenocrides, the son of Euthycles, with four others. And when, in their course from Leucas, they made land on the continent opposite Corcyra, they came to anchor at Chimerium in the territory of Thesprotis. It<sup>1</sup> is a harbor, and a city named Ephyre lies beyond it, away from the sea, in the Elean district of Thesprotis. By it the Acherusian lake empties itself into the sea; and into this lake the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis, empties itself; from which also it takes its name. The river Thyamis also flows there, bounding Thesprotis and Cestrine; and between these rivers the promontory of Chimerium rises. The Corinthians then came to anchor at that part of the continent, and formed their encampment.

47. But the Corcyraeans, when they perceived them sailing up, manned a hundred and ten ships, which were commanded by Miciades, Osimides, and Eurybates; and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota; and the ten Athenian ships were with them. And on the promontory of Leucimna was their land force, and a thousand heavy-armed of the Zacynthians, who had come to their assistance. The Corinthians also had on the mainland many of the barbarians, who had joined them to give assistance; for the people in that part of the continent have always<sup>2</sup> been friendly with them.

48. When the preparations of the Corinthians were made, taking three days' provision, they put out from Chimerium by night, with the purpose of engaging; and in the morning, while on their course, they observed the ships of the Corcyraeans out

<sup>1</sup> Bloomfield, in his new edition, has a long note to prove that it ought to be translated "*there* is a harbor," instead of "*it* is;" but I can not see the force of his argument; as the quotation from Colonel Leake, on which he chiefly relies, establishes no more than what Arnold had already observed, that in sect. 6, "the point of Chimerium seems to be distinguished by Thucydides from the port of Chimerium;" of which he clearly is speaking in this section.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "always in former times;" like the expression "ever of old," in the Psalms.

at sea, and sailing against them. And when they saw each other, they drew up in opposite lines of battle. On the right wing of the Corcyræans were the Athenian ships, but the rest of the line they themselves occupied, having formed three squadrons of their ships, which were commanded each by one of the three generals. In this way did the Corcyræans form their line. On the side of the Corinthians, the Megarean and Ambraciot ships occupied the right wing; in the center were the rest of the allies severally; while the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right of the Corcyræans.

49. As soon as the signals on each side were raised, they closed, and fought; both sides having many heavy-armed on the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen; as they were still rudely equipped in the old fashion. And the battle was well contested; not so much in point of skill, but more like a land fight. For whenever they happened to run on board one another, they did not easily get clear again, owing to the numbers and confusion of the ships; and because they trusted for victory in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, who set to and fought, while the ships remained stationary. There was no breaking through the line, but they fought with fierceness and strength, more than with science. On all sides then there was much confusion, and the battle was a disorderly one; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to the Corcyræans, if they were pressed at any point, struck fear into the enemy, but did not begin fighting, as the commanders were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians. It was the right wing of the Corinthians which was most distressed; for the Corcyræans with twenty ships having routed and pursued them in a scattered condition to the continent, sailed up to their encampment, and having made a descent upon them, burnt the deserted tents, and plundered their goods. On that side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyræans were victorious: but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they had a decided victory; as

<sup>1</sup> Bloomfield says that "*καταστάντες* denotes maintaining the 'pugna stataria,' fighting hand to hand." Such a meaning may perhaps be inferred from the following words, *ἡσυχάζουσάν των νεών*, but I think nothing more is intended than might be otherwise expressed by *ἐς μάχην κατέστησαν*. Compare the expression *καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν*. II. 1; and V. 4, 5.

twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [originally] smaller, had not returned from the pursuit. But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, assisted them now more unequivocally; though at first they refrained from charging any vessel; but when the rout had clearly taken place, and the Corinthians were lying close on them, then indeed every one at length set to work, and there was no longer any distinction, but it had come to such urgent necessity, that the Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.

50. Now when the rout had taken place, the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the vessels which they might happen to have sunk,<sup>1</sup> but turned their attention to the men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather than to make prisoners; and some of their own friends, not being aware that those in the right wing had been worsted, they unwittingly killed. For as both fleets were numerous, and extended over a wide space of the sea; when they closed with each other, they did not easily distinguish, who were conquering, or being conquered; for this engagement, for one of Greeks against Greeks, was greater in the number of vessels than any of those before it. After the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, and their own dead, and got possession of most of them, so as to take them to Sybota, where their land force composed of the barbarians had come to their assistance. Now Sybota is a desert port of Thesprotis. Having done this, they mustered again, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who with their seaworthy ships, and such as were left,<sup>2</sup> in conjunction with those of the Athenians, on their side also sailed out to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory. It was now late, and the Pæan had been sung by them for the advance, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row sternward, on observing twenty ships of the Athenians sailing up;

<sup>1</sup> "*Karadúein naûv* does not mean to sink a ship to the bottom, but to make her water-logged, so that she was useless, although she did not absolutely go down. The Greek triremes were so light and so shallow that they would float in a manner under water, or rather with parts of the vessel still out of water, on which the crew used to take refuge."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> "*Probabilis est opinio Popponia, τὰς λοιπὰς intelligi decem illas naves, quæ ex 120 navibus Corcyraeorum superabant; nam pugnam ingressi erant cum navibus 110 (vid. cap. 47. 1) habebant autem universas 120. Vid. cap. 25. 5.—Göller.*"

which the Athenians had sent after the ten to help them; fearing (as was the case), that the Corcyraeans might be conquered, and their own ten ships be<sup>1</sup> too few to aid them.

51. These, then, the Corinthians having first seen, and suspecting that they were from Athens, [and were] not merely as many as they saw, but more, began to retreat. But by the Corcyraeans they were not seen (for they were advancing more out of *their* view), and they wondered at the Corinthians rowing astern, till some saw them and said, "There are ships yonder sailing toward us." Then *they* also withdrew; for it was now growing dark, and the Corinthians by turning back had occasioned the suspension of hostilities. In this way they parted from each other, and the battle ceased at night. And when the Corcyraeans were encamped on Leucimna, these twenty ships from Athens, which were commanded by Glaucō, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogoras, coming on through the dead bodies and the wrecks, sailed up to the camp not long after they had been descried. Now the Corcyraeans (it being night) were afraid they might be enemies; but afterward they recognized them, and they came to anchor.

52. The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many of the Corcyraean as were sea-worthy, put out and sailed to the harbor at Sybota, in which the Corinthians were anchored, wishing to know whether they would engage. But they, having put out with their ships from the land, and formed them in line at sea, remained quiet; not intending voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh ships from Athens had joined them; and that they themselves were involved in many difficulties, with regard to the safe keeping of the prisoners they had on board, and because there were no means of refitting their ships in so deserted a place. Nay, they were thinking of their voyage home, how they should return; being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to have been broken, because they had come to blows, and not allow them to sail away.

53. They determined therefore to put some men on board a skiff and send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, and make an experiment. And having sent them,

<sup>1</sup> Arnold compares II. 61. *ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἢ διάνοια ἔχαστο-ερεῖν ἂ ἐγνώτε* and Herodotus VI. 109. *ὀλίγους γὰρ εἶναι στρατεῖ τῇ Μήδῳ συμβαλλέειν*

they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, Athenians, in beginning war, and breaking treaty: for while we are avenging ourselves on our enemies, you stand in our way, and raise arms against us. Now if your purpose is to stop our sailing to Corcyra, or wherever else we wish, and if you mean to break the treaty,<sup>1</sup> then seize us here in the first place, and treat us as enemies." They spoke to this effect, and all the army of the Corcyræans that heard them immediately cried out, "Seize them and put them to death!" But the Athenians answered as follows: "We are neither commencing war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty; but we have come to assist the Corcyræans here, who are our allies. If therefore you wish to sail any where else, we do not stop you; but if you sail against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to them, we shall, to the best of our power, not permit it."

54. The Athenians having made this reply, the Corinthians began to prepare for their voyage homeward, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent: while the Corcyræans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which had been carried to them by the current and the wind, which had risen in the night, and scattered them in all directions; and erected a counter-trophy at Sybota on the island, considering that they had been victorious. It was on the following view of the case that each side claimed the victory.—The Corinthians erected a trophy, as having had the advantage in the battle until night, so that they got possession of most wrecks and dead bodies; as having no less than a thousand prisoners; and as having sunk more than seventy ships. The Corcyræans erected a trophy for these reasons;—because they had destroyed about thirty ships; and after the Athenians were come, had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; and because the Corinthians the day before had rowed sternward and retreated from them, on seeing the Athenian ships; and after they were come,<sup>2</sup> did not sail out from Sybota to oppose them. Thus each side claimed to be victorious.

<sup>1</sup> *Ávere* is the present tense with a kind of future signification, as it often has. "If you are for breaking," etc.

<sup>2</sup> Arnold repeats the *ol' Athēnaioi* with *ἡλθον*, and refers to chap. 52. 2, which, he thinks, "decides that the words are rightly inserted, and that the Athenians are the real subject of the verb *ἡλθον*." Poppe puts the words in brackets, and Gölter omits them altogether.



55. As the Corinthians were sailing away homeward, they took by treachery Anactorium, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was possessed in common by the Coreyræans and them; and after establishing in it a Corinthian population [only],<sup>1</sup> they retired homeward; and of the Coreyræans, eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody, and treated with great attention, that on their return they might win over Coreyra to them. For most of them happened to be the first men of the city in power. Coreyra then in this way outlived the war<sup>2</sup> with the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians returned from it. This was the first ground the Corinthians had for their war against the Athenians, namely, that in time of peace they had fought with them by sea in conjunction with the Coreyræans.

56. Immediately after this the following disagreements arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, to lead them to war. While the Corinthians were contriving how to avenge themselves on them, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, ordered the Potidæans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene, being colonists of the Corinthians, but their own subjects and tributaries, to throw down the wall toward Pallene, and give hostages; and to dismiss, and not receive in future, the magistrates<sup>3</sup> whom the Corinthians used to send every year; being afraid that they might revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and lead the rest of their allies Thraceward<sup>4</sup> to revolt with them.

57. These precautionary measures with regard to the Potidæans the Athenians began to adopt immediately after the sea-fight at Coreyra. For the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them; and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had been made their enemy, though he was before an ally and a friend. He became such, be-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., to the exclusion of the Coreyræans, who had before had joint possession of the town with them.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as Göller interprets it, "had the better of the war."

<sup>3</sup> "The term *Δημοσυνργοί*, or *Δαμιοσυνργοί*, was a title applied to the chief magistrates of the Peloponnesians, expressive of their doing 'the service of the people.' Asclepiades, as quoted by the Scholiast, considers the preposition *ἐπί* superfluous. Göller understands it to express an *additional* or *extra* magistrate, sent by the mother country to act as a colleague to the demiurgi appointed by the colonists themselves."—*Arnold*.

<sup>4</sup> "A general term applied to the Greek states which lined the northern coast of the *Ægean* from Thessaly to the Hellespont."—*Arnold*.

cause the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, when acting together against him. And being alarmed, he both sent to Lacedæmon, and tried to contrive that they might be involved in war with the Peloponnesians, and endeavored to win over the Corinthians, with a view to Potidæa's revolting; and made proposals also to the Thraceward Chalcidians and the Bottiæans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had in alliance with him these places on his borders, he should more easily carry on the war in conjunction with them. The Athenians perceiving these things, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, as they happened to be sending out thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed against his country, with Archestratus, the son of Lycomedes, as general with ten others, gave orders to the commanders of the fleet to take hostages of the Potidæans, and throw down the wall, and keep a watchful eye over the neighboring cities, to prevent their revolting.

58. Now the Potidæans sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to try if by any means they might persuade them to adopt no new measures against them; and went also to Lacedæmon in company with the Corinthians, to provide themselves with assistance, should it be necessary; and when, after long negotiating, they obtained no favorable answer from the Athenians, but the ships commissioned against Macedonia were sailing just as much against *them*; and when the authorities at Lacedæmon promised them, that should the Athenians go against Potidæa, they would make an incursion into Attica; then indeed, at that favorable moment, they revolted with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, having entered into a league together. And Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and throw down their cities on the sea, and remove inland to Olynthus and make that one city a place of strength for themselves. And to those who abandoned them he gave a part of his own territory in Mygdonia, round lake Bolbe, to enjoy as long as the war with the Athenians lasted. And so, throwing down their cities, they removed inland, and prepared for war.

59. The thirty ships of the Athenians arrived at the Thraceward towns, and found Potidæa and the rest in revolt: and the generals thinking it impossible with their present force to carry on war both with Philip and the revolted towns, turned their attention to Macedonia, the object for which they were first

sent out; and having established themselves there,<sup>1</sup> carried on the war in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country with an army from the interior.

60. And at this time, when Potidæa had revolted and the Athenian ships were cruising about Macedonia, the Corinthians, being alarmed for the place, and considering the danger to affect themselves, sent volunteers of their own people and mercenaries of the rest of the Peloponnesians, sixteen hundred heavy-armed in all and four hundred light-armed. Their general was Aristeus, the son of Adimantus; and it was from friendship for him especially that most of the soldiers from Corinth joined the expedition as volunteers; for he was always favorably disposed toward the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace the fortieth day after Potidæa had revolted.

61. To the Athenians too came immediately the tidings of the cities having revolted; and when they found that the forces with Aristeus had gone there besides, they sent two thousand heavy-armed of their own men and forty ships to the revolted towns, with Callias, the son of Calliades, as general with four others; who, on arriving in Macedonia first, found that the former thousand had just taken Therme, and were besieging Pydna. So they also sat down before Pydna, and besieged it; but afterward, having made terms and a compulsory alliance<sup>2</sup> with Perdiccas, as they were hurried on by Potidæa and the arrival of Aristeus there, they withdrew from Macedonia; and having gone to Beræa, and thence turned again [to the coast] (after first attempting the place without taking it), they continued their march by land to Potidæa, with three thousand heavy-armed of their own, and many of the allies besides, and six hundred horse of the Macedonians with Philip and Pausanias. At the same time seventy ships were sailing in a line with them. And advancing by short marches, they arrived at Gigonus, and pitched their camp.

62. Now the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, in expectation of the Athenians, were encamped toward

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, "Quum eo venissent, castra posuissent."—Bauer, as quoted by Göller. Or it may mean no more than "having set to," as in the passages quoted in the note on chap. 49. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *i. e.*, "which they only made because they could not help it." Compare II. 70. 1, Βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, "Food which none but a starving man would eat."—Arnold.

Olynthus, on the isthmus, and had established their market outside the city. As general of all the infantry the allies had chosen Aristeus; of the cavalry, Perdiccas; for he had broken terms again immediately with the Athenians, and was in alliance with the Potidæans, having appointed Iolaus to represent him as commander. The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force<sup>1</sup> on the isthmus, and watch the Athenians, in case of their coming against them; while the Chalcidians, and the allies beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry with Perdiccas, should remain at Olynthus; and when the Athenians advanced against his force, they should come up in their rear to assist him, and inclose the enemy between them. But on the other hand, Callias, the general of the Athenians, and his fellow-commanders, dispatch the cavalry of the Macedonians and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to prevent the troops there from giving any assistance; while they themselves broke up their camp, and proceeded to Potidæa. And when they were at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, *they* also took an opposite position; and not long after they began the engagement. And just the wing of Aristeus, and such picked troops of the Corinthians and the rest as were around him, routed the wing opposed to them, and advanced in pursuit a considerable distance; but the remaining force of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the wall for refuge.

63. When Aristeus was returning from the pursuit, seeing the rest of the army conquered; he was at a loss which place he should risk going to, whether toward Olynthus, or to Potidæa. He determined, however, to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way into Potidæa: and he passed along the breakwater through the sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian ships], and with difficulty; having lost a few men, but saved the rest. Now the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from Olynthus (the town is about sixty stades off, and within sight), when the battle was beginning, and the signals had been hoisted, advanced a short distance to give succor, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them to prevent it; but when the victory soon declared for the Athenians, and the signals had been taken

<sup>1</sup> [χοῦντι.] Constructio ad sensum facta: nam verborum τοῦ Ἀριστέως νόμῳ ἦν idem sensus, ac si dixisset τῷ Ἀριστεῖ ἔδοξε.—Güller.

down, they retired again within the wall, and the Macedonians to the Athenians. So neither side had any cavalry present [in the engagement]. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. There were killed of the Potidæans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, and Callias their general.

64. Now against the wall on the side of the isthmus the Athenians immediately raised works, and manned them. But that toward Pallene had no works raised against it; for they did not think themselves strong enough both to keep a garrison on the isthmus, and to cross over the Pallene and raise works there; fearing that the Potidæans and their allies might attack them when divided. And the Athenians in the city, hearing that Pallene had no works on it, some time after send sixteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and Phormio, the son of Asopius, as general; who reached Pallene, and setting out from Aphytis,<sup>1</sup> led his army to Potidæa, advancing by short marches, and ravaging the country at the same time: and when no one came out to offer him battle, he threw up works against the wall on the side of Pallene. And thus Potidæa was now besieged with all their power, on both sides, and from the sea at the same time by ships that were blockading it.

65. Now Aristeus, when it was surrounded with works, and he had no hope of its escape, unless some movement from the Peloponnese, or something else beyond their calculations should occur, advised all, except five hundred, to watch for a wind and sail out of it, that their provisions might hold out the longer; and he was willing himself to be one of those who remained. But when he did not persuade them, from a wish to provide what was the next best thing to be done, and in order that affairs out of the place might proceed in the best way possible, he sailed out, without being observed by

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "having walked of," i. e., cut off by a transverse wall from communication with the country. The absence of any such wall on the opposite side of the city is afterward expressed by τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν.

<sup>2</sup> I do not think that more is meant by ὁρμώμενος in this passage than that he set out by land from Aphytis, having come with his ships to that place, as being the most convenient for his plan of advancing to Potidæa through Pallene.

the guard-ships of the Athenians. And remaining among the Chalcidians, he joined in the other measures of the war; and laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; and sending to the Peloponnesians,<sup>1</sup> endeavored to contrive a way in which some assistance might be brought. After the works round Potidæa were finished, Phormio with his sixteen hundred men proceeded to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice, and took some of the towns also.

66. The Athenians then and Peloponnesians had had these previous grounds of complaint against each other; the Corinthians, because Potidæa, which was a colony of their own, and men of Corinth and from the Peloponnesians in it, were being besieged; the Athenians against the Peloponnesians, because they had caused the revolt of a city which was their ally and tributary, and had come and openly fought with them in conjunction with the Potidæans. The war however had not yet positively broken out, but at present there was a suspension of hostilities; for the Corinthians had done these things on their own responsibility alone.

67. When, however, Potidæa was being besieged, they did not remain quiet, as they had men in it, and were alarmed for the place. And immediately they summoned the allies to Lacedæmon, and came and cried out against the Athenians, as having broken the treaty, and as injuring the Peloponnesians. And the Æginetans, though they did not openly send ambassadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet in secret most of all urged on the war in conjunction with them, saying that they were not independent according to the treaty. So the Lacedæmonians, after summoning any one of the allies besides, who said that in any other respect he had been injured by the Athenians, held their ordinary assembly, and told them to speak. And others came forward and severally made their complaints, and especially the Megareans, who urged no few other grounds of quarrel, but most of all their being excluded from the ports in the Athenian dominions, and from the Attic market, contrary to the treaty. And the Corinthians came forward last, after permitting the others first to exasperate the Lacedæmonians; and they spoke after them as follows.

<sup>1</sup> The original is a condensed expression, the participle *πέμπων* being understood, as is evident from chap. 57 3, where it is expressed, *δεδιώξτε ἐπρασσεν ἐς τε τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα πέμπων ὅπως*, κ. τ. λ.

68. "The trustiness of your policy and intercourse among yourselves, Lacedæmonians, renders you the more distrustful with regard to others, if we say any thing [against them]; and from this you have a character for sober-mindedness, but betray too great ignorance with regard to foreign affairs. For though we often forewarned you what injuries we were going to receive from the Athenians, you did not gain information respecting what we told you from time to time, but rather suspected the speakers of speaking for their own private interests. And for this reason it was not before we suffered, but when we are in the very act of suffering, that you have summoned the allies here; among whom *we* may speak with the greatest propriety, inasmuch as we have also the greatest complaints to make, being insulted by the Athenians, and neglected by you. And if they were an obscure people any where<sup>1</sup> who were injuring Greece, you might have required additional warning, as not being acquainted with them; but as it is, why need we speak at any great length, when you see that some of us are already enslaved, and that they are plotting against others, and especially against our allies, and have been for a long time prepared beforehand, in case they should ever go to war. For they would not else have stolen Corcyra from us, and kept it in spite of us, and besieged Potidæa; of which places, the one is the most convenient for their deriving the full benefit from their possession Thraceward,<sup>2</sup> and the other would have supplied the largest navy to the Peloponnesians.

69. "And for these things it is you who are to blame, by having at first permitted them to fortify their city after the Median war, and subsequently to build the long walls; and by continually up to the present time depriving of liberty, not only those who had been enslaved by them, but your own allies also now. For it is not he who has enslaved them, but he who has the power to stop it, but overlooks it, that more truly does this; especially if he enjoys the reputation for vir-

<sup>1</sup> The *πov* in the original would perhaps be most fully expressed by our colloquial phrase, "in some corner or other."

<sup>2</sup> Arnold translates it, "so as to give *you* the full benefit of your dominion in the neighborhood of Thrace." But could the Lacedæmonians be said to have any such dominion, at any rate before the expedition of Brasidas? and does not the *Πελοποννησίοις* in the next sentence seem to be put emphatically, as in opposition to the Athenian dominion just alluded to?

tue as being the liberator of Greece. But with difficulty have we assembled now, and not even now for any clearly defined object. For we ought to be considering no longer whether we are injured, but in what way we shall defend ourselves. For the aggressors come with their plans already formed against us who have not made up our minds; at once, and not putting it off.<sup>1</sup> And we know in what way, and how gradually, the Athenians encroach upon their neighbors. And while they think that they are not observed through your want of perception,<sup>2</sup> they feel less confident; but when they know that you are aware of their designs, but overlook them, they will press on you with all their power. For you alone of the Greeks, Lacedæmonians, remain quiet, defending yourselves against any one, not by exertion of your power, but my mere demonstration of it; and you alone put down the power of your enemies, not when beginning, but when growing twice as great as it was. And yet you used to have the name of cautious; but in your case the name, it seems, was more than the reality. For we ourselves know that the Mede came from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese, before your forces went out to meet him as they should have done; and now the Athenians, who are not far removed, as he was, but close at hand, you overlook; and instead of attacking them, prefer to defend yourselves against their attack, and to reduce yourselves to mere chances in struggling with them when in a much more powerful condition: though you know that even the barbarian was chiefly wrecked upon himself;<sup>3</sup> and that with regard to these very Athenians, we have often ere this escaped more by their errors than by assistance from you. For indeed hopes of you have before now in some instances even ruined some, while unprepared through trusting you. And let none of you think that this is spoken for enmity, rather than for expostulation; for expostulation is due to friends who are in error, but accusation to enemies who have committed injustice.

70. "At the same time we consider that we, if any, have a right to administer rebuke to our neighbors, especially as the

<sup>1</sup> Or, "not merely threatening to attack us," as μέλλησις is used below.

<sup>2</sup> Or, διὰ τὸ ἀναισθητὸν ὑμῶν may be taken with θαρροῦσι, and be rendered "through your not perceiving it."

<sup>3</sup> i. e., he was himself, as it were, the rock on which his fortune split. "Perished by his own folly."—Arnold.



differences [between you and them] are great; of which you do not seem to us to have any perception, nor to have ever yet considered with what kind of people you will have to struggle in the Athenians, and how very, nay, how entirely different from yourselves. They, for instance, are innovating, and quick to plan and accomplish by action what they have designed; while you are disposed to keep what you have, and form no new design, and by action not even to carry out what is necessary. Again, they are bold even beyond their power, and adventurous beyond their judgment, and sanguine in dangers; while your character is to undertake things beneath your power, and not to trust even the sure grounds of your judgment, and to think that you will never escape from your dangers. Moreover, they are unhesitating, in opposition to you who are dilatory; and fond of going from home, in opposition to you who are most fond of staying at home: for they think that by their absence they may acquire something; whereas you think that by attempting [more] you would do harm to what you have. When they conquer their enemies, they carry out their advantage to the utmost; and when conquered, they fall back the least. Further, they use their bodies as least belonging to them, for the good of their country;<sup>1</sup> but their mind, as being most peculiarly their own, for achieving something on her account. And what they have planned but not carried out, they think that in this they lose something already their own; what they have attempted and gained, that in this they have achieved but little in comparison with what they mean to do. Then, if they fail in an attempt at any thing, by forming fresh hopes in its stead, they supply the deficiency: for they are the only people that<sup>2</sup> succeed to the full extent of their hope in what they have planned, because they quickly undertake what they have resolved. And in this way they labor, with toils and dangers, all their life long; and least enjoy what they have, because they are always getting, and think a feast to be nothing else but to gain their ends, and in-

<sup>1</sup> For this use of ἀλλότριος compare Homer, *Odys.* 20. 346.

μνηστῆρσι δὲ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη  
ἄλλοτριοῖσιν:—

and Horace's imitation of it, *Sat.* 2. 3. 72.

"Cum rapies in jus malis ridentem alienis."

<sup>2</sup> More literally, "possess in the same degree as they hope for."

active quiet to be no less a calamity than laborious occupation. So that if any one should sum up their character, by saying that they are made neither to be quiet themselves, nor let the rest of the world be so, he would speak correctly.

71. "And yet when such is the character of this state that is opposed to you, Lacedæmonians, you go on delaying, and think that peace is not most lasting in the case of those men, who with their resources do what is right, while as regards their feelings, they are known to be determined not to put up with it, if they are injured; but you practice fair dealing on the principle of neither annoying others, nor being hurt yourselves in self-defense. Scarcely, however, could you have succeeded in this, though you had lived by a state of congenial views: while as it is, your ways, as we just now showed you, are old-fashioned compared with them. But, as in the case of art, improvements must ever prevail; and though for a state that enjoys quiet, unchanged institutions are best; yet, for those who are compelled to apply to many things, many a new device is also necessary. And for this reason the institutions of the Athenians, from their great experience, have been remodeled to a greater extent than yours. At this point then let your dilatoriness cease: and now assist us, and especially the Potidæans, as you undertook, by making with all speed an incursion into Attica; that you may not give up men who are your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and turn the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. And in that we should do nothing unjust, in the sight either of the gods who received our oaths<sup>1</sup> or of the men who witness [our conduct]: for the breakers of a treaty are not those who from destitution apply to others, but those who do not assist their confederates. If, however, you will be zealous, we will stand by you; for neither should we act rightly in changing, nor should we find others more congenial. Wherefore deliberate well, and endeavor to keep a supremacy in the Peloponnese no less than your fathers bequeathed to you."

72. To this effect spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, happening before this to have an embassy at Lacedæmon, and hearing what was said, thought that they ought to come before the Lacedæmonians, not to make any defense on

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold, after Reiske and others, explains it, "who are capable of feeling and observing."

the subject of the charges which the states brought against them, but to prove, on a general view of the question, that they ought not to deliberate in a hurry, but take more time to consider it. They wished also to show how powerful their city was; and to remind the older men of what they knew, and to relate to the younger what they were unacquainted with; thinking that in consequence of what they said, they would be more disposed to remain quiet than to go to war. So they came to the Lacedæmonians,<sup>1</sup> and said that *they* also, [as the Corinthians had done], wished to speak to their people, if nothing prevented. They told them to come forward; and the Athenians came forward, and spoke as follows.

73. "Our embassy was not sent for the purpose of controversy with your allies, but on the business on which the state sent us. Perceiving, however, that there is no small outcry against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the states (for our words would not be addressed to you as judges, either of us or of them), but to prevent your adopting bad counsel through being easily persuaded by the allies on matters of great importance; and at the same time with a wish to show, on a view of the general argument as it affects us, that we do not improperly hold what we possess, and that our state is worthy of consideration. Now as to things of very ancient date, why need we mention them? since hearsay must attest them, rather than the eyes of those who will be our auditors. But the Median war, and the deeds with which you yourselves are acquainted, we must speak of; though it will be rather irksome to us to be forever bringing them forward: for when we performed them, the danger was run for a benefit, of the reality of which you had your share; and let us not be deprived of the whole credit, if it is of any service to us. Our words, however, will be spoken, not so much for the purpose of exculpation, as of testimony, and of showing with what kind of a state you will have to contend, if you do not take good counsel. For we say that at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the barbarian; and that when he came a second time, though we were not able to defend ourselves by land, we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis; which prevented his sail-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., to the government, whose consent was required before they could address the assembled people.

ing against and ravaging the Peloponnese, city by city, while you would have been unable to assist one another against his numerous ships. And he himself gave the greatest proof of this; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was no longer what it had been, he retreated as quickly as he could with the greater part of his army.

74. "Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things toward it; viz., the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a general, and the most unshrinking zeal. Toward the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts;<sup>1</sup> and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honored him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you. And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us. So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For *you*, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us); but *we*, setting

<sup>1</sup> What parts we must suppose the speaker to have referred to in this passage, whether quarters or thirds, is much disputed. Didot and Gölter maintain the former, as being in strict agreement with the statement of Herodotus, who makes the whole fleet to have consisted of three hundred and seventy-eight ships, and the Athenian portion of one hundred and eighty. Arnold, after Bredow and Poppo, supports the other interpretation, and observes, that "this is not the statement of Thucydides, but of the Athenian orator, who is made very characteristically to indulge in gross exaggerations." See his whole note on the passage. Bishop Thirlwall, however, thinks that such an exaggeration would have been in very bad taste on such an occasion; and that Thucydides meant to state the true numbers; "in which," he observes, "if we read *τριακοσίας* for *τετρα*, he would have followed Æschylus instead of Herodotus, whom indeed it is possible he has not read." Vol. ii. Append. 4.

out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves. But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterward had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.

75. "Do we not then deserve, Lacedæmonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess? For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders: and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honor also, and afterward of advantage too. And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you.<sup>1</sup> And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils.<sup>2</sup>

76. "You, at least, Lacedæmonians, have settled to your own advantage the government of the states in the Peloponnese over which you have a supremacy; and if at that time you had remained through the whole business, and been disliked in your command, as we were, we know full well that you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or yourselves be exposed to danger. So neither have *we* done any thing marvelous, or contrary to the disposition of man; in having accepted an empire that was offered to us, and not giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives, honor, and fear, and profit; and when, again, we had not

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "the revolts would have been to you."

<sup>2</sup> Or, "none are grudged securing," etc.

been the first to set such a precedent, but it had always been a settled rule that the weaker should be constrained by the stronger; and when at the same time we thought ourselves worthy of it, and were thought so by you, until, from calculations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever yet brought forward when he had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained from taking the advantage. Nay, all are worthy of praise, who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, have been more just than their actual power enabled them to be. At any rate we imagine that if some others had possessed our means, they would have best shown whether we are at all moderate or not: though to us there has unfairly resulted from our good nature disrepute rather than commendation.

77. "For from putting up with less than we might have had in contract-suits with the allies, and from having made our decisions in our own courts on the footing of equal laws, we are thought to be litigious. And none of them considers why this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in any other quarter also, and are less moderate toward their subjects than we have been: for those who can act with violence have no need besides to act with justice. But they, from being accustomed to have intercourse with us on a fair footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been worsted in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by the power of our empire, even in any degree whatever; they feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost, than if from the first we had laid aside law, and openly taken advantage of them. In that case not even they themselves would have denied that it was right for the weaker to yield to the stronger. But when injured, it seems, men are more angry than when treated with violence: for the one case is regarded as an advantage taken by their equal; the other, as compulsion by their superior. At least they endured much harder treatment than this at the hand of the Medes; whereas *our* rule is thought to be severe; and naturally so; for their present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any rate, should you subdue us and possess an empire, would quickly lose the good-will which you have enjoyed through their fear of us; if you have the same views now as you gave

symptoms of then, when you led them against the Mede for a short time. For you have institutions by yourselves, distinct from the rest of the world; and, moreover, each individual of you, on going abroad, neither acts according to these, nor to those which the rest of Greece recognizes.

78. "Deliberate therefore slowly, as on no trifling matters; and do not, though being influenced by other people's views and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: but consider beforehand, previously to your being engaged in it, how far beyond calculation is war; for when long protracted, it generally becomes in the end to depend on chances; from which we are equally removed, and run the risk in uncertainty as to which way it will turn out. And in going to war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do afterward; and when they are in distress, then they have recourse to words. We, however, being neither ourselves yet involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, while good council is still eligible to both sides, not to break treaty nor offend against your oaths, but to let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we will call to witness the gods who received our oaths, and endeavor to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as you may set the example."

79. Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them. And the opinions of the majority went the same way; viz, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they ought to go to war with all speed. But Archidamus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.

80. "I have both myself already had experience in many wars, Lacedæmonians, and see that those of you who are of the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither desire the business from inexperience, as might be the case with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one. But this war, about which you are now consulting, you would find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly consider it. For against the Peloponnesians and our neighbors our strength is of the same description, and we can

quickly reach our destination in each case. But against men who live in a country far away, and besides are most skillful by sea, and most excellently provided with every thing else, with riches, both private and public, and ships, and horses, and heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in any one Grecian town beside, and moreover, have many allies under payment of tribute; how can it be right to declare war rashly against these men? and in what do we trust, that we should hurry on to it unprepared? Is it in our ships? Nay, we are inferior to them: but if we shall practice and prepare against them, time will pass in the interval. Well then, is it in our money? Nay, but we are still more deficient in this, and neither have it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it from our private funds.

81. "Perhaps some one might feel confident because we excel them in heavy-armed troops, and in numbers, so that we might invade and ravage their land. But they have other land in abundance over which they rule, and will import what they want by sea. If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders. What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage; and at such a time it will no longer even be honorable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they. For let us now not be buoyed up with *this* hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather do I fear that we should bequeath it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved<sup>1</sup> in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.

82. "I do not, however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies, whether Greeks or bar-

<sup>1</sup> Compare II. 61. 3. Δουλοὶ γὰρ φρήνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον, κ. τ. λ.



barians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who, like us, are plotted against by the Athenians, may without odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also); and at the same time let us bring out our own resources. And if they listen at all to our ambassadors, this is the best conclusion; but if not, after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think fit, in a better state of defense. And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed. For in their land consider that you have nothing else but a hostage; and the more so, the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, and not, through having reduced them to desperation, find them the more difficult to subdue. For if we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner more disgraceful and perplexing to the Peloponnese [than we should wish].<sup>1</sup> For complaints, both of states and individuals, it is impossible to settle: but when all together have, for their own separate interests, undertaken a war, of which it is impossible to know how it will go on, it is not easy to effect a creditable arrangement.

83. "And let no one think it shows a want of courage for many not to advance at once against one state. For they too have no fewer allies who pay them tribute;<sup>2</sup> and war is not so much a thing of arms as of money, by means of which arms are of service; especially in the case of continental against maritime powers. Let us first then provide ourselves with this, and not be excited beforehand by the speeches of the allies; but as we shall have the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences either way, so also let us quickly take a view of them beforehand.

84. "And as for the slowness and dilatoriness which they most blame in us, be not ashamed of them. For by hurrying [to begin the war] you would be the more slow in finishing it, because you took it in hand when unprepared: and at the same

<sup>1</sup> Or the comparative may perhaps be used for the positive.

<sup>2</sup> These words are *only* applicable to the allies of the *Athenians*.

time we always enjoy a city that is free and most glorious ; and it is a wise moderation that can best constitute this. For owing to it we alone do not grow insolent in success, and yield less than others to misfortunes. We are not excited by the pleasure afforded by those who with praise stimulate us to dangers contrary to our conviction ; and if any one provoke us with accusation, we are not the more prevailed on through being thus annoyed. We are both warlike and wise through our orderly temper : warlike, because shame partakes very largely of moderation, and courage of shame ; and wise, because we are brought up with no little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them ; and are not over-clever in useless things, so that while in word we might ably find fault with our enemies' resources, we should not go against them so well in deed ;<sup>1</sup> but are taught to think that our neighbor's plans,<sup>2</sup> and the chances which befall in war, are very similar, as things not admitting of nice distinction in language. But we always provide *in deed* against our adversaries with the expectation of their planning well ; and must not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but on the belief of our own taking cautious forethought. Again, we should not think that one man differs much from another, but that he is the best who is educated in the most necessary things.

85. "These practices then, which our fathers bequeathed to us, and which we have always retained with benefit, let us not give up, nor determine hurriedly, in the short space of a day, about many lives, and riches, and states, and honors, but let us do it calmly ; as *we* may do more than others, on account of our power. And send to the Athenians respecting Potidæa, and send respecting those things in which the allies say they are injured ; especially as they are ready to submit to judicial decision ; and against the party which offers that, it is not right to proceed ~~as~~ against a guilty one. But prepare for war at the

<sup>1</sup> Or, "should not so well follow up our words with deeds." The following infinitive *νομιζειν* depends upon *παιδευόμενοι* understood again.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed the punctuation and interpretation of Gölter and Arnold in their last edition ; though not with a perfect conviction of its correctness, as I doubt whether the *re* has any place before *παραπλησίους* *καὶ* taken in this sense. But see Gölter's note. According to Haack and Poppo it would be, "that our neighbors' plans are very similar to our own, and that the chances of war," etc.

same time. For in this you will determine both what is best, and what is most formidable to your adversaries." Archidamus spoke to this effect; but Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at that time, came forward last, and spoke before the Lacedæmonians as follows.

86. "As for the long speech of the Athenians, I do not understand it; for though they praised themselves a great deal, in no part did they deny that they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they were good men then against the Medes, but are bad ones now against us, they deserve double punishment for having become bad instead of good. But *we*<sup>\*</sup> are the same both then and now; and shall not, if we are wise, overlook our allies' being injured, nor delay to assist them; for there is no longer delay in their being ill-treated. Others have in abundance riches, and ships, and horses; but *we* have good allies, whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor decide the question with suits and words, while it is not also in word that we are injured; but we must assist them with speed and with all our might. And let no one tell me that it is proper for us to deliberate who are being wronged. It is for those who are about to commit the wrong that it is much more proper to deliberate for a long time. Vote then, Lacedæmonians, for war, as is worthy of Sparta; and neither permit the Athenians to become greater, nor let us betray our allies; but with the help of the gods let us proceed against those who are wronging them."

87. Having spoken to this effect he himself, as ephor, put the question to the assembly of the Lacedæmonians. As they decide by acclamation and not by vote, he said that he did not distinguish on which side the acclamation was greater; but wishing to instigate them the more to war<sup>1</sup> by their openly expressing their views, he said, "Whoever of you, Lacedæmonians, thinks the treaty to have been broken, and the Athenians to have been guilty, let him<sup>2</sup> rise and go yonder" (pointing out a certain place to them); "and whoever does not think so, let him go to the other side." They arose and divided, and there was a large majority who thought that the treaty had been

<sup>1</sup> Because individuals might be afraid of openly opposing the popular wish, which was decidedly for the war.

<sup>2</sup> For another instance of a compound of *ιστημι* used in the same pregnant manner as *ἀνίστημι* is here, see I. §01. 2. *ἐς ἰθὺμην ἀπέστησαν*.

broken. And having summoned the allies, they told them that their own opinion was that the Athenians were in the wrong; but that they wished to summon all the allies also, and to put it to the vote; that after general consultation they might declare war, if they thought fit. They then, after having settled this, returned home; as did the ambassadors of the Athenians afterward, when they had dispatched the business they had gone on. This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the continuance of the thirty years' truce, which had been concluded after the war with Eubœa.

88. Now the Lacedæmonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most parts of Greece were already under their hands.

89. For it was in the following manner that the Athenians were brought to those circumstances under which they increased their power. When the Medes had retreated from Europe after being conquered both by sea and land by the Greeks, and those of them had been destroyed who had fled with their ships to Mycale; Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was the leader of the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies that were with the Peloponnese; while the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, staid behind, and laid siege to Sestos, of which the Medes were in possession. Having spent the winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacuated it; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city. And the people of Athens, when they found the barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immediately to carry over their children and their wives, and the remnant of their furniture, from where they had put them out of the way; and were preparing to rebuild their city and their walls. For short spaces of the inclosure were standing; and though the majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained; in which the grandees of the Persians had themselves taken up their quarters.

90. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving what they were about to do, sent an embassy [to them]; partly because they them-

selves would have been more pleased to see neither them nor any one else in possession of a wall ; but still more because the allies instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in the Median war. And they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnese ; not betraying their real wishes, and their suspicious feelings toward the Athenians ; but representing that the barbarian, if he should again come against them, would not then be able to make his advances from any stronghold, as in the present instance he had done from Thebes ; and the Peloponnese, they said, was sufficient for all, as a place to retreat into and sally forth from. When the Lacedæmonians had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, answered that they would send ambassadors to them concerning what they spoke of ; and immediately dismissed them. And Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as possible to Lacedæmon, and having chosen other ambassadors besides himself, not to dispatch them immediately, but to wait till such time as they should have raised their wall to the height most absolutely necessary for fighting from ; and that the whole population in the city, men, women, and children, should build it, sparing neither private nor public edifice, from which any assistance toward the work would be gained, but throwing down every thing. After giving these instructions, and suggesting that he would himself manage all other matters there, he took his departure. On his arrival at Lacedæmon he did not apply to the authorities, but kept putting off and making excuses. And whenever any of those who were in office asked him why he did not come before the assembly,<sup>1</sup> he said that he was waiting for his colleagues ; that owing to some engagement they had been left behind ; he expected, however, that they would shortly come, and wondered that they were not already there.

91. When they heard this, they believed Themistocles through their friendship for him ; but when every one else<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Or, "about his not coming," according to Arnold, who objects to the common mode of explanation, by understanding *διὰ* before *ὅτι*.

<sup>2</sup> *i. e.*, those who came from Athens, and could therefore speak to the fact. *κατηγορούντων* is thought by some to mean, "charging him with the fact;" but with that signification it would require a genitive case after it (*e. g.*, ch. 95. 7.), and as none is expressed, I have preferred taking it in the more general sense.

came and distinctly informed them that the walls were building, and already advancing to some height, they did not know how to discredit it. When he found this, he told them not to be led away by tales, but rather to send men of their own body who were of good character, and would bring back a credible report after inspection. They dispatched them therefore; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to the Athenians, to detain them, with as little appearance of it as possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had returned back; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, had also come to him with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced); for he was afraid that the Lacedæmonians, when they heard the truth, might not then let them go. So the Athenians detained the ambassadors, as was told them; and Themistocles, having come to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, then indeed told them plainly that their city was already walled, so as to be capable of defending its inhabitants; and if the Lacedæmonians or the allies wished to send any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who could discern what were their own and the general interests. For when they thought it better to abandon their city and to go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their minds, and had the courage to do it, without consulting *them*; and again, on whatever matters they had deliberated with them, they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment. And so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that their city should have a wall, and that it would be more expedient for their citizens in particular, as well as for the allies in general; for it was not possible for any one without equal resources to give any equal or fair advice for the common good. Either all therefore, he said, should join the confederacy without walls, or they should consider that the present case also was as it ought to be.

92. The Lacedæmonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians; (for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state;)<sup>1</sup> and besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against the

<sup>1</sup> Or, as the scholiast explains it, "for the good of their state;" which is adopted by Arnold.

Mede); in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.

93. In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time. And the building still shows even now that it was executed in haste; for the foundations are laid with stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the several parties at any time brought them to the spot: and many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were worked up in them. For the inclosure of the city was carried out to a greater extent on every side; and for this reason they hurried on the work, removing every thing alike. Themistocles also persuaded them to build the remaining walls of the Piræus (they had been begun by him before, at the time of his office as archon, which he had held for a year over the Athenians), thinking that the site was a fine one, as it contained three natural harbors; and that by becoming a naval people they would make a great advance toward the acquisition of power. For he was the first who ventured to tell them that they must apply closely to the sea; and he began immediately to assist in paving the way for their empire. It was by his advice that they built the walls of that thickness which is still seen round the Piræus; for two wagons meeting each other brought up the stones. And in the inside there was neither rubble nor mortar, but large and square-cut stones wrought together, clamped on the outside with iron and lead. But only about half of the height he intended was finished. For he wished by their great dimensions and thickness to keep off the attacks of their enemies; and thought that the protection of a few, and those the least efficient troops, would be sufficient, while the rest would go on board their ships. For to the navy he paid the greatest attention; seeing, I suppose, that the approach of the king's forces against them was easier by sea than by land: and he considered the Piræus more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, in case of their ever being hard pressed by land, to go down into it, and defy the world with their navy. Thus then the Athenians were inclosed with walls, and began to furnish themselves with other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Medes.

94. Now Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out

from Lacedæmon as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; there sailed with him also the Athenians with thirty ships, and a large number of the other allies. And they made an expedition against Cyprus, and subdued the greater part of it; and afterward against Byzantium, of which the Medes were in possession, and reduced it during this period of his command.

95. But when he was now acting with violence, the rest of the Greeks were offended, and especially the Ionians, and such as had lately been liberated from the king; and going to the Athenians, they begged them to become their leaders, on the ground of their relationship; and not to overlook it in Pausanias, if in any case he should treat them with violence. The Athenians received their proposals, and attended to them with a determination not to overlook it, and to settle all other matters as might seem best to them. At this time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias, to bring him to account for what they had heard of him; for many charges were brought against him by the Greeks who came to them; and it appeared to be an imitation of a tyranny, rather than the command of a general. It happened that he was summoned at the very time the allies, through their hatred of him, went over and ranged themselves with the Athenians, except the soldiers from the Peloponnese. So when he came to Lacedæmon, he was censured for the wrongs he had done to any one individually; but was acquitted, as not guilty, on the heaviest charges. (He was especially accused of medizing, and it appeared to be most clearly established). Him they sent out no more as commander, but Dorcis and some others with him, with no great number of troops; but the allies would no longer give up the command to them. On finding this, they returned; and the Lacedæmonians sent out no others after them; fearing that they might find those who went abroad becoming corrupted, just as they saw in the case of Pausanias; and also because they wished to be rid of the Median war, and considered the Athenians competent to take the lead, and well disposed toward themselves at that time.

96. The Athenians having in this way succeeded to the command at the wish of the allies, owing to their hatred of Pausanias, arranged which of the states were to furnish money

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "much guilt was laid to his charge."



against the barbarian, and which of them ships: for their pretext was to avenge themselves for what they had suffered, by ravaging the king's country. And the office of treasurers-of-Greece was then first established by the Athenians; who received the tribute, for so the contribution-money was called. The first tribute that was fixed was 460 talents. Their treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were held in the temple.

97. Now they led the allies at first as possessing independence, and deliberating in common councils; and executed, both in the field and in their administration of affairs, between this war and the Median, the following undertakings; which were achieved by them against the barbarian, and against their own innovating allies, and those of the Peloponnesians who from time to time came in contact with them in each matter. I have written an account of these events, and made this digression from my history, because this subject was omitted by all before me; who either wrote the history of Greece before the Median war, or of that war itself: and Hellanicus, who *did* touch on them in his Attic history, mentioned them but briefly, and not accurately with regard to their chronology. Besides, they also afford<sup>1</sup> an opportunity of showing in what manner the empire of the Athenians was established.

98. In the first place, Eion on the Strymon, of which the Medes were in possession, was taken by them after a siege, and reduced to slavery, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades. In the next place, Scyros, the island in the Ægean Sea, which was inhabited by Dolopes, was reduced to slavery, and colonized by themselves. They had a war also with the Carystians, without the rest of the Eubœans joining in it; and in the course of time they surrendered on conditions. With the Naxians, who had revolted,<sup>2</sup> they afterward waged war, and reduced them after a siege; and this was the first

<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of ἐχέει, in the sense which I have here given to it, see Gôller's note on I. 9. 2.

<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps too strong a term to use with reference to this early period of the Athenian sway, in which ἀπιστασθαι more properly signifies "standing aloof" (or "retiring"), "from the confederacy." I have used it, however, for the sake of uniformity; and especially as it is impossible to fix on any particular part of the history, at which the original verb and its cognate substantive began to be used in the more definite and full meaning which they had gradually acquired.

allied city that was subjugated contrary to the agreement; then the rest, as each happened.

99. Now there were other reasons for the revolts, but the principal were arrears of tribute and ships, and failing (if any did so) in military service; for the Athenians strictly exacted these things, and were offensive, by using compulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work. In some other respects also they were no longer liked in their government, as they had been; and while they did not join in the service on an equal footing, at the same time it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted. And for this the allies themselves were to blame; for owing to this aversion to expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war.

100. After this was fought the battle at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, both by land and sea, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes; and the Athenians were victorious in both engagements on the same day, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades; and took and destroyed in all two hundred triremes of the Phœnicians. Some time after it happened that the Thasians revolted from them, having quarreled about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace and the mine of which they were in possession. And the Athenians, having sailed with their fleet to Thasos, gained the victory in a sea-fight, and made a descent on their land. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to the Strymon, to colonize what was then called the Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis; and they made themselves masters of the Nine Ways, which was held by the Edones; but having advanced into the interior of Thrace, were cut off at Drabescus, a town of the Edones, by the united Thracians, by whom the settlement of the town of Nine Ways was regarded with hostility.

101. The Thasians, having been conquered in some engagements, and being invested, called the Lacedæmonians to their aid, and desired that they would assist them by invading Attica. They promised to do so, without letting the Athenians know,

and intended it; but were prevented by the earthquake which took place; on which occasion also they saw the Helots, and the Thurians and Cetheans among the *Periæci*,<sup>1</sup> establish themselves in revolt at Ithome.<sup>2</sup> Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians who were enslaved at that time [with which all are acquainted<sup>3</sup>]: and for this reason the whole body of them were called Messenians. A war then was commenced by the Lacedæmonians against those in Ithome: and the Thasians in the third year of the siege came to terms with the Athenians, throwing down their wall, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing both to pay immediately the sum of money required, and to pay tribute in future, and surrendering their mainland towns and the mine.

102. The Lacedæmonians, when they found the war against those in Ithome prolonged, called their allies to their aid, and the Athenians also; who went under the command of Cimon with no small force. They asked their aid, because they were considered to be skillful in conducting sieges: whereas in themselves, from the siege having been so protracted, there seemed to be a deficiency of this skill; for else they would have taken the place by assault. It was from this expedition that the first open quarrel arose between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place was not taken by storm, fearing the boldness and innovating spirit of the Athenians—and moreover considering that they were of a different race from themselves—lest, if they remained, they might at the persuasion of those in Ithome attempt some revolution, dismissed them alone of all the allies; not letting their suspicion appear, but saying that they were no longer in any need of them. The Athenians, however, knew that they were dismissed, not on the more creditable reason assigned, but from some suspicion having arisen: and considering it hard usage, and not thinking that they deserved to be so treated by the Lacedæmonians, immediately on their return they broke off the alliance which they had made with them against the Medes, and became allies of the Argives, their enemies. The same oaths also were taken, and the same alliance made by both with the Thessalians.

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.* the inhabitants of the districts adjacent to the capital; or the dependent Achaian population of Laconia in general, as distinct from their Dorian conquerors, the Spartans. For a fuller account of them see Arnold's note, and Appendix 2.

<sup>2</sup> See note on ch. 87. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> These words, explanatory of the *τότε*, are adopted from Gøller.

103. Those in Ithome, in the tenth year, when they could hold out no longer, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians on condition of their going out of the Peloponnese under truce, and never setting foot on it again; and that if any one were caught doing so, he should be the slave of him who caught him. The Lacedæmonians had also before this a Pythian response made to them, "to let go the suppliant of Jupiter at Ithome." So they went out, themselves and their children, and their wives; and the Athenians received them, on the strength of the hatred they now felt for the Lacedæmonians, and settled them at Naupactus, which they had lately taken from the Locri Ozolæ who held it. The Megareans also came over into alliance with the Athenians, having revolted from the Lacedæmonians, because the Corinthians were pressing them with war about the boundaries of their territory. And the Athenians received possession of Megara and Pegæ, and built for the Messenians the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and themselves manned them. And it was chiefly from this that their excessive hatred of the Athenians first began to be felt by the Corinthians.

104. Now Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, the Libyan king of the Libyans, bordering on Egypt, having his headquarters at Maræa, the city above Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from king Artaxerxes, and being himself made ruler of it, invited the Athenians to his aid. They, happening to be engaged in an exhibition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, left Cyprus and came to him; and having sailed up from the sea into the Nile, and being masters of the river and two thirds of Memphis, proceeded to hostilities against the third division, which is called the White-castle, and in which were those of the Persians and Medes who had fled there for refuge, and those of the Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt.

105. The Athenians, having with their fleet made a descent on Halizæ, had a battle with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians gained the victory. Afterward the Athenians had a sea-fight with the fleet of the Peloponnesians off Cecryphalea, and the Athenians gained the victory. After this, war having been commenced by the Athenians on the Æginetans, a great sea-fight took place off Ægina, between

the Athenians and the Æginetans, and the allies were present on both sides; and the Athenians gained the victory, and having taken seventy of their ships, made a descent on the country, and besieged them, under the command of Leocrates, the son of Stræbus. Then the Peloponnesians, wishing to assist the Æginetans, sent over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who were before auxiliaries of the Corinthians and Epidaurians. And the Corinthians with their allies seized the heights of Geranea, and marched down into the Megarid, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to succor the Megareans, while a large force was absent at Ægina and in Egypt; but that if they did assist them, they would raise the siege of Ægina. The Athenians, however, did not remove the army that was at Ægina, but the oldest and the youngest of those who had been left behind in the city came to Megara under the command of Myronides. After an indecisive battle had been fought with the Corinthians, they separated, each side thinking that they had not had the worst in the action. And the Athenians (for they notwithstanding, had the advantage rather [than their opponents]) on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the elder men in the city, made preparations for about twelve days after, and went out and proceeded to set up a counter-trophy on their side also, as having been victorious. And the Athenians, having sallied out from Megara, cut to pieces those who were erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest.

106. The conquered forces commenced a retreat; and a considerable division of them being hard pressed and having missed their way, rushed into a field belonging to a private person, which had a deep trench inclosing it, and there was no road out. The Athenians, perceiving this, hemmed them in with heavy-armed in front, and having placed their light-armed all round, stoned to death all who had gone in; and this was a severe blow for the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

107. About this time the Athenians began also to build their long walls down to the sea, both that to Phalerus, and that to Piræus. And the Phocians having marched against

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Notwithstanding the claim to it made by the Corinthians.

the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedæmonians, [whose towns were] Bœum, and Citinium, and Erineum, and having taken one of these places, the Lacedæmonians under the command of Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, in the stead of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was yet a minor, went to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and ten thousand of the allies; and having compelled the Phocians to restore the town on certain conditions, they proceeded to return back. Now by sea, if they should wish to cross over the Crissæan Gulf, the Athenians were ready to stop them, having sailed round with a fleet: while the march over Geranea did not appear safe for them, as the Athenians were in possession of Megara and Pegæ. For Geranea was both [naturally] difficult to cross, and was continually guarded by the Athenians: and at that time they knew they were going to stop them that way, as well [as by sea]. So they determined to wait in Bœotia, and see in what way they might march across more safely. They were also in some measure urged to this in secret by certain of the Athenians, who hoped to put a stop to the democracy, and to the long walls that were building. But the Athenians sallied out against them with all their citizens, and a thousand Argives, and the several contingents of the other allies, amounting in all to fourteen thousand. They marched against them because they thought they were at a loss how to effect a passage, and in some measure also from a suspicion of the democracy being put down. The Athenians were also joined, in accordance with the treaty, by a thousand horse of the Thessalians, who went over during the action to the Lacedæmonians.

108. A battle having been fought at Tanagra in Bœotia, the Lacedæmonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much bloodshed on both sides. And the Lacedæmonians, after going into the Megarid, and cutting down the fruit trees, returned back home across Geranea and the isthmus: while the Athenians, on the sixty-second day after the battle, marched, under the command of Myronides, against the Bœotians, and having defeated them at an engagement at Cœnophyta, made themselves masters of the country of Bœotia and Phocis, and demolished the wall of the Tanagræans, and took from the Opuntian Locrians their richest hundred men

as hostages, and finished their own long walls. The Æginetans also after this surrendered on condition to the Athenians, demolishing their walls, and giving up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future. And the Athenians sailed round the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmæus, and burned the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians, and took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians in a battle during a descent which they made on their land.

109. The Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still remaining there, and hostilities assumed many different phases with them. For at first the Athenians were masters of Egypt; and the king sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacedæmon with a sum of money, that he might cause the recall of the Athenians from Egypt by the Peloponnesians being persuaded to invade Attica. But when he did not succeed, and the money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus with the remainder of it went back to Asia; and he sent Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large force; who, having arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis, and at last shut them up in the island of Prosopis, and besieged them in it a year and six months, till by draining the canal and turning off the water by another course, he left their ships on dry ground, and joined most of the island to the mainland, and crossed over and took it on foot.

110. Thus the cause of the Greeks was ruined, after a war of six years: and only a few of many marched through Libya and escaped to Cyrene, while most of them perished. So Egypt again came under the power of the king, excepting Amyrtæus, the king in the marshes, whom they could not take owing to the extent of the fen; and besides, the marshmen are the most warlike of the Egyptians. As for Inarus, the king of the Libyans, who had concocted the whole business respecting Egypt, he was taken by treachery and crucified. Moreover, fifty triremes that were sailing to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve their former force, put in to shore at the Mendesian branch, knowing nothing of what had happened: and the land forces falling on them from the shore, and the fleet of the Phœnicians by sea, destroyed the greater part of the ships: the smaller

part escaped back. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

111. Now Orestes, son of Echekratidas, king of the Thes-salians, being banished from Thessaly, persuaded the Athe-nians to restore him: and taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians, who were their allies, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And they were masters of the country, as far as they could be so without advancing far from their camp<sup>1</sup> (for the cavalry of the Thessalians kept them in check), but did not take the city, nor succeed in any other of the designs with which they made the expedition; but they returned with Orestes without effecting any thing. Not long after this, one thousand Athenians having embarked in the ships that were at Pegæ (for they were themselves in possession of that port), coasted along to Sicyon, under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus, and landed, and defeated those of the Sicyonians who met them in battle. And immediately taking with them the Achæans, and sailing across, they turned their arms against Œniadæ in Acarnania, and besieged it; they did not, however, take it, but returned, home.

112. Subsequently, after an interval of three years, a truce for five years was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. So the Athenians ceased from prosecuting the war in Greece, but made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, under the command of Cimon; sixty of which sailed from them to Egypt, being sent for by Amyrtæus, the king in the marshes; while the rest besieged Citium. Cimon having died, and there being a dearth of provisions, they retired from Citium; and while sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought both by sea and land at the same time with the Phœnicians and Silicians; and having conquered in both engagements, returned home, and with them the ships that had come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians waged what is called the sacred war, and having taken possession of the temple at Delphi, gave it up to the Delphians: and the Athenians again afterward, on their

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "from their *arms*," i. e., the place where their spears and shields were piled.—Arnold observes that ὅσα μὴ, like οἷ μὴ, ἄτε, οἷα, etc., has grown by usage into a complete adverb, so as to have lost all the grammatical construction which ὅσα would require as an adjective.



retiring, marched and took possession of it, and restored it to the Phocians.

113. Some time having elapsed after these things, the Boeotian exiles being in possession of Orchomenus, Chæronea, and some other places in Boeotia, the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, marched with one thousand heavy-armed of their own and the several contingents of the allies, against these places; for they were hostile to them. Having taken Chæronea, [and reduced it to slavery,<sup>1</sup>] they were retiring, after placing a garrison in it. But as they were on their march, the Boeotian exiles from Orchómenus, and with them some Docrians and exiles of the Eubœans, and all that were of the same views, attacked them at Coronæa, and, having defeated them in battle slew some of the Athenians, and took others of them alive. So the Athenians evacuated all Boeotia, having made peace on conditions of recovering their men. And the exiles of the Boeotians were restored, and they and all the rest became independent again.

114. Not long after this, Eubœa revolted from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already crossed over to it with an army of Athenians, news was brought him that Megara had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica; and that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans, except as many as had escaped to Nisæa. Now the Megareans had revolted, after calling to their aid the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. So Pericles took the army back from Eubœa as quickly as possible. After this the Peloponnesians made an incursion as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and ravaged the country, under the command of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians; and without advancing any further they returned home. And the Athenians having again crossed over to Eubœa under the command of Pericles, subdued the whole of it, and settled the rest of the island by treaty; but the Histieans they expelled from their homes, and held the territory themselves.

115. Having returned from Eubœa, not long after they made a truce with the Lacedæmonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, Achaia;

<sup>1</sup> Poppo and Göller omit these words; Bekker and Arnold put them in brackets.

for of these places in the Peloponnese the Athenians were in possession. Now in the sixth year a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene; and the Milesians being worsted in the war went to the Athenians, and raised an outcry against the Samians; some private individuals from Samos itself taking part with them, from a wish to effect a revolution in the government. The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships, and established a democracy; and taking as hostages from the Samians fifty boys and as many men, deposited them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island, withdrew. But the exiles of the Samians (for there were some who did not remain in the island, but fled to the continent) having made arrangements with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pisuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had the satrapy of Sardis, at that time, and having collected auxiliaries to the number of seven hundred, crossed over to Samos toward night, and in the first place rose up against the commons, and secured most of them; then, having secretly removed their hostages from Lemnos, they revolted, and gave up to Pisuthnes the garrison and its commanders that were with them, and immediately prepared to go against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.

116. The Athenians, when they were aware of it, sailed with sixty ships for Samos, but did not use sixteen of them (for some were gone toward Caria to look out for the Phœnician fleet; others toward Chios and Lesbos, carrying about orders to bring reinforcements); with forty-four, however, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a battle near the island of Tragia with seventy ships of the Samians, twenty of which were transports (they all happened to be sailing from Miletus), and the Athenians were victorious. Afterward there came to them a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens, and five and twenty from Chios and Lesbos; and when they had disembarked, and had the superiority in land forces, they invested the city with three walls, and blockaded it by sea at the same time. Then Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading squadron, and went as quickly as possible in the direction of Caunus and Caria, news having been brought that the Phœnician fleet was sailing against them: for there had also gone from Samos

Stesagoras and some others with five ships to fetch those of the Phœnicians.

117. At this time the Samians, having suddenly sallied out, fell on the unprotected camp, and destroyed the guard-ships, and in a sea-fight defeated those that put out against them, and were masters of the sea along their coasts about fourteen days, carrying in and out what they pleased. But on the arrival of Pericles they were again closely blockaded by the fleet. Afterward there came reinforcements, of forty ships with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, from Athens, and of thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Against these the Samians fought a short battle by sea, but being unable to hold out, were reduced in the ninth month, and surrendered on conditions; dismantling their wall, and giving hostages, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay back by installments the expenses of the war. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.

118. After these things, though not many years later, what we have before narrated now took place, namely, the affair of Corcyra, and that of Potidæa, and whatever was made a pretext for this war. All these things that the Greeks performed against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war: in the course of which the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great pitch of power; while the Lacedæmonians, though they perceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but remained quiet the greater part of the period. For even before this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and to a certain extent also they were hindered by intestine wars;<sup>1</sup> until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedæmonians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, and that the Athenians were guilty; but they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god, whether it would be better for them

<sup>1</sup> He seems to refer especially to the revolt of the Helots.

if they went to war: and he answered them, as it is reported, that if they carried on the war with all their might, they would gain the victory; and said that he would himself take part with them, whether called upon or not.

119. Still they wished to summon the allies again, and put it to the vote whether they should go to war. When the ambassadors had come from the confederates, and an assembly had been held, the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians, and demanding that war should be declared; and the Corinthians, who had even before begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for the war—being afraid for Potidæa, lest it should be destroyed first—and who were present then also, came forward last, and spoke as follows:

120. "We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedæmonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose:<sup>1</sup> [though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all; as they are also in other respects honored above all. Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the highway of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others]. And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of peace. For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured; but of brave men, when injured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity

<sup>1</sup> The γὰρ in the succeeding words, *καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας*, refers to a suppressed sentence: "We can not now blame them; but had they acted differently, we should have had a right to blame them; for those who command others should provide for the welfare of others."—*Arnold*.

offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace. For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that can not be trusted. For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through<sup>1</sup> the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one<sup>2</sup> conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.

121. "Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time preparing for war because we are injured, and have sufficient grounds of complaint; and when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And for many reasons it is likely that we should have the advantage; first, as we are superior in numbers and military experience; and secondly as we all proceed with equal obedience to do what we are ordered. And for a fleet, in which they are so strong we will equip one from the property we severally possess, and from the money at Delphi and Olympia; for by contracting a loan of that we shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of their foreign sailors. For the power of the Athenians is mercenary, rather than native: but ours would be less exposed to this, as

<sup>1</sup> See note on I. 32. 3.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed Gölter's reading of *ὁμοία*; Arnold prefers *ὁμοία*, considering it as dependent on the two verbs *ἐνθυμείναι* and *ἐπεξέρχεται*. "What we speculate on in our expectations, and what we accomplish in our practice, are wholly different from each other." My chief reason for preferring the former interpretation is, that the article is only used with *πίστει*, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other passages, where there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. *οἱ ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πρῶσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ.* κ. τ. λ. II. 11. 6. *χρὴ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ, τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρασκευάζεσθαι.* Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 85. 5. *τὰς τῶν πολέμιων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξίεναι.* For other instances of *ὁμοίως* with the force here given to it, see note on ch. 35. 5.

it is strong in men more than in money. And by one victory [gained by us] in a sea-fight, in all probability they are ruined; but should they hold out, *we* too shall have more time for studying naval matters; and when we have put our skill on an equal footing with theirs, in courage, we shall most certainly excel them. For the advantage which we possess by nature can not be acquired by them through learning; whereas the superiority which they have in point of skill may be attained by us through practice. And to have money for this purpose, we will raise contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own slavery, while we would not spend it to be avenged on our enemies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid suffering by means of this very money,<sup>1</sup> through having it taken from us by them.

122. "We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong), and<sup>2</sup> raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure. Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne: but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright

<sup>1</sup> i. e., as it would be made the instrument of Athenian tyranny, if by submission they allowed them to take it from them. Or, "on this very point of money," as Arnold renders it.

<sup>2</sup> See ch. 142. 3, where Pericles mentions the two different methods of ἐπιτείχιαις, "the one," as Arnold explains it, "by founding a city in the neighborhood of Athens, strong enough to interfere with her trade, and be a check upon her power, πόλιν ἀντίπαλον; the other by merely raising one or two forts in Attica, as strongholds for plundering parties to keep the country in a constant annoyance and alarm."

slavery: which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas *we* do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up among us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state. And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped<sup>1</sup> these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.

123. "With regard then to what has been done before, why need we find fault with it at greater length than is expedient for what is doing now? But with respect to what will be hereafter, we must labor for it by supporting what is present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by labors; and you must not change the fashion, if you have a slight superiority now in wealth and power (for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in abundance); but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds; since the god has commanded it, and promised to take part with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty; for even the god himself considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to war; but you will rather come to its support after it has been wronged: for the breakers of it are, not those who defend themselves, but those who were the first aggressors.

124. "So then, since on every ground you have good reason for going to war, and since we all in common recommend this, inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for states and individuals [in our league]; do not defer to assist the Potidæans, who are Dorians, and are besieged by Ionians,

<sup>1</sup> Or, "for surely you have not, through a wish to escape these imputations, betaken yourselves," etc. "The play on the words *καταφρόνησις* and *αφροσύνη*," says Arnold, "can hardly be preserved in English: 'A sense of your adversaries' inferiority is so fatal a feeling to those who entertain it, that it more fitly deserves to be called *nonsense*.'"

(the contrary of which used formerly to be the case), and to vindicate the liberty of the rest; since it is no longer possible for them to wait,<sup>1</sup> while some are already injured, and others will be treated in the same way not much later, if we shall be known to have come together, but not to dare to avenge ourselves: but considering, allies, that we have reached a point of necessity, and, moreover, that what is mentioned is the best course, vote for the war; not being afraid of the immediate danger, but setting your hearts on the more lasting peace that will result from it. For it is by war that peace is rendered the more stable; but to refuse to pass from a state of quiet to one of war is not equally free from danger. Being of opinion then that the tyrant state which has set itself up in Greece, has set itself up against all alike, so that it already rules over some, and is designing to rule over others, let us go against it and reduce it; and live ourselves free from danger in future, and give freedom to the Greeks who are now enslaved." To this effect spoke the Corinthians.

125. The Lacedæmonians, after they had heard from all what they thought, put the question to the vote of all the allies who were present in succession, both to greater and smaller states alike: and the majority voted for war. But though they had resolved on it, it was impossible to take it in hand immediately, as they were unprepared; but it was determined that suitable means should be provided by the several states, and that there should be no delay. A year, however, did not pass while they were settling all that was necessary, but less, before they invaded Attica, and openly proceeded to the war.

126. During this time they were sending ambassadors to the Athenians with complaints, in order that they might have as good a pretext as possible for the war, in case they should not listen to them. In the first place the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors, and ordered the Athenians to drive out the pollution of the goddess; which pollution was of the following nature. There was one Cylon, a man who had conquered at the Olympic games, an Athenian of the olden time, both noble and powerful; he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, who at that time was tyrant of

The participle *περιμένοντας* refers to the whole body of the confederates, which is afterward represented in two divisions by the use of the article with *μέν* and *δέ*.



Megara. Now when Cylon was consulting the oracle at Delphi, the god told him to seize on the Acropolis of the Athenians during the greatest feast of Jupiter. So having received a force from Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to it, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came on, he seized the Acropolis with a view to establishing a tyranny; thinking that that was the greatest festival of Jupiter, and that it was a very proper time for *him*, as he had conquered at the Olympic games. But whether it was the greatest festival in Attica, or elsewhere, that had been alluded to, he neither stopped to consider, nor did the oracle express. For the Athenians also have a Diasian festival, which is called the greatest festival of Jupiter Milichius, held outside the city, in which all the people offer [something, though] many of them not victims, but country-offerings.<sup>1</sup> Thinking, however, that he understood it rightly, he took the business in hand. The Athenians, on perceiving it, ran in a body from the fields to resist them, and sitting down before the place besieged them. But as time went on, being tired out by the blockade, most of them went away, having commissioned the nine Archons to keep guard, and to arrange every thing with full powers, as they should consider best: for at that time the nine Archons transacted most of the state affairs. Now those who were besieged with Cylon were in a wretched condition for want of food and water. Cylon therefore and his brother made their escape, but when the rest were pressed hard, and some were even dying of famine, they seated themselves as suppliants on the altar of the Acropolis. And those of the Athenians who had been commissioned to keep guard, when they saw them dying in the temple, raised them up on condition of doing them no harm, and led them away and killed them; while some who were seated before the Awful Goddesses<sup>2</sup> they dispatched on the altars at the side entrance. And from this both they and their descendants after them were called accursed of, and offenders against, the goddess. The Athenians therefore expelled these accursed ones, and Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian also expelled them subsequently,

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, little figures of dough or paste made into the shape of the swine, or other animals, which they were too poor to offer.

<sup>2</sup> A title of the Furies peculiarly given to them at Athens, according to Pausanias, as that of *Εὐφρομένης* was at Sicyon—each 'per euphemismum.'

in conjunction with some Athenian partisans, both driving out the living, and taking up and casting out the bones of the dead. They returned, however, afterward, and their descendants are still in the city.

127. This pollution then the Lacedæmonians ordered them to drive out; principally, as they professed, to avenge the honor of the gods; but really, because they know that Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, was connected with it on his mother's side, and thought that if he were banished, their business with the Athenians would more easily succeed. They did not, however, so much hope that he would be treated in that way, as that it would cause a prejudice against him in the city; from an idea that the war would in part be occasioned by his misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and taking the lead in the government, he opposed the Lacedæmonians in every thing, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but instigated them to hostilities.

128. The Athenians also, in return, commanded the Lacedæmonians to drive out the pollution of Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians having formerly raised up some suppliants of the Helots from the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, led them away and slew them: and for this they think they were themselves also visited with the great earthquake at Sparta. They likewise ordered them to drive out the curse of Minerva of the Brazen-House; which was of the following kind. When Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, after being sent for by the Spartans for the first time from his command in the Hellespont, and brought to trial, was acquitted by them as not guilty, he was not sent out again in a public capacity; but in a private capacity, of his own accord, he took a trireme of Hermione, without the authority of the Lacedæmonians, and came to the Hellespont; nominally, to join in the war of the Greeks; but really, to carry out his measures with the king; which he had undertaken, in the first instance, from a desire of sovereignty over Greece. Now it was from the following fact that he first established a claim for service with the king, and made a commencement of the whole business. Having taken Byzantium when he was there before, after the return from Cyprus (the Medes were in possession of it, and some connections and relations of the king were taken in it), on that occasion he sent back to the king those whom he had taken, not letting the other allies know;

but giving out that they had escaped from him. This he managed in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, to whom he had committed Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus with a letter to him; in which, as was afterward discovered, the following was written: "Pausanias, the general of Sparta, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back to thee, after taking them in war. And I make a proposal, if thou also art pleased with it, that I should marry thy daughter, and make Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to thee. And I think that I am able to do this in concert with thee. If then any of these proposals please thee, send a trustworthy man to the sea, through whom in future we will confer."

129. Such was the purport of the writing; and Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea, and ordered him to succeed to the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor before; and gave him a letter in answer, to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium, and to show him the seal; and whatever message Pausanias should send him on his own affairs, to execute it in the best and most faithful manner possible. On his arrival he did every thing as had been told him; and also sent over the letter; the following being written in reply to him: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium, and sent over the sea to me, there is laid up for thee in our house<sup>1</sup> [the record of] a benefit registered forever; and I am also pleased with thy proposals. And let neither night nor day stop thee, that thou shouldst be remiss in doing any of the things which thou hast promised me: neither let them be impeded by outlay of gold or silver, nor by number of troops, whithersoever there is need of their coming; but in conjunction with Artabazus, an honorable man, whom I have sent to thee, fear not to promote both my interest and thine own, as shall be most creditable and advantageous for both."

130. On the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, though he was even before held in high repute by the Greeks for his generalship at Plataea, was then much more exalted; and could no longer live in the ordinary style, but went out of Byzan-

<sup>1</sup> For other instances of this custom, see Herodotus V. 11. and VIII. 85 and the book of Esther, ch. vi. According to Herodotus, the name by which persons so registered were called was "Orosangæ," or "benefactors."

tium, clothed in a Median dress; and when he went through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard; and he had a Persian table laid for him, and could not conceal his purpose, but betrayed beforehand by trifling actions what he intended to practice in future on a larger scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and indulged such a violent temper toward all, that no one dared to approach him; and this was none of the least reasons why the confederates went over from him to the Athenians.

131. The Lacedæmonians, on becoming acquainted with it, recalled him the first time on this very account; and when he went out the second time in the vessel of Hermione, without their orders, and appeared to be acting in this way, and did not return to Sparta when forcibly driven out from Byzantium by the Athenians after a siege, but news came of his being settled at Colonæ in the Troad, and intriguing with the barbarians, and making his stay there for no good; under these circumstances they waited no longer, but the ephors sent a herald and a *scytale*,<sup>1</sup> and told him not to leave the herald, else that they declared war against him. Wishing to be as little suspected as possible, and trusting to quash the charge by means of money, he proceeded to return the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors (for the ephors have power to do this to the king), but afterward, having settled the business, he subsequently came out, and offered himself for trial to those who wished to examine into his case.

132. Now the Spartans had no clear proof, neither his enemies nor the state at large, on which they could safely rely in punishing a man who was of the royal family and at present holding an honorable office; (for as his cousin and guardian, he was regent for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was king and at present a minor;) but by his contempt of the laws, and imitation of the barbarians, he gave room for many suspicions of his not wishing to be content with things as they were. And they reviewed his other acts, in whatever on any

<sup>1</sup> The *scytale* was a staff used at Sparta as a cipher for writing dispatches. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round it, on which the dispatches were written lengthwise, so that when unrolled they were unintelligible; commanders abroad had one of like thickness, round which they rolled these papers, and so were able to read the dispatches.

occasion he had lived beyond the established usages; and especially, that on the tripod at Delphi, which the Greeks dedicated as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, he had formerly on his own individual responsibility presumed to have the following distich inscribed:—

“The Greek Pausanias, victor o’er the Medo,  
To Phœbus this memorial decreed.”

This distich then the Lacedæmonians at the very time erased from the tripod, and engraved by name all the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian, and had dedicated the offering. This, however, was considered to be an act of guilt in Pausanias; and since he had put himself in his present position, it appeared to have been done in much closer keeping with his present views. They also heard that he was tampering with the Helots; and it was the fact too; for he was promising them liberation and citizenship, if they would join in an insurrection, and in carrying out the whole of his plan. But not even then did they think right to<sup>1</sup> believe even any of the Helots [themselves] as informers, and to proceed to any great severity against him; acting according to the custom which they usually observe toward their own citizens, not to be hasty in adopting any extreme measure in the case of a Spartan without unquestionable evidence; until a man of Argilus, it is said, who was about to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the king, and who had before been his favorite and very much trusted by him, gave information to them; having been alarmed at a thought which struck him, that none of the messengers before him had hitherto come back again; and so, having counterfeited the seal, in order that if he were mistaken in his surmise, or if Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the writing, he might not discover it, he opened the letter, and found written in it—having suspected<sup>2</sup> some additional order of the kind—directions to put *him* also to death.

133. Then, however, the ephors, on his showing them the letter, gave greater credence to it; but still wished to be ear-witnesses of Pausanias’ saying something. When therefore,

<sup>1</sup> Or, “even though they believed some of the Helots who had informed against him.”

<sup>2</sup> Προσεπεστώθαι. The same verb occurs with the same force of the πρὸς, II. 85. 6, τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς προσεπέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ὑφικέσθαι.

from a concerted plan, the man had gone to Tænarus<sup>1</sup> as a suppliant, and had built himself a hut, divided into two by a partition wall, in which he concealed some of the ephors; and when Pausanias came to him, and asked the reason for his becoming a suppliant, they heard all distinctly; while the man charged him with what had been written, and set forth the other particulars, one by one, saying that he had never yet endangered him at all in his services with respect to the king, yet had been, just like the mass of his servants, preferred to death; and Pausanias acknowledged these very things, and desired him not to be angry for what had happened, but gave him the security of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to go as quickly as possible, and not to put an obstacle in the way of his designs.

134. After hearing him accurately, the ephors then went away, and having now certain knowledge [of his guilt], were preparing to arrest him in the city. But it is said that when he was just going to be arrested in the street, from seeing the face of one of the ephors as he approached him, he understood for what purpose he was coming; and on another of them making a secret nod, and out of kindness showing him [their object], he set off running to the temple of Minerva of the Brazen-House, and reached his place of refuge first; for the sacred ground was near at hand. To avoid suffering from exposure to the open air, he entered a building of no great size, which formed part of the temple, and remained quiet in it. The ephors were at the moment distanced in the pursuit; but afterward they took off the roof of the building; and having watched him in, and cut him off from egress, they barricaded the doors; and sitting down before the place, reduced him by starvation. When he was on the point of expiring in his present situation in the building, on perceiving it, they took him out of the temple while still breathing; and when he was taken out, he died immediately. They were going therefore to cast him, as they do malefactors, into the Cæadas; but afterward they thought it best to bury him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi subsequently ordered the Lacedæmonians to remove the tomb to where he died (and he now lies

<sup>1</sup> i. e., to the temple of Neptune on the promontory of Tænarus, which enjoyed the privileges of an asylum, or sanctuary.

in the entrance to the sacred ground, as monumental columns declare in writing); and as what had been done was a pollution to them, he ordered them to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen-House. So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias.

135. The Athenians, then, inasmuch as the god himself had decided this to be a pollution, retorted by commanding the Lacedæmonians to drive it out. Now the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians, and charged Themistocles also as an accomplice in the medizing of Pausanias, as they discovered from the examinations in his case; and demanded that he should be punished with the same penalties. In compliance with this (he happened to have been ostracised, and though he had a residence at Argos, used to travel about to the rest of the Peloponnese), they sent with the Lacedæmonians, who were very ready to join in the pursuit, certain men who were told to bring him wherever they might fall in with him.

136. Themistocles, being aware of this beforehand, fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra; for he had been a benefactor to that people. But when the Corcyræans alleged that they were afraid to keep him at the risk of incurring the enmity of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he was carried over by them to the mainland opposite. And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the work, as they heard on inquiry in what direction he was going, he was compelled in a strait to stop at the house of Admetus, the king of the Molossians, who was not on friendly terms with him. He happened to be from home; but Themistocles, addressing himself as a suppliant to his wife, was instructed by her to take their child, and seat himself on the hearth. And when Admetus came not long after, he declared who he was, and begged him not to avenge himself on a banished man, for whatever he himself might have urged against any request of his to the Athenians; "for in that case he would receive evil from the king, when he was far his inferior in power; whereas it was the part of a noble nature to avenge itself on its equals [alone], and on fair terms. Besides, he had himself opposed the king with regard to some request merely, and not on a point of bodily safety: whereas *he*, if he gave him up (he mentioned by whom and for what he was being pursued),

would deprive him of security of life." The king, after hearing him, raised him up with his son (for so he was sitting with him, and this was the most prevailing mode of supplication).

137. And when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came no long time after, he did not give him up; but as he wished to go to the king, sent him by land to the other sea, to Pydna, which was in Alexander's dominions. There he found a merchant vessel putting to sea for Ionia, and having gone on board was carried by a storm to the armament of the Athenians, that was blockading Naxos. In his fear he told the master who he was (for he was unknown to those in the vessel), and on what account he was flying; and said, that if he did not save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a pecuniary consideration; that their only hope of safety lay in no one's leaving the vessel till the voyage could be continued; and that if he complied with his request, he would remember him with becoming gratitude. The master did so; and after lying out at sea off the naval encampment a day and a night, subsequently arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded him by a present of money (for there came to him afterward money from Athens, sent by his friends, and from Argos that which had been secretly laid up there); and having gone up the country with one of the Persians on the coast, he sent a letter to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who was lately come to the throne. The purport of the letter was this: "I, Themistocles, am come to thee, who have done most harm of all the Greeks to your house, as long as I was compelled to defend myself against thy father who had attacked me, but still far more good, when he was retreating in circumstances of safety to me, but of peril to him. And return for a benefit is owed me;" (he mentioned his sending to him from Salamis previous information of the retreat of the Greeks, and the non-destruction of the bridges at that time through his instrumentality, to which he falsely laid claim;) "and now I am come with power to do thee great good, being persecuted by the Greeks because of my friendship for thee. But I wish to wait a year, and then explain in person to thee the objects of my coming."

138. The king, it is said, approved of his plan, and told him to do so. During the time that he waited he learned as much as he could of the Persian language, and the institutions of the country; and having gone to him after the expiration



of the year, he became an influential person with him, so as none of the Greeks had hitherto been, both on account of his previous reputation, and the hope which he suggested with regard to Greece, namely, that he would make it subject to him; but most of all, from his showing himself talented by actual proofs. For Themistocles was one who most clearly displayed the strength of natural genius, and was particularly worthy of admiration in this respect, more than any other man; for by his own talent, and without learning any thing toward it before, or in addition to it, he was both the best judge of things present with the least deliberation, and the best conjecturer of the future, to the most remote point of what was likely to happen. Moreover, the things which he took in hand he was also able to carry out; and in those in which he had no experience he was not at a loss<sup>1</sup> to form a competent judgment. He had too the greatest foresight of what was the better course or the worse in what was as yet unseen. In a word, by strength of natural talent, and shortness of study, he was the best of all men to do<sup>2</sup> off-hand what was necessary. He ended his life by disease; though some say that he purposely destroyed himself by poison, on finding that he was unable to perform what he had promised to the king. Now there is a monument to him in the Asiatic Magnesia, in the market-place; for he was governor of the country, the king having given him<sup>3</sup> Magnesia, which brought him in fifty

<sup>1</sup> "It should be remembered that τὸ κρῖναι, or the common-sense judgment which man may pass upon subjects which are not within their own peculiar study or possession, was constantly distinguished among the Greeks from that full knowledge, whether theoretical or practical, which enables men not only to judge of things when done, but to do them themselves. See II. 40. 3. VI. 39. 1. And on this principle the people at large were considered competent judges of the conduct of their magistrates, though they might be very unfit to be magistrates themselves."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as *Arnold* renders it, "in determining on a moment's notice." "His wisdom was so little the result of study, that sudden emergencies did not perplex him, as they would those who, being accustomed to trust wholly to it, are called on at once to act without it."

<sup>3</sup> i. e., the land-tax or rent which was paid by these towns to the king, and which amounted generally to the tenth part of the produce, was given by him to Themistocles to furnish him with these articles of his establishment. In addition to similar instances mentioned in *Arnold's* note, I may refer to *Xenophon*, *Hellen.* III. 1. 6, who informs us that *Eurysthenes* and *Procles*, descendants of the Spartan king, *Demaratus*, continued to possess *Pergamus*, *Tenuthrania*, and *Halisarna*, the gift of the king of Persia to their exiled ancestors.

talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus for wine (for it was considered more productive of wine than any other place at that time), and Myus for provisions<sup>1</sup> in general. But his relations say that his bones were carried, by his own command, and laid in Attica without the knowledge of the Athenians; for it was not lawful to give them burial, as they were the bones of a man banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who had been the most distinguished of all the Greeks in their day.

139. On the occasion then of their first embassy the Lacedæmonians gave orders to this effect, and received commands in return about driving out the accursed. But on going subsequently to the Athenians, they commanded them to raise the siege of Potidæa, and leave Ægina independent; and declared, most especially and distinctly of all, that there would be no war, if they rescinded the decree respecting the Megareans, in which it had been declared that they should not use the ports in the Athenian empire, or the Attic market. But the Athenians were neither disposed to obey them in the other points nor to rescind the decree; as they charged the Megareans with an encroaching cultivation of the consecrated and uninclosed land, and with receiving the run-away slaves. Finally, when the last ambassadors had come from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and mentioned none of the things which they usually had before, but simply this, "The Lacedæmonians are desirous that there should be peace; and there would be, if you were to leave the Greeks independent;" the Athenians called an assembly, and proposed the subject for their consideration, and resolved, once for all, to deliberate and answer respecting all their demands. And many others came forward and spoke, supporting both views of the question; both that they should go to war, and that the decree should not be an obstacle to peace, but that they should rescind it: and then came forward Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the first man of the Athenians at that time, and most able both in speaking and acting, and advised them as follows.

<sup>1</sup> i. e., all additional articles of food, such as meat, fish, or vegetables, which were called by the common name of *δψον*, in opposition to bread and wine, which were considered the main supports of human life.

140. "I always adhere to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should make no concessions to the Lacedæmonians; although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, according to results, they also change their views. Still I see that the same advice, or nearly the same, must be given by me now as before; and I claim from those of you who are being persuaded to war, that you will support the common resolutions, should we ever meet with any reverse; or not, on the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. For it frequently happens that the results of measures proceed no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man; and therefore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all things that turn out contrary to our expectation. Now the Lacedæmonians were both evidently plotting against us before, and now especially are doing so. For whereas it is expressed in the treaty that we should give and accept judicial decisions of our differences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what we have; they have neither themselves hitherto asked for such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it; but wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating. For they command us to raise the siege of Potidæa, and to leave Ægina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megareans; while these last envoys that have come charge us also to leave the Greeks independent. But let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle, if we did not rescind the decree respecting the Megareans, which they principally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any room for self-accusation hereafter, as though you had gone to war for a trivial thing. For this trifle<sup>1</sup> involves the whole confirmation, as well as trial, of your purpose. If you yield to these demands, you will soon also be ordered to do something greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear:

<sup>1</sup> "Furnishes you with an opportunity of confirming your resolution, while it tries it." It would confirm their resolution, and secure it against future attempts of the enemy, for the reason given two lines afterward, ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσατε, κ. τ. λ. Ἐχει here exactly agrees with Gölter's explanation of it quoted in the note to c. 9. 2. "Ausam dat alicui rei."—*Arnold*.

but by resolutely refusing you would prove clearly to them that they must treat with you more on an equal footing.

141. "Henceforth then make up your minds, either to submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is better, on important or trivial grounds alike to make no concession, nor to keep with fear what we have now acquired; for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperiously urged on their neighbors previous to a judicial decision, amounts to the same degree of subjugation. Now with regard to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that we shall not be the weaker side, be convinced by hearing the particulars. The Peloponnesians are men who<sup>1</sup> cultivate their lands themselves; and they have no money either in private or public funds. Then they are inexperienced in long and transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this description can neither<sup>2</sup> man fleets nor often send out land armaments; being at the same time absent from their private business, and spending from their own resources; and, moreover, being also shut out from the sea: but it is super-abundant revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contributions. And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one *battle* the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together; but they could not carry on a *war* against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigor; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party; while others wish as little as possible to waste their own pro-

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "who work themselves;" in opposition to such as had slaves to work for them. The substantive *ἔργα*, and the verb *ἐργάζομαι*, are frequently used with especial reference to agricultural work, *e. g.* II. 72. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Göller repeats *ἐκπέμπειν* with *πληροῦντες*.

perty. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.

142. "Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations; whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet. With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them: and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and desertions<sup>1</sup>; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong. For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land. But to become skillful at sea will not easily be acquired by them. For not even have you, though practicing from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfection as yet; how then shall men who are agriculturalists and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted to practice, from being always observed<sup>2</sup> by us with many ships, achieve any thing worth speaking of? Against a few ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging their ignorance by their numbers; but when kept in check by many, they will remain quiet; and through not practicing will be the less skillful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval service is a matter of art, like any thing else; and does not admit of being practiced just when it may happen, as a by-work; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being a by-work to it.

<sup>1</sup> i. e., by harboring the slaves and others who might go over to them.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐπορευεῖν* means properly "to lie at anchor, or take up a station, with a hostile purpose;" hence, "to observe the movements of an enemy, with a view to attack him;" or, frequently, "to blockade him."

143. "Even if they should take some of the funds at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavor, by higher pay, to rob us of our foreign sailors, that would be alarming, if we were not a match for them, by going on board ourselves and our resident aliens; but now this is the case; and, what is best of all, we have native steersmen, and crews at large, more numerous and better than all the rest of Greece. And with the danger before them, none of the foreigners would consent to fly his country, and at the same time with less hope of success to join them in the struggle, for the sake of a few days' higher pay. The circumstances of the Peloponnesians then seem, to me at least, to be of such or nearly such a character; while ours seem both to be free from the faults I have found in theirs, and to have other great advantages in more than an equal degree. Again, should they come by land against our country, we will sail against theirs; and<sup>1</sup> the loss will be greater for even a part of the Peloponnese to be ravaged, than for the whole of Attica. For *they* will not be able to obtain any land in its stead without fighting for it; while *we* have abundance, both in islands and on the mainland. Moreover, consider it [in this point of view]: if we had been islanders, who would have been more impregnable? And we ought, as it is, with views as near as possible to those of islanders, to give<sup>2</sup> up all thought of our land and houses, and keep watch over the sea and the city; and not, through being enraged on their account, to come to an engagement with the Peloponnesians, who are much more numerous; (for if we defeat them, we shall have to fight again with no fewer of them; and if we meet with a reverse, our allies are lost also; for they will not remain quiet if we are not able to lead our forces against them;) and we should make lamentation, not for the houses and land, but for the lives [that are lost]; for it is not these things that gain men, but men that gain these things. And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would bid you go out yourselves and ravage them, and show the Peloponne-

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "it will no longer be the same thing for some part of the Peloponnese to be ravaged, and for the whole of Attica."

<sup>2</sup> ἀφίημι is used in a similar sense by Sophocles, CEd. Col. 914.

εἰτ' ἄφεις  
τὰ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς κύρι', ὥδ' ἐπεισπεσῶν,  
ἄγεις θ' ἂ χηρῆς, καὶ παρίστασαι βίαν.

sians that you will not submit to them for these things, at any rate.

144. "I have also many other grounds for hoping that we shall conquer, if you will avoid gaining additional dominion at the time of your being engaged in the war, and bringing on yourselves dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans. But those points shall be explained in another speech at the time of the events. At the present time let us send these men away with this answer: that with regard to the Megareans, we will allow them to use our ports and market, if the Lacedæmonians also abstain from expelling foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies<sup>1</sup> (for it forbids neither the one nor the other in the treaty): with regard to the states, that he will leave them independent, if we also held them as independent when we made the treaty; and when *they* too restore to the states a permission to be independent suitably to the interests,<sup>2</sup> not of the Lacedæmonians themselves, but of the several states, as they wish.: that we are willing to submit to judicial decision, according to the treaty: and that we will not commence hostilities, but will defend ourselves against those who do. For this is both a right answer and a becoming one for the state to give. But you should know that go to war we must; and if we accept it willingly rather than not, we shall find the enemy less disposed to press us hard; and, moreover; that it is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honors also are gained, both by state and by individual. Our fathers, at any rate, by withstanding the Medes—though they did not begin with such resources [as we have], but had even abandoned what they had—and by counsel, more than by fortune, and by daring, more than by strength, beat off the barbarian, and advanced those resources to their present height. And we must not fall short of them; but must repel our enemies in every way, and endeavor to bequeath our power to our posterity no less [than we received it]."

145. Pericles spoke to this effect; and the Athenians,

<sup>1</sup> Arnold, after Hermann, understands *ἐκεῖνο* and *τόδε* as accusatives, and supplies *τι* as the nominative case to *κωλύει*. Göller, after Haack, understands *κωλύει* as impersonal, "neither the one nor the other is a hinderance in the treaty."

<sup>2</sup> Compare chap. 19. 1. 76. 1.

thinking that he gave them the best advice, voted as he desired them, and answered the Lacedæmonians according to his views, both on the separate points, as he told them, and generally, that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to have their complaints settled by judicial decision, according to the treaty, on a fair and equal footing. So they went back home, and came on no more embassies afterward.

146. These were the charges and differences that each side had before the war, beginning from the very time of the affairs at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless they continued to have intercourse during them, and to go to each other's country without any herald, though not without suspicion; for what was taking place served to break up the treaty, and was a pretext for war.



## BOOK II.

1. THE war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and their respective allies now begins from this period, at which they ceased from further intercourse with each other without a herald, and having once proceeded to hostilities, carried them on continuously; and the history of it is written in order, as the several events happened, by summers and winters.

2. For the thirty years' truce which was made after the reduction of Eubœa lasted fourteen years; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, and Ænesias was ephor of Sparta, and Pythodorus had still two months to be archon at Athens; in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the beginning of spring, rather more than three hundred men of the Thebans (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylidas, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Bœotarchs), about the first<sup>1</sup> watch entered with their arms into Platæa, a town of Bœotia, which was in alliance with the Athenians. There were certain men of the Platæans who called them in, and opened the gates to them, namely, Naucrides and his party, who wished, for the sake of their own power, to put to death those of the citizens who were opposed to them, and to put the city into the hands of the Thebans. They carried on these negotiations through Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, a very influential person at Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing that the war would take place, wished to surprise Platæa, which had always been at variance with them, while it was still time of peace, and the war had not openly broken out. And on this account, too, they entered the more easily without being observed, as no guard had been set before [the gates]. After piling their arms in the market-place, they did not comply with the wish of those who called them in by immediately setting to work, and going to the houses of their adversaries; but determined

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "first sleep."

to make a proclamation in friendly terms, and to bring the city to an agreement rather, and to friendship; and the herald proclaimed, that whoever wished to make alliance according to the hereditary principles of all the Bœotians, should come and pile<sup>1</sup> his arms with them, supposing that the city would easily come over to them by this method.

3. The Platæans, on finding that the Thebans were within their walls, and that their city was unexpectedly taken, being very much alarmed, and thinking that far more had entered than really had (for they did not see them in the night), came to an agreement, and having accepted the terms, remained quiet; especially since they were proceeding to no violent measures against any one. But by some means or other, while making these negotiations, they observed that the Thebans were not numerous, and thought that by attacking them they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the great body of the Platæans to revolt from the Athenians. They determined therefore to make the attempt; and proceeded to join each other by digging through the partition-walls [of their houses], that they might not be seen going through the streets; and set wagons, without the cattle, in the streets, to serve for a barricade; and got every thing else ready, as each seemed likely to be of service for the business in hand. When things were in readiness; as far as they could make them so, having watched for the time when it was still night and just about day-break, they began to go out of their houses against them; that they<sup>2</sup> might not attack them by day-light, when they would be more bold, and on equal terms with themselves, but in the night, when they would be more timid, and fight at a disadvantage through their own acquaintance with the city. So they assailed them immediately, and came to close quarters with them as quickly as they could.

<sup>1</sup> "The Thebans, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever they should be required either to march or to fight."—*Arnold*. See his whole note.

<sup>2</sup> The original is rendered obscure by the singular change in the subjects of the two verbs, *προσφέρωνται* and *γίγνωνται*; the former referring to the Platæans, the latter to the Thebans. I have allowed myself a little more license than usual in translating the passage, to avoid the awkwardness of a literal version.

4. The Thebans, on finding themselves outwitted, proceeded to close their ranks, and repel their attacks, wherever they might fall upon them. And twice or thrice they beat them off; but afterward, when the men were assailing them with a great clamor, and the women and slaves were raising a loud shouting and screaming from the houses, and pelting them with stones and tiles, and a violent rain also had come on in the night, they were frightened, and turned and fled through the city, the greater part of them, through the dark and dirt (for the event happened at the end of the month), being unacquainted with the ways out, by which they were to save themselves; while they had pursuers who were acquainted with them,<sup>1</sup> to prevent their escaping: so that many were put to death. Moreover, one of the Platæans had shut the gate by which they had entered, and which was the only one opened, by driving the spike of a spear into the bar, instead of a bolt<sup>2</sup>; so that there was no longer any way out even by that. As they were chased up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, and perished most of them: others came to a lone gate, and, a woman having given them an ax, cut through the bar without being observed, and went out, but in no great numbers, for it was quickly discovered; while others met their fate scattered about in different parts of the city. But the largest and most united body of them rushed into a spacious building which joined on to the wall, and the near door of which happened to be open, thinking that the door of the building was a gate [of the city], and that there was a passage straight through to the outside. When the Platæans saw them cut off, they consulted whether

<sup>1</sup> "Τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν." Poppo observes that the infinitive does not express a purpose, as it does elsewhere, but a result. Arnold supposes that "when thus added to sentences in the genitive case, it denotes properly neither an intended nor an unintended result, but simply a connection, or belonging to, in the attached idea with respect to that which had preceded it. 'Having their pursuers well acquainted with the ways, which thing belonged to, or was connected with, their not escaping.'"

<sup>2</sup> "The βύλανος was a sort of pin or bolt inserted into the bar, and going through it into the gates. When driven quite home, it could of course only be extracted by a key whose pipe exactly corresponded to it in size, so as to take a firm hold on it: and hence the key was called βαλανάγρα, or catch-bolt, from its catching and so drawing out the βύλανος. The effect of putting in this spike was exactly that of spiking a cannon; it could not again be extracted, as there was no proper key to fit it."—Arnold.

they should burn them where they were, by setting fire to the building, or treat them in any other way. At last, both those and all the rest of the Thebans that were yet alive, and wandering up and down the city, agreed to deliver up themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to do with them as they pleased. Thus then fared the party who were in Plataea.

5. The rest of the Thebans, who were to have joined them with all their forces while it was still night, in case those who had entered should be at all unsuccessful, on receiving on their march the tidings of what had happened, advanced to their succor. Now Plataea is seventy stades distant from Thebes, and the rain which had fallen in the night made them proceed the slower; for the river Asopus was flowing with a full stream, and was not to be crossed easily. So by marching through the rain, and having passed the river with difficulty, they arrived too late; as some of the men had been by this time slain, and others of them were kept alive as prisoners. When the Thebans learned what had happened, they formed a design against those of the Plataeans who were outside the city (for there were both men and stock in the fields, inasmuch as the evil had happened unexpectedly in time of peace), for they wished to have all they could take to exchange for their own men within, should any happen to have been taken alive. Such were their plans. But the Plataeans, while they were still deliberating, having suspected that there would be something of this kind, and being alarmed for those outside, sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had not acted justly in what had been done, by endeavoring to seize their city in time of treaty; and told them not to injure what was without; else *they* also would put to death the men whom they had alive in their hands; but if they withdrew again from the territory, they would give the men back to them. The Thebans give this account of the matter, and say that they swore to it. But the Plataeans do not acknowledge that they promised to give back the men *immediately*, but when proposals had first been made, in case of their coming to any agreement: and they deny that they swore to it. At any rate the Thebans retired from the ter-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., whichever of the two different statements was the more correct one. Such I think is generally the meaning of *ὅ' οὖν*; and I doubt whether it has not this force, I. 3. 5. *Οἱ δ' οὖν ὡς ἕκαστοι Ἕλληνες, κ. τ. λ.* "Whatever truth there may be in the theory just stated, cer-

ritory without having done any injury; but the Plataeans, after getting in as quickly as possible whatever they had in the country, immediately put the men to death. Those who had been taken were one hundred and eighty, and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had negotiated, was one of them.

6. When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged matters in the city to suit their present circumstances, as seemed best to them.—Now news had immediately been taken to the Athenians of what had been done with respect to the Plataeans; and they straightway seized as many of the Boeotians as were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea, with orders to forbid their proceeding to extremities, in the case of the Thebans whom they had in their hands, till *they* also should take counsel about them: for tidings of their being dead had not yet reached them. For the first messenger [of the Plataeans] had gone out at the very time of the entering of the Thebans; and the second, when they had just been conquered and taken: so that of the subsequent events they knew nothing. Thus then the Athenians were in ignorance when they sent their order; and the herald, on his arrival, found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea, and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in it, and took out the least efficient of the men with the women and children.

7. When the business at Plataea had occurred, and the treaty had been clearly broken, the Athenians began to prepare for going to war; and so did the Lacedæmonians and their allies, both intending to send embassies to the king, and to the barbarians in other parts, from whatever quarter either party hoped to gain any assistance, and bringing into alliance with them such states as were not in their power. And on the side of the Lacedæmonians, in addition to the ships already on the spot in Sicily and Italy, belonging to those who had espoused their cause, they were ordered to build more according to the greatness of the cities, so that in the whole number *tainly* the Greeks did nothing in one united body," etc. Thus it approaches more nearly in signification to *γούν* than to the simple *οὐν*, with which it generally seems to be regarded as synonymous. The tragedians very frequently use it in this manner. In other passages, however, it has the proper force of each particle, "and accordingly."

<sup>1</sup> For the construction of this obscure sentence, see Arnold's note.

they should amount to five hundred; and to get ready a certain sum of money which was mentioned, while they remained quiet in other respects, and received the Athenians coming with a single ship, till these preparations should be made. The Athenians, on the other hand, were inspecting their present confederacy, and sending ambassadors to the countries more immediately around the Peloponnese, as Corcyra, Cephalenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; seeing that if these were firm friends to them, they would successfully carry on the war round the Peloponnese.

8. Indeed both parties had no small designs, but put forth their strength to the war: and not unnaturally; for all men at the beginning apply themselves to it more eagerly; and at that time the young men, being numerous in the Peloponnese, and also at Athens, were, through their inexperience, not unwilling to engage in the war. And the rest of Greece was all in excitement at the conflict of the principle states. And many prophecies<sup>1</sup> were repeated, and reciters of oracles were singing many of them, both among those who were going to war and in the other states. Moreover, Delos had been visited by an earthquake a short time before this, though it had never had a shock before in the memory of the Greeks; and it was said and thought to have been ominous of what was about to take place. And whatever else of this kind had happened to occur was all searched up. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedæmonians, especially as they gave out that they were the liberators of Greece. And every individual, as well as state, put forth his strength to help them in whatever he could, both by word and deed; and each thought that the cause was impeded at that point at which he himself would not be present. So angry were the generality with the Athenians; some from a wish to be released from their dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it. With such preparations and feelings then did they enter on the contest.

<sup>1</sup> Poppo, Bredow, and Haack agree in considering *λόγια* as a more general term for any prophetic announcement whatever, in opposition to *χρησμοί*, which were metrical compositions, generally in hexameters or trimeter iambics, delivered by an *oracle*, and recited by persons who collected them, and were called *χρησμολόγοι*. For a specimen of the class, see the Birds of Aristophanes, v. 960.

9. Each party had the following states in alliance when they set to the war. The allies of the Lacedæmonians were these: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans (these were in friendship with both parties; and the Pellenians were the only people of the Achæans that joined in the war at first, though afterward all of them did); and without the Peloponnese, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the states which furnished a navy were the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. Those that supplied cavalry were the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The rest of them sent infantry. This then was the Lacedæmonian confederacy. That of the Athenians comprehended the Chians, Lesbians, Plateans, the Messenians at Naupactus, the greater part of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, the Zacynthians: also some other states which were tributary among the following nations; as the maritime parts of Caria, and Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Greek towns Thrace ward; the islands, which were situated between the Peloponnese and Crete, toward the east,<sup>1</sup> and all the rest of the Cyclades except Moles and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyreans, furnished a naval force, the rest of them infantry and money. Such was the confederacy on each side, and their resources for the war.

10. The Lacedæmonians, immediately after what had happened at Plataea, sent round orders through the Peloponnese and the rest of their confederacy, for the states to prepare an army and such provisions as it was proper to have for a foreign expedition, with a view to invading Attica. When they had each got ready by the appointed time, two thirds from every state assembled at the Isthmus. And after the whole army was mustered, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedæmonians, who led this expedition, summoned to his pres-

<sup>1</sup> I am inclined to think that *αἱ ἄλλαι Κυκλάδες* may signify the more westerly part of the group, in opposition to *ποῖς ἡλίον ἀνίσχονσα*. Otherwise Bloomfield's must be the only correct version; "namely, all the Cyclades," etc. The fact of both Melos and Thera being among the most southerly of all the islands seems entirely to overthrow Gôller's interpretation of the passage, which would refer *αἱ ἄλλαι Κυκλάδες* to the islands east of Greece Proper, in contradistinction to the Peloponnese and Crete.

ence the generals of all the states, and those highest in office and of most importance, and spoke to the following purport :

11. "Men of the Peloponnese and allies, both our fathers made many expeditions, as well in the Peloponnese as out of it, and the elder part of ourselves are not without experience in wars. Never yet, however, have we marched out with a greater force than this ; but we are now going against a most powerful state, and with a most numerous and most excellently equipped army on our own side. We ought then to show ourselves neither inferior to our fathers, nor degenerated from our own character. For the whole of Greece has its expectation raised, and is paying attention to this attack, with good wishes that we may succeed in our designs, through their hatred of the Athenians. Though, then, some may think that we are making the attack with superior numbers, and that it is very certain our adversaries will not meet us in battle, we must not, for this reason, go at all less carefully prepared ; but both the general and soldier of each state should, as far as concerns himself, be always expecting to come into danger. For the events of war are uncertain, and attacks are generally made in it with short notice, and under the impulse of passion ; frequently, too, has the less number, through being afraid, more successfully repelled the more numerous forces, through their being unprepared in consequence of their contempt. In the enemy's country indeed men ought always to march with boldness of feeling, but at the same time to make their actual preparations with a degree of fear ; for in this way they would be at once most full of courage for attacking their adversaries, and most secure against being attacked. But in our own case, we are not going against a state that is so powerless to defend itself, but against one most excellently provided with every thing ; so that we must fully expect that they will meet us in battle ; and if they have not already set out before we are there, yet [that they will do so], when they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their property. For all are angry, when suffering any unwonted evil, to see it done before their eyes, and in their very presence : and those who [on such provocation] reflect the least, set to work with the greatest passion [to avenge themselves]. And it is natural that the Athenians should do so even to a greater ex-



tent than others, since they presume to rule the rest of the world, and to go against and ravage their neighbors' land, rather than see their own ravaged. As then we are marching against a state of this description, and shall gain for our forefathers, as well as for ourselves, the most decided character, one way or the other, from the results; follow where any one may lead you, valuing order and caution above every thing, and with quickness receiving your commands. For this is the finest and the safest thing that can be seen, for a large body of men to show themselves maintaining uniform discipline."

12. Having thus spoken, and dismissed the assembly, Archidamus first sent Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens; in case the Athenians might be more disposed to submit, when they saw that the Peloponnesians were now on their march. But they did not admit him into the city, nor to their assembly; for the opinion of Pericles had previously been adopted, not to admit any herald with an embassy from the Lacedæmonians, when they had once marched out from their frontiers. They sent him back therefore before hearing him, and ordered him beyond the borders that same day, and [to tell those who sent him] that in future, if they wished to propose any thing, they should send ambassadors after they had retired to their own territories. And they sent an escort with Melesippus, to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he was on the frontiers, and was about to be dismissed, he spoke these words and departed: "This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece." When he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus found that the Athenians would not yet submit at all, he then set out and advanced with his army into their territory. At the same time, the Bœotians, while they furnished their contingent and their cavalry to join the Peloponnesians in their expedition, went to Platæa with the remainder of their force, and laid waste their land.

13. While the Peloponnesians were still assembling at the Isthmus, and were on their march, before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, who was general of the Athenians with nine colleagues, when he found that the invasion would take place, suspected that either Archidamus, because he happened to be his friend, might frequently pass over his

lands, and not ravage them, from a personal wish to oblige him; or that this might be done at the command of the Lacedæmonians for the purpose of raising a slander against him—as it was also with reference to him that they had charged them to drive out the accursed; and therefore he publicly declared to the Athenians in the assembly, that though Archidamus was his friend, he had not been admitted into his friendship for any harm to the state; should, then, the enemy not lay waste his lands and houses, like those of the rest, he gave them up to be public property, and that no suspicion might arise against them on these grounds. He gave them advice also on their present affairs, the same as he had before given; namely, to prepare for the war, and bring in their property from the country, and not go out against them to battle, but to come in and guard the city, and get ready their fleet, in which they were so strong, and keep the allies tight in hand; reminding them that their main strength was derived from the returns of the money paid by these, and that most of the advantages in war were gained by counsel and abundance of money. And [on this head] he told them to be of good courage, as the state had, on an average, six hundred talents coming in yearly as tribute from the allies, not reckoning its other sources of income; while there were still at that time in the Acropolis 6000 talents of coined silver; (for the greatest sum there had ever been was 9700 talents, from which had been taken what was spent on the propylæa of the citadel, and the other buildings, and on Potidæa;) and besides, of uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, and all the sacred utensils for the processions and games, and the Median spoils, and every thing else of the kind, there was not less than 500 talents. Moreover, he added the treasures in the other temples,<sup>1</sup> to no small amount, which they would use; and, in case of their being absolutely excluded from all resources, even the golden appendages of the goddess herself; explaining to them that the statue contained 40 talents of pure gold, and that it was all removable; and after using it for their preservation they must, he said, restore it to the same amount. With regard to money, then, he thus encouraged them. And as for heavy-armed troops, he told them that they had thirteen thousand, besides those in gar-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., besides the temple of Minerva, which was the public treasury.

risons and<sup>1</sup> on the ramparts to the number of sixteen thousand. For this was the number that kept guard at first, whenever the enemy made an incursion, drawn from the oldest and the youngest, and such of the resident aliens as were heavy-armed. For of the Phaleric wall there were five and thirty stades to the circuit of the city wall; and of that circuit itself the guarded part was three and forty stades; a certain part of it being unguarded, viz. that between<sup>2</sup> the long wall and the Phaleric. There were also the long walls to the Piræus, a distance of forty stades, of which the outer one was manned; while the whole circumference of Piræus with Munychia was sixty stades, though the guarded part was only half that extent. Of cavalry, again, he showed them that they had twelve hundred, including mounted bowmen; with sixteen hundred bowmen [on foot], and three hundred triremes fit for service. These resources, and no fewer than these in their several kinds, had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first going to be made, and when they were setting to the war. Other statements also did Pericles make to them, as he was accustomed, to prove that they would have the superiority in the war.

14. The Athenians were persuaded by what they heard from him; and proceeded to bring in from the country their children and wives, and all the furniture which they used in their houses, pulling down even the wood-work of their residences; while they sent their sheep and cattle over to Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But the removal was made by them with reluctance, from the greater part having always been accustomed to live in the country.

15. This had, from the very earliest times, been the case with the Athenians more than with others. For under Cecrops, and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus,<sup>3</sup> the population of Athens had always inhabited independent cities, with their own guild-halls and magistrates; and at

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "soldiers to line a parapet," i. e., "for garrison duty."—Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., the Piraic wall, in opposition to the Phaleric. It is sometimes spoken of in the plural number, τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη, because an inner, or southern, wall was added to the original one by Pericles. See Arnold's and Göller's notes.

<sup>3</sup> Or, "Attica had always been inhabited by a number of independent communities," or "civil societies," as Arnold renders it.

such times as they were not in fear of any danger, they did not meet the king to consult with him, but themselves severally conducted their own government, and took their own counsel; and there were instances in which some of them even waged war [against him], as the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did against Erechtheus. But when Theseus had come to the throne, who along with wisdom had power also, he both regulated the country in other respects, and having abolished the council-houses and magistracies of the other cities, he brought them all into union with the present city, assigning them one guild-hall and one council-house; and compelled them all, while they enjoyed each their own property as before, to use this one city only; which, since all were counted as belonging to it, became great, and was so bequeathed by Theseus to those who came after him. And from that time even to this the Athenians keep, at the public expense, a festival to the goddess, called *Synæcia*.<sup>1</sup> Before that time, what is now the citadel was the city, with the district which lies under it, looking chiefly toward the south. And this is a proof of it; the temples of the other gods as well [as of Minerva] are in the citadel itself, and those that are out of it are situated chiefly in this part of the city; as that of the Olympian Jupiter, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in whose honor the more ancient festival of Bacchus is held on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion; as the Ionians also, who are descended from the Athenians, even to this day observe it. And there are other ancient temples also situated in this quarter. The conduit too, which is now called Enneacrunus, [or, nine-pipes,] from the tyrants having so constituted it, but which had formerly the name of Calirrhoe, when the springs were open, the men of that day used, as it was near, on the most important occasions; and even at the present time they are accustomed, from the old fashion, to use the water before marriages, and for other sacred purposes. Moreover, from their living of old in this quarter, the citadel even to this day is called by the Athenians the city.

16. For a long time then the Athenians enjoyed their independent life in the country; and after they were united, still, from the force of habit, the generality of them at that early

<sup>1</sup> i. e., the feast of the union.

period, and even afterward, down to the time of this war, having with all their families settled and lived in the country, did not remove without reluctance (especially as they had but lately recovered their establishments after the Median war), but were distressed and grieved to leave their houses, and the temples which, according to the spirit of the ancient constitution, had always been regarded by them as the places<sup>1</sup> of their hereditary worship; going, as they now were, to change their mode of life, and each<sup>2</sup> of them doing what was equivalent to leaving his native city.

17. When they came into the city, some few indeed had residences, and a place of refuge with some of their friends or relations; but the great bulk of them dwelt in the unoccupied parts of the city, and in all the temples and hero-chapels, except the Acropolis, and the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and any other that was kept constantly locked up. The Pelasgium also, as it is called, under the Acropolis, which it was even forbidden by a curse to inhabit, and prohibited by the end of a Pythian oracle, to this effect, "the Pelasgium is better unoccupied," was nevertheless built over, from the immediate necessity of the case. And, in my opinion, the oracle proved true in the contrary way to what was expected. For it was not, I think, because of their unlawfully inhabiting this spot, that such misfortunes befell the city; but it was owing to the war that the necessity of inhabiting it arose; which war though the god did not mention, he foreknew that [owing to it] the Pelasgium would hereafter be inhabited for no good. Many, too, quartered themselves in the towers of the walls, and in whatever way each could: for the city did not hold them when they were come all together; but subsequently they occupied the long walls, partitioning them out among them, and the greater part of the Piræus. At the same time they also applied themselves to matters connected with the war; mustering their allies, and equipping an armament of a hundred ships for the Peloponnesse. The Athenians then were in this state of preparation.

18. As for the army of the Peloponnesians, on the other

<sup>1</sup> And therefore the only ones in which they thought the gods would receive their prayers and sacrifices. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "doing nothing else but leaving," etc. Compare III. 39. 2. τί ἄλλο οὗτοι, ἢ ἐπεβούλευσαν; and IV. 14. 3. οὐδεν ἄλλο ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν. See Jelf's Gr. Gr. 895. c.

hand, the first town it came to in Attica was CEnoe, at which point they intended to make their inroad. And having sat down before it, they prepared to make assaults on the wall, both with engines and in every other way. For CEnoe, as lying on the frontiers of Attica and Bœotia, had been surrounded with a wall, and the Athenians used it as a garrisoned fort, whenever any war befell them. They prepared then for assaulting it, and wasted their time about it to no purpose. And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest censure: though he had, even while the war was gathering, been thought to show a want of spirit, and to favor the Athenians, by not heartily recommending hostilities. And again, after the army was mustered, the stay that was made at the Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, gave occasion for charges against him, but most of all his stopping at CEnoe. For the Athenians during this time were carrying in their property, and the Peloponnesians thought that by advancing against them quickly they would have found every thing still out, but for his dilatoriness. Such resentment did the army feel toward Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, was waiting in expectation that the Athenians would give in, while their land was still unravaged, and would shrink from enduring to see it wasted.

19. When, however, after assaulting CEnoe, and trying every method, they were unable to take the place, and the Athenians sent no herald to them, then indeed they set out from before it, and about eighty days after the events at Platæa, caused by the Thebans who had entered it, when the summer was at its height and the corn ripe, they made their incursion into Attica; Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the La-

<sup>1</sup> By the expression, ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου, he refers to the gradual maturing of their hostile intentions, and especially to the efforts of the Corinthians to induce a positive declaration of hostilities, as narrated in the first book; and so to precipitate that "storm of war" (to use a common metaphor) which had long been "gathering." Bloomfield is correct in saying that "it can not signify, as the translators render, 'in gathering the forces together,' which would be a strange *Hysteron proteron*." But I do not think that either of the passages he quotes can warrant his rendering ξυναγωγῇ by "congress;" for in one of them ξυνάγειν is followed by its proper accusative case, and in the other ξυναγωγῇ has its proper genitive, as it evidently has here; though, were it otherwise, such an absolute use of the word by Polybius would by itself be no authority for supposing that Thucydides used it in the same way.

cedæmonians, being their commander. After pitching their camp there, they first ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and put to flight some Athenian cavalry near a place called Rheiti [or "the brooks"]. Afterward they continued their march, keeping Mount Ægaleos on their right through Cropæa, till they came to Acharnæ, a place which is the largest of the *demes*, [or townships,] as they are called, of Attica. And sitting down before it they formed an encampment, and staid a long time in the place, and continued ravaging it.

20. It was with the following views that Archidamus is said to have remained in order of battle at Acharnæ; and not to have gone down to the plain during that incursion. He hoped that the Athenians, abounding as they were in numbers of young men, and prepared for war as they had never before been, would perhaps come out against him, and not stand still and see their land ravaged. Since, then, they had not met him at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, he pitched his camp at Acharnæ, and tried whether they would now march out against him. For he thought the post a favorable one for encamping in, and moreover that the Acharnians forming as they did a large part of the state, (for they amounted to three thousand heavy-armed,) would not overlook the destruction of what belonged to them, but would stir up the whole army also to an engagement. If, on the other hand, the Athenians should *not* come out against him during that incursion, he would then lay waste the plain with less fear in future, and advance to the city itself; for the Acharnians, after losing their own property, would not be so forward to run into danger for that of other people, but there would be a division in their counsels. It was with this view of the case that Archidamus remained at Acharnæ.

21. As for the Athenians, so long as the army was in the neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they had some hope of its not advancing nearer; remembering the case of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias the king of the Lacedæmonians, when with a Peloponnesian army he made an inroad into Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, fourteen years before this war, and retired again without advancing any further (for which reason indeed he was banished from Sparta, as he was thought to have been bribed to make the retreat). When, however, they saw the army at Acharnæ, only sixty

stades from the city, they considered it no longer bearable, and, as was natural, when their land was being ravaged before their eyes—a thing which the younger men had never yet seen, nor even the elder, except in the Persian wars—it was thought a great indignity, and all of them, especially the young men, determined to go out against them, and not to put up with it. They met therefore in knots and were in a state of great dissension, some urging them to go out, others dissuading them from it. Prophets too were repeating all kinds of oracles, to which they' eagerly listened, as they were severally disposed. The Acharnians especially, thinking that no considerable part of the Athenian forces was in their ranks, urged them to march out, while their land was being ravaged. Nay, in every way the city was excited; and they were angry with Pericles, and remembered none of the advice which he had before given them, but abused him for not leading them out as their general; and they regarded him as the author of all that they were suffering.

22. He, in the mean time, seeing them angry at the present state of things and not in the best mind; and being confident that he took a right view in not wishing to march out against the enemy, did not call them to an assembly, or any other meeting (that they might not commit themselves by coming together with more anger than judgment); but looked to the defense of the city and kept it quiet, as far as possible. He was, however, continually sending out cavalry, to prevent the advanced guard of the army from falling on the estates near the city and ravaging them. There was also a skirmish of cavalry at Phrygia, between one squadron of the Athenian horse, joined by some Thessalians, and the cavalry of the Bœotians, in which the Athenians and Thessalians had rather the advantage, until, on the heavy-armed coming to the succor of the Bœotians, they were routed, and some few of them killed: they took up their bodies, however, on the same day without a truce; and the Peloponnesians erected a trophy the day after. This assistance on the part of the Thessalians was given to the Athenians on the ground of their ancient alliance; and those

<sup>1</sup> "The construction seems to be, that the finite verb ὤρηντο is in sense repeated: 'which they were eager to listen to, as each was eager: which they were severally eager to listen to.' He adds ὡς ἕκαστος ὤρηντο, because different persons ran to listen to different prophesies, each choosing those which encouraged his own opinions or feelings."—Arnold.



who came to them consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, [Parasians,] Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheræans. Their commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, each from his own faction, and Menon from Pharsalus. The rest also had their commanders according to their respective cities.

23. The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not come out against them to battle, broke up from before Acharnæ, and proceeded to ravage some others of the townships between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in the country, the Athenians dispatched round the Peloponnese the hundred ships they were preparing, [when I last mentioned them,] with a thousand heavy-armed on board, and four hundred bowmen under the command of Caranus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. So they weighed anchor, and were cruising round with this armament; while the Peloponnesians, after staying in Attica the time for which they had provisions, retired through Bœotia (not by the same way they had made their inroad), and passing by Oropus ravaged the Piraic territory, as it is called, which the Oropians inhabit as subjects to the Athenians. On arriving at the Peloponnese, they were disbanded, and returned to their several cities.

24. When they had retired, the Athenians set guards by land and by sea, as they intended to keep them through the whole war. And they resolved to take out and set apart a thousand talents from the money in the Acropolis, and not to spend them, but to carry on the war with their other resources; and if any one should move or put to the vote a proposition for applying that money to any other purpose, except in case of the enemy sailing against the city with a naval armament, and its being necessary to defend themselves, they declared it a capital offense. Together with this sum of money, they also laid by a hundred triremes, the best they had each year, and trierarchs for them; none of which were they to use except with the money, and in the same peril [as that was reserved for], should any such necessity arise.

25. The Athenians on board the hundred ships around Peloponnese, and the Corcyræans with them, who had come to their aid with fifty ships, and some others of the allies in those parts, ravaged other places as they cruised round, and landed at Methone in Laconia, and assaulted the wall, which was

weak and had no men<sup>1</sup> within it. Now Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in command of a guard for the defense of those parts; and, on hearing of the attack, he came to the assistance of those in the place with a hundred heavy-armed. Dashing, therefore, through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country, and had its attention directed toward the wall, he threw himself into Methone; and having lost a few of his own men in entering it, both saved the city, and from this daring deed was the first that received praise at Sparta in the course of the war. Upon this the Athenians weighed anchor, and coasted along; and landing at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the territory for two days, and conquered in battle three hundred picked men, who had come to the rescue from the inhabitants of the Vale of Elis,<sup>2</sup> and from the Eleans in the immediate neighborhood. But a violent wind coming down upon them, being exposed to the storm in a harborless place, the greater part of them went on board their ships, and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys, into the port at Pheia; but the Messenians, and some others who would not go on board, went in the mean time by land, and took Pheia. Afterward the fleet sailed round and picked them up, and they evacuated the place and put out to sea; the main army of the Eleans having by this time come to its rescue. The Athenians then coasted along to other places and ravaged them.

26. About the same time they sent out thirty ships to cruise about Locria, and also to serve as a guard for Eubœa. Their commander was Cleopompus, son of Clinius, who, making descents, ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium, and took hostages from them; defeating also in a battle at Alope, those of the Locrians who had come to the rescue.

27. This summer the Athenians also expelled the Æginetans from their island, themselves, their children, and wives, charging them with being the chief authors of the war they

<sup>1</sup> i. e., no garrison for its defense.

<sup>2</sup> "Or the valley of the Peneus, in which Elis itself was situated. This, as the richest of the whole territory, was naturally occupied by the conquering Ætolians, when they came in with the Dorians at what is called the return of the Heraclidæ. The neighborhood of Pheia, on the other hand, was inhabited by the descendants of the older people, who were conquered by the Ætolians, and now formed, as in so many Peloponnesian states, the subordinate class called *περιοικοί*."—Arnold.

were engaged in; besides which, it appeared safer to send settlers of their own to hold Ægina, lying so near as it does to the Peloponnese. No long time after therefore they sent the colonists to it; while to the Æginetans who were expelled the Lacedæmonians gave Thyrea to live in, and the territory to occupy, as well on the ground of their quarrel with the Athenians, as because they had been benefactors to themselves at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, stretching down to the sea. So some of them dwelled there, while others were scattered through the rest of Greece.

28. The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month (the only time at which it appears possible), the sun was eclipsed after mid-day, and became full again after it had assumed a crescent form, and after some of the stars had shone out.

29. It was also in the course of the same summer that Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister was the wife of Sitalces, and who had great influence with that monarch, was made their *prozenus*<sup>1</sup> by the Athenians, who had before considered him hostile to them, and was sent for by them, because they wished Sitalces, son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally. Now this Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first who founded the great kingdom of the Odrysæ on a larger scale than those in the rest of Thrace; for indeed a large part of the Thracians are independent. This Teres is not at all connected with Tereus who married from Athens Procne, the daughter of Pandion; nor were they of the same part of Thrace. The latter lived in Daulis, a part of what is now called Phocis, which was then inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the [cruel] deed to Itys, and by many of the poets, when they mention the nightingale, it is called the Daulian bird. Besides, it is probable that Pandion should have formed the connection for his daughter [with one who lived] at that distance, with a view to mutual succor, rather than at the distance of several days' journey [as it is] to the Odrysæ. On the other hand, Teres, besides not having the same name, was the first king of the *Odrysæ* that attained to any power.

<sup>1</sup> i. e., was publicly appointed by them to show hospitality to any of their citizens going to that country, and to look after their interests there; very nearly like a consul of modern Europe. See note, III. 70. 5.

Sitalces then, being this man's son, the Athenians made their ally, wishing him to join them in conquering the Thraceward towns and Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance with Sitalces, and made his own son Sadocus a citizen of Athens, and undertook to bring to a close the war on the side of Thrace: for he said he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, he reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and also persuaded them to restore Therme to him; and Perdiccas immediately joined in an expedition against the Chalcidians with the Athenians and Phormio. Thus Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, as also did Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

30. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels, still cruising around the Peloponnese, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, and gave it up to the Palæareans alone of the Acarnanians, to enjoy the territory and city; and having stormed Astacus, of which Evarchus was tyrant, they expelled him, and won the place for their confederacy. They then sailed to the island of Cephallenia, and brought it over to their side without fighting. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samæans, and Pronæans. Not long after, the ships returned to Athens.

31. About the autumn of this summer, the Athenians invaded the Megarid with all their forces, themselves and the resident aliens, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. And the Athenians in the hundred ships around the Peloponnese (for they happened at this time to be at Ægina on their return home), finding that the men of the city were in full force at Megara, sailed and joined them. And this was certainly the largest army of the Athenians that ever assembled together; as the city was at the height of its strength, and not yet afflicted with the plague; for of the Athenians themselves there were not fewer than ten thousand heavy-armed (besides which they had the three thousand at Potidæa), and of resident aliens who joined them in the incursion not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed; and added to these, there was all the crowd of light-armed in great numbers.

After ravaging the greater part of the territory, they returned. Other incursions into the Megarid were also afterward made annually by the Athenians in the course of the war, both with their cavalry and with all their force, until Nisæa was taken by them.

32. Moreover Atalanta, the island near the Opuntian Locrians, which had previously been unoccupied, was fortified by the Athenians as a stronghold at the close of this summer, to prevent privateers from sailing out from Opus and the rest of Locris, and plundering Eubœa. These were the events which occurred in the course of this summer, after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

33. The following winter Evarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy-armed and restore him, he himself hiring some auxiliaries besides: the commanders of the army were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxemus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. So they sailed and restored him; and wishing to gain certain places in the rest of Acarnania, along the coast, and having made an attempt without being able to succeed, they sailed back homeward. Having landed, as they coasted along, on Cephallenia, and made a descent on the territory of the Cranians, they were deceived by them after an arrangement that they had come to, and lost some of their men in an unexpected attack of the Cranians; then, having put out to sea with some precipitation, they returned home.

34. In the course of this winter the Athenians, in accordance with the custom of their forefathers, buried at the public expense those who had first fallen in the war, after the following manner. Having erected a tent, they lay out the bones of the dead three days before, and each one brings to his own relative whatever [funeral offering] he pleases. When the funeral procession takes place, cars convey coffins of cypress wood, one for each tribe; in which are laid the bones of every man, according to the tribe to which he belonged; and one empty bier is carried, spread in honor of the missing, whose bodies could not be found to be taken up. Whoever wishes, both of citizens and strangers, joins in the procession; and their female relatives attend at the burial to make the wailings. They lay them then in the public sepulcher, which is

in the fairest suburb of the city, and in which they always bury those who have fallen in the wars (except, at least, those who fell at Marathon; but to them, as they considered their valor distinguished above that of all others, they gave a burial on the very spot). After they had laid them in the ground, a man chosen by the state—one who in point of intellect is considered talented, and in dignity is pre-eminent—speaks over them such a panegyric as may be appropriate; after which they all retire. In this way they bury them: and through the whole of the war, whenever they had occasion, they observed the established custom. Over these who were first buried<sup>1</sup> at any rate, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when the time for doing so came, advancing from the sepulcher on to a platform, which had been raised to some height, that he might be heard over as great a part of the crowd as possible, he spoke to the following effect:

35. "The greater part of those who ere now have spoken in this place, have been accustomed to praise the man who introduced this oration into the law; considering it a right thing that it should be delivered over those who are buried after falling in battle. To me, however, it would have appeared sufficient, that when men had shown themselves brave by deeds, their honors also should be displayed by deeds—as you now see in the case of this burial, prepared at the public expense—and not that the virtues of many should be periled in one individual, for credit to be given him according as he expresses himself well or ill. For it is difficult to speak with propriety on a subject on which even the impression of one's truthfulness is with difficulty established. For the hearer who is acquainted [with the facts], and kindly disposed [toward those who performed them], might perhaps think them somewhat imperfectly set forth, compared with what he both wishes and knows; while he who is unacquainted with them might think that some points were even exaggerated, being led to this conclusion by envy, should he hear any thing surpassing his own natural powers. For praises spoken of others are only endured so far as each one thinks that he is himself also capable of doing any of the things he hears; but that which exceeds their own capacity men at once envy and disbelieve. Since, however, our ancestors judged this to

<sup>1</sup> Or, "accordingly over these," etc. See note, II. 5. 8.

be a right custom, I too, in obedience to the law, must endeavor to meet the wishes and views of every one, as far as possible.

36. "I will begin then with our ancestors first: for it is just, and becoming too at the same time, that on such an occasion the honor of being thus mentioned should be paid them. For always inhabiting the country without change, through a long succession of posterity, by their valor they transmitted it free to this very time. Justly then may they claim to be commended; and more justly still may our own fathers. For in addition to what they inherited, they acquired the great empire which we possess, and by painful exertions bequeathed it to us of the present day: though to most part of it have additions been made by ourselves here, who are still, generally speaking in the vigor of life; and we have furnished our city with every thing, so as to be most self-sufficient both for peace and for war. Now with regard to our military achievements, by which each possession was gained, whether in any case it were ourselves, or our fathers, that repelled with spirit hostilities brought against us by barbarian or Greek; as I do not wish to enlarge on the subject before you who are well acquainted with it, I will pass them over. But by what mode of life we attained to our power, and by what form of government and owing to what habits it became so great, I will explain these points first, and then proceed to the eulogy of these men; as I consider that on the present occasion they will not be inappropriately mentioned, and that it is profitable for the whole assembly, both citizens and strangers, to listen to them.

37. "For we enjoy a form of government which does not copy the laws of our neighbors; but we are ourselves rather a pattern to others than imitators of them. In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the few but of the many, it is called a democracy; but with regard to its laws, all enjoy equality, as concerns their private differences; while with regard to public rank, according as each man has reputation for any thing, he is preferred for public honors, not so much from consideration of party, as of merit; nor, again, on the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good service, is he prevented by the obscurity of his position. We are liberal then in our public administration; and with re-

gard to mutual jealousy of our daily pursuits, we are not angry with our neighbor, if he does any thing to please himself; nor wear on our countenance offensive looks, which though harmless, are yet unpleasant. While, however, in private matters we live together agreeably, in public matters, under the influence of fear, we most carefully abstain from transgression, through our obedience to those who are from time to time in office, and to the laws; especially such of them as are enacted for the benefit of the injured, and such as, though unwritten, bring acknowledged disgrace [on those who break them].

38. "Moreover, we have provided for our spirits the most numerous recreations from labors, by celebrating games and sacrifices through the whole year, and by maintaining elegant private establishments, of which the daily gratification drives away sadness. Owing to the greatness too of our city, every thing from every land is imported into it; and it is our lot to reap with no more peculiar enjoyment the good things which are produced here, than those of the rest of the world likewise.

39. "In the studies of war also we differ from our enemies in the following respects. We throw our city open to all, and never, by the expulsion of strangers, exclude any one from either learning or observing things, by seeing which unconcealed any of our enemies might gain an advantage; for we trust not so much to preparations and stratagems, as to our own valor for daring deeds. Again, as to our modes of education, *they* aim at the acquisition of a manly character, by laborious training from their very youth; while *we*, though living at our ease, no less boldly advance to meet equal dangers. As a proof of this, the Lacedæmonians never march against our country singly, but with all [their confederates] together: while we, generally speaking, have no difficulty in conquering in battle upon hostile ground those who are standing up in defense of their own. And no enemy ever yet encountered our whole united force, through our attending at the same time to our navy, and sending our troops by land on so many different services: but wherever they have engaged with any part of it, if they conquer only some of us, they boast that we were all routed by them; and if they are conquered, they say it was by all that they were beaten.



And yet if with careless ease rather than with laborious practice, and with a courage which is the result not so much of laws as of natural disposition, we are willing to face danger, we have the advantage of not suffering beforehand from coming troubles, and of proving ourselves, when we are involved in them, no less bold than those who are always toiling; so that our country is worthy of admiration in these respects, and in others besides.

40. "For we study taste with economy, and philosophy without effeminacy; and employ wealth rather for opportunity of action than for boastfulness of talking; while poverty is nothing disgraceful for a man to confess, but not to escape it by exertion is more disgraceful. Again, the same men can attend at the same time to domestic as well as to public affairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still form a sufficient judgment on political questions. For we are the only people that consider the man who takes no part in these things, not as unofficious, but as useless; and we ourselves judge rightly of measures, at any rate, if we do not originate them; while we do not regard words as any hinderance to deeds, but rather [consider it a hinderance] not to have been previously instructed by word, before undertaking in deed what we have to do. For we have this characteristic also in a remarkable degree, that we are at the same time most daring and most calculating in what we take in hand; whereas to other men it is ignorance that brings daring, while calculation brings fear. These, however, would deservedly be deemed most courageous, who know most fully what is terrible and what is pleasant, and yet do not on this account shrink from dangers. As regards beneficence also we differ from the generality of men; for we make friends, not by receiving, but by conferring kindness. Now he who has conferred the favor is the firmer friend, in order that he may keep alive the obligation by good will toward the man on whom he has conferred it; whereas he who owes it in return feels less keenly, knowing that it is not as a favor, but as a debt, that he will repay the kindness. Nay, we are the only men who fearlessly benefit any one, not so much from calculations of expediency, as with the confidence of liberality.

41. "In short, I say that both the whole city is a school for Greece, and that, in my opinion, the same individual would

among us prove himself qualified for the most varied kinds of action, and with the most graceful versatility. And that this is not mere vaunting language for the occasion, so much as actual truth, the very power of the state, which we have won by such habits, affords a proof. For it is the only country at the present time that, when brought to the test, proves superior to its fame; and the only one that neither gives to the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at being worsted by such opponents, nor to him who is subject to us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are worthy of empire. But we shall be admired both by present and future generations as having exhibited our power with great proofs, and by no means without evidence; and as having no further need, either of Homer to praise us, or any one else who might charm for the moment by his verses, while the truth of the facts would mar the idea formed of them; but as having compelled every sea and land to become accessible to our daring, and every where established everlasting records, whether of evil or of good. It was for such a country then that these men, nobly resolving not to have it taken from them, fell fighting; and every one of their survivors may well be willing to suffer in its behalf.

42. "For this reason, indeed, it is that I have enlarged on the characteristics of the state; both to prove that the struggle is not for the same object in our case as in that of men who have none of these advantages in an equal degree; and at the same time clearly to establish by proofs [the truth of] the eulogy of those men over whom I am now speaking. And now the chief points of it have been mentioned; for with regard to the things for which I have commended the city, it was the virtues of these men, and such as these, that adorned her with them; and few of the Greeks are there whose fame, like these men's, would appear but the just counterpoise of their deeds. Again, the closing scene of these men appears to me to supply an illustration of human worth, whether as affording us the first information respecting it, or its final confirmation. For even in the case of men who have been in other respects of an inferior character, it is but fair for them to hold forth as a screen their military courage in their country's behalf; for, having wiped out their evil by their good, they did more service collectively, than harm by their

individual offenses. But of these men there was none that either was made a coward by his wealth, from preferring the continued enjoyment of it; or shrank from danger through a hope suggested by poverty, namely, that he might yet escape it, and grow rich; but conceiving that vengeance on their foes was more to be desired than these objects, and at the same time regarding this as the most glorious of hazards, they wished by risking it to be avenged on their enemies, and so to aim at procuring those advantages; committing to hope the uncertainty of success, but resolving to trust to action, with regard to what was visible to themselves; and in that action, being minded rather to resist and die, than by surrendering to escape, they fled from the shame of [a discreditable] report, while they endured the brunt of the battle with their bodies; and after the shortest crisis, when at the very height of their fortune, were taken away from their glory rather than their fear.

43. "Such did these men prove themselves, as became the character of their country. For you that remain, you must pray that you may have a more successful resolution, but must determine not to have one less bold against your enemies; not in word alone considering the benefit [of such a spirit] (on which one might descant to you at great length—though you know it yourselves quite as well—telling you how many advantages are contained in repelling your foes); but rather day by day beholding the power of the city as it appears in fact, and growing enamored of it, and reflecting, when you think it great, that it was by being bold, and knowing their duty, and being alive to shame in action, that men acquired these things; and because, if they ever failed in their attempt at any thing, they did not on that account think it right to deprive their country also of their valor, but conferred upon her a most glorious joint-offering. For while collectively they gave her their lives, individually they received that renown which never grows old, and the most distinguished tomb they could have; not so much that in which they are laid, as that in which their glory is left behind them, to be everlastingly recorded on<sup>1</sup> every occasion for doing so, either by word or deed, that may from time to time present itself. For of illustrious men the whole earth

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "on every occasion, either of word or deed, that may from time to time present itself."

is the sepulcher; and not only does the inscription upon columns in their own land point it out, but in that also which is not their own there dwells with every one an unwritten memorial of the heart, rather than of a material monument. Vieing then with these men in your turn, and deeming happiness to consist in freedom, and freedom in valor, do not think lightly of the hazards of war. For it is not the unfortunate [and those] who have no hope of any good, that would with most reason be unsparing of their lives; but those who, while they live, still incur the risk of a change to the opposite condition, and to whom the difference would be the greatest, should they meet with any reverse. For more grievous, to a man of high spirit at least, is the misery which accompanies cowardice, than the unfelt death which comes upon him at once, in the time of his strength and of his hope for the common welfare.

44. "Wherefore to the parents of the dead—as many of them as are here among you—I will not offer condolence, so much as consolation. For they know that they have been brought up subject to manifold misfortunes; but that happy is *their* lot who have gained the most glorious—death, as these have,—sorrow, as you have; and to whom life has been so exactly measured; that they were both happy in it, and died in [that happiness]. Difficult, indeed, I know it is to persuade you of this, with regard to those of whom you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others, in which you yourselves also once rejoiced; and sorrow is felt, not for the blessings of which one is bereft without full experience of them, but of that which one loses after becoming accustomed to it. But you must bear up in the hope of other children, those of you whose age yet allows you to have them. For to yourselves individually those who are subsequently born will be a reason for your forgetting those who are no more; and to the state it will be beneficial in two ways, by its not being depopulated, and by the enjoyment of security; for it is not possible that those should offer any fair and just advice, who do not incur equal risk with their neighbors by having children at stake. Those of you, however, who are past that age, must consider that the longer period of your life during which you have been prosperous is so much gain, and that the remainder will be but a short one; and you must

selves with the fair fame of these [your lost ones]. For the love of honor is the only feeling that never grows old; and in the helplessness of age it is not the acquisition of gain, as some assert, that gives greatest pleasure, but the enjoyment of honor.

45. "For those of you, on the other hand, who are sons or brothers of the dead, great, I see, will be the struggle of competition. For every one is accustomed to praise the man who is no more; and scarcely, though even for an excess of worth, would you be esteemed, I do not say equal to them, but only slightly inferior. For<sup>1</sup> the living are exposed to envy in their rivalry; but those who are in no one's way are honored with a good will free from all opposition. If, again, I must say any thing on the subject of woman's excellence also, with reference to those of you who will now be in widowhood, I will express it all in a brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of the natural character that belongs to you; and great is hers, who is least talked of among the men, either for good or evil.

46. "I have now expressed *in word*, as the law required, what I had to say befitting the occasion; and, *in deed*, those who are here interred, have already received part of their honors; while, for the remaining part, the state will bring up their sons at the public expense, from this time to their manhood; thus offering both to these and to their posterity a beneficial reward for such contests; for where the greatest prizes for virtue are given, there also the most virtuous men are found among the citizens. And now, having finished your lamentations for your several relatives, depart."

47. Such was the funeral that took place this winter, at the close of which the first year of this war ended. At the very beginning of the next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two thirds of their forces, as on the first occasion, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus,

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Göller explains it, "the living feel envy toward their rivals." "τὸ ἀντίπαλον" intelligendos esse *æmulos*, non *æmulationem*, ea quoque indicant quæ contrariè ponuntur: τὸ μὴ ἐμποδῶν, i. e., ii, qui non impedimento. non *æmuli* sunt (utpote mortui)." But is not the opposition between τοῖς ζῶσι and τὸ μὴ ἐμποδῶν? like the sentiment of

... in suo, qui prægravat artes  
... extinctus amabitur idem."

the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and after encamping, they laid waste the country. When they had not yet been many days in Attica, the plague first began to show itself among the Athenians; though it was said to have previously lighted on many places, about Lemnos and elsewhere. Such a pestilence, however, and loss of life as this was nowhere remembered to have happened. For neither were physicians of any avail at first, treating it as they did, in ignorance of its nature—nay, they themselves died most of all, inasmuch as they most visited the sick—nor any other art of man. And as to the supplications that they offered in their temples or the divinations, and similar means, that they had recourse to, they were all unavailing; and at last they ceased from them, being overcome by the pressure of the calamity.

48. It is said to have first begun in the part of Æthiopia above Egypt, and then to have come down into Egypt, and Libya, and the greatest part of the king's territory. On the city of Athens it fell suddenly, and first attacked the men in the Piræus; so that it was even reported by them that the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the cisterns; for as yet there were no fountains there. Afterward it reached the upper city also; and then they died much more generally. Now let every one, whether physician or unprofessional man, speak on the subject according to his views; from what source it was likely to have arisen, and the causes which he thinks were sufficient to have produced so great a change [from health to universal sickness]. I, however, shall only describe what was its character; and explain those symptoms by reference to which one might best be enabled to recognize it through this previous acquaintance, if it should ever break out again; for I was both attacked by it myself, and had personal observation of others who were suffering with it.

49. That year then, as was generally allowed, happened to be of all years the most free from disease, so far as regards other disorders; and if any one *had* any previous sickness, all terminated in this. Others, without any ostensible cause, but suddenly, while in the enjoyment of health, were seized at first with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes; and the internal parts, both the throat and the tongue, immediately assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted

an unnatural and fetid breath. Next after these symptoms, sneezing and hoarseness came on ; and in a short time the pain descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled in the stomach, it caused vomiting ; and all the discharges of bile that have been mentioned by physicians succeeded, and those accompanied with great suffering. An ineffectual retching also followed in most cases, producing a violent spasm, which in some cases ceased soon afterward, in others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor was it pale ; but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and sores. But the internal parts were burnt to such a degree that they could not bear clothing or linen of the very lightest kind to be laid upon them, nor to be any thing else but stark naked ; but would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water if they could. Indeed many of those who were not taken care of did so, plunging into cisterns in the agony of their unquenchable thirst : and it was all the same whether they drank much or little. Moreover, the misery of restlessness and wakefulness continually oppressed them. The body did not waste away so long as the disease was at its height, but resisted it beyond all expectation : so that they either died in most cases on the ninth or the seventh day, through the internal burning, while they had still some degree of strength ; or if they escaped [that stage of the disorder], then, after it had further descended into the bowels, and violent ulceration was produced in them, and intense diarrhoea had come on, the greater part were afterward carried off through the weakness occasioned by it. For the disease, which was originally seated in the head, beginning from above, passed throughout the whole body : and if any one survived its most fatal consequences, yet it marked him by laying hold of his extremities ; for it settled on the pudenda, and fingers, and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, while some also lost their eyes. Others, again, were seized on their first recovery with forgetfulness of every thing alike, and did not know either themselves or their friends.

50. For the character of the disorder surpassed description ; and while in other respects also it attacked every one in a degree more grievous than human nature could endure, in the following way, especially, it proved itself to be something different from any of the diseases familiar to man. All

the birds and beasts that prey on human bodies, either did not come near them, though there were many lying unburied, or died after they had tasted them. As a proof of this, there was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they were not seen either engaged in this way, or in any other; while the dogs, from their domestic habits, more clearly afforded opportunity of marking the result I have mentioned.

51. The disease, then, to pass over many various points of peculiarity, as it happened to be different in one case from another, was in its general nature such, as I have described. And no other of those to which they were accustomed afflicted them besides this at that time; or whatever there was, it ended in this. And [of those who were seized by it] some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. And there was no one settled remedy, so to speak, by applying which they were to give them relief; for what did good to one, did harm to another. And no constitution showed itself fortified against it, in point either of strength or weakness; but it seized on all alike, even those that were treated with all possible regard to diet. But the most dreadful part of the whole calamity was the dejection felt whenever any one found himself sickening (for by immediately falling into a feeling of despair, they abandoned themselves much more certainly to the disease, and did not resist it), and the fact of their being charged with infection from attending on one another, and so dying like sheep. And it was this that caused the greatest mortality among them; for if through fear they were unwilling to visit each other, they perished from being deserted, and many houses were emptied for want of some one to attend to the sufferers; or if they did visit them, they met their death, and especially such as made any pretensions to goodness; for through a feeling of shame they were unsparing to themselves, in going into their friends' houses [when deserted by all others]; since even the members of the family were at length worn out by the very moanings of the dying,<sup>1</sup> and were overcome by their excessive misery. Still more, however, than even these, did such as had escaped from the disorder show pity for the dying and the suffering, both from their previous knowledge of what it was, and from their being now in no fear of it themselves; for it never seized the same person twice, so as

<sup>1</sup> Or, "by lamenting for the dying." See Arnold's note.



to prove actually fatal. And such persons were felicitated by others; and themselves, in the excess of their present joy, entertained for the future also, to a certain degree, a vain hope that they would never now be carried off even by any other disease.

52. In addition to the original calamity, what oppressed them still more was the crowding into the city from the country, especially the new comers. For as they had no houses, but lived in stifling cabins at the hot season of the year, the mortality among them spread without restraint; bodies lying on one another in the death-agony, and half-dead creatures rolling about the streets and round all the fountains, in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves, were full of the corpses of those that died there in them: for in the surpassing violence of the calamity, men not knowing what was to become of them, came to disregard every thing, both sacred and profane, alike. And all the laws were violated which they before observed respecting burials; and they buried them as each one could. And many from want of proper means, in consequence of so many of their friends having already died, had recourse to shameless modes of sepulture; for on the piles prepared for others, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would lay their own dead relative and set fire to them; and others, while the body of a stranger was burning, would throw on the top of it the one they were carrying, and go away.

53. In other respects also the plague was the origin of lawless conduct in the city, to a greater extent [than it had before existed]. For deeds which formerly men hid from view, so as not to do them just as they pleased, they now more readily ventured on; since they saw the change so sudden in the case of those who were prosperous and quickly perished, and of those who before had had nothing, and at once came into possession of the property of the dead. So they resolved to take their enjoyment quickly, and with a sole view to gratification; regarding their lives and their riches alike as things of a day. As for taking trouble about what was thought honorable, no one was forward to do it; deeming it uncertain whether, before he had attained to it, he would not be cut off; but every thing that was immediately pleasant, and that which was conducive to it by any means whatever, this was laid down to be both honorable and expedient. And fear of gods, or law of

men, there was none to stop them ; for with regard to the former they esteemed it all the same whether they worshiped them or not, from seeing all alike perishing ; and with regard to their offenses [against the latter], no one expected to live till judgment should be passed on him, and so to pay the penalty of them ; but they thought a far heavier sentence was impending in that which had already been passed upon them ; and that before it fell on them, it was right to have some enjoyment of life.

54. Such was the calamity which the Athenians had met with, and by which they were afflicted, their men dying within the city, and their land being wasted without. In their misery they remembered this verse among other things, as was natural they should ; the old men saying that it had been uttered long ago :

“ A Dorian war shall come, and plague with it.”

Now there was a dispute among them, [and some asserted] that it was not “ a plague” [*loimos*] that had been mentioned in the verse by the men of former times, but “ a famine,” [*limos*] : the opinion, however, at the present time naturally prevailed that “ a plague” had been mentioned : for men adapted their recollections to what they were suffering. But, I suppose, in case of another Dorian war ever befalling them after this, and a famine happening to exist, in all probability they will recite the verse accordingly. Those who were acquainted with it recollected also the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians when on their inquiring of the god whether they should go to war, he answered, “ that if they carried it on with all their might, they would gain the victory ; and that he would himself take part with them in it.” With regard to the oracle then, they supposed that what was happening answered to it. For the disease had begun immediately after the Lacedæmonians had made their incursion ; and it did not go into the Peloponnese, worth even speaking of, but ravaged Athens most of all, and next to it the most populous of the other towns. Such were the circumstances that occurred in connection with the plague.

55. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, passed into the Paralain territory, as it is called, as far as Laurium, where the gold mines of the Athenians are situated. And first

they ravaged the side which looks toward Peloponnese; afterward, that which lies toward Eubœa and Andrus. Now Pericles being general at that time as well as before, maintained the same opinion as he had in the former invasion, about the Athenians not marching out against them.

56. While they were still in the plain, before they went to the Paralian territory, he was preparing an armament of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnese; and when all was ready, he put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then for the first time made out of old vessels: a Chian and Lesbian force also joined the expedition with fifty ships. When this armament of the Athenians put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in the Paralian territory of Attica. On arriving at Epidaurus, in the Peloponnese, they ravaged the greater part of the land, and having made an assault on the city, entertained some hope of taking it; but did not, however, succeed. After sailing from Epidaurus, they ravaged the land belonging to Trœzen, Halice, and Hermione; all which places are on the coast of the Peloponnese. Proceeding thence they came to Prasixæ, a maritime town of Laconia, and ravaged some of the land, and took the town itself, and sacked it. After performing these achievements, they returned home; and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but returned.

57. Now all the time that the Peloponnesians were in the Athenian territory, and the Athenians were engaged in the expedition on board their ships, the plague was carrying them off both in the armament and in the city, so that it was even said that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the disorder, when they heard from the deserters that it was in the city, and also perceived them performing the funeral rites, retired the quicker from the country. Yet in this invasion they staid the longest time, and ravaged the whole country: for they were about forty days in the Athenian territory.

58. The same summer Hagnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, who were colleagues with Pericles, took the army which he had employed, and went straightway on an expedition against the Chalcidians Thraceward, and Potidæa, which was still being besieged: and on their arrival they brought up their engines against Potidæa, and endeav-

voured to take it by every means. But they neither succeeded in capturing the city, nor in their other measures, to any extent worthy of their preparations; for the plague attacked them, and this indeed utterly overpowered them there, wasting their force to such a degree that even the soldiers of the Athenians who were there before were infected with it by the troops which came with Hagnon, though previously they had been in good health. Phormio, however, and his sixteen hundred, were no longer in the neighborhood of the Chalcidians, [and so escaped its ravages]. Hagnon therefore returned with his ships to Athens, having lost by the plague fifteen hundred out of four thousand heavy-armed, in about forty days. The soldiers who were there before still remained in the country, and continued the siege of Potidæa.

59. After the second invasion of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, when their land had been again ravaged, and the disease and the war were afflicting them at the same time, changed their views, and found fault with Pericles, thinking that he had persuaded them to go to war, and that it was through him that they had met with their misfortunes; and they were eager to come to terms with the Lacedæmonians. Indeed they sent ambassadors to them, but did not succeed in their object. And their minds being on all sides reduced to despair, they were violent against Pericles. He therefore seeing them irritated by their present circumstances, and doing every thing that he had himself expected them to do, called an assembly (for he was still general), wishing to cheer them, and by drawing off the irritation of their feelings to lead them to a calmer and more confident state of mind. So he came forward and spoke as follows:

60. "I had both expected the proofs of your anger against me, which have been exhibited (for I am aware of the causes of it), and have now convened an assembly for this purpose, that I may remind you [of what you have forgotten], and reprove you if in any respect you are wrong, either in being irritated against me or in succumbing to your misfortunes. For I consider that a state which in its public capacity is successful confers more benefit on individuals than one which is prosperous as regards its particular citizens, while collectively it comes to ruin. For though a man is individually prosperous, yet if his country is ruined, he none the less shares

in its destruction; whereas, if he is unfortunate in a country that is fortunate, he has a much better hope of escaping his dangers. Since then a state is able to bear the misfortunes of individuals, while each individual is unable to bear hers, how can it fail to be the duty of all to support her, and not to act as *you* are now doing, who, being panic-stricken by your domestic afflictions, give up all thought of the public safety, and are blaming both me who advised you to go to war, and yourselves who joined in voting for it. And yet I, with whom you are angry, am a man who deem myself second to none in at once knowing what measures are required, and explaining them to others; a lover too of my country, and superior to the influence of money. For he who knows a thing that is right, but does not explain it with clearness, is no better than if he had never had a conception of it; and he, again, who has both these requisites, but is ill-affected toward his country, would not so well speak for her interest. And even if this qualification be added to the others, while he is influenced by regard for money, all of them together would be sacrificed for this one consideration. So that if you were persuaded by me to go to war, because you thought that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than other men, I can not now fairly be charged with injuring you, at any rate.

61. "For those indeed to go to war, who, while successful in other things, have had a choice in the matter allowed them, it is great folly. But if [in our case] it were necessary, either immediately to submit to our neighbors, if we made concessions, or to preserve our independence by running a great risk; then he who shrank from the risk is more reprehensible than he who faced it. For my part then, I am the same that I ever was, and do not depart from my opinion; but you are changing, since it happens that you were persuaded [to go to war] while unscathed, but repent of it now you are suffering: and that my advice appears wrong through the weakness of your resolution; because pain is now in possession of each man's feeling, while the certainty of the benefit is as yet hidden from all: and a great reverse having befallen you, and that suddenly, your mind is too prostrated to persevere in your determinations. For the spirit is enslaved by what is sudden and unlooked for, and most beyond our calculation;

which has been your case, in addition to every thing else, more especially with regard to the plague. Living, however, as you do in a great city, and brought up with habits corresponding to it, you ought to be willing to encounter the greatest misfortunes, and not to sully your reputation; (for men think it equally just to find fault with him who weakly falls short of his proper character, and to hate him who rashly grasps at that which does not belong to him;) and you ought to cease grieving for your private sufferings, and to devote yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth.

62. "But with regard to your trouble in the war, lest you should fear that it may prove great, and we may still be none the more successful, let those arguments suffice you, with which on many other occasions I have proved the error of your suspicions respecting it. At the same time, I will also lay before you the following advantage, which yourselves do not appear ever yet to have thought of as belonging to you, respecting the greatness of your empire, and which I never urged in my former speeches; nor would I even now, as it has rather too boastful an air, if I did not see you unreasonably cast down. You think then that you only bear rule over your own subject allies; but I declare to you that of the two parts of the world open for man's use, the land and the sea, of the whole of the one you are most absolute masters, both as far as you avail yourselves of it now, and if you should wish to do so still further; and there is no power, neither the king nor any nation besides at the present day, that can prevent your sailing [where you please] with your present naval resources. This power then evidently is far from being merely on a level with the benefits of your houses and lands, which you think so much to be deprived of; nor is it right for you to grieve about them, but rather to hold them cheap, considering them, in comparison with this, as a mere garden-plot and embellishment of a rich man's estate. You should know, too, that liberty, provided we devote ourselves to *that*, and preserve it, will easily recover these losses; whereas those who have once submitted to others find even their greatest gains diminish. Nor should you show yourselves inferior in both respects to your fathers, who with labor, and not by inheritance from others, acquired these possessions, and moreover kept them, and bequeathed them to us; for it is more-

disgraceful to be deprived of a thing when we have got it, than to fail in getting it. On the contrary, you should meet your enemies, not only with spirit, but also with a spirit of contempt. For *confidence* is produced even by lucky ignorance, ay, even in a coward; but *contempt* is the feeling of the man who trusts that he is superior to his adversaries in counsel also, which is our case. And ability, with a high spirit, renders more sure the daring which arises from equal fortune; and does not so much trust to mere hope, whose strength mainly displays itself in difficulties; but rather to a judgment grounded upon present realities, whose anticipations may be more relied upon.

63. "It is but fair, too, that you should sustain the dignity of the state derived from its sovereignty, on which you all pride yourselves; and that either you should not shrink from its labors, or else should lay no claim to its honors either. Nor should you suppose that you are struggling to escape one evil only, slavery instead of freedom; but to avoid loss of dominion also, and danger from the animosities which you have incurred in your exercise of that dominion. And from this it is no longer possible for you to retire; if through fear at the present time any one is for so playing the honest man in quiet. For you now hold it as a tyranny, which it seems wrong to have assumed, but dangerous to give up. And men with these views would very quickly ruin the state, whether they persuaded others [to adopt the same], or even lived any where independently by themselves; for quietness is not a safe principle, unless ranged with activity; nor is it for the interest of a sovereign state, but of a subject one, that it may live in safe slavery.

64. "Do you then neither be seduced by such citizens, nor be angry with me, whom yourselves also joined in voting for war, though the enemy has invaded our country, and done what it was natural that he should do, if you would not submit; and though, besides what we looked for, this disease also has come upon us—the only thing, indeed, of all that has happened beyond our expectations. And it is through this, I well know, that in some degree I am still more the object of your displeasure; yet not with justice, unless you will also give me the credit when you meet with any success beyond your calculation. The evils then which are sent by heaven,

you must bear perforce; those which are inflicted by your enemies, with courage; for such was formerly the custom of this country, and let it not now meet with a check in your case. But consider that it has the greatest name in all the world from not yielding to misfortunes, and from expending in war more lives and labor than any other state; and that it has now the greatest power that ever existed up to the present time; the memory of which, even should we now at length give way (for every thing is naturally liable to decrease), will be left to posterity forever, namely, that we had dominion over more Greeks than any other Greek state ever had; and held out in the greatest wars against them, both collectively and singly; and inhabited a city better provided with all things than any other, and greater. And yet your quiet man would find fault with these things; but the man who has himself a wish to achieve something, will emulate them; while whoever does not possess them will envy them. But to be hated and offensive for the time present has been the lot of all who have ever presumed to rule over others; that man, however, takes wise counsel who incurs envy for the greatest things. For odium does not last long; but present splendor and future glory are handed down to perpetual memory. Do you then, providing both for your future honor, and for your immediate escape from disgrace,<sup>1</sup> secure both objects by your present spirit; and neither send any heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor show that you are weighed down by your present troubles; for such as in feeling are least annoyed at their misfortunes, while in action they most courageously resist them, these, both of states and of individuals, are the best."

65. By speaking to this effect Pericles endeavored both to divert the Athenians from their anger toward himself, and to lead away their thoughts from their present hardships. And in a public point of view they were persuaded by his speech, and were no longer for sending to the Lacedæmonians, but

<sup>1</sup> "Recte Dukas τὸ μέλλον καλὸν ad τὴν ἔπειτα δόξαν, τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν ad τὴν παρὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα respicere adnotat."—Göller, whose interpretation is adopted by Arnold. By others καλὸν and μὴ αἰσχρὸν are taken as dependent on πρόγονοι; "providing what is honorable for the future and not disgraceful for the present." The rhythm of the sentence is, I think, in favor of the latter interpretation; the absence of the article from the neuter singular adjectives, in favor of the former.



were more resolute for the war ; though in their private feelings they were distressed by their sufferings ; the commons, because, having set out with less resources, they had been deprived of even those ; the higher orders, because they had lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and expensive establishments, and, what was the greatest evil of all, had war instead of peace. They did not, however, cease from their public displeasure toward him, till they had fined him in a sum of money. But no long time after, as the multitude is wont to act, they again elected him general, and committed every thing to him ; for on the points in which each man was vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly ; but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought that he was most valuable. For as long as he was at the head of the state in time of peace, he governed it with moderation, and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in his time ; and when the war broke out, he appears to have foreknown its power in this respect also. He survived its commencement two years and six months ; and when he was dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated to a still greater degree. For he said that if they kept quiet, and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have nothing to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both toward themselves and their allies ; which, if successful, conduced to the honor and benefit of individuals ; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war. And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multitude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them ; for he did not say any thing to humor them, for the acquisition of power by improper means ; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure. Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language, he would dash them down to alarm ; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in

name it was a democracy, in fact it was a government administered by the first man. Whereas those who came after, being more on a level with each other, and each grasping to become first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, but] even their *measures*, to the humors of the people. In consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially the expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of judgment with respect to the people they went against, as that those who had sent them out, by not afterward voting supplies required by the armament, but proceeding with their private criminations, to gain the leadership of the commons, both blunted the spirit of measures in the camp, and for the first time were embroiled with one another in the affairs of the city. But even when they had suffered in Sicily the loss of other forces, and of the greater part of their fleet, and were now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out three years, both against their former enemies, and those from Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of their allies who had revolted, and Cyrus, the king's son, who afterward joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet: nor did they succumb, before they were overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their private quarrels. Such a superabundance of means had Pericles at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with the greatest ease he could gain the advantage in the war over the Peloponnesians by themselves.

66. The Lacedæmonians and their allies the same summer made an expedition with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The inhabitants are a colony of the Achæans of the Peloponnesus and were in alliance with the Athenians. On board the fleet were a thousand heavy-armed of the Lacedæmonians, and Cnemus, a Spartan as admiral. Having made a descent on the country, they ravaged the greater part of it; and when they did not surrender, they sailed back home.

67. At the end of the same summer, Aristeus, a Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, Timagoras, a Tegean, and Pollis, an Argive in a private capacity, being on their way to Asia, to obtain an interview with the king, if by any means they might

prevail on him to supply money and join in the war, went first to Thrace, to Sitalces the son of Teres, wishing to persuade him, if they could, to withdraw from his alliance with the Athenians, and make an expedition against Potidæa, where was an armament of the Athenians besieging the place; and then, to proceed by his assistance to their destination across the Hellespont, to Pharnaces the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them up the country to the king. But some Athenian ambassadors, Learchus son of Callimachus, and Aminiades son of Philemon, happening to be with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus his son, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands, that they may not, by passing over to the king, do their best to injure [what was now] his own country. He, in compliance with their request, having sent some other men with Learchus and Aminiades, seized them as they were traveling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the Hellespont, before they went on board, and gave orders to deliver them up to the Athenian ambassadors; who, having received them, took them to Athens. On their arrival the Athenians, being afraid that if Aristeus escaped he might do them still more mischief (for even before this he had evidently conducted all the measures in Potidæa and their possessions Thraceward), without giving them a trial, though they requested to say something [in their own defense], put them to death that same day, and threw them into pits; thinking it but just to requite them in the same way as the Lacedæmonians had begun with; for they had killed and thrown into pits the merchants both of the Athenians and their allies, whom they had taken on board trading vessels about the coast of the Peloponnese. Indeed all that the Lacedæmonians took on the sea at the beginning of the war, they butchered as enemies, both those who were confederates of the Athenians and those who were neutral.

68. About the same time, when the summer was drawing to a close, the Ambraciots, with their own forces and many of the barbarians whom they had raised, made an expedition against Argos in Amphilochia, and the rest of that country. Now their enmity against the Argives first arose from the following circumstances. Argos in Amphilochia and the rest of the country was colonized by Amphilocheus the son of Amphiaras, when he returned home after the Trojan war, and

was not pleased with the state of things at Argos; [and he built it] on the Ambracian Gulf, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. This was the largest city of Amphilochia, and had the most powerful inhabitants. But many generations afterward, being pressed by misfortunes, they called in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Amphilochia, as joint-inhabitants; and from the Ambraciots who joined them they were taught the Greek language which they now speak, the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. Now the Ambraciots in process of time drove out the Argives, and held the city by themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves up to the Acarnanians; and both together having called in the Athenians, who sent them Phormio for a general and thirty ships, on the arrival of Phormio they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; while the Amphilochians and Acarnanians occupied the town in common. And it was after this event that the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians was first made. The Ambraciots then first conceived their enmity to the Argives from this enslavement of their people; and afterward, during the war, formed this armament from themselves and the Chaonians, and some other of the neighboring barbarians. Having come to Argos, they obtained command of the country; but being unable to take the city by assault, they retired homeward, and disbanding returned to their different nations. These were the events of the summer.

69. The following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnese, with Phormio as commander, who, making Naupectus his station, kept watch that no one either sailed out from Corinth and the Crisæan Bay, or in to it. Another squadron of six they sent toward Caria and Lycia, with Melesander as commander, to raise money from those parts, and to hinder the privateers of the Peloponnesians from making that their rendezvous, and interfering with the navigation of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phœnice, and the continent in that direction. But Melesander, having gone up the country into Lycia with a force composed of the Athenians from the ships and the allies, and being defeated in a battle, was killed, and lost a considerable part of the army.

70. The same winter, when the Potidæans could no longer hold out against their besiegers, the inroads of the Pelopon-

*you does?*  
 nesians into Attica having had no more effect toward causing the Athenians to withdraw, and their provisions being exhausted, and many other horrors having befallen them in their straits for food, and some having even eaten one another; under these circumstances, I says, they make proposals for a capitulation to the generals of the Athenians who were in command against them, Xenophon son of Euripides, Histiodorus son of Aristoclide, the son of Phanomachus son of Calimachus; who accepted them, seeing the distress of their army in so exposed a position, and the state having already expended 2000 talents on the siege. On these terms therefore they came to an agreement; that themselves, their children, wives, and auxiliaries, should go out of the place with one dress each—but the women with two—and with a fixed sum of money for their journey. According to this treaty, they went out to Chalcidice, or where each could: but the Athenians blamed the generals for having come to an agreement without consulting them; for they thought they might, have got possession of the place on their own terms; and afterward they sent settlers of their own to Potidæa and colonized it. These were the transactions of the winter; and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

71. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not make an incursion into Attica, but marched against Plataea, being led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. Having encamped his army, he was going to ravage the land; but the Plataeans immediately sent ambassadors to him, and spoke as follows: "Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are not doing what is right, or worthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, in marching against the territory of the Plataeans. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedæmonian, when he had liberated Greece from the Medes, in conjunction with those Greeks who had been willing to incur with him the peril of the battle that was fought near our city, after sacrificing in the market-place of Plataea to Jupiter the Deliverer, and assembling all the allies, proceeded to grant to the Plataeans to live in independent possession of their land and city, and that no one should ever make war upon them unjustly, or to enslave them; else that the allies then present

should assist them to their utmost. These rewards your fathers gave us for our valor and zeal, shown in those scenes of danger ; but *you* are doing the very contrary ; for in conjunction with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are come to enslave us. Calling the gods then to witness, both those who at that time received the oaths, and those of your own fathers, and those of our country, we charge you not to injure the Plataean territory, nor break the oaths, but to let us live independent, as Pausanias thought right to grant us."

72. When the Plataeans had spoken thus much, Archidamus took them up and said : " You speak what is just, Plataeans, if you act in accordance with your speech. As then Pausanias bequeathed to you, so both enjoy independence yourselves, and assist in liberating the rest, as many as shared the dangers of that day, and are now under the rule of the Athenians ; and for whose liberation, and that of the rest [of their subjects], all this provision and war has been undertaken. Do you then yourselves abide by the oaths, by taking your part in this liberation, if possible ; but if not, then, as we before proposed, keep quiet in the enjoyment of your own possessions, and do not join either side, but receive both as friends, and for warlike purposes neither the one nor the other. And this will satisfy us." Thus much said Archidamus. The Plataeans having heard it went into the city, and after communicating to the whole people what had been said, answered him that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians ; for their children and wives were with *them* ; and that they had also fears for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians had retired, the Athenians should come and not leave it in their hands ; or the Thebans, as being included in the treaty, on the strength of their " receiving both parties," should again endeavor to seize on it. To encourage them on these points he said, " Do you then give up your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians, and point out the boundaries of your territory, and your trees in number, and whatever else can be reduced to number ; and yourselves remove wherever you please for as long as the war may last. When it is over, we will restore to you whatever we may have received. Till then we will hold it in trust, cultivating it, and bringing to you such of the produce as will be sufficient for you."

73. When they had heard his proposal, they went again into

the city, and after consulting with the people, said that they wished first to communicate to the Athenians what he proposed, and should they gain their consent, then to do so; but till that time they begged him to grant them a truce, and not to lay waste the land. So he granted them a truce for the number of days within which it was likely they would return home, and in the mean time did not begin to ravage the land. The Plataean ambassadors having come to the Athenians and consulted with them, returned with the following message to those in the city: "Men of Plataea, the Athenians say, that never in times past, since we became their allies, have they on any occasion deserted us when injured; nor will they neglect us now, but will succor us to the best of their power. And they charge you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to make no innovation in the terms of the alliance."

74. The ambassadors having delivered this message, they resolved not to prove false to the Athenians, but to endure, if necessary, both to see their land ravaged, and to suffer whatever else might befall them. They resolved also that no one should go out again, but that they should reply from the walls, that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians proposed. When they had given this answer, king Archidamus proceeded in the first place to call to witness the gods and heroes of the country, in these words: "Ye gods and heroes that dwell in the land of Plataea, bear witness that it was neither unjustly in the first instance, but when these men had first broken the agreement they had sworn to, that we came against this land, in which our fathers prayed to you before they conquered the Medes, and which you rendered an auspicious one for the Greeks to contend in; nor shall we act unjustly now, whatever we may do; for though we have made many fair proposals, we have not succeeded in gaining their assent. Grant then that those may be punished for the wrong who were the first to begin it, and that those may obtain their revenge who are lawfully trying to inflict it."

75. Having thus appealed to the gods, he set his army to the war. In the first place he inclosed them with a palisade, made of the trees which they cut down, that no one might go out of the town any longer. Next they began to throw up a mound against the city, hoping that the reduction of it would be very speedily effected with so large an army at work.

Cutting down timber therefore from Cithæron, they built it up on each side, laying it like lattice-work, to serve as walls, that the mound might not spread over a wide space; and they carried to it brushwood, and stone, and soil, and whatever else would help to complete it when thrown on. Seventy days and nights continuously they were throwing it up, being divided into relief-parties, so that some should be carrying, while others were taking sleep and refreshment; the Lacedæmonian officers who shared the command over the contingents of each state urging them to the work. But the Plateæans, seeing the mound rising, put together a wooden wall, and placed it on the wall of their city, where the mound was being made, and built bricks inside it, which they took from the neighboring houses. The timbers served as a frame for them, to prevent the building from being weak as it became high; and for curtains it had skins and hides, so that the workmen and the timbers were not exposed to fiery missiles, but were in safety. So the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound rose opposite to it no less quickly. The Plateæans also adopted some such device as follows: they took down a part of the wall, where the mound lay against it, and carried the earth into the city.

76. The Peloponnesians, on perceiving this, rammed down clay in wattles of reed, and threw it into the breach, that it might not be loose, and so carried away like the soil. Being thus baffled, the Plateæans ceased from this attempt; but having dug a passage under ground from the city, and having guessed their way under the mound, they began again to carry the soil in to them. And for a long time they escaped the observation of the enemy outside; so that though they continued to throw on materials, they were further from finishing it; as their mound was carried away from beneath, and continually sinking down into the vacuum. Fearing, however, that they might not even by this means be able to hold out, so few in numbers against so many, they adopted the following additional contrivance. They ceased to work at the great building opposite to the mound; but beginning at either end of it, where the wall was of its original height, they built another in the form of a crescent, running inward into the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might hold out, and their opponents might have to throw up a second mound against it,



and as they advanced within, might have double trouble, and be more exposed to missiles on both their flanks. At the same time that they were raising the mound, the Peloponnesians brought engines also to play upon the city; one of which, being brought up close to the wall, shook down a considerable part of the great building, and terrified the Plataeans. Others were advanced against different parts of the wall; but the Plataeans broke them off by throwing nooses around them. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains from the extremity of two levers, which were laid upon the wall, and stretched out beyond it; and having drawn them up at an angle, whenever the engine was going to fall on any point, by loosing the chains and not holding them tight in hand, they let the beam drop; which, falling on it with great impetus, broke off the head of the battering-ram.<sup>1</sup>

77. After this, when their engines were of no avail, and the building of the wall was going on in opposition to the mound, the Peloponnesians, thinking it impossible to take the city by their present means of offense, prepared for circumvallating it. First, however, they determined to make an attempt upon it by fire, [and see] whether with the help of a favorable wind they could burn the town, as it was not a large one: for they thought of every possible device, if by any means it might be reduced by them without the expense of a siege. They took therefore faggots of brushwood, and threw them from the mound; at first into the space between it and the wall, and when that had soon been filled by the many hands at work, they piled them up also as far into the town as they could reach from the height; and then lighted the wood by throwing on it fire with sulphur and pitch. By this means such a flame was raised as no one had ever yet seen produced by the hand of man; [though *natural* conflagrations might have exceeded it;] for ere now the wood of a mountain forest has been known to take fire of itself, and to emit a flame in consequence, through the mutual attrition of the boughs by high winds. This fire, however, was a great one, and was within very little of destroying the Plataeans, after they had escaped all their

<sup>1</sup> Arnold thinks that the battering engine ended in a point, to force its way into the wall, rather than with a thick solid end, merely to batter it; and so that τὸ προέχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς answers exactly to τὸ τρύπανον in a parallel passage quoted by him from Æneas Tacticus.

other dangers; for there was a considerable part of the town within which it was not possible to approach; and if a wind had risen to blow upon it, as their enemy hoped, they would not have escaped. As it was, however, the following occurrence is also said to have favored them; a heavy rain and thunder-storm came on, and quenched the flame; and so the danger ceased.

78. When the Peloponnesians had failed in this attempt also, they left behind them a certain part of their force, [having disbanded the rest,] and proceeded to raise a wall of circumvallation round the town, dividing the whole extent among the contingents of the different states. There was a ditch, too, both inside and outside of the lines, from which they made their bricks. All being finished by about the rising of Arcturus,<sup>1</sup> they left troops to man half the extent of the wall (the other half being manned by the Boeotians), and retired with their army, and dispersed to their different cities. Now the Plataeans had previously carried out of the town to Athens their children, and wives, and oldest men, and the mass of the inhabitants that would be of no service; but the men themselves who were left in the place and stood the siege, amounted to four hundred, with eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to make bread for them. This was the total number of them when they began to be besieged, and there was no one else within the walls, either bond or free. Such was the provision made for the siege of Plataea.

79. The same summer, and at the same time as the expedition was made against the Plataeans, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy-armed of their own, and two hundred horse, against the Thraceward Chalcidians, and the Bottiaeans, when the corn was ripe, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides, and two colleagues. On arriving under the walls of Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn; and expected that the town would also surrender to them, through the intrigues of a party within. Those, however, who did not wish this, having sent to Olynthus, a body of heavy-armed and other troops came as a garrison for the place; and on their making a sally from it, the Athenians met them in battle close to the town. The heavy-armed of the

<sup>1</sup> i. e., its morning rising, nearly coincident with the autumnal equinox.

Chalcidians, and some auxiliaries with them, were defeated by the Athenians, and retired into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light-armed defeated the horse and light-armed of the Athenians. They had [from the first] some few targeteers from the district of Crusis, as it is called; and when the battle had just been fought, others joined them from Olynthus. When the light-armed from Spartolus saw these, being encouraged by the accession to their force, and by the fact that they were not worsted before, in conjunction with the Chalcidian horse and the late reinforcement they attacked the Athenians again; who retired to the two divisions they had left with the baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced against them, they gave way; but on their beginning to retreat, they pressed them close, and harassed them with their darts. The cavalry of the Chalcidians also rode up and charged them wherever they pleased; and having struck the greatest panic into them, routed and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fled for refuge to Potidæa, and having subsequently recovered their dead by truce, returned to Athens with the remnant of the army; four hundred and thirty of them having been killed, and all the generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiæans erected a trophy, and after taking up their dead, separated to their different cities.

80. The same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania, and to separate it from its connection with Athens, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to equip a fleet from their confederacy, and to send one thousand heavy-armed to Acarnania; saying that if they were to join them with both a naval and land force, while the Acarnanians on the coast were unable to succor [their countrymen], after gaining possession of Acarnania, they would easily make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia; and so the Athenians would no longer find the circumnavigation of the Peloponnese what it had hitherto been. They suggested too that there was a hope of taking Naupactus also. Being thus persuaded, the Lacedæmonians dispatched immediately Cnemus, who was still high-admiral, and the heavy-armed on board a few vessels; while they sent round orders for the fleet to prepare as quickly as possible, and sail to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were

most hearty in the cause of the Ambraciots, who were a colony of theirs; and the squadrons from Corinth and Sicyon, and those parts were in preparation; while those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived before, and were waiting for them at Leucas. In the mean time Cnemus and the one thousand heavy-armed with him had effected a passage unobserved by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian ships that kept guard off Naupactus; and they immediately prepared for the expedition by land. There were with him, of the Greeks, the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and his own force of one thousand Peloponnesians; of the barbarians, one thousand Chaonians, who were not under kingly government, but who were led by Photys and Nicanor, of the family to which the chieftainship was confined, with a yearly exercise of that power. With the Chaonians some Thesprotians also joined the expedition, being [like them] not under kingly government. Some Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, as guardian of Tharypus, their king, who was yet a minor; and some Paravæans by Oroedus their king. One thousand of the Orestians, of whom Antiochus was king, accompanied the Paravæans, Oroedus being intrusted with the command of them by that monarch. Perdiccas also, without the knowledge of the Athenians, sent one thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this force Cnemus commenced his march, without waiting the arrival of the fleet from Corinth: and in their passage through the Argive country they sacked Limnæa, an unfortified village; and then went against Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, thinking that if they took that first, the other towns would readily surrender to them.

81. The Acarnanians, finding that a large army had invaded them by land, and that the enemy would also be upon them with a fleet by sea, did not prepare to make any united resistance, but to defend their own separate possessions; while they sent to Phormio, and desired him to succor them; who, however, said that it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus unprotected, while a fleet was on the point of sailing out from Corinth. So the Peloponnesians and their allies, having formed themselves into three divisions, were advancing to the city of Stratus; that after encamping near to it, they might attempt the wall by force, if they could not prevail

on them [to surrender] by words. As they advanced, the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians occupied the center; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and those with them, were on their right; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on their left; but they were at a considerable distance from each other, and sometimes not even within sight. The Greeks advanced in good order, and keeping a look-out, until they had encamped in a convenient position; but the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and being reputed by the inhabitants of those parts of the continent to be the most warlike tribe, did not wait to take up their position, but rushing on with the rest of the barbarians thought they should take the town at the first assault, and so the achievement would be all their own. The Stratians, informed of this while they were yet coming on, and thinking that if they could defeat them while thus by themselves, the Greeks would not attack them with the same eagerness, laid an ambush near the walls; and when they had come near, attacked them in close combat, both from the town and from the ambuscade. Being thrown into consternation, great numbers of the Chaonians were slain; and when the rest of the barbarians saw them giving way, they no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Now neither of the Greek divisions<sup>1</sup> was aware of the battle, as their confederates had proceeded far in advance, and had been supposed to be hurrying on to occupy their encampment. But when the barbarians broke in upon them in their flight, they rallied them; and after uniting their separate divisions, remained there quiet during the day; as the Stratians did not come to close quarters with them because the rest of the Acarnanians had not arrived to help them; but annoyed them with their slings from a distance, and distressed them, (for it was impossible for them to stir without their armor), the Acarnanians being considered to excel very much in this mode of warfare.

82. When night came on, Cnemus retired as quickly as he could with his army to the river Anapus, which is eighty stades distant from Stratus, and the next day recovered his dead by truce; and the Cœniadæ having joined him, on the ground of a friendly connection, he fell back upon that city before the reinforcements of the enemy had arrived. Thence

<sup>1</sup> Or, "camps," the word being frequently used in both senses.

they departed to their respective homes; while the Stratians erected a trophy for the result of their engagement with the barbarians.

83. Now the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates coming from the Crisæan Bay, which ought to have joined Cnemus, in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succoring their countrymen in the interior, did not do so; but they were compelled, about the same time as the battle was fought at Stratus, to come to an engagement with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels that kept guard at Naupactus. For Phormio kept watching them as they coasted along out of the gulf, wishing to attack them in the open sea. But the Corinthians and the allies were not sailing to Acarnania with any intention to fight by sea, but were equipped more for land service. When, however, they saw them sailing along opposite to them, as they themselves proceeded along their own coast; and on attempting to cross over from Patræ in Achaia to the mainland opposite, on their way to Acarnania, observed the Athenians sailing against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus; (for they had not escaped their observation when they had endeavored to bring to secretly during the night;) under these circumstances they were compelled to engage in the mid passage. They had separate commanders for the contingents of the different states that joined the armament, but those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Ioscates, and Agatharcidas. And now the Peloponnesians ranged their ships in a circle, as large as they could without leaving any opening, with their prows turned outward and their sterns inward; and placed inside all the small craft that accompanied them, and their five best sailers, to advance out quickly and strengthen any point on which the enemy might make his attack.

84. On the other hand, the Athenians, ranged in a single line, kept sailing round them, and reducing them into a smaller compass; continually brushing past them, and making demonstrations of an immediate onset; though they had previously been commanded by Phormio not to attack them till he himself gave the signal. For he hoped that their order would not be maintained like that of a land-force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of each other, and that the other craft would cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from the

gulf, in expectation of which he was sailing round them, and which usually rose toward morning, that they would not remain steady an instant. He thought too that it rested with *him* to make the attack, whenever he pleased, as his ships were better sailers [than those opposed to him]; and that then would be the best time for making it. So when the wind came down upon them, and their ships being now brought into a narrow compass, were thrown into confusion by the operation of both causes—the violence of the wind, and the small craft dashing against them—and when ship was falling foul of ship, and the crews were pushing them off with poles, and in their shouting, and trying to keep clear, and abusing each other, did not hear a word either of their orders or the boatswains' directions; while, through inexperience, they could not lift their oars in the swell of the sea, and so rendered the vessels less obedient to the helmsmen; just then, at that favorable moment, he gave the signal. And the Athenians attacked them, and first of all sunk one of the admiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and reduced them to such a condition, that owing to their confusion none of them thought of resistance, but they fled to Patræ and Dyme, in Achaia. The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrion; and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patræ to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle at Stratus, to the same port.

85. Then the Lacedæmonians sent to the fleet, as counselors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected; (particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for

they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They dispatched them therefore in anger; and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement. Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for he was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They dispatched to him twenty; but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their *proxenus*, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitæ, who bordered on the Cydonians. The commander therefore of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitæ laid waste the territory of the Cydonians; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.

86. During the time that the Athenians were thus detained on the coast of Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achæa, where the land-force of the Peloponnesians had come to support them. Phormio, too, coasted along to the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor outside of it, with twenty ships, the same as he had before fought with. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other, namely, that in the Peloponnese, is opposite to it; the distance between the two being about seven stades of sea, which forms the mouth of the Crisæan Gulf. At the Rhium in Achæa, then, being not far from Panormus, where their land-force was, the Peloponnesians also came to anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw that the Athenians had done the same. And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practicing and preparing for the battle; the Peloponnesians intending not to sail beyond the Rhia into the open sea, for they were afraid of a disaster like the former; the Athenians, not to sail into the straits, for they thought that fighting in a confined



space was in favor of the enemy. Afterward Cnemus, and Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement as quickly as they could, before any reinforcement came from Athens, assembled the men first; and seeing the greater part of them frightened in consequence of their former defeat, and not eager for the battle, they cheered them by speaking as follows:

87. "The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if owing to it any one be afraid of this before us, affords no just grounds<sup>1</sup> for his alarm. For it was deficient, as you know, in preparation; and we were sailing not so much for a naval engagement as for a land expedition. It happened too that not a few of the chances of war were against us; while partly, perhaps, our inexperience caused our failure, as it was our first battle by sea. It was not then through our cowardice that we experienced the defeat; nor is it right that our spirits, which were not crushed by force, but still retain a measure of defiance<sup>2</sup> to the enemy, should lose their edge from the result of that mishap. We should rather think that men may indeed be overthrown by mere chances, but that in spirit the same men ought always to be brave; and that while their courage remains, they can not reasonably on any occasion act like cowards under the cloak of inexperience. In your case, however, you are not so far inferior to the enemy, even through your inexperience, as you are superior to him in daring. As for their skill, of which you are most afraid, if indeed it be joined with courage, it will also be accompanied with presence of mind in danger to execute what it has learned; but without gallantry no art whatever is of any avail in the face of perils. For fear banishes presence of mind; and art without bravery is good for nothing. Against their greater experience then put your own greater daring; against your fear in consequence of your defeat put the fact of your having then been unprepared; and

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "no ground for drawing this conclusion, so as to alarm him;" the infinitive τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι being explanatory of τέκμαραι.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀντιλογία is opposed to the "acknowledgment of our own defeat," and signifies literally "making answer; maintaining the quarrel."—*Arnold*. Compare the use of our word "controversy," by which it may generally be rendered, in Shakespeare's *Julius Cæsar*.

"The torrent roar'd, and we did buffet it  
With lusty sinews; throwing it aside,  
And stemming it with hearts of controversy."

there is in your favor a clear balance of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast in the presence of your heavy-armed; and victory, generally speaking, declares for those who are the more numerous and better appointed. On no one single ground then do we find it probable that we should be defeated. As for the blunders we committed before, the very fact of their having been committed will now teach us a lesson. With good courage, therefore, both steersmen and sailors, do every man your own duty, without leaving the post assigned to each. And *we* will prepare for the engagement not worse than your former commanders; and will give no one any excuse for being a coward: but if any one should wish to be one, he shall be visited with the punishment he deserves; while the brave shall be honored with the rewards befitting their bravery."

88. Such was the exhortation given to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio, on the other hand, being also alarmed at the apprehensions of his men, and perceiving that they formed in groups among themselves, and showed their fears of the superior numbers of the ships opposed to them, wished to assemble and cheer them, and offer them some advice at the present juncture. For before this he always used to tell them, and prepare their minds for the conviction, that there was no number of ships whatever so great that they ought not to face it, if it sailed against them; and his men had for a long time entertained this resolution, that from no multitude of Peloponnesian ships whatever would they, Athenians as they were, retire. Seeing them, however, at that time out of spirits, he wished to remind them of their former confidence, and therefore called them together, and addressed them as follows:

89. "Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of your opponents, I have called you together; and I do not wish you to be in dread of what is not really to be feared. For these men, in the first place, because they have been previously conquered by us, and do not even themselves think that they are a match for us, have equipped this great number of ships, and not such as would be merely equal to ours. Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against us—that it is their natural character to be courageous—they feel this confidence for no other reason than because they are

generally successful owing to their experience in land-service; and they think<sup>1</sup> it will do the same for them at sea. But this, in all reason, will rather be our advantage now, as it is theirs in that case: for in valor they are not at all superior to us; but from our being respectively more experienced in one particular service, we are also more confident respecting it. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians lead their allies from regard to their own glory, and bring the greater part of them into dangers against their will; else [without such compulsion], they would have never dared to fight again by sea, after being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their boldness. It is *you* that cause *them* a much greater and better-founded alarm, both on the ground of your having previously conquered them, and because they think we should not have faced them if we did not mean to do something worthy our decisive victory. For when equal to their opponents, men generally come against them, as these do, trusting to their power rather than to their spirit; but those who dare to meet them with far inferior resources, and yet without being compelled, do so because they have the strong assurance of their own resolution. From this consideration these men fear us more for the inequality of our preparations, than they would have done for more proportionate ones. Many armies, too, have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through want of skill, and others through want of daring; with neither of which have we now any thing to do. As for the battle, I will not, if I can help, fight it in the strait; nor will I sail in there at all; being aware that for a few skillfully managed and fast-sailing vessels, against a large number unskillfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For one could neither sail up as he ought to the charge, without having a view of the enemy from a distance; nor retire at the proper time, if hard-pressed; and there is no breaking through the line, nor returning to a second charge—which are the manœuvres of the better-sailing vessels—but the sea-fight must in that case become a land-fight; and then the greater number of ships gain the superiority. On these points then I will exercise as much forethought as possible; and do you, remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving

<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of the confused construction in this passage, see Arnold's note.

the word of command; especially as our post of observation is at so short a distance; and during the action attach the greatest importance to order and silence, which is of service for operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement more particularly; and repel these your enemies in a manner worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed is the struggle in which you are engaged, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesians as regards their navy, or to bring nearer home to the Athenians apprehensions for the command of the sea. Again I remind you that you have already conquered the greater part of them; and the spirits of defeated men will not be what they were, in the face of the same dangers."

90. Such was the exhortation that Phormio, on his side, addressed to his men. Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land toward the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor. In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailors; that if Phormio, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in. As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore; while the land-forces of the Messenians at the same time came to support him. When the Peloponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and already within the gulf and near the shore (which was just what they wished), at one signal they suddenly brought their ships round and sailed in a line, as fast as each could, against the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. Eleven of them, however, which were taking the lead, escaped the wing of the Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into the open gulf; but the rest they surprised, and drove them on shore, in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such of the crews as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships

they lashed to their own and began to tow off empty, and one they took men and all; while in the case of some others, the Messenians, coming to their succor, and dashing into the sea with their armor, and boarding them, fought from the decks, and rescued them when they were already being towed off.

91. To this extent then the Peloponnesians had the advantage, and destroyed the Athenian ships; while their twenty vessels in the right wing were in pursuit of those eleven of the enemy that had just escaped their turn into the open gulf. They, with the exception of one ship, got the start of them and fled for refuge to Naupactus; and facing about, opposite the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves, in case they should sail to shore against them. Presently they came up, and were singing the pæan as they sailed, considering that they had gained the victory; and the one Athenian vessel that had been left behind was chased by a single Leucadian far in advance of the rest. Now there happened to be a merchant-vessel moored out at sea, which the Athenian ship had time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in pursuit of her amid-ship, and sunk her. The Peloponnesians therefore were panic-stricken by this sudden and unlooked for achievement; and moreover, as they were pursuing in disorder, on account of the advantage they had gained, some of the ships dropped their oars, and stopped in their course, from a wish to wait for the rest—doing what was unadvisable, considering that they were observing each other at so short a distance—while others even ran on the shoals, through their ignorance of the localities.

92. The Athenians, on seeing this, took courage, and at one word shouted for battle, and rushed upon them. In consequence of their previous blunders and their present confusion, they withstood them but a short time, and then fled to Panormus, whence they had put out. The Athenians pursued them closely, and took six of the ships nearest to them, and recovered their own, which the enemy had disabled near the shore and at the beginning of the engagement, and had taken in tow. Of the men, they put some to death, and made others prisoners. Now on board the Leucadian ship, which went down off the merchant-vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian; who, when the ship was destroyed, killed himself, and falling overboard was floated into the harbor of Naupactus. On their return, the Athenians erected a trophy at the

spot from which they put out before gaining the victory; and all the dead and the wrecks that were near their coast they took up, and gave back to the enemy theirs under truce. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, as victors, for the defeat of the ships they had disabled near the shore; and the ship they had taken they dedicated at Rhium, in Achæa, by the side of the trophy. Afterward, being afraid of the reinforcement from Athens, all but the Leucadians sailed at the approach of night into the Crisæan Bay and the port of Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the Athenians from Crete arrived at Naupactus, with the twenty ships that were to have joined Phormio before the engagement. And thus ended the summer.

93. Before, however, the fleet dispersed which had retired to Corinth and the Crisæan Bay, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the suggestion of the Megareans, to make an attempt upon Piræus, the port of Athens; which, as was natural from their decided superiority at sea, was left unguarded and open. It was determined, therefore, that each man should take his oar, and cushion, and *tropoter*,<sup>1</sup> and go by land from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens; and that after proceeding as quickly as possible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Nisæa, forty vessels that happened to be there, and sail straightway to Piræus. For there was neither any fleet keeping guard before it, nor any thought of the enemy ever sailing against it in so sudden a manner; and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately [to execute it]; and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisæa, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk (some wind or other was also said to have prevented them<sup>2</sup>), but to the headland of Salamis looking toward Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three

<sup>1</sup> Supposed to have been a thong, or rope, wound round the loom of a portlock oar, and serving the triple purpose of a counterpoise, a nut, and a loop. See Arnold, vol. i. Appendix 3.

<sup>2</sup> Τίς is here used, I think, with that signification of *contempt* which it sometimes conveys; to mark the writer's utter disbelief of the report alluded to.

ships to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

94. Now fire-signals of an enemy's approach were raised toward Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Piræus; while those in Piræus thought that Salamis had been taken, and that they were all but sailing into their harbors: which indeed, if they would but have not been afraid of it, might easily have been done; and it was not a *wind* that would have prevented it. But at day-break the Athenians went all in a body to Piræus to resist the enemy; and launched their ships, and going on board with haste and much uproar, sailed with the fleet to Salamis, while with their land-forces they mounted guard at Piræus. When the Peloponnesians saw them coming to the rescue, after overrunning the greater part of Salamis, and taking both men and booty, and the three ships from the port of Budorum, they sailed for Nisæa as quickly as they could; for their vessels too caused them some alarm, as they had been launched after lying idle a long time, and were not at all watertight. On their arrival at Megara they returned again to Corinth by land. When the Athenians found them no longer on the coast of Salamis, they also sailed back; and after this alarm they paid more attention in future to the safety of Piræus, both by closing the harbors, and by all other precautions.

95. About the same period, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces son of Teres, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Thraceward Chalcidians; of two promises wishing to enforce the one, and himself to perform the other. For Perdiccas had made him certain promises if he would effect a reconciliation between him and the Athenians, when he was hard pressed by the war at its commencement, and if he would not restore his brother Philip, who was at enmity with him, to place him on the throne; but he was not disposed to perform what he had promised. On the other hand, Sitalces had pledged himself to the Athenians, when he entered into alliance with them, to bring the Chalcidian war in Thrace to

a successful issue. It was with both these objects then that he made the invasion; in which he took with him Philip's son Amyntas, to set him on the throne of Macedonia, and some envoys from Athens, who happened to be at his court on this business, and Hagnon as commander; for the Athenians also were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet, and as large an army as they could raise.

96. Setting out then from the Odrysians, he summoned to his standard, first the Thracians within Mount Hæmus and Rhodope, as many as were subject to him, as far as the coast of the Euxine and the Hellespont; next the Getæ beyond Hæmus, and all the other hordes that were settled south of the Danube,<sup>1</sup> more toward the sea-board of the Euxine; the Getæ and the tribes in this part being both borderers on the Scythians, and equipped in the same manner, for they are all mounted bowmen. He also invited many of the Highland Thracians, who are independent, and armed with swords; they are called the Dii, and are mostly inhabitants [of the valleys] of Hæmus: some of these he engaged as mercenaries, while others followed him as volunteers. Moreover, he summoned the Agrianians and Lææans and all the other Pæonian tribes that acknowledged his sway. And these were the last people in his dominion, for at the Graæans and Lææans, both of them Pæonian tribes, and at the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scomius through their country, his empire terminated on the side of the Pæonians, who from this point were independent. On the side of the Triballi, who were also independent the border tribes were the Treres and Tilatæans, who live to the north of Mount Scombrus, and stretch toward the west as far as the river Oscius. This river flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebrus, and uninhabited and extensive range, joining on to Rhodope.

97. The extent then of the Odrysian dominion, taking the line of its sea-coast, was from the city of Abdera to the Euxine, up to the mouth of the Danube. This tract is by the shortest way a voyage of four days and nights for a merchant-vessel, supposing the wind to be always steady astern. By land, taking the shortest way from Abdera to the [mouth of] the Danube, a quick traveler performs the journey in eleven days. Such was the extent of its sea-board. As for the in-

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "within the Danube."



terior, from Byzantium to the Lææans and the Strymon (for at this point it reached its greatest extent up the country from the sea), for a quick traveler it was a journey of thirteen days. The tribute raised from all the barbarian dominions and the Grecian cities, taking the sum which they paid under Seuthes, who was successor of Sitalces, and raised it to its greatest amount, was about 400 talents in gold and silver. Presents were also made to no less an amount in gold and silver; and besides these there was all the clothing, both figured and plain, and other articles for use; and that not only for himself, but for those of the Odrysians also who were his lords and nobles. For they established their custom the very reverse of that in the Persian kingdom (though it prevails among the rest of the Thracians also), namely, to receive rather than to give; and it was considered more disgraceful not to give when asked, than not to succeed by asking. But [though the other Thracians practiced the same thing], still the Odrysians, owing to their greater power, practiced it to a greater extent; for it was impossible to get any thing done without making presents. The kingdom then had reached a high pitch of power. For of all those in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in amount of revenue and general prosperity; while in military power and number of troops it was decidedly next to that of the Scythians. But with *this* not only is it impossible for those in Europe to vie, but even in Asia, putting one nation against another, there is none that can stand up against the Thracians, if they are all unanimous. Not, however, that they are on a level with other men in general good management and understanding in the things of common life.

98. Sitalces, then, being king over all this extent of country, prepared his army to take the field. And when all was ready for him, he set out and marched against Macedonia; at first through his own dominions, then over Cercine, a desert mountain, which forms the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians, crossing it by a road which he had himself before made, by felling the timber, when he turned his arms against the Pæonians. In crossing this mountain from the Odrysians, they had the Pæonians on their right, and on their left the Sintians and Mædians; and after crossing it they arrived at Doberus in Pæonia. While he was on the march,

there was no diminution of his army (except by disease), but accessions to it; for many of the independent Thracians, though uninvited, followed him for plunder; so that the whole number is said to have been not less than one hundred and fifty thousand, of which the greater part was infantry, but about a third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians themselves furnished the largest portion; next to them, the Getae. Of the infantry, the most warlike were those armed with swords, the independent tribe that came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him was far more formidable for its numbers than any thing else.

99. They mustered, then, at Doberus, and made their preparations for bursting from the highland down upon the lower Macedonia, which formed the dominion of Perdiccas. For under the name of Macedonians are included also the Lyncestæ and Elemiotæ, and other highland tribes, which are in alliance with the lowlanders and subject to them, but have separate kingdoms of their own. But the Macedonia along the coast, now properly so called, was first acquired and governed by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, who were originally of the family of Temenus of Argos. These expelled by force of arms the Pierians from Pieria, who afterward lived under Mount Pangæus, beyond the Strymon, in Phagres and some other places (and even now the country under Pangæus down to the sea continues to be called the Pierian Gulf). They also drove out of the country called Bottia, the Bottiæans, who now live on the confines of the Chalcidians; while in Pæonia they acquired a narrow strip of territory along the river Axius, stretching down to Pella and the sea-coast; and beyond the Axius, as far as the Strymon, they occupy what is called Mygdonia, having expelled the Edonians from it. Again, they drove out the Eordians from what is now called Eordia (of whom the greater part perished, though a small division of them is settled about Physca), as also the Almopians from Almopia. Those Macedonians, moreover, subdued [the places belonging to] the other tribes, which they still continue to hold, such as Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of the country that belonged to the original Macedonians. The whole of it is called Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, was king of the country when Sitalces invaded it.

100. These Macedonians, then, on the approach of so large an enemy, not being able to offer any resistance, betook themselves to their strongholds and fortifications, such as they had in the country. These, however, were not numerous; but it was at a later period that Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he came to the throne, built those which are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and made other arrangements, both for its having horses and arms for war, and resources of all other kinds, better than had been provided by all the rest of the kings, eight in number, who had preceded him. Now the army of the Thracians, advancing from Doberas, overran first of all what had once been the government of Philip; and took Idomene by storm, and Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by capitulation, as they came over to him from their friendship for Amyntas, Philip's son, who was with him. To Europus they laid siege, but could not reduce it. Afterward he advanced into the rest of Macedonia, on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Beyond these they did not march, namely, into Bottiæa and Pieria, but staid to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians, meanwhile, had not even a thought of resisting them with their infantry; but having sent for an additional supply of horse from their allies in the interior, attacked the Thracian host, few as they were against so many, wherever an opportunity offered. And wherever they charged them, no one stood his ground against troops who were excellent horsemen and armed with breastplates; but surrounded as they were by superior numbers, they exposed themselves to peril by fighting against that crowd of many times their own number: so that at length they kept quiet, not thinking themselves able to run such hazards against a force so far superior.

101. In the mean time, Sitalces conferred with Perdiccas on the objects of his expedition; and since the Athenians had not joined him with their fleet (not believing that he would come), but had sent presents and envoys to him, he sent a part of his forces against the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, and after shutting them up within their walls, laid waste their country. While he was staying in these parts, the people toward the south, as the Thessalians, the Magnesians, with others who were subject to the Thessalians, and the Greeks as far as Thermopylæ, were afraid that the army might ad-

vance against them, and were preparing [for such an event]. The northward Thracians, too, beyond the Strymon were alarmed, as many as lived in a champaign country, namely, the Panæi, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersæi; who are all independent. Nay, it afforded subject of discussion even with the Greeks who were enemies of the Athenians, whether they were not led on by that people on the strength of their alliance, and might not come against *them* also. Sitalces then was commanding at once Chalcidice, Bottica, and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all. But when none of the objects for which he made the expedition was being gained by him, and he found his army without provisions and suffering from the severity of the weather, he was persuaded by Seuthes the son of Spardacus, who was the nephew and next in authority to himself, to return with all speed. For Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a sum of money with her. Thus persuaded then, after remaining [in the enemy's country] thirty days in all, and eight of them in Chalcidice, he retired home with his army as quickly as he could: and Perdiccas subsequently gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. Such were the events that happened in the expedition of Sitalces.

102. During this winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus under the command of Phormio, after coasting along to Astacus, and there disembarking, marched into the interior of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed of the Athenians from the ships and four hundred of the Messenians. From Stratus, Coronta, and some other places, they expelled certain individuals who were not thought to be true to them; and having restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, returned again to their vessels. For against the Æniadæ, who alone of the Acarnanians had always been hostile to them, they did not think it possible to march during the winter, as the river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agræans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, passing by the town of Stratus in the upper part of its course, and by Æniadæ near its mouth, forms lakes round their city, and so makes it impracticable to lead an army against it in the winter on account of the water. Op-

posite to *Æniadæ* lie most of the islands called *Echinades*, close to the mouths of the *Achelous*; so that the river, being so large as it is, continually forms depositions round them, and some of the islands have been joined to the continent, as I expect will be the case with all of them in no long period of time. For the stream is strong, and deep, and turbid, and the islands are thick together, and mutually serve to connect the alluvium so as to prevent its being dispersed; as they lie in alternating rows, not in one line, and have no free passages for the water into the open sea. They are uninhabited, and of no great extent. There<sup>1</sup> is a report which I may also mention, that when *Alcmæon*, son of *Amphiaraus*, was wandering about after the murder of his mother, *Apollo* directed him by an oracle to inhabit this region, by suggesting to him that he would have no release from his terrors till he should discover and inhabit a country which had not yet been seen by the sun, nor existed as land, at the time he slew his mother; since all the rest of the earth was polluted to him. He was perplexed, they say [by such a command]; but at length observed this alluvial deposition of the *Achelous*, and thought that enough might have been thrown up to support life during the long period that he had been a wanderer since killing his mother. Accordingly he settled in the parts about *Æniadæ*, and became powerful, and left the name to the country from his son *Acarman*. Such is the account we have received respecting *Alcmæon*.

103. The Athenians then, and *Phormio*, having departed from *Acarmania* and arrived at *Naupactus*, sailed home to Athens at the return of spring, taking with them such of the prisoners from the naval battles as were freemen (who were exchanged man for man), and the ships they had captured. And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war of which *Thucydides* wrote the history.

<sup>1</sup> Such appears to be the force of the conjunctions *ὁ δὲ καί*, by which the following story is introduced in connection with the preceding account of the islands.

### BOOK III.

1. THE following summer, as soon as the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. There they encamped, and laid waste the land; while charges were made upon them, as usual, by the Athenian cavalry wherever opportunity offered; and they prevented the main host of the light-armed from advancing far from their camp,<sup>1</sup> and damaging the property near the city. After remaining in the country the time for which they had taken provisions, they returned and dispersed to their respective cities.

2. Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, all Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, revolted from the Athenians; having wished indeed to do so before the commencement of the war (the Lacedæmonians, however, did not accept their offers), and yet compelled even now to execute their purpose sooner than they intended. For they were inclined to wait the completion of the moles for the security of their harbors, and of the building of their walls and ships, and the arrival of all that was to come from the Pontus, namely, bowmen and corn, and whatever they had sent for. [But this they were prevented doing;] for<sup>2</sup> the Tenedians, who were at variance with them, and the Methymnæans, and even some private individuals of the Mytilenæans, under the influence of party spirit, as *proxeni* of the Athenians informed that people that the Mytilenæans were forcibly bringing [the rest of] Lesbos into union with their own city, and hurrying all their preparations for a revolt, in conjunction with the

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "from their arms," i. e., the place in which the spears and shields of the heavy-armed soldiers were piled; and so, in a more general sense, the camp where they were quartered.

<sup>2</sup> The *γάρ* in this sentence refers to *αναγκασθέντες* in the first section; as that in the preceding one does to *διενοστήντο*.

Lacedæmonians and Boeotians, who were of the same race as themselves,<sup>1</sup> and that if some one did not at once anticipate their designs, they would lose Lesbos.

3. But the Athenians (being distressed by the plague and the war, which had so recently broken out and was now at its height) thought it a serious business to incur the additional hostility of Lesbos, with her fleet and power hitherto unimpaired; and were not at first disposed to listen to the charges, allowing too much weight to their wish that it might not be true. When, however, they had even sent ambassadors without prevailing on the Mytilenæans to stop their measures for the union and their preparations, they were alarmed, and wished to reduce them by surprise. Accordingly they dispatched with all haste forty ships that happened to have been equipped for cruising round the Peloponnese, under the command of Cleippides son of Dinias, and two colleagues. For information had been brought them that there was a festival in honor of the Malean Apollo outside the city, at which all the people of the Mytilenæans kept holiday: and there was reason to hope that by coming with all speed they would thus fall upon them by surprise. If then the attempt should succeed, [all would be well]; if not, they should charge the Mytilenæans<sup>2</sup> to deliver up their fleet and dismantle their walls; and if they did not obey, should make war upon them. So the ships set sail; but the ten triremes of the Mytilenæans, which had come to them as a reinforcement, according to the terms of their alliance, were detained by the Athenians, and the crews of them were put in prison. The Mytilenæans, however, were informed of the expedition against them by a man who crossed over from Athens to Eubœa, and having gone by land to Geræstus, there found a merchant-vessel getting under weigh, and so proceeded by sea, and arrived at Mytilene the third day after leaving Athens. Accordingly they both abstained from going out to the temple at Malea, and, for the rest, barricaded and kept guard around their half-finished walls.

<sup>1</sup> i. e., of the Æolic race, to which most of the northern states of Greece considered themselves to belong, and among the rest the Boeotians, who had chiefly composed the colony headed by Penthilus, the son of Orestes, from which the Lesbians derived their origin.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., the commanders. The infinitive seems to depend upon ἐκέλευσαν, or some such word, understood.

4. When the Athenians sailed up soon after and saw this, the commanders delivered their orders; and as the Mytilenæans did not obey them, they commenced hostilities. Being thus compelled to go to war while unprepared, and without any notice, the Mytilenæans sailed out with their fleet to battle, a short distance from their harbor; but when driven to shore by the Athenian ships, they then proposed terms to the commanders, wishing, if they could, to get the squadron sent back for the present on any reasonable conditions. The Athenian commanders agreed to their proposals, having fears on *their* side also, that they might not be able to carry on war with the whole of Lesbos. Accordingly, having concluded an armistice, the Mytilenæans sent to Athens one of their accusers, who now repented [of what he had said], and some others, to try if by any means they might persuade them to let the squadron return, on the belief of their meditating no innovation. In the mean time they also sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon in a trireme, having escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet, which was anchored at Malea, northward of the city; for they were not confident of the success of the answer from Athens. These having reached Lacedæmon with much trouble across the open sea, negotiated for some succors being sent to them.

5. When the ambassadors from Athens came back without having effected any thing, the Mytilenæans commenced hostilities, and all the rest of Lesbos excepting [the people of] Methymna; but these had reinforced the Athenians, with the Imbrians, Lesbians, and some few of the rest of the allies. The Mytilenæans then made a sally with all their forces against the camp of the Athenians; and a battle was fought, in which though the former had the advantage, they neither spent the night on the field, nor felt any confidence in themselves, but withdrew. After this they remained quiet, wishing to hazard a battle in conjunction with additional troops from the Peloponnese, if any force should join them: (for there had come to them Meleas, a Lacedæmonian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who had been dispatched before the revolt, but not being able to anticipate the expedition of the Athenians, sailed up by stealth in a trireme after the battle, and advised them to send another trireme and ambassadors in company with themselves; which they did.)



6. The Athenians, on the other hand, being much assured by the quiet of the Mytilenæans, were calling allies to join them, who came much quicker from seeing no vigor on the part of the Lesbians; and bringing round their ships<sup>1</sup> to a new station on the south of the town, they fortified two camps, one on each side of the town, and established their blockades at both the harbors. Thus they excluded the Mytilenæans from the use of the sea; but of the whole of the land they were still masters, with the rest of the Lesbians who had now come to their assistance; while the Athenians commanded only the small extent round their camps, Malea being rather a station for their ships and a market [than any thing else]. Such were the features of the war about Mytilene.

7. About the same period of this summer the Athenians also dispatched thirty ships to the Peloponnese, with Asopius son of Phormio as commander; the Acarnanians having requested them to send them either a son or other relative of his to take the command. The ships, as they coasted along, ravaged the maritime towns of Laconia. Afterward Asopius sent back home the greater part of them, but himself went to Naupactus with twelve; and subsequently, having raised the whole population of the Acarnanians, marched against Cēniadæ; sailing with his fleet by the Achelous, and his army by land laying waste the country. When it did not surrender, he dismissed his land-forces, and having himself sailed to Leucas, and made a descent upon Nericus, was cut off on his return, and some part of his army with him, by the people of the neighborhood who had come to the rescue, and some few guard-troops. The Athenians, after sailing away, subsequently recovered their dead from the Leucadians by treaty.

8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans sent out in the first ship, being told by the Lacedæmonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest of the confederates also might and consult upon their case, accordingly went thither. It was the Olympiad at which Dorieus the Rhodian gained his second victory. And when after the festival they came to conference, the envoys spoke as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Göller differs from Arnold's interpretation which I have given, and takes τὸ πρὸς νότον with ἐρείξουσιν, thinking that both the camps were to the south of the city, one on the east, the other on the west side of it. See their notes, and also that of Bishop Thirlwall, vol. iii. p. 173.

9. "With the settled principle of the Greeks [with regard to a case like ours], Lacedæmonians and allies, we are well acquainted; for when men revolt in war, and leave their former confederacy, those who receive them are pleased with them so far as they derive benefit from them; but inasmuch as they consider them traitors to their former friends, they have a meaner opinion of them. And this is no unfair estimate of their conduct, supposing that both those who revolt, and those from whom they separate, agreed in their views and in kindly feeling, and were equally matched in resources and power, and no reasonable ground for the revolt previously existed. But this was not the case with us and the Athenians; nor ought we to be worse thought of by any one for revolting from them in the time of their peril, when we were honored by them in time of peace.

10. "For it is on the justice and goodness of our cause that we will first address you, especially as we are requesting the favor of your alliance; knowing that neither friendship between individuals, nor league between communities, is ever lasting, unless they formed the connection<sup>1</sup> with an appearance of good principle toward each other, and were of congenial dispositions in other respects; for from the difference of feelings difference of conduct also arises. Now between us and the Athenians alliance was first made when you left us, and withdrew from the Median war, while they stood by us to finish the business. We became allies, however, not to the Athenians for the enslaving of the Greeks, but to the Greeks for their liberation from the Mede. And so long as they led us on equal terms, we followed them heartily; but when we saw them relaxing in their hostility to the Mede, and undertaking to enslave<sup>2</sup> the Greeks, we were no longer without alarm. Being incapable, however, through the number of those who had votes, to join together and defend themselves, the allies were reduced to slavery, except ourselves and the Chians; but *we* joined their enterprises as independent, forsooth, and free—in *name*. And now we had no longer in the Athenians such leaders as we could trust, having before us the examples that were already given: for it was not

<sup>1</sup> According to Gøller, φίλοι is understood after γίγνεται; according to Poppo, φιλία καὶ κοινωνία before it. I prefer the former construction.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as Poppo takes it, "bringing on the subjugation."

likely that they should reduce to subjection those whom they had taken into treaty along with us, and not do the same to the rest, if ever they had the power.

11. "If indeed we had all been still independent, they might have been better trusted by us not to attempt any innovation: but having the majority subject to them, while they associated with us on terms of equality; and comparing the submission of the greater part with our alone being treated as equals, they would naturally brook it the worse; especially as they were themselves growing more powerful than ever, and we more destitute. But equality of fear is the only sure basis of an alliance; for then the party that wishes to commit any offense is deterred by the knowledge that he would not attempt it with any advantage on his side. Again, we were left independent for no other reason than inasmuch as their schemes of empire appeared attainable by specious language, and encroachment in the way of policy rather than of force. For at the same time they used us as evidence that such as had equal votes with themselves, at any rate, would not join them in their enterprises against their will [and therefore not at all]; unless those they attacked were in the wrong: and by the same system they also led the stronger states with them against the weaker ones first, and by leaving the more powerful until the last they were sure to find them less so, when all the rest had been stripped away from them. But if they had begun with us, while all of them still had their power, and a center round which to take their stand, they would not have subdued them so easily. Our fleet, too, caused them a degree of fear, lest by uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, it might some time bring them into danger. And again, to a certain extent we preserved ourselves by paying court to their commons, and to those who from time to time took the lead of them. We did not, however, expect to be long able to do so, if this war had not broken out; looking to the examples they had given in their dealings with the rest.

12. "What then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to be relied on, in which we received each other contrary to our real sentiments; and they, through fear, courted us in war, while we did the same to them in peace? And whereas in the case of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it was fear that gave this assurance; and we were constrained to

be allies by terror more than by affection; and to whichever party security should first give confidence, that party was sure to be the first also to violate the treaty in some way or other. If therefore we are thought by any one to be wrong in first revolting, because they deferred the evils we dreaded, while we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would be inflicted, he does not view the case aright. For if we were able on equal terms with them to return their plots against us, and their delay in the execution of them, what reason was there, that being [according to this view of the case], on an equal footing, we should [really] be at their mercy?<sup>1</sup> But as it was always in *their* power to make the attempt, it ought to be in *ours* to guard against it beforehand.

13. "It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedæmonians, and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety: which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Bœotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; from the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty; and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them]. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succor speedily; that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us; so that it

<sup>1</sup> In other words, the *fact* of their being always at the mercy of the Athenians proved the falsity of the *hypothesis* of their being on equal terms with them, and therefore the reasonableness of their anticipating the attack which might at any time be made upon them, instead of waiting till it had actually been made. Such I think is the meaning of this very difficult passage.

is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores. And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defense of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succors. Now their revenue is drawn from their allies; and it will be still greater, if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before [they revolted]. But if you will give us hearty assistance, you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, of which you especially stand in need; and will the more easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their allies (for every one will then join you more boldly), and will escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, you will find your advantage in the war more certain.

14. "From respect then for the hopes of the Greeks reposed in you, and for that Olympian Jupiter in whose temple we stand in the character of suppliants,<sup>1</sup> assist the Mytilenæans by becoming their allies; and do not abandon us [to destruction], standing as we do the brunt of the danger in our own persons, while we shall confer on all a general benefit from our success, and a still more general detriment, if we are ruined through your not being prevailed on to help us. Show yourselves then to be such men as the Greeks esteem you, and as our fear would have you to be."

15. To this effect spoke the Mytilenæans. When the Lacedæmonians and the confederates had heard them, they admitted the force of their arguments, and received the Lesbians into alliance. And with regard to the invasion of Attica, they told the confederates who were present to go with all speed to the isthmus with two third of their forces, to put it into execution, and were themselves the first to arrive there, and proceeded to get ready at the isthmus machines for hauling their ships, with a view to transporting them to Corinth to the sea on

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "like as suppliants."

the side of Athens, and making an attack both by sea and land at the same time. They, then, were heartily engaged in these operations; but the rest of the confederates were slow in assembling, as they were occupied in gathering in their harvest, and sick of making expeditions.

16. The Athenians were aware that they were making these preparations from a conviction of their weakness; and wishing to show that it was not a correct opinion, but that they were able, without moving the squadron stationed against Lesbos, at the same time to repel with ease that which was coming against them from the Peloponnese, they manned a hundred ships, going on board themselves (with the exception of the knights and the *pentacosio medimni*),<sup>1</sup> and their resident aliens; and having put out to the isthmus, they made both a display [of their power], and descents on whatever parts of the Peloponnese they pleased. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought that what had been told them by the Lesbians was not true; and considering themselves in a strait, as their allies at the same time had not joined them, and the thirty Athenian ships cruising round the Peloponnese were reported to be ravaging the land near their city, they returned home. Afterward, however, they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos, and gave orders to the different states for ships to the number of forty, and appointed Alcidas,<sup>2</sup> who was to conduct the expedition, their high-admiral. The Athenians, too, returned with their hundred ships, when they saw that the Lacedæmonians had done so.

17. <sup>3</sup>At the time that this squadron was at sea, they had

<sup>1</sup> These were the citizens whose lands brought them in yearly 500 medimni (equal to about 94 English quarters) of corn, wine, or oil; and they formed the highest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people. The knights formed the second class, their qualification being 300 medimni; and were so called from being obliged to serve in war on horseback.

<sup>2</sup> I am far from certain what is the exact force of this clause, but think it may possibly refer to the fact of Alcidas having been fixed upon to command this expedition *before* the office of high admiral was conferred upon him; and that his subsequent appointment to that office is also referred to, c. 26. 1, τὰς—ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν ἔχοντα Ἀλκίδα, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες: in which case προστάξαντες would be far from being superfluous, as it has generally been supposed. If, however, this interpretation be thought fanciful, the ἐμελλεν must simply mean that he "was to conduct the expedition" in his capacity as admiral.

<sup>3</sup> "The object of this chapter," as Arnold observes, "is merely to bring

about the largest number of ships they had ever possessed at once, in effective and fine condition :<sup>1</sup> (though they had as many, or even more, at the beginning of the war). For a hundred kept guard round Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis, while another hundred were cruising about the Peloponnese, besides those at Potidæa and in other places ; so that altogether there were two hundred and fifty [in service] in the course of that one summer. And it was this, in conjunction with Potidæa, that most exhausted their revenues. For at Potidæa the number of heavy-armed that kept guard at two drachmas a day (for each man received one for himself and another for his servant), was at first three thousand ; and not fewer than these remained there to the end of the siege, besides one thousand six hundred with Phormio, who went away before it was concluded ; while all the ships, too, received the same pay. In this way then was their money heedlessly lavished at first ; and such was the largest number of ships manned by them.

18. At the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the neighborhood of the isthmus, the Mytilenæans marched by land, both themselves and their auxiliaries, against Methymna, in hope of its being betrayed to them. After assaulting the city, when they did not succeed as they had expected to do, they withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and having rendered the condition of those towns more secure, and strengthened the fortifications, they returned home. When they had retired, the Methymnæans marched against Antissa ; and being defeated by the inhabitants and their auxiliaries in a sortie that was made, many of them were slain, and the remainder retreated as quickly as possible. The Athenians, on receiving this intelligence of the Mytilenæans' commanding the country, and their own troops not being sufficient to keep them in check, sent, about the beginning of autumn, Paches son of Epicurus as commander, with a thousand heavy-armed of their own ; who having themselves rowed their ships, arrived at Mytilene, and inclosed it all round with a single wall ; forts being built on some of the

in what Thucydides had forgotten to mention in its proper place, namely, the greatest naval force, and the greatest war expedition, which Athens had ever been able to employ and support ; just as he had mentioned, II. 31. 3, the greatest land army which she had ever sent out on one service.

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "effective, in fine condition ;" "with handsomeness," as Bloomfield renders it ; whose interpretation of the passage I prefer to either Gôller's or Poppo's.

strongest points of it. Thus the place was vigorously blockaded on both sides, by land and by sea; and the commencement of winter was near at hand.

19. The Athenians, being in want of money for the siege, although they had among themselves for the first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents, dispatched to their allies also twelve ships to levy subsidies, and Lysicles with five others in command of them. Accordingly he levied them in various places, cruising about; and having gone up the country from Myus in Caria, across the plain of the Mæander, as far as the hill of Sandius, he was both slain himself and many of the army besides, in an attack made by the Carians and the people of Anæa.

20. The same winter the Plataeans (for they were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians), when distressed by the failure of their provisions, and when there was no hope of aid from Attica, and no other means of safety presented itself, both themselves and the Athenians who were besieged with them formed a design, in which they were at first unanimous, for all to sally forth and pass the walls of the enemy, if they could force their way over them; the attempt having been suggested to them by Theænetus son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupomidas son of Daïmachus, who was also one of their generals. Subsequently half of them shrank from it, thinking it a great risk; but about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persevered in the attempt, [which they effected] in the following manner. They made ladders to suit the height of the enemy's wall, measuring by the layers of bricks, where the wall looking toward them happened to be imperfectly whitewashed. Now many counted the layers at the same time; and though some would naturally miss the correct calculation, the majority would attain it; especially as they counted them many times over, and were also at no great distance, but the wall was easily observed by them as far as they wished. In this way they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, guessing the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

21. Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was of the following construction. It consisted of two lines round the place, one against the Plataeans, and another in case any one should attack them on the outside from Athens; and the lines were about sixteen feet apart. In this interval then of the sixteen feet there were quarters built, and partitioned out among the soldiers that



were on guard; and these were continuous, so that it appeared but one thick wall, with battlements on each side. At the distance of every ten battlements there were towers, of considerable size, and of the same breadth as the wall, reaching both to its inner and its outer front, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but they passed through the middle of them. During the nights therefore, whenever it was stormy and wet weather, they used to leave the battlements, and to keep watch from the towers, as they were only at a short distance one from another, and were covered in above. Such then was the nature of the wall by which the Plateans were inclosed.

22. When they had made their preparations, having watched for a stormy night of wind and rain, and at the same time moonless, they went forth under the guidance of those who had been the authors of the enterprise. In the first place then they crossed the ditch which ran round their city, and then came up to the enemy's wall, unperceived by the sentinels; for they did not see before them in the dark, and did not hear them owing to the wind, which drowned with its clatter the noise of their approach; besides, they went far apart from each other, that their arms might not clash together and betray them. They were also lightly armed, and had only the left foot shod, for security against slipping in the mire. So they came up to the battlements at one of the spaces between the towers, knowing that they were deserted. First came those who carried the ladders, which they planted; then twelve light-armed, with only a dagger and a breastplate, proceeded to mount, Ammias son of Corcelius leading them, and being the first to mount, and after him his followers, six going to each of the towers. Next after them came another party of light-armed, with darts, whose shields, that they might the more easily advance, others carried in the rear, and were ready to hand them to them whenever they came to the enemy. When a considerable number had got up, the sentinels in the towers discovered it; for one of the Plateans, in laying hold of the battlements, threw down a tile from them, which made a noise as it fell. And immediately a shout was raised, and the troops rushed to the wall, for they did not know what the alarm was, the night being dark, and the weather stormy; and besides, those of the Plateans who had been left behind in the town sallied forth, and made an attack on the wall of the Peloponnesians on the

opposite side to where their men were getting over, that they might pay as little attention as possible to them. Thus, though they were alarmed, and stood to their several posts, no one ventured to go to the rescue beyond his own station, but they were at a loss to conjecture what was going on. Meanwhile their three hundred, whose orders were to give aid at whatever point it might be necessary, proceeded outside the wall in the direction of the shout. Fire-signals of an attack from the enemy were likewise raised toward Thebes; but the Plataeans in the city also raised many others, which had been prepared beforehand for this purpose, that the indications of the enemy's signals might be indistinct, and so [their friends] might not come to their aid, thinking the business something different from what it really was, till those of their own number who had gone out should have escaped and gained their safety.

23. In the mean time, with regard to the party of Plataeans that were scaling the wall, when the first of them had mounted, and after putting the sentinels to the sword, had taken possession of each of the two towers, they posted themselves in them, and kept guard, to prevent any reinforcement coming through them; and when they had raised ladders to them from the wall, and sent up a considerable party of men, those at the towers kept in check with their missiles, both from above and below,<sup>1</sup> such as were coming to the rescue; while the other and greater part of them had in the mean time planted many ladders, and thrown down the battlements, and were passing over between the towers. As each successively effected his passage, he took his stand on the edge of the ditch; and thence they used their bows and darts against any one that came to the rescue along the wall, and tried to stop the passage [of their comrades]. When all were over, those on the towers descended—the last of them with great difficulty—and proceeded to the ditch; and in the mean time the three hundred were coming against them with torches. Now the Plataeans, as they stood in the dark on the edge of the ditch, had a better view of them, and discharged their arrows and darts against the exposed parts of their bodies; while they themselves, in the obscurity of their position, were the less seen for the torches; so that even the last of the Plataeans got clear over

<sup>1</sup> i. e., from the top of the towers and from the wall at their base.

the ditch, though with difficulty and by a violent effort; for ice had frozen over it, not strong enough to allow of their walking on it, but rather watery, as it usually is with<sup>1</sup> a wind more east than north; and the night being somewhat snowy in consequence of such a wind, had swollen the water in it, which they crossed with their heads barely above it. But at the same time their escape was mainly effected through the violence of the storm.<sup>2</sup>

24. Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went in a body along the road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates on their right, thinking that the Peloponnesians would least suspect their taking *that* road, toward their enemies' country; and in the mean time they saw them in pursuit with torches along the road to Cithæron and the Oak-heads, in the direction of Athens. So after they had gone six or seven stades along the road to Thebes, they then turned off, and took that which leads to the mountain, to Erythræ, and Hysiaë; and having reached the hills, they escaped to Athens, to the number of two hundred and twelve out of one originally greater; for some of them turned back again into the city before they passed over the wall, and one bowman was taken prisoner at the outer ditch. So the Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts; while the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had happened, but having been informed by those who returned that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day, and wished to make a truce for taking up their dead; when, however, they knew the truth, they ceased from their application. In this way then the party of Plataeans passed over the wall and were saved.

25. At the close of the same winter, Salæthus the Lacedæ-

<sup>1</sup> Arnold and Bloomfield, on the authority of the Scholiast, supply *uállon* before *η*. Indeed, if both the east and north wind were rainy, from what quarter could a clear and dry frost be expected? For the character here attributed to the east wind, compare Horace, Epod. 16. 53, "Ut neque largis Aquosus Eurus arva radat imbribus." In the words that follow, if the *ὑπό* in *ὑπονευομένη* has the diminutive force which is generally attributed to it, the swelling of the water in the ditch must be referred to the *general* character of the night, as before described; for without the violent storms of *rain* it is evident that a *little snow* could have produced no such effect in so short a time.

<sup>2</sup> The force of the *καί* seems to be, that although the storm increased the difficulty of crossing the ditch, it also contributed very largely to the success of their plan in other respects.

monian was sent out from Lacedæmon in a trireme to Mytilene; and having gone by sea to Pyrrha, and thence by land, he entered Mytilene unobserved, along the bed of a torrent, where the lines round the town were passable, and told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica, and at the same time the ships would come which were to have assisted them before; and that he himself had been dispatched in advance on this account, and to attend to all other matters. The Mytilenæans therefore took fresh courage, and thought less of coming to terms with the Athenians. And so ended this winter, and the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

26. The following summer, after the Peloponnesians had dispatched Alcidas, who was their high-admiral (for they had conferred that office upon him), with the two and forty<sup>1</sup> ships to Mitylene, they themselves and their allies made an irruption into Attica; that the Athenians, being harassed both ways, might be the less able to send succors against the ships that were sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this irruption was Cleomenes, as representative of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who was king, and still a minor, and Cleomenes was his father's brother. They ravaged therefore both the parts which had been devastated before, if there were any thing that had shot up again, and all that had been passed over in their previous irruptions. And this invasion was most severely felt by the Athenians, next to the second; for continually expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement performed by their ships, which they thought had by this time made their passage, they went on committing general devastation. When, however, none of the results which they expected was obtained, and when their provisions had failed, they returned, and were dispersed through their several countries.

27. The Mytilenæans, meanwhile, as the ships from the Peloponnese had not come to them, but were wasting the time, and as their provisions had failed, were compelled to

<sup>1</sup> As only forty are mentioned before, c. 16. 3, and 25. 2, Arnold thinks it possible that the additional two formed the contingent of Lacedæmon itself. They are again spoken of as forty, c. 29. 1, and 69. 1; in which places he may refer to them merely in round numbers. In the words that follow, Arnold agrees with Gölter that either *ἑξοντα* or *πρωτάξαιρες* is superfluous; but see note on c. 16. 3.

come to terms with the Athenians, by the following circumstances. Since even Salæthus himself no longer expected the arrival of the fleet, he equipped as heavy-armed soldiers the commons who had before been only light-armed, with a view to sallying out against the Athenians; but as soon as they were in possession of arms, they no longer obeyed their commanders, but collecting in groups, ordered those in power to bring the provision-stores into public view, and divide them among all; or they would themselves make terms with the Athenians, and deliver up the city.

28. The members of the government, knowing that they would not be able to prevent them, and that they would themselves be exposed to danger if excluded from the arrangement, made a general agreement with Paches and the army, that the Athenians should be at liberty to adopt what measures they chose respecting the Mytilenæans; that they should receive the army into the city, and send ambassadors to Athens to plead their cause; and that until they returned, Paches should neither throw into prison, nor reduce to slavery, nor put to death, any of the Mytilenæans. This was the nature of the agreement: but those of the inhabitants who had been most prominent in negotiating with the Lacedæmonians, were very much alarmed when the army entered the city, and could not restrain themselves, but went and seated themselves by the altars, notwithstanding [the assurances that had been given]. Paches, however, raised them up with a promise to do them no harm, and deposited them in Tenedos until the Athenians should have come to some determination about them. He also sent some triremes to Antissa, and won the place over; and arranged all other matters concerning the forces as he pleased.

29. Now the Peloponnesians on board the forty ships, who ought with all speed to have joined the Mytilenæans, both lost time in cruising about the Peloponnese itself, and proceeded at their leisure during the rest of the voyage, unobserved by the Athenians at home, until they touched at Delos; after leaving which island they came to land at Icarus and Myconus, and there received the first tidings of the capture of Mytilene. Wishing, however, to know the exact truth of the matter, they put into Embatum in the Erythræan territory; seven days having elapsed from the taking of Mytilene when

they did so. After hearing the exact truth, they consulted on the present state of affairs; and Teutiplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows :

30. " Alcidas, and the rest of my Peloponnesian colleagues in the command of the forces, my opinion is that we should sail straightway<sup>1</sup> to Mytilene, before we have been heard of. For in all probability we shall find great want of watchfulness, as is usual on the part of men who have but recently taken possession of a city. By sea, indeed, where they have no thought of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength mainly lies, this will be altogether the case; and even their land-forces are likely to be dispersed through the houses too carelessly. If then we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I hope that with the aid of those in the city (if, indeed, there be any one left who wishes us well), possession of the place might be gained.<sup>2</sup> And let us not shrink from the danger, but consider that the proverbial "surprises of war" are nothing else than chances such as this; which if any one should guard against in his own case, and avail himself of them, when he saw them in the case of his enemy, he would be a most successful general."

31. Such was his speech; but he did not persuade Alcidas. On the other hand, some of the exiles from Ionia and the Lesbians who were on board with them, advised, that since he was afraid of that danger, he should seize one of the Ionian cities, or Cyeme in Æolia; so that having a city as the base of their operations they might excite Ionia to revolt: (and there was reason to hope this, for their arrival was unwelcome to no one.) If then they should take away from the Athenians this their chief source of revenue, and<sup>3</sup> if at the same time

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "just as we are."

<sup>2</sup> Or more literally, "our measures might be achieved."

<sup>3</sup> The difficulties in the construction of this passage are too numerous to be even separately mentioned here. What I have given is, I think, the most probable meaning of the original, according to Arnold's text; as the position of the *σφίσι* seems absolutely to require that it should be taken after *γίνηται*, and not after *ἐφορμῶσιν*. Göller and Bloomfield reject it altogether as a mere gloss; and according to that reading the *ἐφορμῶν* would, of course, refer to the Athenians. For my own part, I am far from certain that *ἐφορμῶσιν*, the reading which is found in all the manuscripts, has not unnecessarily been altered; whether *αὐτοῦς* or *αὐτοῖς* be the genuine form of the pronoun governed by it. In the former case it would mean, "if they should be put to expense by exciting

they should themselves incur the expense of keeping a fleet of observation, they thought they should prevail on Pisuthnes also to take part in the war with them. He did not, however, accede to this proposal either; but was most strongly inclined, since he had come too late for Mytilene, to reach the Peloponnesians again as quickly as possible.

32. Weighing therefore from Embatum, he coasted along, and having touched at Myonnesus, a place belonging to the Teians, he butchered most of the prisoners he had taken on his passage. On his coming to anchor at Ephesus ambassadors came from the Samians of Anæa, and told him that he was not liberating Greece in the right way, by destroying men who were neither raising their hands against him, nor were hostile to him, but allies of the Athenians through necessity; and if he did not cease, he would bring few of his enemies into friendship with him, but would find many more of his friends become his enemies. He was convinced [by these arguments], and set at liberty all the Chians he had still in his hands, and some of the others. [And there had been very many taken by him<sup>1</sup>]; for at the sight of his ships the men did not fly, but rather came to them, thinking they were from Athens; and they had not even the slightest expectation, that while the Athenians had command of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would dare to cross over to Ionia.

33. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed as quickly as possible, and took to flight. For while still lying at anchor off Clarus, he had been seen by the Salaminian and the Paralus ships (which happened to be sailing from Athens), and fearing pursuit, he took his course across the open sea, intending to make no land voluntarily but the Peloponnesians. Now tidings of him had been sent to Paches and the Athenians from the Erythræan country, and indeed from every quarter; for as Ionia had no fortified towns, the alarm was great lest the Peloponnesians in coasting along, even though they did not intend to stay, might at the same time assault and plunder the

*them to hostilities*," i. e., the Ionians, understood from τὴν ἰωνίαν; in the latter, "by attacking them." For though the *middle* voice of the verb is more generally used in that sense, I can not think it impossible that Thucydides might sometimes use the active also; as Euripides does, Hippol. 1270.

<sup>1</sup> Some such clause as this seems necessary, as the following paragraph is intended to account for his having made so many prisoners

cities. And now the Paralus and Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence of the fact. Accordingly he made chase with all speed, and continued in pursuit of him as far as the isle of Patmos, but returned when he found that he was not within distance to be overtaken. He considered it, however, a lucky thing, as he did not fall in with them out at sea, that they had not been overtaken any where near shore, and obliged to form an encampment, and so give his forces the trouble of watching and blockading them.

34. As he coasted along on his return, he touched, among other places, at Notium, [the port] of the Colophonians, where they had settled after the capture of the upper city by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in by individuals on the ground of a factious quarrel. The city was taken about the time that the second irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica took place. Those then who had fled for refuge to Notium, and settled there, having again split into factions, one party introduced and kept in the fortified quarter of the town an auxiliary force of Arcadians and barbarians sent by Pisuthnes; and those of the Colophonians in the upper city who formed the Median party, went in with them and joined their community; while those who had retired from them, and were now in exile, introduced Paches. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter,<sup>1</sup> to a parley, on condition that if he proposed nothing to meet his wishes, he should restore him safe and sound to the fortress; but when he went out to him, he kept him in hold, though not in bonds; and having assaulted the place on a sudden and when they were not expecting it, he took it, and put to the sword the Arcadians and all the rest that were in it. Having afterward taking Hippias into it, as he had agreed to do, he seized him when he was inside, and shot him through. He then gave up Notium to the Colophonians, excepting the Median party; and the Athenians subsequently sent our colonists, and settled the place according to their own laws; having collected all the Colophonians, wherever there was one in any of the cities.

35. On his arrival at Mytilene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having seized Salæthus the Lacedæmonian in the

<sup>1</sup> Properly, "the cross-wall," which divided one part of the town from the rest.



city, where he was hiding, he dispatched him to Athens, and with him the Mytilenæans at Tenedos, whom he had deposited there, and whomever else he thought implicated in the revolt. He also sent back the greater part of his forces. With the remainder he staid there, and settled the affairs of Mytileno and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought proper.

36. On the arrival of the men with Salæthus, the Athenians immediately put the latter to death, though he held out certain promises, and among others, that he would obtain the retreat of the Peloponnesians from Plataea (for it was still being besieged): but respecting the former they deliberated what to do; and in their anger they determined to put to death, not only these that were there, but all the Mytilenæans also that were of age; and to make slaves of the women and children. For they both urged against them [the aggravated character of] their revolt in other respects, namely, that they had executed it without being subject to their dominion, like the rest; and the fact of the Peloponnesian ships having dared to venture over to Ionia to assist them, contributed also no little to their wrath; for they thought it was with no short premeditation that they had revolted. They sent therefore a trireme to Paches with intelligence of their resolution, and commanded him to dispatch the Mytilenæans as quickly as possible. The next day they felt immediately a degree of repentance, and reflected that the resolution they had passed was a cruel and sweeping one, to put a whole city to the sword, instead of those who were guilty. When the Mytilenæan ambassadors who were present, and those of the Athenians who co-operated with them, perceived this, they got the authorities to put the question again to the vote; and the more easily prevailed on them to do it, because they also saw plainly that the majority of the citizens wished some one to give them another opportunity of deliberating. An assembly therefore being immediately summoned, different opinions were expressed on both sides; and Cleon, son of Cleænetus, who had carried the former resolution, to put them to death, being on other subjects also the most violent of the citizens, and by far the most influential with the commons, at that time came forward again, and spoke as follows:

37. "On many other occasions before this have I been convinced that a democracy is incapable of maintaining dominion

over others, and I am so more than ever from your present change of purpose respecting the Mytilenæans. For owing to your daily freedom from fear, and plotting against each other, you entertain the same views toward your allies also. And you do not reflect, in whatever case you may either have made a mistake through being persuaded by their words, or may have given way to pity, that you show such weakness to your own peril, and at the same time to gain no gratitude from your allies; not considering that it is a tyrannical dominion which you hold, and over men who are plotting against you, and involuntarily subject to you; and who obey you not from any favors you confer on them to your own hurt, but from the fact of your being superior to them through your power, rather than their good feeling. But of all things it is the most fearful, if nothing of what we have resolved is to be steadfast; and if we are not convinced that a state with inferior laws which are unchanged is better than one with good ones which are not authoritative; that homely wit with immoderation is more useful than cleverness with intemperance; and that the duller class of men, compared with the more talented, generally speaking, manage public affairs better. For the latter wish to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule what is ever spoken for the public good—thinking that they could not show their wisdom in more important matters—and by such means they generally ruin their country. But the former, distrusting their own talent, deign to be less learned than the laws, and less able than to find fault with the words of one who has spoken well; and being judges on fair terms, rather than rivals for a prize, they are more commonly right in their views. So then ought *we* also to do, and not to advise your people contrary to our real opinion, urged on by cleverness and rivalry of talent.

38. "I, then, continue of the same opinion; and am astonished at those who have proposed to discuss a second time the case of the Mytilenæans, and caused in it a delay of time, which is all for the advantage of the guilty (for so the sufferer proceeds against the offender with his anger less keen; whereas when retribution treads most closely on the heels of suffering, it best matches it in wreaking vengeance). I wonder, too, who will be the man to maintain the opposite opinion, and to pretend to show that the injuries done by the Mytilenæans

are beneficial to us, and that our misfortunes are losses to our allies. It is evident that either trusting to his eloquence he would strive to prove, in opposition to us, that what we consider most certain has not been ascertained; or, urged on by the hope of gain, will endeavor to lead us away by an elaborate display of specious language. But in such contests as these the state gives the prizes to others, and takes only the dangers itself. And it is you who are to blame for it, through unwisely instituting those contests; inasmuch as you are accustomed to attend to speeches like spectators [in a theater], and to facts like mere listeners [to what others tell you]; with regard to things future, judging of their possibility from those who have spoken cleverly about them; and with regard to things which have already occurred, not taking what has been done as more credible from your having seen it, than what has been only heard from those who in words have delivered a clever invective. And so you are the best men to be imposed on with novelty of argument, and to be unwilling to follow up what has been approved by you; being slaves to every new paradox, and despisers of what is ordinary. Each of you wishes, above all, to be able to speak himself; but if that is not possible, in rivalry of those who so speak, you strive not to appear to have followed his sentiments at second-hand; but when he has said any thing cleverly, you would fain appear to have anticipated its expression by your applause, and are eager to catch beforehand what is said, and at the same time slow to foresee the consequences of it. Thus you look, so to speak, for something different from the circumstances in which we are actually living; while you have not a sufficient understanding of even that which is before you. In a word, you are overpowered by the pleasures of the ear, and are like men sitting to be amused<sup>1</sup> by rhetoricians rather than deliberating upon state affairs.

39. "Wishing then to call you off from this course, I declare to you that the Mytilenæans have injured you more than any one state ever did. For I can make allowance for men who have revolted because they could not endure your government, or because they were compelled by their enemies. But for those who inhabited an island with fortifications, and had only to fear our enemies by sea, on which element, too, they were

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "as spectators" of them.

themselves not unprotected against them by a fleet of triremes, and who lived independent, and were honored in the highest degree by us, and then treated us in this way; what else did those men do than deliberately devise our ruin, and rise up against us, rather than revolt from us (revolt, at least, is the part of those who are subject to some violent treatment), and seek to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies? Yet surely that is more intolerable than if they waged war against you by themselves for the acquisition of power. Again, neither were the calamities of their neighbors, who had already revolted from us and been subdued, a warning to them; nor did the good fortune they enjoyed make them loathe to come into trouble; but being over-confident with regard to the future, and having formed hopes beyond their power, though less than their desire, they declared war, having determined to prefer might to right; for at a time when they thought they should overcome us, they attacked us, though they were not being wronged. But success is wont to make those states insolent to which it comes most unexpected and with the shortest notice; whereas the good fortune which is according to men's calculation is generally more steady than when it comes beyond their expectation; and, so to say, they more easily drive off adversity than they preserve prosperity. The Mytilenæans, then, ought all along to have been honored by us on the same footing as the rest, and in that case they would not have come to such a pitch of insolence; for in other instances, as well as theirs, man is naturally inclined to despise those who court him, and to respect those who do not stoop to him. But let them even now be punished as their crime deserves; and let not the guilt attach to the aristocracy, while you acquit the commons. For at any rate they all alike attacked *you*; since they might have come over to us, and so have been now in possession of their city again. Thinking, however, the chance they ran with the aristocracy to be the safer, they joined them in revolting. And now consider; if you attach the same penalties to those of the allies who were compelled by their enemies to revolt, and to those who did it voluntarily, which of them, think you, will not revolt on any slight pretext, when he either gains his liberation, if he succeed, or incurs no extreme suffering, if he fail? And so we shall presently have to risk both our money and our lives

against each separate state. And if we are successful, by taking possession of a ruined city, you will hereafter be deprived of all future revenue from it—in which our strength consists; while if we fail, we shall have fresh enemies in addition to those we have already; and during the time that we ought to be opposing our present foes, we shall be engaged in hostilities with our own allies.

40. "You ought not therefore to hold out any hope, either relying on oratory or purchased with money, of their receiving allowance for having erred through human infirmity. For they did not involuntarily hurt you, but wittingly plotted against you; and it is only what is involuntary that can claim allowance. I, then, both on that first occasion [so advised you], and now contend that you should not rescind your former resolutions, nor err through three things, the most inexpedient for empire, namely, pity, delight in oratory, and lenity. For pity is properly felt toward those of a kindred temper, and not toward those who will not feel it in return, but are of necessity our enemies forever. And the orators who delight us with their language will have a field in other subjects of less importance, instead of one in which the state, after being a little pleased, will pay a great penalty; while they themselves from their good speaking will receive good treatment in return. And lenity is shown to those who will be well-disposed in future, rather than to those who remain just what they were, and not at all less hostile. To sum up in one word, if you are persuaded by me, you will do what is just toward the Mytilenæans, and at the same time expedient; but if you decide otherwise, you will not oblige *them*, but will rather pass sentence upon *yourselves*. For if they were right in revolting, you can not properly maintain your empire. If, however, you determine to do so, even though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is right, punish these men from regard to expediency, or else give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. Resolve, then, to requite them with the same penalty; and not to show yourselves, in escaping their design, more insensible than those who formed them against you; considering what they would probably have done, if they had prevailed over you; especially as they were the first to begin the wrong. For it is those who do ill to any one without reason,

that persecute him most bitterly, nay, even to the death,<sup>1</sup> from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared; since he who has suffered evil without any necessity, [but by provoking it himself], is more bitter, if he escape, than one who was an enemy on equal terms. Be not therefore traitors to your own cause; but bringing yourselves in feeling as near as possible to the actual state of suffering, and reflecting how you would in that case have valued their subjection above every thing, now pay them back in return, not indulging in weakness at the present moment, nor forgetting the danger which once hung over you. Punish these men, I say, as they deserve; and give a striking example to the rest of your allies, that whoever revolts will pay the penalty for it with his life. For if they know this, you will less frequently have to neglect your enemies, while you are fighting with your own confederates."

41. To this effect spoke Cleon. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly spoke most strongly against putting the Mytilenæans to death, came forward then also, and said as follows.

42. "I neither blame those who have a second time proposed the discussion of the case of the Mytilenæans, nor commend those who object to repeated deliberation on the most important subjects; but I think that the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, one of which is generally the companion of folly, and the other of coarseness and narrowness of mind. And whoever contends that words are not to be the exponents of measures, is either wanting in understanding, or self-interested: wanting in understanding, if he thinks it possible to express himself in any other way on what is future and not certain; self-interested, if, when wishing to persuade to something base, he thinks that he could not speak to his credit on a discreditable subject, but that by clever calumny he might confound both his opponents and audience. But most cruel of all are those who charge us besides with a display [of rhetoric] for pecuniary motives. For if they only imputed ignorance, he who failed in carrying his point would retire with a character for want of understanding, rather than of honesty: but when a

<sup>1</sup> Göller and Poppo follow Hermann in taking ἀπόλλυνται passively, "they are killed by living in suspicion of danger," etc.

charge of dishonesty is brought against him, if successful, he is suspected; and if unsuccessful, together with his inability, he is also thought dishonest. And the state is not benefited by such a system; for through fear it is deprived of its counselors. Most prosperous indeed would it be, if such of its citizens were incapable of speaking; for then they would be less often persuaded to do wrong. But the good citizen ought to show himself the better speaker not by terrifying his opponent, but by meeting him on equal terms; and the state that acts wisely should not, indeed, confer honor on the man who most frequently gives good advice, but neither should it detract from what he enjoys already; and so far from punishing him who is wrong in his judgment, it should not even degrade him. For so the successful counselor would be least tempted to speak any thing contrary to his real opinion, in order to gratify his hearers; and the unsuccessful one would be least anxious, by the same means of gratification, to bring over the multitude to *his* side also.

43. "But we do the contrary of this; and moreover, if any one be suspected of speaking with a view to his own advantage, though at the same time what is best, through grudging him the gain of which we have but an uncertain idea, we deprive the state of its certain benefit. And thus good advice, given in a straightforward manner, has come to be no less suspected than bad; so that it is equally necessary for one who wishes to carry the most dreadful measures to win over the multitude by trickery, and for one who speaks on the better side to gain credit by falsehood. And the state alone it is impossible, owing to these over-wise notions, to serve in an open manner and without deceiving it; for he who openly confers any good upon it is suspected of getting secretly, in some way or other, an advantage in return. Now on subjects of the greatest importance, and with such an estimate of our conduct, we [orators] ought to speak with more extensive forethought than you who take but an off-hand view of measures; especially as we are responsible for the advice we give, whereas you are irresponsible for listening to it.<sup>1</sup> For if he who offered counsel, and he who followed it, suffered alike, you would judge more prudently. But as it is, through

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "have our advising responsible, in opposition to (or compared with) your irresponsible listening."

whatever passion you may at any time have met with disasters, you punish the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, and not your own, for having so numerous joined in the blunder.

44. "I came forward, however, neither to speak against any one in defense of the Mytilenæans, nor to accuse any one. For the question we have to decide is not, if we take a wise view of it, respecting their guilt, but respecting our taking good counsel. For though I should prove them to be utterly guilty, I will not for that reason also bid you to put them to death, unless it were expedient: and though they might claim some allowance [I would not bid you make it], unless it should appear good for the state. But I am of opinion that we are deliberating for the future, rather than the present; and as to what Cleon most positively asserts, that it will be advantageous to us in future, with a view to less frequent revolts, if we hold out death as the penalty; I too as positively contradict him, with regard to what is good for the future, and maintain the opposite opinion. And I beg you not to reject the utility of my advice for the plausibility of his. For his words might perhaps attract you, through being more just with regard to your present displeasure against the Mytilenæans: but we are not holding a judicial inquiry in their case, that we should want what is just; but are deliberating respecting them, how they may be of service to us.

45. "Now the penalty of death has been enacted in states for many offenses, and those not equal to this, but less heinous; and yet, urged on by hope, men venture to commit them; and no one ever yet came into danger with a conviction of his own mind that he would not succeed in his attempt.<sup>1</sup> What city, too, when bent on revolt, ever attempted it with deficient resources—according to its own idea—either internal, or by means of alliance with others? Indeed all men, both in a private and public capacity, are naturally disposed to do wrong, and there is no law that will keep them from it; at least men have gone through all kinds of punishments in their enactments, to try if by any means they might be less injured by evil-doers, and it is probable that in early times the punishments for the greatest offenses were more lenient; but as they are disregarded, they generally, in the course of time, ex-

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "having passed sentence upon himself."



tend to death; and still even this is disregarded. Either, then, some fear more dreadful than this must be discovered, or this, at any rate, does not restrain men: but poverty inspiring boldness through necessity, and larger means inspiring ambition through insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life through some human passion or other, according as they are severally enslaved by some fatal and overpowering one, lead men on to dangers. Moreover, hope and desire for every thing, the one taking the lead, and the other following; and the one devising the attempt, while the other suggests the facility of succeeding in it; cause the most numerous disasters; and though unseen, they are more influential than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, aids them no less in urging men on; for by sometimes siding with them unexpectedly, she induces them to run the risk even with inferior means; especially in the case of states, inasmuch as the venture is for the greatest objects, namely, freedom, or empire over others; and as each individual, when acting in concert with all, unreasonably carries his ideas to an extravagant length concerning them. In short, it is impossible [to remedy the evil], and the man is very simple who thinks, that when human nature is eagerly set on doing a thing, he has any means of diverting it, either by the rigor of laws, or any other kind of terror.

46. "We must not, then, either take bad counsel through trusting to the punishment of death as a thing to be relied on, or leave to those who have revolted no hope of being allowed to change their minds, and wipe out their offense in as short a time as possible. For consider that at present, if any city, even after revolting, find that it will not succeed, it would come to terms while it has still means of refunding the expenses, and of paying tribute in future. But in the other case, which of them, think you, would not make better preparations for the attempt than they do now, and hold out against its besiegers to the utmost, if it is all one whether it surrender slowly or quickly? And how can it fail to be injurious for us to be put to expense by sitting down before it, because it will not surrender; and if we take the city, to recover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue from it in future? For our strength against the enemy lies in this. So then we must not hurt ourselves, by being strict judges of the offenders, but rather see how, by punishing them

moderately, we may be able in future to avail ourselves of the cities with unimpaired means on the score of money; and we must resolve to derive our protection, not from severity of laws, but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which we do at present; and if we have subdued any power that was [once] free, and, when harshly governed, naturally revolted for its independence, we fancy that we are bound to avenge ourselves with severity. But in dealing with freemen, we must not *punish* them rigorously when they revolt, but *watch* them rigorously *before* they revolt, and prevent their even coming to the thought of it: and when we have got the mastery of them, we should attach the guilt to as few as possible.

47. "Now consider what an error you would commit in this also, if persuaded by Cleon. For at present the commons in all the states are well disposed toward you, and either do not revolt with the aristocratical party, or if compelled to do so, are straightway hostile to those who made them; and you have the mass of the city opposed to you on your side, when you proceed to war. But if you butcher the commons of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt, and when they had got possession of arms, voluntarily gave up the city; in the first place you will act unjustly by slaying your benefactors; and in the next you will produce for the higher classes of men a result which they most desire; for when they lead their cities to revolt, they will immediately have the commons on their side, because you had shown them beforehand that the same penalty is appointed for those who are guilty and those who are not. On the contrary, even if they *were* guilty, you ought to pretend not to notice it; that the only class still allied with us may not become hostile to us. And this I consider far more beneficial toward retaining our empire—that we should voluntarily be treated with injustice—than that with justice we should put to the sword those whom we ought not. And so the identity of the justice and expediency of the punishment, which Cleon asserts, is found impossible to exist therein.

48. "Being convinced then that this is the better course, and not allowing too much weight either to pity or to lenity (for neither do I [any more than Cleon], wish you to be influenced by these), but judging from the advice itself which is given you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mytilenæans whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to allow the

rest to live where they are. For this is both profitable for the future, and terrible to your enemies at the present moment; since whoever takes good advice against his adversaries is stronger than one who recklessly proceeds against them with violence of action."

49. To this effect spoke Diodotus. These being the views that were expressed in most direct opposition to one another, the Athenians, notwithstanding [their wish to reconsider the question], came to a conflict of opinion respecting them, and were nearly matched in the voting, though that of Diodotus prevailed. And they immediately dispatched another trireme with all speed, that they might not find the city destroyed through the previous arrival of the first;<sup>1</sup> which had the start by a day and a night. The Mytilenæan ambassadors having provided for the vessel wine and barley-cakes, and promising great rewards if they should arrive first, there was such haste in their course, that at the same time as they rowed they ate cakes kneaded with oil and wine; and some slept in turns, while others rowed. And as there happened to be no wind against them, and the former vessel did not sail in any haste on so horrible<sup>2</sup> a business, while this hurried on in the manner described; though the other arrived so much first that Paches had read the decree, and was on the point of executing the sentence, the second came to land after it, and prevented the butchery. Into such imminent peril did Mytilene come.

50. The other party, whom Paches had sent off as the chief authors of the revolt, the Athenians put to death, according to the advice of Cleon, amounting to rather more than one thousand. They also dismantled the walls of the Mytilenæans, and seized their ships. After this, they did not impose any tribute on the Lesbians, but having divided the land, excepting that of the Methymnæans, into three thousand portions,

<sup>1</sup> The common reading *δευτέρως* is abandoned by all the best editors; and therefore it is not without great diffidence that I confess my inability to understand why it need be so. The sense of the passages would be equally good if it were translated, "that by the previous arrival of the second, they might avoid finding the city ruined:" and I can not but think such a method borne out by many other passages of our author; e. g., II. 3. 3. *Ἐυνελέγοντο—ὥπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν λόντες*. And again in the next section, *Ἐχώρουν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλευτέροις οὐσι προσφέρωνται, κ. τ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "monstrous."

they set apart three hundred of them as consecrated to the gods, and to the rest sent out as shareholders those of their own citizens to whose lot they had fallen; with whom the Lesbians having agreed to pay in money two minæ a year for each portion, farmed the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent of which the Mytilenæans were masters, and they were afterward subject to Athens. Such then was the issue of affairs as regarded Lesbos.

51. In the course of the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians made an expedition under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara, and which the Megareans used as a fortress, having built a tower on it. From this spot, being more close at hand, Nicias wished the Athenians to keep their guard [over Nisæa], instead of from Budorum and Salamis, and to prevent the Peloponnesians from sailing out thence unobserved, as was formerly the case, with triremes and privateers; and at the same time to see that nothing was imported by the Megareans. Having therefore in the first instance taken by engines from the sea two towers which projected on the side of Nisæa, and having cleared the entrance to the strait<sup>1</sup> between the island [and the continent], he proceeded to cut off all communication on the side of the mainland also, where there was a passage by a bridge over a morass for succoring the island, which lay not far off from the continent. This having been accomplished by them in a few days, he afterwards left works on the island also, with a garrison, and retired with his forces.

52. It was also about the same period of this summer that the Plateans, having no longer any provisions, and being unable to endure the blockade, surrendered to the Peloponnesians in the following manner. The enemy assaulted their wall and they were incapable of defending it. So when the Lacedæmonian commander was aware of their powerless condition, he did not wish to take it by storm (for such were his instructions from Lacedæmon, in order that if a treaty should ever be made with the Athenians, and they should agree to restore such

<sup>1</sup> Gölter translates this expression by "viam in portum aperuit:" but the strict meaning of the *μεταξυ* must be, I think, that which I have given to it, and which it has, IV. 25. 1, 'Εν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξυ οἱ Ευρακόσιοι, κ. τ. λ.

places as they had respectively taken in the war, Plataea might not be given up, on the strength of its inhabitants having voluntarily gone over to them), but he sent to them a herald with this question, "Were they disposed voluntarily to surrender their city to the Lacedæmonians, and submit to them as their judges; and that they should punish the guilty, but no one contrary to justice?" Such were the words of the herald; and they, being now in a state of extreme weakness, surrendered the city. The Peloponnesians then fed the Plataeans for nine days, till the judges from Lacedæmon, five in number, arrived. When they were come, no charge was preferred against them; but they called them forward, and merely asked them this question, "Had they in any particular done the Lacedæmonians and the allies any service during the present war?" They made a speech [in reply], for they had requested permission to speak at greater length, and had deputed to plead their cause Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who came forward and said as follows:

53. "The surrender of our city, Lacedæmonians, we made with full confidence in you, not supposing that we should be subjected to such a trial as this, but that it would be one more consistent with law; and with an agreement that we should not, as we now are, be at the mercy of any other judges but yourselves; thinking that so we should best obtain what was fair. But as things are, we fear that we have failed at once in both expectations. For with reason we suspect that our contest is for life or death,<sup>1</sup> and that you will not prove impartial; inferring this from the fact of there having been made against us no previous charge for us to reply to (but it was ourselves who requested permission to speak), and from the question put to us being so concise; a true answer to which tells against us, while a false one is open to refutation. Being involved, however, in perplexity on all sides, we are compelled, and it seems the safer course, to say something at all risks; for the words that had been left unspoken might occasion to men in our situation the self-accusing thought, that if they had been spoken, they might have saved us. But in addition to our other disadvantages, the work of convincing you is also surrounded with difficulties. Were we unacquainted

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "for the most fearful things."

with each other, we might derive assistance from bringing forward fresh proofs of what you did not know : but as it is, every thing will be said to men who know it already ; and our fear is, not that you have before considered our services as inferior to your own, and now make that fact a ground of accusation against us ; but that, through your determination to gratify another party, we are brought to a trial which is already decided against us.

54. " Nevertheless, while we urge what claims of justice we have, both against the Thebans, and with respect to you, and the rest of the Greeks, we will remind you of our good deeds, and endeavor to persuade you [to have mercy on us]. With regard then to your brief question, ' whether we have done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war,' we say, that if you ask us as enemies, you are not wronged by us, though you should have received no good at our hands ; and that if you consider us as friends, you are yourselves more in the wrong, for having marched against us. With respect, however, to what happened during the peace, and in opposition to the Medæ, we proved ourselves good and true men ; for we have not now been the first to break the peace, and we were then the only part of the Bœotians who joined in attacking the Medæ for the liberty of Greece. Even though we are an inland people, we were present in the sea-fight at Artemisium, and in the battle fought in our territory we stood by you and Pausanias ; and whatever other perilous achievement was performed by the Greeks, we took part in every thing beyond our strength. And to you, Lacedæmonians, in particular, at the very time when, after the earthquake, the greatest alarm surrounded Sparta, because of the Helots who had established themselves in revolt at Ithome, we sent the third part of our own people to your assistance : and you ought not to forget this.

55. " With regard to events of early date, and of the greatest importance, such was the part we thought right to act ; though afterward we became your enemies. But it is you that are to blame for that ; for on our requesting an alliance with you, when the Thebans had used violence toward us, you rejected our suit, and told us to apply to the Athenians, since they were near to us, whereas you lived far away from us. In the war, however, you neither suffered, nor would have suffered,

any improper treatment from us. But if we would not revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we did no wrong in that; for it was they who assisted us against the Thebans, when you refused; and to give them up would not then have been honorable—especially as we had taken them for allies after receiving good from them, and at our own request, and had shared the rights of citizenship with them—but it was only reasonable that we should heartily obey their commands. And as to the measures in which either of you take the lead of your allies, it is not those who follow that are to blame, if you have ever done any thing wrong, but those who lead them on to what is not right.

56. "With respect to the Thebans, they had on many other occasions wronged us; and as for the last occasion, you know yourselves on what account we are in our present condition. For as they were seizing our city in time of peace, and, moreover, at a holy time of the month, we did right in avenging ourselves on them, according to the principle recognized by all, that it is allowable to defend oneself against the attack of an enemy; and it would not now be fair that we should suffer on their account. For if you take your views of justice from your own immediate advantage and their animosity, you will show yourselves no true judges of what is right, but rather attentive to what is expedient. And yet if they appear to be serviceable to you now, much more did we and the rest of the Greeks then, when you were in greater danger. For now you are yourselves attacking others, and the objects of their fear; but at that crisis, when the barbarian was bringing slavery on all, these Thebans were on his side. And it is but just that against our present misdeed—if we have really done amiss—you should set the zeal we showed then; and you will find it greater than the fault to which it is opposed,<sup>1</sup> and exhibited at those critical times when it was a rare thing for any of the Greeks to oppose his courage to the power of Xerxes; and therefore those were the more commended who did not in safety act for their own interest with regard to his invasion, but were willing to dare with dangers the better part. But though *we* were of that number, and honored by you in the highest degree, we are now afraid that we have been ruined by acting on the same principles,

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "the greater opposed to the less."

because we chose the side of the Athenians from regard to right, rather than yours from regard to interest. And yet men should consistently take the same view of the same case, and account expediency to be nothing else than this—when good allies receive everlasting gratitude for their services, while our own immediate interest in any case is secured.

57. "Consider, too, that at present you are esteemed by the Greeks in general a pattern of honor and virtue: but if you pass an unjust sentence on us (for this is no obscure cause that you will decide, but as men of high repute yourselves, you will pass sentence on us who are also not contemptible), beware lest they may not approve of your coming to any improper decision respecting men of good character, though you are yourselves of still better; nor of spoils which were taken from us, the benefactors of Greece, being devoted in the national temples. For it will seem a shocking thing that Lacedæmonians should have destroyed Plataea; and that your fathers should have inscribed the name of that city on the tripod at Delphi for its good services, whereas you utterly obliterated it from the whole Grecian name for the sake of Thebans. For to such a degree of misfortune have we been brought: if the Medes had been victorious, we should have been ruined; and now we are supplanted by Thebans in your good opinion, who were before our best friends; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest that can be imagined—then, to that of being starved to death,<sup>1</sup> if we had not surrendered our city; and now, to that of being tried for our lives. And thus we Plataeans, who were zealous beyond our power in the cause of the Greeks, are rejected by all, deserted and unassisted; for of those who were then our allies, no one helps us; and as for you, Lacedæmonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not to be depended upon.

58. "And yet, for the sake of the gods who once presided over our confederacy, and of our valor in the cause of the

<sup>1</sup> Bloomfield, in his last edition, rightly explains *αλοχίστω* (as Gölle had already done), by comparing the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, "*fame, ignavissimo mortis genere, tabescentes*;" and observes that "to be pined to death was, according to the idea of the ancients, a death, as compared with that of dying with arms in one's hands, especially *ignominious*, as suggesting the idea of a snared brute beast." Yet he inconsistently retains the part of his original note, in which he objected to Hobbes rendering the word by "base," a term to which Hobbes himself doubtless attached the same meaning.



Greeks, we call on you to relent and change your mind, if you have been persuaded to any thing by the Thebans; and to ask as a boon from them in return that they would not kill those whose death is not honorable to you; and to receive an honest gratitude [from us], instead of a disgraceful one [from them]; and not, after giving pleasure to others, to incur infamy for it yourselves. For it is an easy matter to take away our lives, but a difficult one to wipe out the disgrace of it; since we are not enemies, that you should justly take vengeance on us, but men well disposed toward you, and who went to war with you only on compulsion. You would judge the case therefore rightly, if you both granted us personal security, and considered beforehand that you received us by our own consent, and while holding forth our hands to you—and the law of the Greeks is not to kill such—and, moreover, after our being all along your benefactors. For look to the sepulchers of your fathers, whom, after being slain by the Medes, and buried in our country, we used to honor every year at the public expense with both garments and other things that are usual, and by offering first-fruits of all that our land produced in its season; as friends from a friendly country, and as allies to our former companions in arms. But you would do the contrary of this, should you decide unjustly. For consider: Pausanias buried them with a conviction that he was laying them in a friendly land, and among men of that character; but you, if you kill us, and make the Plataean territory a part of the Theban, what else will you do but leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile country, and among their murderers, unhonored with the gifts which they now receive? And further, you will condemn to slavery the land in which the Greeks won their freedom; will desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed, before conquering the Medes; and will take away our ancestral<sup>1</sup> sacrifices from those who founded and instituted them.

59. "This were not to your credit, Lacedæmonians, nor to offend against the general principles of the Greeks and your own forefathers, nor to destroy us, your benefactors, for other

<sup>1</sup> Gottleber and Poppo refer *ἐσαμένων* as well as *κτισάντων* to *θεοίας*; and the collocation of the words certainly makes this the most natural mode of explaining them. Bloomfield, however, denies that *ἐω* is ever used in such a figurative sense, and maintains that it can only refer here to *ισπεί*.

men's hatred of us, without having been wronged yourselves; but rather, to spare us, and relent in your hearts, having taken a rational pity on us; reflecting not only on the dreadful nature of the things we should suffer, but also on the character of the sufferers, and how misfortune admits not of calculating on whom it may one day fall, even without his deserving it. We then, as is suitable for us, and as our need induces us to do, entreat you, with invocations to the gods who are worshiped at the same altar, and by all the Greeks in common, that we may prevail on you in these things; pleading the oaths which your fathers swore, we pray that you will not be unmindful of them: we beseech you by your fathers' tombs, and appeal for aid to the dead, that we may not come under the power of the Thebans, nor those who are dearest to them be given up to those who are most hateful. We remind you, too, of that day on which we performed the most glorious things in their company, and yet now on this day are in danger of suffering the most dreadful. But, to bring our speech to a close—a thing which is necessary, and at the same time hard for men so circumstanced, because the peril of our life approaches with it—we now say, in conclusion, that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans (for before that we would have preferred to die the most inglorious death—that of famine), but confided in and capitulated to *you*. And it were but fair that, if we do not persuade you, you should restore us to the same position, and let us ourselves take the risk that befalls us. At the same time we solemnly beseech you that we who are Platæans, and who showed the greatest zeal for the cause of the Greeks, may not be given up, suppliants as we are, out of your hands and your good faith, Lacedæmonians, to Thebans, who are our bitterest enemies; but that you would become our preservers, and not, while you are giving freedom to the rest of the Greeks, bring utter destruction upon us."

60. To this effect spoke the Platæans. The Thebans, fearing that the Lacedæmonians might somewhat relent in consequence of their words, came forward, and said that *they* also wished to address them, since, contrary to their expectation, the Platæans had had a longer speech allowed them than a simple answer to the question. So when they had given them leave, they spoke as follows:

61. "We should not have asked permission to make this address, if the Plataeans, on their part, had briefly answered the question put to them, and had not turned upon us and delivered an invective; while at the same time they made a long defense of themselves, beyond the limits of the present question, and on points that had never been the grounds of any charge, together with a panegyric for things which no one found fault with. But as it is, we must answer their accusations, and refute their self-praises; that neither our disgrace nor their reputation may assist them, but that you may hear the truth on both points, and so decide. We quarreled then with them in the first instance, because, on our settling Plataea at a later period than the rest of Boeotia, and some other places with it, of which we took possession after driving out their mixed population, these men did not think fit, as had been first arranged, to submit to our supremacy, but, apart from the rest of the Boeotians, offended against the principles of their fathers, and when they were being compelled to observe them, went over to the Athenians, in conjunction with whom they did us many injuries, for which they also suffered in return.

62. "Again, when the barbarian came against Greece, they say that they were the only part of the Boeotians that did not Medize; and it is on this point that they most pride themselves, and abuse us. But *we* say that they did not *Medize*, because the Athenians did not either; but that in the same way, when the Athenians afterward attacked the Greeks, they were the only people that *Atticized*. Yet look in what political condition we respectively did this. For our city happened at that time to be governed neither by an oligarchy with equal laws,<sup>1</sup> nor by a democracy; but what is most opposed to laws and the best form of government, and comes nearest to [the rule of] a tyrant, a dominant party of a few individuals had the administration of affairs. And so they, hoping to hold it still more surely if the cause of the Medes were triumphant, kept down the populace by force, and introduced him; and the whole city was not its own master

<sup>1</sup> "The term *ισόνομος* relates to the equality of all the citizens with one another, as far as related to their private disputes and private injuries; whereas under the worst form of oligarchy, which was called *δυναστεία*, those who were possessed of political power were also above the law in private matters, and could oppress their fellow-citizens at their pleasure. See Aristotle, *Politics*, iv. 5. 2."—*Arnold*.

when it so acted; nor is it right to reproach it for what it did amiss when not in the enjoyment of its laws. At any rate, after the Mede had retreated, and it had regained its laws, you ought to consider, that when the Athenians subsequently attacked the rest of Greece, and endeavored to bring our country under their power, and by the aid of faction were already in possession of the greater part of it, we fought and conquered them at Coronea, and liberated Bœotia, and are now heartily joining in the liberation of the other states, by furnishing horses, and such a force as no other of the allies do. With regard then to our Medizing, such is the defense we make.

63. "But that it is *you*, [Platæans,] who have both done more injury to Greece, and are more deserving of extreme punishment, we will now attempt to prove. It was for vengeance against us, you say, that you became allies and fellow-citizens of the Athenians. Then you ought to have introduced them for aid against us alone, and not to have joined with them in attacking others; such a course having certainly been open to you, in case of your being at all led on by the Athenians against your will, since the confederacy against the Mede had already been formed by these Lacedæmonians here, which you yourselves bring forward most prominently [in your own defense]. Surely this was strong enough to divert us from attacking you, and what is the greatest advantage, to enable you to take counsel in security. But of your own accord, and not by compulsion, you still took the part of the Athenians by preference. And you say that it had been base for you to betray your benefactors: but much more base and criminal was it so utterly to betray the whole body of the Greeks, with whom you confederated, than to give up the Athenians alone, who were enslaving Greece, while the others were its liberators. And it was no equal return of favor that you made them, nor one free from disgrace. For you introduced them, as you say, when you were being injured; but you became co-operators with them in injuring others. And yet not to return equal favors is more disgraceful than to fail in those which, though justly due, will be returned in furtherance of injustice.

64. "You showed then plainly, that not even at that time was it for the sake of the Greeks that you alone did not Medize,

but because the Athenians did not either, and because you wished to side with them, and against the rest. And now you claim to derive assistance from the circumstances in which you acted well through the influence of others. That however is not reasonable; but as you chose the Athenians, stand the brunt of the struggle with them, and do not bring forward the league that was then made, as though you ought to be spared from regard to that. For you deserted it, and in violation of it joined in enslaving the Æginetans, and some others who had entered into it, rather than prevented their being enslaved; and that too not against your will, but while enjoying the same laws as you have to the present time, and without any one's compelling you, as they did us. Besides, the last proposal made to you before you were blockaded, that you should remain unmolested on condition of your aiding neither side, you did not accept. Who, then, could be more justly hated by the Greeks than you, who assumed an honorable bearing for their injury? And the goodness which you say you once exhibited, you have now shown to be not your proper character; but what your nature always wished, has been truly proved against you; for you accompanied the Athenians when they were walking in the path of injustice. With regard then to our involuntary *Medizing*, and your voluntary *Atticizing*, such are the proofs we have to offer.

65. "As for the last injuries which you say that you received, namely, that we came against your city in time of peace and at a holy time of the month, we are of opinion that neither in this point did we act more wrongly than you. If, indeed, we came against your city by our own design, and fought, and ravaged the land as enemies, we are guilty. But if men who were the first among you, both in property and family, wishing to stop you from your foreign connection, and restore you to your hereditary principles common to all the Bœotians, voluntarily called us to their aid, how are we guilty? For it is those who lead that are the transgressors, rather than those who follow<sup>1</sup>. But neither did they do wrong, in our judgment, nor did we; but being citizens, like yourselves, and having more at stake, by opening their walls to us and introducing us into

<sup>1</sup> Retorting the remark of the Plateans, ch. 55. 5, οὐχ οἱ ἐπόμενοι ἄτιοι—ἀλλ' οἱ ἄγοντες.

their city in a friendly, not in a hostile, manner, they wished the bad among you no longer to become worse,<sup>1</sup> and the good to have their deserts; being reformers of your principles, and not depriving the state of your persons, but restoring you to your kinsmen; making you foes to no one, but friends alike to all.

66. "And we gave you a proof of our not having acted in a hostile manner; for we injured no one, but made proclamation that whoever wished to be governed according to the hereditary principles of all the Bœotians, should come over to us. And you gladly came, and made an agreement with us, and remained quiet at first; but afterward, when you perceived that we were few in number, even supposing that we might be thought to have acted somewhat unfairly in entering your city without the consent of your populace, you did not requite us in the same manner—by not proceeding to extreme measures in action, but persuading us by words to retire—but you attacked us in violation of your agreement. And as for those whom you slew in battle, we do not grieve for them so much (for they suffered according to law—of a certain kind); but in the case of those whom you lawlessly butchered while holding forth their hands, and when you had given them quarter, and had subsequently promised us not to kill them, how can you deny that you acted atrociously? And now, after having perpetrated in a short time these three crimes—the breach of your agreement, the subsequent murder of the men, and the falsification of your promise not to kill them, in case we did no injury to your property in the country—you still assert that it is we who are the transgressors; and yourselves claim to escape paying the penalty for your crimes. No, not if these your judges come to a right decision; but for all of them shall you be punished.

67. "And now, Lacedæmonians, it is with this view that we have gone so far into these subjects—both with reference to you and to ourselves—that *you* may know that you will justly pass sentence on them, and *we*, that we have still more

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, understanding *χείρους* again after *μᾶλλον*, as Poppo explains it. Bloomfield supposes that *μᾶλλον* here assumes the nature of an adjective; and thus *μᾶλλον γενέσθαι* will mean, "to be uppermost," to have the upper hand—"to be [in power] rather than others." But the passage which he quotes, ch. 82. 2, as an instance of such a usage, is not, I think, sufficiently parallel to justify this interpretation.

righteously been avenged on them; and that you may not relent on hearing of their virtues in times long gone by (if, indeed, they ever had any); for though these ought to be of service to the injured, to such as are doing any thing base they should be a reason for double punishment, because they do amiss in opposition to their proper character. Nor let them derive benefit from their lamentations and pitiful wailing, while they appeal to the tombs of your fathers and their own destitution. For *we* show you, on the other hand, that our youth who were butchered by them received far more dreadful treatment; some of whose fathers fell at Coronea, in bringing Bœotia into connection with you; while others, left lonely in their old age, and their houses desolate, prefer to you a far more just request for vengeance on these men. And with regard to pity, it is those men who suffer undeservedly that better deserve to receive it; but those who suffer justly, as these do, deserve, on the contrary, to be rejoiced over. Their present destitution, then, they have incurred by their own conduct; for they wilfully rejected the better alliance. Nor did they thus outrage all law in consequence of having first suffered at our hands, but from deciding under the influence of hatred, rather than of justice. And they have not now given us proportionate satisfaction for their crimes; for they will suffer by a legal sentence, and not while holding forth their hands after battle, as they say, but after surrendering to you on definite terms to take their trial. Avenge therefore, Lacedæmonians, the law of the Greeks which has been violated by these men. And to us who have been treated in contempt of all law return a due gratitude for the zeal we have shown; and let us not lose our place in your favor through their words, but give the Greeks a proof that you will not institute contests of words, but of deeds; for which a short statement is sufficient when they are good; but when they are done amiss, harangues dressed out with imposing language serve as vails for them. But if ruling states should, like you in the present instance, summarily pronounce their decisions on all offenders, men would be less disposed to seek for fine words as a screen for unjust actions."

68. To this effect then spoke the Thebans. The Lacedæmonian judges, thinking that the question, "Whether they had received any service from them during the war," would

be a fair one for them to put, because they had all along requested them, as they said, to remain quiet according to the original covenant of Pausanias, after the [retreat of the] Mede; and when afterward they made to them the proposal which they did before they were besieged—to be neutral, according to the terms of that compact—in consequence of their not receiving it, they considered that on the strength of their own just wish they were now released from covenant with them, and had received evil at their hands. Accordingly, bringing each of them forward, and asking the same question, “Whether they had done the Lacedæmonians and allies any service in the war,” when they said they had not, they led them away and killed them, not excepting one. Of the Platæans themselves they slew not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians twenty-five, who were besieged with them; the women they sold as slaves. As for the city, the Thebans gave it for about a year to some of the Megareans to inhabit, who had been banished by party influence, and to such of the Platæans on their own side as still survived. Afterward they razed the whole of it to the ground, from the very foundations, and built to the sacred precinct of Juno an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round, above and below, making use of the roofs and doors of the Platæans; and with the rest of the furniture, in brass and iron, that was within the wall,<sup>1</sup> they made couches and dedicated them to Juno, building also in her honor a stone chapel of one hundred feet square. The land they confiscated, and let out for ten years, its occupiers being Thebans. And nearly throughout the whole business it

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Bloomfield and Gölle render it, “whatever movable materials there were in the wall,” referring to the metal cramps by which the coping-stones were fastened. But though lead and iron are mentioned as having been used for that purpose (see I. p. 93. 6), they do not bring forward any instance of *brass* having been used with them; nor does it seem probable that such would be the case. I have therefore followed Poppo, Haack, and others, in supposing, that as the wood-work in the new building was taken from the houses in the town, a similar use was made of the iron and brass implements, which must also surely have been found there. At least it is very difficult to imagine, with Gölle, that they had been all used up by the garrison during the siege. And instead of the *opposition* which he says is intended between the wood in the house and the metal in the wall, the use of the ἀλλοις appears rather to imply that the rafters, doors, and metal implements, were *all* taken from the *same* quarter.



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party, charging them with cutting stakes in the ground to Jupiter and to [the hero] Alcinous; the penalty being a stater for every stake. When they had been convicted, and, owing to the amount of the penalty, were sitting as suppliants in the temples, that they might be allowed to pay it by installments, Pithias, who was a member of the council also, persuades that body to enforce to law. So when they were excluded from all hope by the severity of the law, and at the same time heard that Pithias was likely, while he was still in the council, to persuade the populace to hold as friends those who do the same as the Athenians did, they conspired together, and took daggers, and, having suddenly entered the council, assassinated Pithias and others, both counselors and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few, however, of the same party as Pithias, took refuge on board the Athenian trireme, which was still there.

71. Having perpetrated this deed, and summoned the Corcyraeans to an assembly, they told them that this was the best thing for them, and that so they would be least in danger of being enslaved by the Athenians; and they moved, that in future they should receive neither party, except coming in a quiet manner with a single ship, but should consider a larger force as hostile. As they moved, so also they compelled them to adopt their motion. They likewise sent immediately ambassadors to Athens, to show, respecting what had been done, that it was for their best interests, and to prevail on the refugees there to adopt no measure prejudicial to them, that there might not be any reaction.

72. On their arrival, the Athenians arrested as revolutionists both the ambassadors and all who were persuaded by them, and lodged them in custody in Ægina. In the mean time, on the arrival of a Corinthian ship and some Lacedæmonian envoys, the dominant party of the Corcyraeans attacked the commonalty, and defeated them in battle. When night came on, the commons took refuge in the citadel, and on the eminences in the city, and there established themselves in a body, having possession also of the Hyllaic harbor; while the other party occupied the market-place, where most of them dwelt, with the harbor adjoining it, looking toward the mainland.

73. The next day they had a few skirmishes, and both parties sent about into the country, inviting the slaves, and

offering them freedom. The greater part of them joined the commons as allies; while the other party was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

74. After the interval of a day, a battle was again fought, and the commons gained the victory, having the advantage both in strength of position and in numbers: the women also boldly assisted them, throwing at the enemy with the tiling from the houses, and standing the brunt of the *mêlée* beyond what could have been expected from their nature. About twilight the rout of the oligarchical party was effected; and fearing that the commons might carry the arsenal at the first assault, and put them to the sword, they fired the houses round about the market-place, and the lodging-houses, to stop their advance, sparing neither their own nor other people's; so that much property belonging to the merchants was consumed, and the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if, in addition to the fire, there had been a wind blowing on it. After ceasing from the engagement, both sides remained quiet; and kept guard during the night. On victory declaring for the commons, the Corinthian ship stole out to sea; while the greater part of the auxiliaries passed over unobserved to the continent.

75. The day following, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, a general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred heavy-armed, and wished to negotiate a settlement, persuading them to agree with each other to bring to trial the ten chief authors of the sedition (who immediately fled), and for the rest to dwell in peace, having made an arrangement with each other, and with the Athenians, to have the same foes and friends. After effecting this he was going to sail away; but the leaders of the commons urged him to leave them five of his ships, that their adversaries might be less on the move; and they would themselves man and send with him an equal number of theirs. He consented to do so, and they proceeded to enlist their adversaries for the ships. They, fearing that they should be sent off to Athens, seated themselves [as suppliants] in the temple of the Dioscuri; while Nicostratus was trying to persuade them to rise, and to encourage them. When he did not prevail on them, the commons, having armed themselves on this pretext, alleged that they had no good intentions, [as was evident] from their mistrust in not sailing with them: and removed their arms

from their houses, and would have dispatched some of them whom they met with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Juno, their number amounting to not less than four hundred. But the commons being afraid of their making some new attempt, persuaded them to rise, and transferred them to the island in front of the temple, and provisions were sent over there for them.

76. When the sedition was at this point, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the ships of the Peloponnesians, three-and-fifty in number, came up from Cyllene, having been stationed there since their return from Ionia. The commander of them, as before, was Alcidas, Brasidas sailing with him as counselor. After coming to anchor at Sybota, a port on the mainland, as soon as it was morning they sailed toward Coreyra.

77. The Corcyræans, being in great confusion, and alarmed both at the state of things in the city and at the advance of the enemy, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, and to send them out, as they were successively manned, against the enemy; though the Athenians advised them to let *them* sail out first, and afterward to follow themselves with all their ships together. On their vessels coming up to the enemy in this scattered manner, two immediately went over to them, while in others the crews were fighting among themselves, and there was no order in their measures. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, drew up twenty of their ships against the Corcyræans, and the remainder against the twelve of the Athenians, among which were the two celebrated vessels, Salaminia and Paralus.

78. The Corcyræans, coming to the attack in bad order, and by few ships at a time, were distressed through their own arrangements; while the Athenians fearing the enemy's numbers and the chance of their surrounding them, did not attack their whole fleet, or even the center of the division opposed to themselves, but took it in flank, and sunk one ship. After this, when the Peloponnesians had formed in a circle, they began to sail round them, and endeavored to throw them into confusion. The division which was opposed to the Corcyræans perceiving this, and fearing that the same thing might happen as had at Naupactus, advanced to their support. Thus

the whole united fleet simultaneously attacked the Athenians, who now began to retire, rowing astern; at the same time wishing the vessels of the Corcyraeans to retreat first, while they themselves drew off as leisurely as possible, and while the enemy were still ranged against them. The sea-fight then, having been of this character, ended at sun-set.

79. The Corcyraeans, fearing that the enemy, on the strength of his victory, might sail against the city, and either rescue the men in the island, or proceed to some other violent measures, carried the men over again to the sanctuary of Juno, and kept the city under guard. The Peloponnesians, however, though victorious in the engagement, did not dare to sail against the city, but withdrew with thirteen of the Corcyraean vessels to the continent, whence they had put out. The next day they advanced none the more against the city, though the inhabitants were in great confusion, and though Brasidas, it is said, advised Alcidas to do so, but was not equal to him in authority; but they landed on the promontory of Leucinne, and ravaged the country.

80. Meanwhile, the commons of the Corcyraeans, being very much alarmed lest the fleet should sail against them, entered into negotiation with the suppliants and the rest for the preservation of the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for [notwithstanding the general dismay] they still manned thirty in expectation of the enemy's advance against them. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till mid-day, sailed away: and at night-fall the approach of sixty Athenian ships from Leucas was signaled to them, which the Athenians had sent with Eurymedon son of Thucles, as commander, on hearing of the sedition, and of the fleet about to go to Corcyra with Alcidas.

81. The Peloponnesians then immediately proceeded homeward by night with all haste, passing along shore; and having hauled their ships over the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not be seen doubling it, they sailed back. The Corcyraeans, on learning the approach of the Athenian fleet and the retreat of the enemy, took and brought into the city the Messenians, who before had been without the walls: and having ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbor, while they were going round, they put to death any of their opponents they might have happened to

seize : and afterward dispatched, as they landed them from the ships, all that they had persuaded to go on board. They also went to the sanctuary of Juno, and persuaded about fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The majority of the suppliants who had not been prevailed on by them, when they saw what was being done, slew one another there on the sacred ground ; while some hanged themselves on the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they severally could. During seven days that Eurymedon staid after his arrival with sixty ships, the Corcyræans were butchering those of their countrymen whom they thought hostile to them ; bringing their accusations, indeed, against those only who were for putting down the democracy ; but some were slain for private enmity also, and others for money owed them by those who had borrowed it. Every mode of death was thus had recourse to ; and whatever ordinarily happens in such a state of things, all happened then, and still more. For father murdered son, and they were dragged out of the sanctuaries, or slain in them ; while in that of Bacchus some were walled up and perished. So savagely did the sedition proceed ; while it appeared to do so all the more from its being among the earliest.

82. For afterward, even the whole of Greece, so to say, was convulsed ; struggles being every where made by the popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical party, the Lacedæmonians. Now they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do so, in time of peace.<sup>1</sup> But when pressed by war, and when an alliance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to effect any revolution. And many dreadful things befell the

<sup>1</sup> "Here, as in I. 36. 3, the participle and the finite verb are made to answer to each other, οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων—ἐπορίζοντο, whereas it should have been either οὐκ ἂν εἶχον πρόφασιν—ἐπορίζοντο, or οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων—τῶν ἐπαγωγῶν ποριζομένων."—*Arnold*. The only way to avoid this confusion of constructions would be to understand ἐχόντων and ἐτοίμων again after πολεμουμένων. "And as they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do it, in time of peace, but were so in time of war—occasions of inviting them were easily supplied, when this war had broken out." But from the fact of no commentator (so far as I am aware) having adopted this method, there are probably greater objections to it than, I confess, present themselves to my own mind.

cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do so, as long as human nature is the same, but<sup>1</sup> in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves. For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals have better feelings, through not falling into urgent<sup>2</sup> needs; whereas war by taking away the free supply of daily wants is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition. The states then were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both, in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance. The ordinary meaning of words was changed by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage that is true to its friends; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation as a cloak for unmanliness; being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing. Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest. The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries. In a word, the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an evil deed, or who persuaded it to one who had no thought of it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, because the latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those institutions by a spirit of rapacity. Again, their mutual grounds of confidence they confirmed not so much by any reference to the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlessness. The fair professions of their adversaries they received with a cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than them-

<sup>1</sup> For a similar use of *μᾶλλον*, compare IV. 19. 7, *εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν*.

<sup>2</sup> Literally "compulsory," *ἰ. e.*, which compel a man to do what he would otherwise not think of.

selves, and not with a spirit of generosity. To be avenged on another was deemed of greater consequence than to escape being first injured one's self. As for oaths, if in any case exchanged with a view to reconciliation, being taken by either party with regard to their immediate necessity, they only held good so long as they had no resources from any other quarter; but he that first, when occasion offered, took courage [to break them], if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his vengeance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he would have done in an open manner; taking into account both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for cleverness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily get the name of talented than, when simple, that of good; and of the one they are ashamed, while of the other they are proud. Now the cause of all these things was power pursued for the gratification of covetousness and ambition, and the consequent violence of parties when once engaged in contention. For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profession on each side, putting forward, respectively, the political equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in word they served the common interests, in truth they made them their prizes. And while struggling by every means to obtain an advantage over each other, they dared and carried out the most dreadful deeds; heaping on still greater vengeance, not only so far as was just and expedient for the state, but to the measure of what was pleasing to either party in each successive case: and whether by an unjust sentence of condemnation, or on gaining the ascendancy by the strong hand, they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment. Thus piety was in fashion with neither party; but those who had the luck to effect some odious purpose under fair pretences were the more highly spoken of. The neutrals among the citizens were destroyed by both parties; either because they did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should so escape.

83. Thus every kind of villainy arose in Greece from these seditions. Simplicity, which is a very large ingredient in a

<sup>1</sup> Or, *χειρί* may be taken by itself, in opposition to *μετὰ ψήφου ἀποκρινόμενος*; but the rhythm of the sentence appears better with the other construction.



noble nature, was laughed down and disappeared; and mutual opposition of feeling, with a want of confidence, prevailed to a great extent. For there was neither promise that could be depended on, nor oath that struck them with fear, to put an end to their strife; but all being in their calculations more strongly inclined to despair of any thing proving trustworthy, they looked forward to their own escape from suffering more easily than they could place confidence [in arrangements with others]. And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, had the advantage; for through fearing their own deficiency and the cleverness of their opponents, lest they might be worsted in words, and be first plotted against by means of the versatility of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deeds. Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their securing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguarded and more often ruined.

84. It was in Corcyra then that most of these things were first ventured on; both the deeds which men who were governed with a spirit of insolence, rather than of moderation, by those who afterward afforded them an opportunity of vengeance, would do as the retaliating party; or which those who wished to rid themselves of their accustomed poverty, and passionately desired the possession of their neighbor's goods, might unjustly resolve on; or which those who had begun the struggle, not from covetousness, but on a more equal footing, might savagely and ruthlessly proceed to, chiefly through being carried away by the rudeness of their anger. Thus the course of life being at that time thrown into confusion in the city, human nature, which is wont to do wrong even in spite of the laws, having then got the mastery of the law, gladly showed itself to be unrestrained in passion, above regard for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. They would not else have preferred vengeance to religion, and gain to innocence; in which state envy would have had no power to hurt them. And so men presume in their acts of vengeance to be the first to violate those common laws on such questions, from which all have a hope secured to them of being themselves rescued from misfortune; and they will not allow them to remain, in case of any one's ever being in danger and in need of some of them.

85. Such then were the passions which the Corcyraeans

in the city indulged toward one another, being the first that did so. And Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their ships; after which the Corcyraean exiles (for five hundred of them had escaped), having taken some forts that were on the mainland, were masters of their own territory on the opposite coast, and sallying forth from it, plundered those in the island, and did them much damage, a violent famine being produced in the city. They also sent embassies to Lacedæmon and Corinth about their restoration. When they met with no success, they afterward got some boats and auxiliaries and crossed over to the island, to the number of six hundred in all; and having burnt their boats, that they might have no hope from any thing but the command of the country, they went up to the hill Istone, and after building a fort on it, began to annoy those in the city, and were in the mean time masters of the country.

86. At the close of the same summer the Athenians dispatched twenty ships to Sicily, with Laches son of Melanopus, and Charceades son of Euphiletus, in command of them. For the Syracusans and Leontines had gone to war with each other; the Syracusans having, with the exception of Camarina, all the Dorian cities in alliance with them—for indeed these had joined the Lacedæmonian confederacy at the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any part in it with them—while the Leontines had the Chalcidian cities, and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians were on the side of the Syracusans; the Rhegians, on that of the Leontines, in consequence of their affinity to them. So the allies of the Leontines sent to Athens, both on the ground of their former confederacy with them and because they were Ionians, and urged the Athenians to send them a fleet, for they were excluded by the Syracusans from the use both of land and sea. Accordingly the Athenians sent it, on the pretense of their relationship, but really from a wish that no corn might be brought thence to the Peloponnese; and to make an experiment whether it were possible for them to bring Sicily into subjection to themselves. Having established themselves therefore at Rhegium in Italy, they began the operations of the war in concert with their allies. And so the summer ended.

87. The following winter the plague a second time attacked the Athenians, having indeed never entirely left them, though

there had been some abatement of it. It lasted the second time not less than a year—the former attack having lasted two—so that nothing reduced the power of the Athenians more than this. For not less than four thousand four hundred heavy-armed in the ranks died of it, and three hundred of the equestrian order, with a number of the multitude that was never ascertained. It was at that time also that the numerous earthquakes happened at Athens, Eubœa, and Bœotia, particularly at Orchomenos in the last-named country.

88. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Æolus; for in summer it was impossible to invade them, owing to their want of water. They are occupied by the Liparæan colony from Cnidos, who live in one of the islands which is of no great extent, called Lipara, and proceed from that to cultivate the rest, namely, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. Now the people in those parts think that in Hiera Vulcan works as a smith; because it is seen to emit abundance of fire by night, and of smoke by day. These islands lie opposite the coasts of the Sicels and Messanians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans. The Athenians ravaged their territory, and when they did not surrender, sailed back to Rhegium. And so the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

89. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies proceeded as far as the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; but on the occurrence of numerous earthquakes, they turned back again, and no invasion was made. About this period, when the earthquakes were so prevalent, the seat at Orobæ in Eubœa, having retired from what was then the line of coast, and afterward returned with a great swell, invaded a portion of the city, and partly inundated it, though it also partly subsided; and so that is now sea which was before land. It also destroyed the inhabitants, excepting such as could run up first to the higher parts of the city. There was a similar inundation too at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of the fort built by the Athenians, and wrecked one of two ships that were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus too there was a retreat of the sea, though no inundation followed; and

an earthquake threw down a part of the wall, with the town-hall, and a few houses besides. The cause of this, in my own opinion, is, that where the shock of the earthquake has been most violent, there it drives the sea back, and this suddenly coming on again with a violent rush causes the inundation. But without an earthquake I do not think that such an occurrence would ever happen.

90. During the same summer different parties, as they might severally happen, made war in Sicily; both the Siceliots themselves against each other, and the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall [only] mention the most memorable actions achieved by the Athenians and their allies, or against the Athenians by the enemy. Charæades then, the Athenian commander, having already been killed in war by the Syracusans, Laches, who was now in sole command of the fleet, turned his arms, in concert with his allies, against Mylæ, a town belonging to the Messanians. Now there were two divisions of the Messanians in garrison at Mylæ, and they had lain an ambush for the party coming from their ships. But the Athenians and their allies routed the troops in ambush, and slew many of them, and having assaulted the fortifications, compelled them to surrender the citadel, and to march with them against Messana. Afterward, on the attack of the Athenians and their allies, the Messanians too capitulated, giving hostages and all other securities.<sup>1</sup>

91. The same summer the Athenians dispatched thirty ships to cruise about the Peloponnese, under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand heavy-armed against Melos, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus. For as the Melians were islanders, and yet would not submit to them nor join their confederacy, they wished to reduce them. When, however, they did not surrender to them on the wasting of their territory, they sailed to Oropus, on the coast opposite Attica; and having landed at night, the heavy-armed immediately marched from their ships to Tanagra in Bœotia; while the Athenians in the city, on a given signal, met them at the same place by land in full force, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son

<sup>1</sup> "Satisfying the Athenians in all other points." Lit. "presenting all other things of such a nature as to be satisfactory."—*Arnold*.

of Thucles. Having pitched their camp for that day in the territory of Tanagra, they laid it waste, and passed the night there. The next day, after defeating in battle those of the Tanagræans and the Thebans who had come out against them, and after taking some arms, and erecting a trophy, they returned, one party to the city, the other to their fleet. And Nicias, with his sixty ships, coasted along and ravaged the maritime parts of Locris, and then returned home.

92. About this time the Lacedæmonians prepared to found their colony of Heraclea, in Trachiniæ, with the following purpose. The Melians form, in all, three tribes, the Paralians, Hiereans, and Trachinians. Of these, the Trachinians, having been reduced to great weakness by the Ætæans, who border on them, intended at first to give themselves up to the Athenians; but afterward, fearing that they could not be trusted by them, they sent to Lacedæmon, having chosen Tisamenus as their envoy. They were joined in the embassy by the Dorians also, the mother-state of the Lacedæmonians, with the same petition; for they, too, were much injured by the Ætæans. On hearing their request, the Lacedæmonians determined to send out this colony, from a wish to assist both the Trachinians and the Dorians. Besides, they thought the town would be placed advantageously for them with respect to the war with the Athenians; for a fleet might be equipped so as to have a short passage to Eubœa, and it would be useful for marching to Thrace. Indeed on all accounts they were anxious to found the place. They first consulted therefore the god at Delphi; and on his advising them to do it, they dispatched the settlers, taken both from their own citizens and from the *Periæci*, and gave permission to any of the rest of the Greeks that wished to accompany them, except Ionians, Achæans, and some other races. Three of the Lacedæmonians led them as founders of the colony, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. When they had established themselves in the country, they fortified anew the city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stades from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the sea. They also provided themselves with docks, beginning to build them at Thermopylæ, just by the pass, that they might the more easily be defended by them.

93. When this town was being thus jointly founded, the Athenians were at first alarmed, thinking that it was being set

up chiefly for the annoyance of Eubœa, because the passage to Cinæum in that island is a short one. The event, however, afterward proved contrary to their expectation, for no danger arose from it. And the reason was this. The Thes-salians, who had dominion in these parts, and to the injury of whose territory the place was being founded, fearing they might prove very powerful neighbors, continually harassed and made war upon the new settlers, till they wore down their strength, though at first they had been very numerous; for as the Lacedæmonians were the founders of the town, every one went to it with confidence, thinking it a place of security. It was, however, the Lacedæmonian officers themselves, who went to it, that chiefly contributed to ruining its interests, and reducing it to a scanty population, by frightening away the greater part, and governing harshly, and in some cases not fairly, so that their neighbors then prevailed over them more easily.

94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians were detained at Melos, the forces on board the thirty ships that were cruising about the Peloponnese first of all laid an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and cut off some garrison troops; and afterward came against Leucas with a larger force, and with all the Acarnanians, who accompanied them in a body, except the Æniadæ, and with the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships of the Corcyræans. The Leucadians, on the wasting of their territory, both without and within the isthmus, on which stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo, being overpowered by such numbers, remained quiet; while the Acarnanians requested Demosthenes, the general of the Athenians, to cut them off by a wall, thinking that they might then easily take them by storm, and so be rid of a city which was always hostile to them. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messanians that it was a fine opportunity for him, with so large an army collected together, to attack the Ætolians, who were hostile to Naupactus, and by reducing whom he would easily win for Athens the rest of the continent in these parts. For they represented to him that the nation of the Ætolians, though numerous and warlike, were yet not difficult to subdue before succors reached them, as they lived in unfortified villages, and those far apart, and used but light armor. And they advised him to attack in the first place,

the Apodotians, next the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytians, which are the largest division of the nation, speaking, it is said, the most unintelligible language, and being cannibals; for if these were subdued, the rest would readily surrender.

95. He consented to do so, out of regard for the Messanians, and still more because he thought, that without employing the forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and with the Ætolians, he would be able to go by land against the Boeotians, through the Locri Ozolæ to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right hand till he reached the Phocians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him, for the friendship they had always borne the Athenians, or might be brought over by force; and to Phocis Boeotia is at once the bordering state. Starting therefore with all his armament from Leucas, in opposition to the wishes of the Acarnanians, he coasted along to Sollium. There he communicated his plan to the Acarnanians; and when they did not assent to it in consequence of his refusal to invest Leucas, he himself with the remainder of the force, the Cephallenians, Messanians, Zacynthians, and the three hundred *epibatæ*<sup>1</sup> from his own ships (for the fifteen Corcyraean vessels had gone away), made an expedition against the Ætolians, having his head-quarters at Æaeon in Locris. Now the Locri Ozolæ were allies of the Athenians, and were to meet them in full force in the heart of the country: for as they bordered on the Ætolians, and were similarly equipped, they were thought likely to prove of great service in acting with them, from their acquaintance both with the Ætolian mode of fighting and with the localities.

96. After bivouacing with the army in the sacred precinct of the Nemean Jupiter, in which Hesiod the poet is said to have been killed by the people of this country, an oracle having before declared that he should meet with this fate at Nemea; in the morning he set out and marched into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidanea; on the second, Crocyleum; and on the third, Tichium, where he halted, and sent off his booty to Eupalium in Locris; for he intended, when he had subdued the other parts, to make a subsequent expedition against the Ophionians, if they would not surrender, after returning to Naupactus. But the Ætolians were both aware of

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, the heavy-armed soldiers who served on board ship, answering to our marines.

these preparations when he first formed his designs against them, and when the army had invaded their country they came to the rescue with a great force, all of them, so that even the most distant of the Ophionians, who stretch toward the Median Gulf, the Borniensians and Calliensians, joined in bringing aid.

97. Now the Messanians gave Demosthenes the following advice, as they also did at first. Assuring him that the reduction of the Ætolians was easy, they urged him to go as quickly as possible against their villages, and not wait till the whole people should unite and oppose him, but to endeavor successively to make himself master of each village before him.<sup>1</sup> Being thus persuaded by them, and relying on his fortune, because nothing ever went against him, without waiting for those who should have reinforced him (for he was most in want of light-armed dartmen) he advanced for Ægitium, and took it by assault, the inhabitants flying before him, and posting themselves on the hills round the town; for it stood on high ground, at the distance of about eighty stades from the sea. The Ætolians (for they had now come to the rescue of Ægitium) charged the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills in different directions, and plied them with darts; retreating when the Athenian force advanced against them, and pressing it close when it retired. And for a long time this was the character of the engagement—repeated pursuing and retreating—in both of which the Athenians had the worse.

98. Now so long as they saw that their archers had their arrows and were able to use them, they continued to resist; for, when harassed by the bowmen, the Ætolians, being a light-armed force, retired. But when, after the fall of their leader, the archers were dispersed, and they themselves distressed by enduring for a long time the same labor, and the Ætolians were pressing hard on them, and pouring their darts on them; then indeed they turned and fled, and falling into pathless ravines and places with which they were unacquainted, were cut off: for the guide who showed them the way, Chromon the Messanian, had been killed. And the Ætolians, still plying them with missiles, by their rapid movements (for they are swift of

<sup>1</sup> Or, "as it came in his way." Literally, "at his feet." Compare Herodotus, 3. 79, πάντα τινὰ τῶν Μάγων τὸν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον.



foot and light-armed) took many of them there in the rout, and put them to the sword; but the greater part missing their way and rushing into the forest, from which there were no roads out, they brought fire and burnt it round them. Indeed the Athenian forces were subjected to every form of flight and death, and it was with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea and to Œneon in Locris, the same place from which they had set out. Great numbers of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about a hundred and twenty heavy-armed—so many in number, and all in the prime of their youth. These were the best men of the city of Athens that fell during this war. One of the generals also, namely, Procles, was slain. Having taken up their dead under truce, and retired to Naupactus, they afterward went with their ships to Athens. But Demosthenes staid behind in the neighborhood of Naupactus and those parts, being afraid of the Athenians in consequence of what had been done.

99. About the same period the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they made on the country, defeated those of the Locrians who came against them, and took a guard-fort which stood on the river Halex.

100. The same summer the Ætolians, having before [the invasion of their country] sent as envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon, Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanean, and Tisander the Apodotian, persuaded them to send them an army to attack Naupactus, because it had brought the Athenians against them. And the Lacedæmonians dispatched about autumn three thousand heavy-armed of the allies; five hundred of whom were from Heraclea, their newly founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, had the command of the force, accompanied by Macarius and Menedæus, who were also Spartans.

101. When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locri Ozolæ; for the route to Naupactus was through their territory, and moreover he wished to make them revolt from the Athenians. Those among the Locrians who most forwarded his views were the Amphissians, who were alarmed in consequence of the enmity of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves, and persuaded the rest to do so, in their fear of the invading army; first the Myonæans, who were their neighbors (for on this side Locria

is most difficult to enter), then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalcæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Ceantheans. All these joined the expedition also. The Olpæans gave hostages, but did not accompany them; while the Hyæans refused to give hostages, till they took a village belonging to them, called Polis.

102. When every thing was prepared, and he had placed the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, he advanced with his army against Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians; and on his march took Ceneon, one of their towns, and Eupalium; for they refused to surrender. When they had reached the Naupactian territory, and the Ætolians also had now come to their aid, they ravaged the country, and took the suburb<sup>1</sup> of the capital, which was unfortified. They also went against and took Molyenium, which, though a colony from Corinth, was subject to the Athenians. Now Demosthenes, the Athenian (for after what had happened in Ætolia, he was still in the neighborhood of Naupactus) having previous notice of the armament, and being alarmed for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians (though with difficulty, on account of his retreat from Leucas) to go to the relief of Naupactus. Accordingly they sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy-armed, who threw themselves into the place and saved it. For the walls being extensive, and the garrison small, there was reason to fear that they might not hold out. When Eurylochus and his colleagues found that this force had entered the town, and that it was impossible to take it by storm, they withdrew, not toward the Peloponnese, but to Æolis, which is now called Calydon and Pleuron,<sup>2</sup> with the places in that quarter, and to Proschium in Ætolia. For the Ambra-ciots had come to them, and urged them to make, in concert

<sup>1</sup> We have no term exactly answering to the Greek *προαστειον*, or, "approach to the city," for, as Arnold observes on IV. 69. 5, "was not what we call a suburb, but rather an open space like the parks in London, partly planted with trees, and containing public walks, colonnades, temples, and the houses of some of the principal citizens. It was used as a ground for reviews of the army and for public games. At Rome the Campus Martius was exactly what the Greeks call *προαστειον*."

<sup>2</sup> *i. e.* (as Arnold explains it, after Wasse, Palmer, and Kruse), the district once called Æolis was now called by the names of the two principal towns in it, Calydon and Pleuron. Poppo and Göller understand it as the ancient name of Calydon alone.

with themselves, an attack upon the Amphilocheian Argos and the rest of that country, and upon Acarnania at the same time; telling them that if they made themselves masters of these countries, the whole of the continent would be united in alliance with the Lacedæmonians. So Eurylochus consented, and having dismissed the Ætolians, remained quiet with his army in that neighborhood, till he should have to assist the Ambraciots, on their taking the field before Argos. And so the summer ended.

103. The following winter, the Athenians in Sicily having marched with their Grecian allies, and as many of the Sieels as joined them in the war—being either subject by force to the Syracusans or allies who had revolted from them—against Inessa, the Sieel town, the citadel of which was held by the Syracusans, attacked it, and, not being able to take it, retired. On their return, the Syracusans from the citadel fell on the allies as they were retiring somewhat after the Athenians, and routed a division of their army, and killed no small number. After this, Laches and the Athenians, with the fleet, made some descents upon the Locrian territory, by the river Cœcinus, and defeated in battle those of the Locrians who came out against them with Proxenus the son of Capaton, about three hundred in number, and having taken some arms, departed.

104. The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience, as they professed, to a certain oracle. For Pisistratus the tyrant had also purified it before; not the whole of the island, but as much of it as was within sight of the temple. At this time, however, the whole of it was purified in the following manner. All the sepulchers of those who had died in Delos they removed, and commanded that in future no one should either die in the island or bear a child, but that [in such cases all should] be carried across to Rhenea. (This Rhenea is so short a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, after being powerful at sea for a considerable time, and ruling over the rest of the islands, and taking Rhenea, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo, by connecting it with Delos by a chain). It was at this time, too, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. There had been, however, even in very early times, a great assembly of the Ionians and

the neighboring islanders held at Delos; for they used to come to the feast with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesian festivals, and gymnastic and musical contests were held, and the different cities took up bands of dancers. Homer shows most clearly that such was the case, in the following verses, taken from a hymn to Apollo.

"Anon to Delos, Phœbus, wouldst thou come,  
Still most delighting in thine island-home;  
Where the long-robed Ionians thronging meet,  
With wives and children, at thy hallow'd seat;  
With buffets, dance, and song extol thy name,  
And win thy smile upon their solemn game."

That there was a musical contest also, and that they went to take part in it, he shows again in the following verses, taken from the same hymn. For after mentioning the Delian dance of the women, he ends his praise of the god with these verses, in which he also makes mention of himself.

"Now be Apollo kind, and Dian too;  
And ye, fair Delian damsels, all adieu!  
But in your memory grant me still a home;  
And oft as to your sacred isle may come  
A pilgrim care-worn denizen of earth,  
And ask, while joining in your social mirth,  
'Maidens, of all the bards that seek your coast,  
'Who sings the sweetest, and who charms you most?'  
Then answer one and all, with gracious smile,  
'A blind old man who lives in Chios' rocky isle.'"

Such evidence does Homer afford of there having been, even in early times, a great assembly and festival at Delos. But afterward, though the islanders and the Athenians sent the bands of dancers with sacrifices, the games and the greater part of the observances were abolished—as is most probable, through adversity—until the Athenians held the games at that time, with horse-races, which before had not been usual.

105. The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when they retained his army, marched forth against the Amphilochean Argos with three thousand heavy-armed; and entering the Argive territory, occupied Olpæ, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had once fortified, and used as their common place of meeting for judicial purposes; its distance from the city of Argos on the coast being about twenty-five stades. Now some of

the Acarnanians went to the relief of Argos, while others encamped in Amphilochia, in the place called Crenæ,<sup>1</sup> being on the watch to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus passing through unobserved to the Ambraciots. They also sent for Demosthenes, who had commanded the Athenian expedition against Ætolia, to be their leader; and for the twenty Athenian ships that happened to be cruising about the Peloponnese, under the command of Aristoteles son of Timocrates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. The Ambraciots at Olpæ also sent a messenger to their city, desiring them to come in full force to their assistance, fearing that the troops under Eurylochus might not be able to effect a passage through the Acarnanians, and that they themselves might either have to fight unsupported, or, if they wished to retreat, find it unsafe to do so.

106. The Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, therefore, finding that the Ambraciots at Olpæ were come, set out from Proschium and went as quickly as possible to their aid; and having crossed the Achelous, proceeded through Acarnania, which was left deserted in consequence of the reinforcement sent to Argos; keeping on their right hand the city of the Stratians with their garrison, and on the left the rest of Acarnania. After passing the territory of the Stratians, they proceeded through Phytia, and again through Medeon, along the borders; then through Limnæa; and so they entered the territory of the Ægræans, which formed no part of Acarnania, but was friendly to themselves. Then, having reached Mount Thyamus, which is uncultivated, they proceeded across it, and so came down into the Argive country by night, and passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenæ, joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ.

107: Having thus effected a union at day-break, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, and formed their encampment. Not long after, the Athenians came with their twenty ships into the Ambracian Gulf to assist the Argives; and Demosthenes arrived with two hundred heavy-armed of the Messenians, and sixty Athenian archers. The fleet therefore at Olpæ blockaded the hill from the sea; while the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (for the majority were forcibly detained by the Ambraciots) had by this time met at

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding exactly to our "Wells."

Argos, and were preparing to engage with the enemy, having appointed Demosthenes as commander of the whole army in concert with their own generals. He, having led them near to Olpæ, encamped there; a great ravine separating their armies. For five days they remained still, but on the sixth both sides drew up for battle. And as the force of the Peloponnesians was the larger, and outflanked his, Demosthenes, fearing that he might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way covered with a thicket, a body of heavy and light-armed troops, four hundred in all, that on the flank of the enemy which reached beyond his own, these troops might rise up in the very midst of the conflict and take them in their rear. When the preparations were completed on both sides, they closed in battle. Demosthenes occupied the right wing with the Messanians and the few Athenians; while the remainder of the line was formed by the Acarnanians in their several divisions, and the Amphilochean dartmen that were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up without distinction, excepting the Mantineans, who kept together more on the left, though not in the extremity of the flank, for the extreme left was held by Eurylochus and his men, opposed to the Messanians and Demosthenes.

108. When the Peloponnesians, being now engaged, outflanked their opponents, and were surrounding; their right, the Acarnanians, rising from the ambuscade, fell on them in the rear, and broke them; so that they did not stand to make any resistance, and, moreover, by their panic threw their main army into flight; for when they saw the division of Eurylochus, and the bravest of their forces being cut to pieces, they were far more alarmed. It was the Messanians, posted in that part of the field with Demosthenes, that performed the chief part of the work. But the Ambraciots and those in the right wing defeated the division opposed to them, and pursued it back to Argos; for they are the most warlike of all in those parts. When, however, on their return they saw their main army defeated, and the rest of the Acarnanians were pressing them closely, they escaped with difficulty into Olpæ; and many of them were killed, while they hurried on without any order, excepting the Mantineans, who kept their ranks best of all the army during the retreat. And so the battle ended, after lasting till evening.

109. The next day Menedæus, who on the death of Eurylachus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, was at a loss, since so great a defeat had been experienced, to see in what way he should either remain and sustain a siege—cut off as he was by land, and at the same time, through the presence of the Athenian fleet, by sea—or should escape if he retreated. He therefore made proposals to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a truce, and permission to retire, as well as for the recovery of his dead. They restored him his dead, and themselves erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number; but for permission to retire they did not openly grant any truce to the whole army; but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues secretly granted one to the Mantineans, and Menedæus and the other Peloponnesian commanders, to retreat with all speed; wishing to strip of their supporters the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners; but most of all desiring to raise a prejudice against the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians among the Greeks in those parts, from the impression of their having betrayed their friends, and deemed their own interest of more importance. They, then, took up their dead, and were burying them with all speed, as circumstances allowed; while those who had received permission were planning their retreat.

110. Now tidings were brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots at home, in compliance with the first message from Olpæ, were marching in full force with succors through Amphilochia, with a wish to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and knowing nothing of what had happened. Accordingly he straightway sent a division to lay ambushes beforehand in the roads, and to preoccupy the strong positions; while with the rest of his army he prepared to march against them.

111. Meanwhile the Mantineans, and those to whom the truce had been granted, going out under the pretext of gathering herbs and fire-wood, secretly went away in small parties, picking up at the same time the things for which they professed to have left the camp: but when they had now proceeded some distance from Olpæ, they began to retreat at a quicker pace. The Ambraciots and the rest, as many as hap-

pened thus to have gone out with them in a body,<sup>1</sup> when they found that they were gone away; themselves also pushed forward, and began running, on purpose to overtake them. But the Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were flying without permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and when some even of their generals tried to stop them, and said that permission had been granted to the Peloponnesians, one or two men threw their darts at them, believing that they were being betrayed. Afterward, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go away, but killed the Ambraciots. And there was much contention and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed some two hundred of them; the rest escaped into Agræa, a bordering territory, and Salæthus, king of the Agræans, being their friend, received them.

112. The Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. This town consists of two high hills; the greater of which, after night had come on, the troops sent forward from the camp by Demosthenes preoccupied unobserved; while the Ambraciots had previously ascended the smaller, and bivouaced on it. Demosthenes, after supper, marched with the rest of the army as soon as it was evening; himself with half of his force making for the pass, the remainder proceeding over the mountains of Amphilochia. At dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, while they were yet in their beds, and had had no notice of his measures, but much rather imagined that his forces were their own countrymen. For Demosthenes had purposely posted the Messenians first, with orders to address them, speaking in the Doric dialect, and so creating confidence in the sentinels; while at the same time they were not visible to the eye, as it was still night. When therefore he fell upon them, they routed them, and slew the greater part on the spot; the rest rushed in flight over the mountains. But as the roads were preoccupied, and the Amphilochians, moreover, were well acquainted with their own country, and light-armed against a heavy-armed enemy, whereas the Ambraciots were unacquainted with it, and knew not which way to turn, they perished by falling into ravines, and the am-

<sup>1</sup> 'Ἀθροοί seems to be in opposition to κατ' ὀλίγους in the preceding section. Or it may signify, as Arnold takes it, in such numbers as would justify the experiment, which small parties might think too hazardous.



bushes that had been previously laid. After attempting every mode of escape, some of them also turned to the sea, which was not far off; and when they saw the Athenian ships coasting along shore at the time that the affair happened, they swam to them, in their present alarm thinking it better to be slain, if they must, by those on board, than by their barbarous and most bitter enemies, the Amphilochians. The Ambraciots then were destroyed in this manner, and only few of many escaped to their city. The Acarnanians, after stripping the dead, and erecting trophies, returned to Argos.

113. The next day there came to them a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpæ into Agræa, to ask permission to take up the dead whom they had slain after the first engagement, when they left the camp without permission with the Mantineans and those who had received it. At sight of the arms taken from the Ambraciots from the city, the herald was astonished at their number; for he was not acquainted with the disaster, but imagined that they had belonged to their own party. And some one asked him why he was so astonished; and how many of them had been killed; his interrogator again supposing him to be the herald from the troops at Idomene. He said, "About two hundred." His interrogator, taking him up, said, "These then are evidently not the arms [of such a number], but of more than a thousand." The herald said in reply, "Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us." He answered, "Yes, they are; if at least it was you that fought yesterday at Idomene." "*We* fought with no one yesterday; but the day before, on our retreat." "Ay, but *we* fought yesterday with these, who had come as a reinforcement from the city of the Ambraciots." When the herald heard that, and learned that the reinforcement from the city had been cut off, breaking out into wailing, and astounded at the magnitude of the present evils, he returned without executing his commission, and no longer asked back the bodies. For this was the greatest disaster that befell any one Grecian city in an equal number of days during the course of this war: and I have not recorded the numbers of the slain, because the multitude said to have fallen is incredible, in comparison with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had

wished, in compliance with the advice of Demosthenes, to take Ambracia, they would have done so on the first assault: but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they had possession of it, might prove more troublesome neighbors to themselves.

114. After this, they allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians, and divided the rest among their several cities. Those given to the Athenians were taken while on their voyage home; and what are now deposited in the temples of Attica, are three hundred full suits of armor, which were reserved for Demosthenes, and with which he sailed back home; his restoration after the disaster in Ætolia being rendered more safe in consequence of this achievement. The Athenians on board the twenty ships also returned to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, on the departure of the Athenians and of Demosthenes, granted a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthus and the Agræans, to return from Æniadæ, whither they had removed from the country of Salynthus. And to provide for the future, they also concluded a treaty and alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, on these conditions: that neither the Ambraciots should march with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians; but that they should succor each other's country; and that the Ambraciots should restore whatever towns or hostages they held from the Amphilochians, and not go to the assistance of Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians. Having made these arrangements, they put an end to the war. Afterward the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xenocles son of Euthycles, who reached their destination by a difficult route through Epirus. Such was the conclusion of the measures in Ambracia.

115. The Athenians in Sicily the same winter made a descent from their ships on the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had made an irruption on its borders from the interior; they also sailed against the islands of Æolus. On their return to Rhegium they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, a general of the Athenians, had come to succeed to the command of the ships under Laches;

the allies in Sicily having sailed and persuaded the Athenians to assist them with more vessels. For though the Syracusans commanded their land, yet, as they were excluded from the sea by only a few ships, they were making preparations, and raising a fleet, with a determination not to put up with it. And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them; thinking that so the war in that quarter would be more speedily brought to a conclusion, and at the same time wishing to practice their men in seamanship. They dispatched therefore one of their commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships; intending to send out Sophocles son of Sostradides, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, with the larger squadron. So Pythodorus, being now in command of Laches' ships, sailed at the close of the winter to the fort of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken; and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

116. Just about the beginning of this spring, the fire flood issued from *Ætna*, as it had done on former occasions, and destroyed some of the territory of the Catanæans, who live on Mount *Ætna*, the largest mountain in Sicily. It is said that this eruption took place fifty years after the preceding one; and that it has occurred three times in all since Sicily has been inhabited by the Greeks. These were the events of this winter; and so ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

## BOOK IV.

1. THE following summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and an equal number of Locrians sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, at the invitation of the inhabitants; and so Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was chiefly done by the Syracusans because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and were afraid that the Athenians might hereafter make it their head-quarters and proceed against them with a larger force; by the Locrians, for hatred of the people of Rhegium, and with a wish to reduce them by hostilities on both sides. At the same time too the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with all their forces, to prevent their going to the rescue of Messana, and also at the instigation of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them. For that town had been for a long time torn by faction, and it was impossible at the present time to resist the Locrians; for which reason they were the more determined to attack them. After devastating the country, the Locrians retired with their land-forces, but their ships remained to guard Messana; and others that were being manned were to go to that station, and carry on the war from it.

2. About the same period of the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an incursion into Attica, under the conduct of Agis son of Achidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and pitching their camp in the country, proceeded to lay it waste. But the Athenians dispatched the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of them, had already arrived in Sicily before them. These they also ordered to attend, as they sailed by the island, to those of the Corcyreans who were in the city, and who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain; sixty ships having likewise sailed from the Peloponnese to assist

those on the mountain, and with an idea, that as there was a great famine in the city, they should easily possess themselves of the government. Demosthenes, who had continued in a private capacity since his return from Acarnania, was, at his own request, authorized by them to use that fleet, if he wished, for service about the Peloponnesians.

3. When, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Coreyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what was necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. While they were making objections, a storm happened to come on, and carried the fleet to Pylus. So Demosthenes immediately begged them to fortify the place (for this, he said, was his object in sailing with them), and showed them that there was great abundance of timber and stone, and that the post was a strong one, and unoccupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Sparta, and is situated in what was once the Messanian territory, being called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium. But the commanders said that there were many unoccupied promontories in the Peloponnesians, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them. He, however, considered that this was a more advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a harbor close by, and the Messanians, who in early times were connected with the place, and spoke the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, would do them very great injury by their excursions from it, and, at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

4. When he could not convince either the generals or the soldiers, having subsequently communicated his views to the subordinate officers also, he remained quiet from stress of weather; till the soldiers themselves, in their want of occupation, were seized with a desire to set to and fortify the post. Accordingly they took the work in hand, and proceeded with it, though they had no iron tools, but carried stones just as they picked them up, and put them together, as they severally might happen to fit; while the mortar, wherever it was necessary to use any, for want of hods they carried on their back, stooping down in such a way that it might best lie on, and clasping their hands behind them, to prevent its falling

off. Indeed in every way they made haste to anticipate the Lacedæmonians, by completing the most assailable points of the work before they came to the rescue; for the greater part of the position was strong by nature, and had no need of fortifications.

5. Now the Lacedæmonians happened to be celebrating a festival; and, moreover, when they heard it, they made light of it, thinking that when they took the field, either the enemy would not wait their attack, or they should easily take the place by storm. To a certain extent also the fact of their army being still before Athens delayed them. So the Athenians, after fortifying in six days the side toward the interior, and what most required it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to protect the place, while with the main body of the fleet they hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

6. When the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylus, they returned home with all speed; for the Lacedæmonians and Agis their king thought that the affair of Pylus closely affected them; and, besides, having made their incursion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, they were in want of provisions for most of their troops; while stormy weather, coming on with greater violence than was usual at that season, distressed the army. So that for many reasons it happened that they returned quicker than usual, and that this was the shortest incursion they had made; for they remained in Attica but fifteen days.

7. At this same period, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having got together a few Athenians from the guard-stations, and a large body of the allies in that neighborhood, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony from Mende, and hostile [to Athens], which was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiæans having immediately come to its rescue, he was beaten out of it, and lost many of his soldiers.

8. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the *Peræici* immediately went to the rescue of Pylus; but the other Lacedæmonians were more slow in marching against it, as they had but just reached home from a different expedition. They dispatched orders also through the rest of the Peloponnese to bring up their reinforcements to Pylus as quickly as possible, and sent

for their sixty ships at Corcyra. These having been hauled over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the land-forces also having by that time arrived. / While the Peloponnesians were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them by secretly sending two ships with a message to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, as the place was in danger. So the ships sailed with all speed, according to the orders of Demosthenes; while the Lacedæmonians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only a few men in it. At the same time, expecting the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances into the harbor, that the Athenians might not be able to come to anchor in it. For the island that is called Sphacteria both secures the harbor, by stretching in a line with it, and close off it, and narrows its entrances; on one side, near the Athenian fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships; on the other, toward the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outward, while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their operations against them from it, they conveyed over some heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the mainland. For so they thought that both the island would be unfavorable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did not afford any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself outside the inlet, looking toward the open sea, would present no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their countrymen; and so they should storm the place, in all probability, without the risk of a sea-fight, as there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation. Having adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over the heavy-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from all the *lochi*.<sup>1</sup> There had also been some others sent over before in turns; but these last who went, and who were left there, were four hundred and twenty in number, with

<sup>1</sup> On these divisions of the Lacedæmonian army, see Arnold's note, V. 68. 3.

their attendant Helots; their commander being Epitadas son of Molobrus.

9. Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedæmonians about to attack him both by sea and land at once, made his own preparations also; and having drawn up under the fortifications the triremes he had remaining from those that had been left him, he inclosed them in a stockade, and armed the crews taken out of them with shields of an inferior kind, and in most cases made of osiers. For it was not possible in so lonely a place to provide themselves with arms; but even these they had got from a thirty-oared privateer and skiff belonging to some Messanians, who happened to have come to them. Of these Messanians there were also about forty heavy-armed, whose services he used with the rest. The main body, both of the unarmed and the armed, he posted at the most fortified and secure points of the place, facing the interior, with orders to repel the land-forces, should they make an assault; while he himself, having picked from the whole force sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected that they would attempt a landing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, looking as it did to the open sea, but still, as their wall was weakest at that point,<sup>1</sup> he thought that this would tempt them to be eager in attacking it. For they built it of no great strength just there, expecting never to be beaten at sea themselves; and also thinking that if the enemy once forced a landing, the place then became easy to take. At this point then he went down to the very sea, and posted his heavy-armed, to prevent a landing, if possible; while he encouraged them with these words:

10. "Soldiers, who have shared with me this adventure, let none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever

<sup>1</sup> I have followed the usual interpretation of this sentence, though the sense can not fairly be drawn from the words as they now stand. Either *ἀν* must be supplied with *ἐπισύσασθαι*, or it must be changed into the future, as Dobree proposes, even allowing Gölner's explanation of the following verb being put in the future: Futuro *προθυμῆσθαι* usus est, quia in totâ sententiâ futuræ rei significatio inest." Would it be possible to avoid the difficulty by taking *ἐπισύσασθαι* in one of its other senses, "to win" or "carry" the wall? The general usage of Thucydides, I confess, is against this interpretation; but, on the other hand, there is in all the MSS. but one various reading of the passage, and that would not remedy the fault in the tense, if the ordinary force of the verb be retained.



by calculating the whole amount of the danger that surrounds us, but rather to charge the enemy with reckless confidence, and with the probability of escaping by these means. For circumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit of calculation, but require the danger to be faced as quickly as possible. But indeed I see the greater part of them favorable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the advantages we have. For the difficulty of landing which the place presents I consider to be in our favor: for while we remain where we are, this assists us in the struggle; but if we retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that case we shall find the enemy the more formidable on this very account, because his retreat will not be easily effected, even though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their ships, they are most easy to repel; but when they have once landed, they are then on equal terms with us. Nor should you be very much alarmed at their numbers; for though great, they will engage in small detachments, through the impossibility of bringing to: and it is not an army on the land, fighting on equal ground, while superior in numbers; but one on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances are required [to make it effective]. So that I consider their difficulties a fair equivalent for our numbers;<sup>1</sup> and at the same time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from experience as you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the ships sailing to shore, he would never be driven back; [I call on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your ground, and by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves and the place."

11. When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they were more inspirited, and went down against them, and

<sup>1</sup> With the use of *πλήθος* in this passage, to signify inferior numbers, compare the frequent use of *ποσούτος* and *τηλικούτος* with the same indefinite meaning, applying to small quantities or numbers, as well as to great; *e. g.*, Demosth. Philipp. I. 23, *Τοσαύτην μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνὶ νῦν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῳ παραταξομένην.* "Only so large a force." So also Soph. Aj. 747, and Eur. Hipp. 804.

ranged themselves close along the sea. The Lacedæmonians, moved from their position, and assaulted the fort at the same time both with their army by land and with their ships, of which there were forty-three; the admiral on board being Thrasy melidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just where Demosthenes was expecting him. So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, landward and seaward; while their opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, because it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each other in turn, were sailing up against them with all eagerness and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might force their passage and take the place. The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedæmonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.

12. In this way he urged on the rest, and having compelled his own steersman to run the ship ashore, he stepped on the gang-board, and was endeavoring to land when he was cut down by the Athenians, and fainted away after receiving many wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, his shield slipped from around his arm into the sea; and on its being thrown ashore, the Athenians picked it up, and afterward used it for the trophy which they erected for this attack. The rest were eager to land, but unable, both from the difficulty of the ground and from the Athenians standing firm and not giving way. And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fighting from land, and that a part of Laconia, were repelling Lacedæmonians when sailing against them; while Lacedæmonians were landing from ships, and on their own country, now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revolution of fortune,] for it formed at that time the main glory of the Lacedæmonians, that they were an inland people, and most powerful by land; and of the Athenians, that they

were a maritime people, and had by far the most powerful navy.

13. Having then made their attacks during that day and part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third sent some of their ships to Asine, to fetch timber for the construction of their engines; hoping that though the wall opposite the harbor was high, yet as the landing was most practicable there, they would take it by means of engines. Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in number; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-ships at Naupactus, and four Chians. When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with heavy-armed, and the ships in the harbor, and not sailing out of it; being at a loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at the time to the island of Prote, which is not far off, and is uninhabited, and there they passed the night. The next day they weighed anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there; if not, intending to sail in and attack them. They, however, neither put out to meet them, nor had done what they had intended, viz. to bar the entrances; but remaining quiet on shore, were manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sailing in, to engage in the harbor, which is of no small extent.

14. The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against them by each entrance; and finding most of their ships already afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them to flight, and chasing them as well as the short distance permitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its crew; while the rest they charged after they had taken refuge under the land. Some too were battered while still being manned, before they got under weigh; while others they lashed to their own, and began to tow off empty, the crews having taken to flight. The Lacedæmonians seeing this, and being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men were being intercepted on the island, went to the rescue, and rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, and began to pull them back again; every one thinking the business to be obstructed in that part in which he was not himself engaged. Thus the uproar occasioned was great, and the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with regard to ships: for the Lacedæmonians, in their eagerness and

dismay, were absolutely engaged in a sea-fight, so to speak, from the land; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, and wishing to follow up their present success as far as possible, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels. After inflicting much labor and many wounds on each other, they separated; and the Lacedæmonians saved their empty vessels, excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and immediately began to cruise round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men as intercepted; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had by this time come with their contingents from all the cities, remained stationary at Pylus.

15. When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached Sparta, it was determined that, in so great a calamity, the authorities should go down to the camp, and immediately decide on inspection<sup>1</sup> what they thought best. They, seeing that it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice concerning matters at Pylus, and then send ambassadors to Athens on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

16. The generals having acceded to their proposal, an armistice was concluded on the following terms: "That the Lacedæmonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war; and should make no attack on the fort, either by land or sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedæmonians on the mainland to send over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic chœnixes of barley-meal a man, with two cotylæ of wine and a piece of flesh; and half that quantity for each attendant.<sup>2</sup> That they should send in these rations under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep guard over the island, nevertheless, so long as they did not

<sup>1</sup> Haack, Göller, and Dindorf retain the old reading, πρὸς τὸ χρῆμα, depending on ὁρῶντας, "on inspection of the case."

<sup>2</sup> i. e., each of those who are called, ch. 8. 9, Εἰλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς.

land on it, and should abstain from attacking the forces of the Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea. That if either party should break any of these terms, in any particular whatever, the armistice should at once be void. That it should be in force till the Lacedæmonian ambassadors returned from Athens, the Athenians conveying them thither in a trireme, and bringing them back again. That on their arrival this armistice should be void, and the Athenians should deliver back the ships, in the same condition as they had received them." The armistice was concluded on these terms; and accordingly the ships, amounting to about sixty, were given up, and the ambassadors dispatched; who, on their arrival at Athens, spoke as follows:

17. "Athenians, the Lacedæmonians have sent us to effect, in behalf of our men in the island, whatever arrangement we may prove to be most advantageous for you, while at the same time it would be most creditable for us with regard to our misfortune, as far as present circumstances allow. Nor will it be contrary to our habit that we shall address you at some length; but it is the fashion of our country, where few words are sufficient, not to use many; but to use more than ordinary, when there is occasion for proving by words a point of importance to us, and so effecting our purpose. Receive then what we say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were considered ignorant and were being instructed by us; but rather regarding it as an admonition to take good advice, offered to men who are well informed. For it is in your power honorably to secure your present good fortune, keeping the advantages you have, and receiving an accession of honor and renown; and not to feel as men do that gain any advantage contrary to their habit; for through hope they are ever grasping for more, because they have unexpectedly enjoyed even their present good luck. But those who have had most changes of fortune both ways, ought fairly to be most distrustful of prosperity. And this might reasonably be the case, both with your city, owing to its great experience, and with ourselves.

18. "You may learn this lesson by looking at our present misfortunes; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, though we were before accustomed to think that we had ourselves more power to grant what we have now come to sue

for. And yet we were not reduced to this either from decay of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession to it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordinary resources; a subject in which the same thing is alike incident to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that because of the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune too will be always on your side. They indeed are wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more discreetly than others;) and who think that war does not conform itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success, would be most inclined to bring the war to a conclusion during their prosperity. And you, Athenians, have now an excellent opportunity of doing this with us; and of escaping hereafter, should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet with reverses (which is very possible), the imputation of having gained even your present advantages by mere chance; when you might have left behind you a character for power and wisdom exposed to no such hazard.

19. "Now the Lacedæmonians invite you to a treaty and conclusion of the war, offering you peace and alliance, and that there should subsist between us in other respects close friendship and intimacy with one another; while they ask back, in return, their men in the island; at the same time, thinking it better for both parties not to try the chances of war to the uttermost, whether they may escape by force through some accidental means of preservation, or be reduced to surrender, and be more severely dealt with. And we think that great enmities would be most effectually reconciled, not if one party, acting in a revengeful spirit, and after gaining most advantages in the war, should bind the other down by compulsory oaths, and make an arrangement with him on unequal terms; but if, when he might do so, showing regard for fairness, and conquering him by a display of goodness, he should, beyond his expectations, be reconciled to him on moderate terms. For his adversary being now bound, not to retaliate on him, as one who had been treated with violence, but to make him a return of goodness, is more disposed, for

very shame, to abide by the terms of his agreement. And men act thus toward their greatest enemies, more than toward those who have quareled with them in an ordinary degree : and they are naturally disposed with pleasure to give way in their turn to such as willingly yield to them ; but against those that are overbearing, to hazard all, even against their better judgment.

20. "To come to terms then were good for both of us now, if ever, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in the mean time ; in which case we must forever feel a private hatred of you, in addition to the public one ; and you must lose the advantages to which we now invite you. But while things are undecided, and while glory and friendship with us are offered to you, our own misfortune, on the other hand, being adjusted on moderate terms, before any disgrace befalls us, let us be reconciled, and both ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant a respite from their miseries to the rest of the Greeks ; who herein also will think you the chief agents. For they are harassed with war without knowing which of the two parties began it ; but if a pacification be effected, on which you have now the greater power to decide, they will refer the obligation to you. If you thus decide, you have an opportunity of becoming firm friends with the Lacedæmonians, at their own request, and by conferring a favor on them, rather than by treating them with violence. And in this consider what great advantages are likely to be involved ; for if we and you agree together, be assured that the rest of Greece, being inferior in power, will honor us in the highest degree."

21. The Lacedæmonians then spoke to this effect, thinking that the Athenians were before desirous of a truce, but debarred from it through their own opposition ; and that if peace were offered, they would gladly accept it, and give back the men. They, however, since they had the men in the island, thought the treaty was now ready for them, whenever they might wish to conclude it with them, and were grasping after further advantage. They were especially urged to this by Cleon son of Cleænetus, a demagogue at that time, and most influential with the populace ; who persuaded them to answer, that the men in the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be conveyed to Athens ; and that on their arrival, when the Lacedæmonians had restored Nisæa,

Pegæ, Troezen, and Achaia—which they had taken, not by war, but by virtue of the former arrangement, when the Athenians had conceded them under the pressure of calamities, and were at that time somewhat more in need of a truce—they should then recover their men, and conclude a treaty for as long a period as both sides might wish.

22. To this answer they made no reply, but desired them to choose commissioners to meet them, who should speak and hear on each point, and so calmly come to any arrangement to which they might persuade each other. Upon that Cleon fell violently upon them, saying that he knew beforehand that they had no sound purpose; and it was evident now; since they were unwilling to say any thing before the people, but wished to meet in council with a few individuals; if, however, they had any honest intentions, he told them to declare it before all. But the Lacedæmonians seeing that they could not speak before the multitude (even though they did think it best, in consequence of their misfortune, to make some concessions), lest they should lose favor with their allies by speaking and not succeeding; and being convinced that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on moderate terms, returned from Athens without effecting their purpose.

23. On their arrival, the truce concluded at Pylus was immediately at an end, and the Lacedæmonians asked back their ships, according to agreement. But the Athenians, alleging as grounds of complaint an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other particulars which appear not worth mentioning, refused to return them; laying stress on its having been said, that if there were any violation of it whatever, the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians denied it, and charging them with injustice in their conduct respecting the ships, went away, and set themselves to the war. And now hostilities were carried on at Pylus with the greatest vigor on both sides; the Athenians cruising round the island continually with two ships in opposite directions during the day, while by night they were all moored round it, except on the side of the open sea, whenever there was a wind blowing; (twenty ships too had joined them from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that in all they amounted to seventy;) and the Peloponnesians being encamped on the continent, and



making attacks on the fort, on the look-out for opportunity, should any offer, of rescuing their men.

24. In the mean time the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken to join the ships on guard at Messina the other squadron which they were preparing, carried on the war from that place. They were especially urged on to this by the Locrians, out of hatred for the people of Rhegium, whose territory they had themselves also invaded with all their forces. And they wished to try the result of a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenian ships stationed at Messina were but few; while by the greater part of them, including those that were to come thither, they heard that the island was being blockaded. For if they gained the advantage by sea, they hoped that by blockading Rhegium both with their land-forces and their ships they would easily reduce it, and then their success would be secured; for as the promontory of Rhegium in Italy, and that of Messina in Sicily, lay close together, the Athenians would not be able to cruise against them, and command the strait. This strait is formed by the sea between Rhegium and Messina, where Sicily is at the least distance from the continent; and is the Charybdis, so called, through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. And as the sea falls into it through a narrow passage from two great mains, the Tuscan and Sicilian, flowing at the same time with a strong current, it has naturally been considered dangerous.

25. In this strait then the Syracusans and their allies, with rather more than thirty ships, were compelled to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, and put out to meet sixteen vessels from Athens and eight from Rhegium. Being defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off with all speed, as they severally happened, to their own camps, the one at Rhegium, the other at Messina, after the loss of one ship, eight having overtaken them in the action. After this, the Locrians withdrew from the Rhegian territory; and the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces having also joined them. The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and seeing their ships unmanned, attacked them, and now on *their* side lost a ship, through an iron grapple

having been thrown on it, but the men swam out of it. Afterward, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships, and were being towed along shore to Messana, the Athenians again advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy having got their ships out into the open sea, and charged them first. Thus the Syracusans had the advantage in the passage along shore and in the engagement, which was such as has been described, and passed on to the port of Messana. The Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; while the Messanians, in the mean time, with all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders. The first day, having driven the Naxians within their walls, they ravaged the land, and the next day sailed round with their fleet, and did the same in the direction of the river Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incursion toward the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the highlands in great numbers to assist against the Messanians; and when the Naxians saw them, they took courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Grecian allies were coming to their aid, made a sudden sally from the town, and fell upon the Messanians, and having routed them, slew more than a thousand, the rest having a miserable return homeward; for the barbarians fell upon them on the road, and cut off most of them. The ships, having put in at Messana, subsequently dispersed for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, turned their arms against Messana, in the belief of its having been weakened; and attempted it by an attack, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbor, the land-forces on the side of the town. But the Messanians, and some Locrians with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a garrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part of the Leontine troops, and slew many of them. The Athenians, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their assistance, and drove the Messanians, back again into the town, having come upon them while in confusion; they then erected

<sup>1</sup> For the different explanations of ἀποσιμωσάντων, see Arnold's note.

a trophy and returned to Rhegium. After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without the co-operation of the Athenians.

26. At Pylos, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedæmonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water; for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation; for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink. The cause of this delay was the Lacedæmonians having proclaimed, that any one who wished should carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be serviceable in the siege; rating it a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who should carry it in. Many others therefore carried it in, at all risks, and especially the Helots, putting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, and landing by night on the side of the island toward the open sea. But what they particularly watched for was a chance of being carried to shore by a wind; for they more easily escaped the look-out of the triremes, when there was a breeze from sea-ward; as it was then impossible for the cruisers to anchor round it, while their own landing was effected in a reckless manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, they drove them up on the beach, while the soldiers were watching for them at the landing places in the island. But all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners. Divers also swam in under water on the side of the harbor, dragging by a chord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but though these escaped unobserved at first, precautions were afterward taken against them. Indeed each party contrived in every possible manner, the one to throw in

provisions, the other to prevent its being done without their observation.

27. When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves], and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harborless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them. Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them; and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose. Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true. And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it.

28. Nicias, observing that the Athenians began to murmur at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at *him*, desired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the generals were concerned, and make the attempt. Cleon think-

ing at first that he only pretended to give up the command to him, was prepared to accept it; but when he found that he really wished to transfer it to him, he drew back, and said that he was not general, but they; being afraid now, and not supposing that Nicias would have brought himself to retire in his favor. He, however, again urged him to undertake it, and resigned the command against Pylus, and called on the Athenians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to escape from what he had said, pressed Nicias the more to give up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set sail. So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, he undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but would set sail, taking with him no one out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, with some targeteers that had come to their aid from CEnus, and four hundred bowmen from other quarters. With these, in addition to the soldiers at Pylus, he said that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians were seized with laughter at his vain talking, but nevertheless the sensible part of them were pleased with the business, reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; either to be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedæmonians into their hands.

29. When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible. He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence. For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favor of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their

mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack. And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other.

30. It was, above all, from his disaster in Ætolia, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him. The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterward arisen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it. In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the Lacedæmonians were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the Athenians were more earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighboring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when Cleon, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at Pylus with the forces he had asked for. After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded.

31. When they did not accept their proposal, they waited one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a little before morning effected a landing on each side of the island, both that of the open sea and that of the harbor, amounting to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a run against the first post in the island. For the following was the

way in which the men were disposed. In this first guard there were thirty heavy-armed; the center and most level part was held by their main body, and Epitadas their commander; while a small division guarded the very corner of the island toward Pylus, which on the sea side was precipitous, and on the land side least exposed to assault. For there stood there an old fort, rudely built of stone,<sup>1</sup> which they thought might be of service to them, if they should be driven to a compulsory retreat. In this way then were they posted.

32. The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz., all the crews of seventy ships and rather more (except the lowest rank of rowers), with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messanian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications. By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement. And so, wherever they went they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it.

33. The party under Epitadas, which was also the main division in the island, on seeing the first post cut off, and an army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "with stones as they were picked up."

advanced to meet the heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a wish to engage with them; for they were stationed on their front, but the light-armed on their flanks and rear. They could not however come up with them, and avail themselves of their superior skill in arms (for the light troops kept them in check with their missiles from both sides; while at the same time the heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, but remained still); but the irregulars, on whatever point they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed; and these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flight, from the difficult nature of the ground, and its rough condition through being before uninhabited, over which the Lacedæmonians with their heavy armor could not pursue them.

34. For some short time then they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able with vigor to dash out against them where they made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they were now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving most confidence from a closer view—appearing as they did many times more numerous than the enemy—and having now more accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as they had expected, when they were first landing with spirits cowed at the thought of attacking Lacedæmonians [under these circumstances, I say], they despised them, and with a shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand. From the shouting thus raised, while they ran upon them, bewilderment seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. The dust also from the wood that had been burnt was rising thick into the air, and it was impossible for any one to see before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the dust, were flying from such a host of men. And here the action became distressing to the Lacedæmonians; for their caps were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken in them, when they were struck; and they could make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as sight was concerned, from any view before them; and not hearing, for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of command; while danger surrounded them on every side, and they



had no hope of any means of defending and saving themselves.

35. At last, when many were now being wounded from constantly moving in the same place, they formed into a close body, and went to the fort in the corner of the island, which was not far off, and to their own guards there. On their giving way, the light-armed then at once took courage, and pressed on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of the Lacedæmonians then who were overtaken in the retreat were slain; but the greater part escaped to the fort, and with the garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to defend themselves where it was assailable. The Athenians, on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to the natural strength of the place, but advanced in front, and endeavored to force their position. And thus for a long time, indeed for the greater part of the day, though suffering from the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out; the one striving to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give way; and the Lacedæmonians now defended themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks.

36. When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messanians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were laboring in vain; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach. Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedæmonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labor and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for. And now the Lacedæmonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylæ; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their

ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches.

37. Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger. And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be treated at their discretion.<sup>1</sup>

38. On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their shields, and waved their hands, to show that they accepted the proposal. After this, when the cessation of hostilities had taken place, a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the other side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, was lying among the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take the command in case of any thing happening to them. He, then, and those who were with him, said that they wished to send a herald to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland, and ask what they should do. When the Athenians would not allow any of them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland; and when questions had passed between them twice or thrice, the last man that came over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the mainland brought them this message; "The Lacedæmonians bid you to provide for your own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonorable." So after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their arms and their persons. That day and the following night the Athenians kept them in custody; but the next day, after erecting a trophy on the island, they made all their other arrangements for sailing, and distributed the men among the captains of the fleet, to take charge of; while the Lacedæmonians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the number of those who were killed in the island, or were taken alive,

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "for them to decide as they pleased."

was as follows. There had crossed over in all four hundred and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of which were taken [to Athens] alive, and the rest were slain. Of those that were living about one hundred and twenty were Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many killed; for the battle was not fought hand to hand.

39. The whole length of time that the men were blockaded, from the sea-fight to the battle in the island, was seventy-two days; for about twenty of which, while the ambassadors were gone to treat of peace, they had provisions given; but for the remainder, they were fed by those that sailed in by stealth. And there was still corn in the island, and other kinds of food were found in it; for Epitadas, the commander, supplied them with it more sparingly than he might have done. The Athenians then and the Peloponnesians returned with their forces from Pylus to their several homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, was fulfilled; for within twenty days he took the men to Athens, as he engaged to do.

40. And of all the events of the war this happened most to the surprise of the Greeks; for their opinion of the Lacedæmonians was, that neither for famine nor any other form of necessity would they surrender their arms, but would keep them, and fight as they could, till they were killed. Indeed they did not believe that those who had surrendered were men of the same stamp with those who had fallen; and thus one of the allies of the Athenians some time after asked one of the prisoners from the island, by way of insult, if those of them who had fallen were honorable<sup>1</sup> and brave men? to which he answered, that the *atractus*<sup>2</sup> (meaning the arrow) would be worth a great deal, if it knew the brave men from the rest; thus stating the fact, that any one was killed who came in the way of the stones and arrows.

41. On the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison, till some arrangement should be made; and if the Lacedæmonians should before that invade their territory, to take them out and put them to death. They also

<sup>1</sup> i. e., "gentlemen" of the true Spartan blood, such as they were so fond of representing themselves. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> "One of the ordinary Spartan words to express what the other Greeks called *δυστός*." Id.

arranged for the defense of Pylus; and the Messanians of Naupactus sent to the place, as to the land of their fathers (for Pylus is a part of what was formerly the Messanian country), such of their men as were most fit for the service, and plundered Laconia, and annoyed them most seriously by means of their common dialect. The Lacedæmonians having had no experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and finding their Helots deserting, and fearing that they might see their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, were not easy under it, but, although unwilling to show this to the Athenians, they sent ambassadors to them, and endeavored to recover Pylus and the men. They, however, were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often went to them, sent them back without effecting any thing. These then were the things that happened about Pylus.

42. The same summer, immediately after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and two hundred cavalry on board horse-transport; the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, from among the allies, accompanying them, and Nicias the son of Niceratus taking the command, with two colleagues. Setting sail, they made land in the morning between the Chersonesus<sup>1</sup> and Rheitus, on the beach adjoining to the spot above which is the Solygian hill, on which the Dorians in early times established themselves, and carried on war against the Corinthians in the city, who were Æolians; and on which there now stands a village called Solygia. From this beach, where the ships came to land, the village is twelve stades off, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having heard long before from Argos that the armament of the Athenians was coming, went with succors to the Isthmus, all but those who lived above it: there were absent too in Ambracia and Leucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison; but the rest, with all their forces, were watching where the Athenians would make the land. But when they had come to during the night unobserved by them, and the appointed signals were raised to tell them of the fact, they left half their

<sup>1</sup> i. e., the peninsula and the stream; the former running out into the sea, from the ridge of Mount Oneum. See the sketch of the coast in Arnold, vol. ii.

forces at Cenchreæ, in case the Athenians should advance against Crommyon, and went to the rescue with all speed.

43. And Battus, one of the generals (for there were two present in the engagement), took a battalion, and went to the village of Solygia to defend it, as it was unwalled; while Lycophron gave them battle with the rest. First, the Corinthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, immediately after it had landed in front of Chersonesus, then the rest of their army also. And the battle was an obstinate one, and fought entirely hand to hand. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for these had been posted in the extremity of the line) received the charge of the Corinthians, and drove them back after some trouble; but after retreating to a wall (for the ground was all on a rise) they assailed them with stones from the higher ground, and singing the pæan, returned to the attack; which being received by the Athenians, the battle was again fought hand to hand. Meanwhile a battalion of the Corinthians, having gone to the relief of their left wing, broke the right of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians from the ships drove them back again. The rest of the army on both sides were fighting without cessation, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, in which Lycophron was opposed to the left of the Athenians, and acting on the defensive; for they expected them to try for the village of Solygia.

44. For a long time then they held out without yielding to each other; but afterward (the Athenians having a serviceable force on their side in their cavalry, while the others had no horse) the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they piled their arms, and did not come down again, but remained quiet. It was in this rout of the right wing that the greater part of them fell, and Lycophron their general. The rest of the army, whose flight, when it was broken, was effected in this manner—with neither hot pursuit nor hurry—withdrawed to the higher ground, and there took up its position. The Athenians, finding that they no longer advanced to engage them, spoiled the dead, and took up their own, and immediately erected a trophy. But to that half of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchreæ for protection, lest the enemy should sail against Crommyon, the battle was not visible, owing to [an intervening ridge of] Mount Oneum; but when

they saw dust, and were aware of it, they immediately went to the scene of action; as also did the older Corinthians from the city, when they found what had been done. The Athenians, seeing them coming all together against them, and thinking that reinforcements were being brought by the neighboring Peloponnesians, retreated with all speed to their ships, with the spoils and their own dead, except two whom they had left on the field because they could not find them. Having gone on board their ships, they crossed over to the islands that lie off the coast, and from them sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies they had left behind them. There were killed in the battle, on the side of the Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; of the Athenians, rather less than fifty.

45. Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, distant from the city one hundred and twenty stades, and having come to their moorings, ravaged the land, and passed the night there. The next day, having first coasted along to the Epidaurian territory and made a descent upon it, they came to Methone, which stands between Epidaurus and Trœzen; and cutting off the isthmus of the peninsula in which Methone is situated, they fortified it, and having made it a post for a garrison, continued afterward to lay waste the land of Trœzen, Haliæ, and Epidaurus. After cutting off this spot by a wall, they sailed back home with their ships.

46. At the same time that these things were being done, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after weighing from Pylus for Sicily with an Athenian squadron, came to Corcyra, and with the Corcyraeans in the city carried on war upon those that had established themselves on Mount Istione, and who at that time, after crossing over subsequently to the insurrection, commanded the country, and were doing them much damage. They attacked their stronghold and took it, but the men, having escaped in a body to a higher eminence, surrendered on condition of giving up their auxiliaries, and letting the Athenian people decide their own fate, after they had given up their arms. So the generals carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they were sent to Athens; with an understanding that if any one were caught running away, the treaty would be void in the case of all. But the leaders of the popular party at Corcyra, fearing

that the Athenians might not put to death those that were sent to them, contrive the following stratagem. They persuade some few of the men in the island, by secretly sending friends to them, and instructing them to say, as though with a kind motive, that it was best for them to make their escape as quickly as possible, and that they would themselves get a vessel ready, for that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the Corcyraean populace.

47. So when they had persuaded them, and through their own arrangements about the vessel the men were caught sailing away, the treaty was declared void, and the whole party given up to the Corcyraeans. And the Athenian generals contributed no small share to such a result—that the pretext seemed strictly true, and its contrivers took it in hand more securely—by showing that they would not wish the men to be conveyed to Athens by another party (they themselves being bound for Sicily), and so to confer the honor on those who took them there. When the Corcyraeans had got possession of them, they shut them up in a large building, and afterward taking them out by twenties, led them through two rows of heavy-armed soldiers posted on each side; the prisoners being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men ranged in the lines, wherever any of them happened to see a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side, and hastened on the way those that were proceeding too slowly.

48. As many as sixty men they took out in this manner, and put to death without the knowledge of those in the building; (for they supposed that they were taking them to be removed to some other place;) but when they were aware of it, through some ones' having pointed it out to them, they called on the Athenians, and desired that they would themselves put them to death if they wished. They refused also any longer to leave the building, and said they would not, as far as they could prevent it, permit any one to come in. The Corcyraeans indeed were themselves not disposed to force a passage by the doors; but having gone up to the top of the building, and broken through the roof, they threw the tiles and discharged their arrows down on them. The prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could, while at the same time the greater part were dispatching themselves, by thrusting into

their throats the arrows which their enemies discharged, and hanging themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place, and by making strips from their clothes; and so in every manner during the greater part of the night (for night came on while the tragedy was acting), they were destroying themselves, and were dispatched with missiles by those on the roof. When it was day, the Corcyræans threw them in layers on wagons, and carried them out of the city; while all the women that were taken in the building were reduced to slavery. In this way were the Corcyræans of the mountain cut off by the commons; and the sedition, after raging so violently, came to this termination, at least, as far as the present war is concerned; for of one of the two parties there was nothing left worth mentioning. The Athenians then sailed away to Sicily, which was their original destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.

49. At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition, and took Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was betrayed to them. And having turned out the Corinthians, Acarnanian settlers from all parts of the country themselves kept possession of the place. And so the summer ended.

50. The following winter Aristides son of Archippus, a commander of the Athenian ships which had been sent out to the allies to levy contributions, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the king to Lacedæmon. On his being conveyed to Athens, they got his dispatches translated out of the Assyrian character, and read them: the substance of which, as regarded the Lacedæmonians (though many other things were mentioned in them), was, that the king did not understand what they would have; for though many ambassadors had come to him, no one ever made the same statement as another; if then they would but speak plainly, they might send men to him in company with this Persian. The Athenians afterward sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and ambassadors with him; but on hearing there that king Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was lately dead (for it was at that time that he died), they returned home.

51. The same winter also the Chians dismantled their new



fortifications, at the command of the Athenians, and in consequence of their suspecting that they would form some new designs against them: they obtained, however, pledges from the Athenians, and security (as far as they could) for their making no change in their treatment of them. And so the winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

52. At the very commencement of the following summer, there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of a new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake. Moreover, the exiles of the Mytilenæans and the other Lesbians, setting out most of them from the continent, and having taken into their pay an auxiliary force from the Peloponnese, and raised troops from the neighborhood, took Rhœteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of 2000 Phocæan staters. After this they marched against Antandrus, and took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And their design was to liberate both the other Actæan towns,<sup>1</sup> as they were called—which the Athenians held, though formerly the Mytilenæans owned them—and, above all, Antandrus; having fortified which (for there were great facilities for building ships there, as there was a supply of timber, with Ida close at hand), and sallying from it, as they easily might, with resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravage Lesbos, which lay near, and to subdue the Æolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant to make.

53. The Athenians in the same summer made an expedition against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, taking with them also from among the allies the Milesians and some others; under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrepheas, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite to Malea. The inhabitants are Laconians, of the class of the *periæci*, and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually. They also sent over regularly a garrison of heavy-armed, and paid great attention to it. For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; and at the same time privateers were less

<sup>1</sup> i. e., situated on the ἀκτῆς, or coast of Asia, opposite to Lesbos.

able to annoy Laconia from the sea, the only side on which it could be injured; for the whole of it runs out toward the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

54. The Athenians, therefore, having made the land with their armament, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy-armed of the Milesians, took the town on the coast called Scandea; while with the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island looking toward Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, and at once found all the inhabitants encamped there. A battle having been fought, the Cytherians stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and fled into the upper town; after which they came to an agreement with Nicias and his colleagues to throw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, only stipulating that they should not be put to death. Indeed there had been before certain proposals made by Nicias to some of the Cytherians, in consequence of which the terms of the capitulation were settled more quickly and favorably, both for their present and future interests: and the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedæmonians and of the island being so adjacent to Laconia. After the capitulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scandea, the town near the harbor, and appointed a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Hêlus, and most of the places on the sea; and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, they continued ravaging the country about seven days.

55. The Lacedæmonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, nowhere opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen; and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters,

being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have. At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them. And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune.

56. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the neighborhood of which each descent was made, generally speaking they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And one garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrtæ and Aphrodisia, though it terrified by an attack the scattered crowd of light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained by the heavy-armed; and some few men belonging to it were killed, and some arms were taken; and the Athenians raised a trophy, and then sailed back to Cythera. Thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, which forms a part of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia. This district the Lacedæmonians, who owned it, gave to the Æginetans, when expelled from their island, as a residence, for the service they had done them at the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always stood on *their* side.

57. While then the Athenians were yet sailing toward them, the Æginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the upper town, in which they lived, at the distance of about ten stades from the sea. And one of the garrisons in the country, which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with them within the wall, though the Æginetans requested them; but thought it dangerous to be shut up within it; and so

having retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, as they did not consider themselves a match for the enemy. In the mean time the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they burned down, and plundered the property in it, and took the Æginetans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen in battle, and the Lacedæmonian commander who was among them, Tantalus the son of Patrocles; for he was taken prisoner after being wounded. They also took with them some few individuals from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for security. These the Athenians determined to deposit in the islands; to order the rest of the Cytherians, while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four talents; to put to death all the Æginetans that had been taken, for their former perpetual hostility; and to throw Tantalus in prison with the other Lacedæmonians taken in the island.

58. The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with one another; and then all the rest of the Sicilians also assembled at Gela, with embassies from all the cities, and held a conference together on the subject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were expressed on both sides of the question, while they stated their differences and urged their claims, as they severally thought themselves injured; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the man who had the greatest influence with them, addressed the following words to the assembly:

59. "It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily. And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, or deterred from it by fear, should he think that he will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will face the perils rather than put up with any present loss. But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful. And this would be most serviceable to us

too at the present time, if we did but believe it. For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavoring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.

60. "We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us. For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion: it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavor to bring all these states into subjection to them.

61. "And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily; the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city. Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connection. For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race: for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their

alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practice this covetousness and forecasting; and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm; we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other: for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success.

62. "With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice. And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it among ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honors and splendors? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it. And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had. For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future

prevails to the greatest possible degree ; and though the most deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful : for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.

63. " And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians' presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfillment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is among us, and ourselves make peace forever, if possible ; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period. In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill : but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not to speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.

64. " And for myself, although, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I represent a most powerful city, and am more likely to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to provide against these things, and to make concessions ; and not so to injure my enemies as to incur greater damage myself ; nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, which I can not control ; but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies. For there is no disgrace in connections giving way to connections, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race ; in a word, all of us who are neighbors, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again among ourselves by means of general conferences : but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered ; and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time

avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.”

65. Hermocrates having spoken to this effect, the Sicilians agreed among themselves in a determination to have done with the war, retaining their several possessions, but that Morgantina should be ceded to the Camarinæans on their paying a stipulated sum of money to the Syracusans. So the allies of the Athenians called those of them who were in command, and said that they should conclude peace, and that the treaty would extend to them also. When the generals had expressed their assent, they concluded peace, and the Athenian ships afterward sailed away from Sicily. But on the arrival of the generals, the Athenians at home banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, on the belief of their having been bribed to return, when they might have brought Sicily under their dominion. Thus in their present success they presumed that they could meet with no impediment, but equally achieve what was possible and impossible, with ample or deficient resources alike. The reason of which was their general success beyond their calculations, which suggested to them an idea of strength resting only on hope.<sup>1</sup>

66. The same summer, the Megareans in the city, pressed at once by the hostilities of the Athenians, who always invaded their country in full force twice a year, and by their own exiles in Pegæ, who had been expelled during the strife of factions by the popular party, and harassed them by their forays, began to discuss among themselves the propriety of receiving back their exiles, and not ruining the city in both ways. The friends of the banished, when aware of such discussion, themselves begged them more openly than before to adopt this proposal. But the leaders of the commons, knowing that the populace would not be able under the pressure of their sufferings to hold out with them, in their fear entered into communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, wishing to betray the city to them, and thinking that the danger to themselves would be less than from the return of those who had been banished by them. It was agreed then that in the first

<sup>1</sup> i. e., “not arising from reality or from resources now in existence, but from the hope of gaining such.”—*Arnold*.



place the Athenians should take the long walls (they were about eight stades in length, from the city to Nisæa their port), that the Peloponnesians might not come to the rescue from Nisæa, where they alone formed the garrison to secure the good faith of Megara; and then that they should endeavor to put the upper town into their hands; and they thought the inhabitants would the more readily surrender when that had been done.

67. The Athenians, therefore, when preparations had been made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the night to Minoa, an island off Megara, with six hundred heavy-armed under the command of Hippocrates, and posted themselves in an excavated piece of ground, from which they used to make their bricks, and which was not far off; while the troops, with Demosthenes, the other commander, consisting of light-armed Plateans, and a second corps composed of *peripoli*,<sup>1</sup> placed themselves in ambush in the ground consecrated to Mars, which was at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this but those who took care to know [what was doing] that night. When day was about to dawn, the traitors among the Megareans did as follows. They had for a long time past used means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the consent of the officer in command, in the guise of privateers, to carry on a cart, during the night, a boat worked by sculls along the trench down to the sea, and so sail out; and before it was day, they brought it again on the cart, and took it within the wall through the gates; that the Athenians, as they pretended, might not know what precautions to take, no boat being visible in the harbor. And on that occasion the cart was already at the gates, and on their being opened in the usual manner for the skiff, as they thought, the Athenians (for this had been done by agreement with them), on seeing it, ran full speed from their ambush, wishing to reach the spot before the gates were shut again, and while the cart was still in the entrance, and prevented their being closed; the Megareans who were in concert with them at the same time dispatching the guard at the gate. Demosthenes with his Plateans and *peripoli* were the first to run in (at the point where the trophy

<sup>1</sup> The *peripoli* were employed as a movable force, and confined exclusively within the walls of fortified places, but disposable for the defense of any point that might be particularly threatened. See Arnold's note.

now stands), and as soon as they were within the wall (for now the nearest Peloponnesians were aware of it), the Plataeans engaged with and defeated those who came to the rescue, and secured the gates for the advancing heavy-armed of the Athenians.

68. Then each of the Athenians, as he successively entered, proceeded against the wall. And of the Peloponnesian garrison a few at first resisted, and defended themselves; and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight, being terrified in consequence of the enemy having attacked them by night, and the Megarean traitors fighting against them; and thinking that all the Megareans had betrayed them. For it happened that the Athenian herald had of his own accord proclaimed, that whoever of the Megareans wished, should go and pile his arms with the Athenians. So when they heard that, they staid no longer; but thinking that they were certainly the objects of a common attack, fled for refuge to Nisæa. In the morning, when the walls were now taken, and the Megareans in the city were in confusion, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and others with them, viz. the popular party who were privy to the measure, said that they ought to throw open the gates, and march out to battle. It had been arranged by them, that when the gates were opened, the Athenians should rush in; and they themselves would be distinguished from the rest, for they said they would anoint themselves with oil, that they might not be hurt. And they felt the greater security in opening the gates, since, according to agreement, the four thousand Athenian heavy-armed from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, and were now there. But when they were anointed, and were now standing about the gates, one of their associates gave information of the plot to the other party, who consequently united, and came in a body, and urged that they ought neither to march out (for not even before, when they were stronger, had they ever ventured on this), nor to bring the city into evident danger; and if any one did not obey them, there [in Megara itself], should the battle be fought. But they gave no intimation of their being acquainted with their practices, but positively maintained that they were giving the best advice; and at the same time they kept their post about the gates, so that it was not possible for the conspirators to accomplish what they intended.

69. The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had arisen, and that they would not be able to take the city by force, immediately proceeded to invest Nisæa; thinking that if they could take it before it was relieved, Megara also would the more quickly surrender. Now iron, stone-masons, and all other requisites were quickly brought from Athens. So they began from the wall which they occupied, and built a cross-wall on the side of Megara, from the point mentioned down to the sea on each side of Nisæa; the whole army having divided among themselves the trench and walls; and they used the stones and bricks from the suburb, and cutting down the fruit-trees and timber, strengthened with a palisade whatever point might require it. The houses, too, in the suburb, when provided with battlements, were in themselves a fortification. That whole day they continued working; and about afternoon of the next day the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisæa, in despair of provisions (for they used to receive daily rations from the upper city), not thinking that the Peloponnesians would soon relieve them, and supposing the Megareans to be their enemies, capitulated to the Athenians, on condition that after surrendering their arms, they should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; but that the Lacedæmonians, both the commander and all others in the place, should be treated by the Athenians according to their pleasure. On these conditions they surrendered and went out; and the Athenians, having broken down the long walls at their abutment on Megara, and having taken possession of Nisæa, proceeded with their other preparations.

70. Now Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be in the neighborhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army for Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing both for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Bœotians with orders to meet him with a body of troops as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus (it is a village in the Megarean territory that has this name, under Mount Gerania), and went himself with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy-armed, four hundred Phliasian, six hundred Sicyonian, and all his own forces that had been already raised, thinking that he should still find Nisæa untaken. But when he heard of its capture (for he happened to have gone out to

Tripodiscus by night), picking out three hundred men from his army, before he was heard of, he advanced to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were about the shore; wishing nominally, and really too, if he could, to make an attempt on Nisæa; but, above all, to effect an entrance into Megara, and secure it. Accordingly he begged them to receive his forces, telling them that he was in hope of recovering Nisæa.

71. But the Megarean factions were afraid, on the one side, that he might introduce the exiles, and expel them; on the other, that the popular party, through fear of this very thing, might attack them, and so the city be ruined by their fighting with each other, while the Athenians were close at hand in ambush against them; and therefore they did not receive him, but both parties determined to remain quiet, and wait to see the result. For each side expected that a battle would be fought between the Athenians and those who had come to relieve the place, and that so it would be safer for themselves to go over to the side they favored, if it were victorious. When therefore Brasidas did not prevail on them, he returned again to the rest of the army.

72. In the morning the Bœotians joined them, having indeed purposed, even before Brasidas sent to them, to march to the relief of Megara, considering the danger to affect themselves, and being already in full force at Plataea; but when the messenger reached them, they felt much more confidence, and after dispatching two thousand two hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred cavalry, they returned again with the main force. When the whole army was now come, amounting to no less than six thousand heavy-armed, and when the Athenian heavy-armed were formed in line about Nisæa at the shore, but their light-armed were dispersed over the plain; the Bœotian horse fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the sea, while they were not expecting it; for before this no succors had yet come to the Megareans from any quarter. But the Athenian horse charged in return, and came to close quarters with them; and there was a cavalry action which lasted for a long time, in which both parties claim to have had the better. For the Athenians, close under the walls of Nisæa, charged, killed, and stripped the Bœotian commander of the horse, and some few others; and having got possession of these bodies, restored them under truce, and

erected a trophy: yet, regarding the action as a whole, neither party retired with a decided result, but the Boeotians drew off to their forces, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

73. After this, Brasidas and the army moved nearer to the sea and to Megara; and having chosen a convenient spot, drew up in order of battle, and remained still, thinking that the Athenians would advance against them, and knowing that the Megareans were waiting to see on which side would be the victory. And they considered that both results were favorable for them, their not being the first to make the attack, and voluntarily to begin an engagement with all its hazard (since, at any rate, they had clearly shown that they were ready to defend themselves), and the victory being fairly assigned to them, without any struggle, so to speak; and that at the same time it was favorable to their interest at Megara. For if they had not shown themselves there, they would not have had a chance, but would certainly have lost the city, being considered as good as beaten. But as it was, the Athenians might happen to be not disposed for a contest; so that without fighting they would succeed in the objects of their coming. And this was indeed the case. For the Athenians came out, and drew up by the long walls, but remained quiet on their side also, as the enemy did not attack them: since their commanders too considered it no equal hazard, on the one hand for them, after succeeding in most of their designs, to commence an engagement against superior numbers, and either, if victorious, only to take Megara, or, if beaten, to sacrifice the flower of their heavy-soldiery; and, on the other hand, for merely a part of their enemies' whole force, nay even of that which was present in each case, to be willing, as they reasonably might, with boldness to risk a battle. So when, after waiting some time and no attack being made on either side, the Athenians first returned to Nisæa, and then the Peloponnesians to the point they had set out from; under these circumstances the friends of the Megarean exiles with greater confidence threw open the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states (considering that he had proved his superior strength, and that the Athenians had no longer been willing to fight), and having received them, proceeded to confer with them, while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were now confounded.

74. Afterward, when Brasidas had dismissed the allies to their several cities, he himself went back to Corinth, and prepared for his expedition to Thrace, which was the original destination. When the Athenians also had returned home, such of the Megareans in the city as had been most implicated in the negotiations with them, knowing that they had been marked, immediately stole away; while the rest, having conferred with the friends of the exiles, restored the party at Pegæ, after binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past, and to advise what was best for the city. When, however, they had been put in office, and held a review of the heavy-armed troops, having separated the battalions, they selected a hundred of their enemies, and of those who appeared to have joined most decidedly in the negotiations with the Athenians; and having compelled the commons to pass an open sentence upon them, on their being condemned, they put them to death; and established a thorough oligarchy in the city. And this change of government lasted a very long time, though effected by a very few men through the triumph of a faction.

75. The same summer, when Antandrus was going to be strengthened by the Mytilenæans, as they were planning [when we last mentioned them], Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the ships sent to levy contributions, being about the Hellespont (for Lamachus, their third colleague, had sailed with ten ships into the Pontus), became aware of the provisions made for the place, and thinking there was danger of its becoming what Ancea was to Samos—where the Samian exiles had established themselves, and both assisted the Peloponnesians by sending pilates to their squadrons, and threw the Samians in the city into confusion, and received those who deserted them—on these grounds they collected a force from the allies and set sail, and having defeated in a battle those who came out from Antandrus against them, retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, having anchored in the river Calix, in the territory of Heraclea, lost his ships in consequence of a rain in the interior,<sup>1</sup> and the flood coming suddenly down upon them. He himself and his troops went by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who are situated across the strait in

<sup>1</sup> Poppo explains *ανωθεν* by "cœlitus." See Arnold's note.

Asia, to Chalcedon, the Megarean colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

76. The same summer Demosthenes, the Athenian general, went to Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid. For communications respecting the affairs of Bœotia were being carried on with Hippocrates and him by certain men in the cities, who wished to change the constitution, and to bring them under a democracy like that of Athens; it being especially under the direction of Ptœodorus, an exile from Thebes, that these preparations were made by them. A party was to betray to them Siphæ, a sea-port town in the Thespian territory, on the Crisæan Bay; while Chæronea, which was dependent on what was formerly called the Minyan, but now the Bœotian Orchomenus, was to be delivered up by another party in that city; the exiles from it also co-operating most warmly, and raising mercenary troops from the Peloponnese. Chæronea is the frontier town too of Bœotia, near to Phanotis in Phocis, and a party of Phocians joined in the design. On the other hand, the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, looking toward Eubœa; and these measures were to be simultaneously executed on the same day; that the Bœotians might not oppose them in a body at Delium, but have to attend to their own respective neighborhoods that were being revolutionized. And should the attempt succeed, and Delium be fortified, they confidently hoped that even if no change in their constitution were immediately made by the Bœotians, yet when these posts were occupied by Athenian garrisons, and the land was being plundered, and the several parties had a rallying place close at hand, that things would not remain in their present position, but that, in the course of time, when the Athenians supported the disaffected, and the power of the oligarchs was disunited, they would settle them to their own advantage. Such then was the design in preparation.

77. Now Hippocrates himself, with a force raised at home, was ready, when the time came, to take the field against the Bœotians; but Demosthenes he sent on before, with the forty ships mentioned, to Naupactus; that after raising in those quarters an army of Acarnanians and the other allies, he might sail to Siphæ, in expectation of its being betrayed to him: and the day had been fixed between them on which

they were simultaneously to carry out these plans. Accordingly, Demosthenes went to Naupactus, and finding Æniadæ compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and having himself raised all the allies on that side, and marched first against Salynthius and the Agræans, and reduced them to subjection, he proceeded to make his other preparations for going at the proper time to Siphæ.

78. About the same part of the summer, when Brasidas, being on his march with one thousand seven hundred heavy-armed to the Thrace ward countries, had come to Heraclea in Trachinia; and when, on his sending before him a messenger to his partisans in Pharsalus, and requesting them to conduct himself and his army through the country, there came to Melitia, in Achaia, Panærus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was *proxenus* to the Chalcidians; upon that he proceeded on his march, being conducted both by other Thessalians and especially by Niconidas of Larissa, who was a friend of Perdiccas. For on other grounds it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and with an armed force, especially, to pass through a neighbor's country without having obtained his consent, was regarded with suspicion by all the Greeks alike. Besides, the great mass of the Thessalians had always been on friendly terms with Athens: so that, had not Thessaly, by the constitution of their country, been under the dominion of a few individuals, rather than in the enjoyment of civil equality, he would never have made his way; since even as it was, another party, of contrary views to those who have been named, met him on his march on the river Enipeus, and tried to stop him, telling him that he did wrong in advancing without the national consent. But his conductors said that they would not escort him against their will, and that they were only attending him as friends, on his unexpectedly coming to them. Brasidas himself also told them that he came as a friend both to the country of the Thessalians and to themselves, and was bringing his forces against the Athenians, who were at war with his country, and not against them; nor did he know of any enmity existing between the Thessalians and the Lacedæmonians, to prevent their having access to each other's territory: and now he would not advance against their will (for neither indeed could he); but yet he claimed not to be obstructed.



After hearing this, they went away; and he, without halting at all, pushed on at a rapid pace, according to the advice of his conductors, before a greater force might be collected to stop him. And so on the day of his setting out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; thence to Phacium, and thence to Peræbia. At that point his Thessalian escort returned; but the Peræbians, who were subject to the Thessalians, brought him to Dium, in the dominions of Perdiccas, a town of Macedonia lying under Mount Olympus, on the side of Thessaly.

79. In this way Brasidas stole a rapid march through Thessaly, before any one was prepared to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. For what brought the army up out of the Peloponnese, while the affairs of Athens were so prosperous, was the fear of the Thrace-ward cities which had revolted from the Athenians, and that of Perdiccas: the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the first place march against them (and moreover, the cities near to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation), and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being afraid, on his part also, because of his old quarrels with the Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to subjection Arrhibæus, the king of the Lyncestians.

80. And what contributed to their getting the army out of the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of the Lacedæmonians at that time. For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and especially upon *their* territory, they hoped to divert them from it most effectually, if they annoyed them in return by sending an army to their allies; especially as they were ready to maintain it, and were calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting. Besides, they were glad to have a pretext for sending away some of the Helots; lest in the present state of affairs, when Pylus was occupied by an enemy, they might attempt some revolution. Indeed through fear of their youth and great numbers, they even perpetrated the following deed (for at all times most of the Lacedæmonian institutions were framed particularly with a view to the Helots, to guard against them): They made proclamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done the state most service against the enemy should be picked out, professing that they would give them their liberty; thus ap-

plying a test to them, and thinking that those who severally claimed to be first made free, would also, through their high spirit, be most ready to attack them. Having thus selected as many as two thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their freedom; but the Spartans soon after did away with them, and no one ever knew by what means they were severally dispatched. And on this occasion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of them with Brasidas as heavy-armed troops: the rest of his army he induced by pay to follow him from the Peloponnese. As for Brasidas himself, it was chiefly at his own desire that the Lacedæmonians sent him out.

81. But the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to be active in every thing, and after he had gone from home, proved himself most valuable to the Lacedæmonians. For at that present time, by showing himself just and moderate toward the cities, he caused their revolt in most instances; while other places he took through their being betrayed to him; so that the Lacedæmonians, if they might wish to conclude peace (as they did), had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the war in the Peloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after what had happened in Sicily, it was the probity and tact of Brasidas at this time, experienced by some and heard of by others, that most raised among the allies of Athens a strong inclination toward the Lacedæmonians. For by going out first, and showing himself to be in all respects a worthy man, he left among them an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

82. On his arrival then at this time in the countries Thraceward, the Athenians, when they heard it, declared war against Perdiccas, thinking that he was the cause of his march thither; and kept a closer watch over their allies in that quarter.

83. Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, and led them with his own forces against Arrhibæus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whose territory bordered on his own; for he had a quarrel with him, and wished to reduce him to subjection. But when he had come with his army, accompanied by Brasidas, to the pass into Lynceus, Brasidas told him that he wished to go, before

hostilities were commenced, and by means of words bring Arrhibæus into alliance with the Lacedæmonians, if he could. Indeed Arrhibæus sent a herald to make some advances, being willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as an arbitrator between them: and the Chalcidian envoys who were with him, advised him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, that they might be able to command his more hearty assistance in their own affairs also. Besides, the envoys from Perdiccas had made at Lacedæmon a declaration to this effect, that he would bring many places around him into alliance with them; so that Brasidas, on the strength of this thought himself entitled to arrange the affairs of Arrhibæus in common<sup>1</sup> with Perdiccas, rather than leave them to him alone. But Perdiccas said that he had not taken Brasidas as an arbitrator in their disputes, but rather to destroy the enemies he should point out to him; and, that he would act unjustly, if, while he supported half his army, he should hold a conference with Arrhibæus. But Brasidas, against the king's will, and after a quarrel with him, had a meeting with Arrhibæus, and, being persuaded by his arguments, drew off the army before they entered his country. And Perdiccas after this supplied but a third, instead of a half, toward the support of the army, considering himself to be aggrieved.

84. The same summer, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chalcidians, immediately made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Adrians, a little before the vintage. The people there were divided into parties among themselves on the subject of receiving him, those who with the Chalcidians joined in inviting him, and the commons [who were opposed to it]. Nevertheless, through fear for their fruit, which was still out, when the commons were urged by Brasidas to admit him alone, and to decide after hearing him, they admitted him. And coming forward to speak to the people (being, for a Lacedæmonian, not deficient in eloquence), he addressed them as follows:

85. "The sending out, Acanthians, of myself and my army by the Lacedæmonians, has been executed to verify the reason we alleged for hostilities at the commencement of them, viz.,

<sup>1</sup> Or, κοινῇ μάλλον may signify "on more public grounds," i. e., on the strength of what Perdiccas had held out at Sparta as a national advantage that would result from their sending troops to co-operate with him. Poppo and Bloomfield think it signifies "more impartially."

that to liberate Greece we should go to war with the Athenians. And if we have been long in coming to you, through being disappointed in our expectation regarding the war in those parts, according to which we hoped quickly by ourselves, and without any risk on your part, to overthrow the Athenians, let no one find fault with us; for now, when we had an opportunity, we are come, and will endeavor, in concert with you, to subdue them. But I am astonished at my being shut out of your gates, and that my arrival should be unwelcome to any of you. For we Lacodæmonians, as thinking that we should come to men who in feeling, at any rate, were on our side, even before we actually joined them, and that we should be welcome to you, ran the great risk of making a march of many days through the country of strangers, and evinced<sup>1</sup> all possible zeal: and now, if you have aught else in mind, or if you should stand in the way of your own liberty, and that of the rest of the Greeks, it would be a hard case. For it is not merely that you oppose me yourselves, but of those also to whom I may apply, each will be less disposed to come over to me, raising a difficulty on the ground that you, to whom I first came, and who are seen in the possession of a considerable city, and are considered to be prudent men, did not admit me. And I shall not be able to prove the credibility of the reason [alleged by us for the war], but shall be charged with either bringing to them a liberty which has an unjust end in view, or of having come too weak and powerless to assist them against the Athenians, in case of their attacking them. And yet when I went with the army I now have to the relief of Nisæa, the Athenians though more numerous, were unwilling to engage with me: so that it is not likely, that coming with forces conveyed by sea,<sup>2</sup> they will send against you an army equal in numbers to that at Nisæa. With regard to myself, too, I have come to you, not for the injury, but for the liberation of the Greeks—having bound the Lacodæmonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that such as I

<sup>1</sup> If the *τε* after *κίνδυνον* is to be retained, I think Haack's explanation of the passage the only one that can give it its true force, viz., that *παρασχόμενοι* is carelessly introduced instead of *παρεσχόμεθα*. If Poppo's objection to this be considered valid, I should then agree with him in omitting *τε*.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed Poppo in understanding *σπαρῶ* after *νηϊῇ*, so that there is no reason for striking out the words *τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ*.

win over shall assuredly be independent confederates—nor, again, that we may have allies whom we have got by violence or deceit, but, on the contrary, prepared to act as allies to you, who are enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, neither to be suspected myself, since I have given the strongest pledges for my honesty, nor to be considered a powerless avenger; and I call upon you to come over to me with confidence.

86. "And if any one be backward to do so, from being personally afraid of some individual or other, lest I should put the city into the hands of a particular party, let him above all others feel confidence. For I am not come to be a partisan; nor am I minded to bring you a doubtful liberty, as I should do, if, disregarding your hereditary constitution, I should enslave the many to the few, or the few to the many. For that would be more grievous than foreign dominion; and toward us Lacedæmonians no obligation would be felt for our exertions, but instead of honor and glory, accusation rather. And those charges with which we are throwing down the Athenians, we should ourselves seem to incur in a more odious degree than a party which has shown no pretensions to honesty. For to gain advantage by specious trickery is more disgraceful, at any rate for men in high station than to do it by open violence: since the one is a case of aggression on the plea of might, which fortune has given; the other, by the insidiousness of a dishonest policy. So great care<sup>1</sup> do we take for things which most deeply interest us; and in addition to oaths, you could not receive a greater assurance than in the case of men whose actions, when viewed in the light of their words, convey a necessary conviction that it is even expedient for them to do as they have said.

87. "But if, when I advance these arguments, you say that you have not the power to comply with them, and yet claim, on the strength of your kind wishes, to incur no harm by refusing; and allege that freedom does not appear to you unaccompanied with danger, and that it is right to offer it to those who have the power to accept it, but to force it on no one against his will: in that case I will take the gods and heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your

<sup>1</sup> "Οὕτω πολλὰν περιωπὴν, κ. τ. λ.] These words should be closely connected with the following clause, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω—ὥς εἶπον, and the chapter should end at εἶπον, instead of at ποιοῦμεθα."—Arnold.

benefit, I can not prevail upon you to accept it; and will endeavor to compel you by ravaging your country. Nor shall I then think that I am doing wrong, but that reason is on my side, on the ground of two compulsory considerations; with regard to the Lacedæmonians, that they may not, with all your kind feelings toward them, be injured, in case of your not being won over to them, by means of the money paid by you to the Athenians; and with regard to the Greeks, that they may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For, otherwise, certainly we should have no right to act thus; nor are we Lacedæmonians bound to liberate those who do not wish it, except on the plea of some general good. Nor is it dominion that we aim at; but rather being anxious, as we are, to stop others from acquiring it, we should wrong the majority, if, when bringing independence to all, we should permit you to stand in the way of it. Wherefore advise well, and strive to be the first to give liberty to the Greeks, and lay up for yourselves everlasting glory; and both to avoid suffering in your private capacities, and to confer on your whole city the most honorable title."

88. To this effect spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much previous speaking on both sides of the question, gave their votes upon it in secret; and because Brasidas had urged alluring arguments, and at the same time through fear for their fruit, the majority determined to revolt from the Athenians; and after pledging him to the oaths which the Lacedæmonian authorities swore before they sent him out, that such as he won over should assuredly be independent allies, in this way they admitted the army. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, also joined them in the revolt. Such then were the events of this summer.

89. At the very commencement of the following winter, when the towns in Bœotia were to be delivered up to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, and Demosthenes was to repair with his ships to Siphæ, Hippocrates to Delium; a mistake having been made in the days on which they were both to take the field, Demosthenes sailed first to Siphæ, with the Acarnanians and many allies from those parts on board, but did not succeed in his undertaking, through information of the design having been given by Nichomachus, a Phocian of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedæmonians, and they

the Bœotians. Accordingly, succors being brought by all the Bœotians (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to make<sup>1</sup> a diversion), Siphæ and Chæroneæ were secured by surprise; and when the conspirators were aware of the mistake, they attempted no movement in the cities.

90. But Hippocrates having drawn out the whole population of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and all the foreigners then in the city, afterward arrived at Delium, when the Bœotians had now returned from Siphæ; and having encamped his army, proceeded to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner. They dug a trench all round the sacred precinct and the fane, and from the ground thus excavated threw up the earth in a mound, as a substitute for a wall; and fixing stakes on it, cut down the vines that were round the sanctuary and threw them in, taking down also at the same time stones and brick-work from the neighboring houses; and so they ran up the work in every way. They also erected wooden towers where there was occasion for them, and where there was not already any building belonging to the temple: for [on one side] the gallery that once existed had fallen down. Having begun the work on the third day after setting out from home, they continued it that day, the fourth, and till dinner-time of the fifth. Then, as the main part of it was finished, the army went forward from Delium about ten stades on its way home; whence most of the light-armed proceeded straight on, but the heavy-armed halted, and remained stationary; while Hippocrates was still staying behind, and arranging the guards, and how they should complete such parts of the out-works as remained to be finished.

91. Now during the days thus employed, the Bœotians were mustering at Tanagra; and when they were come from all the cities, and found the Athenians on their progress homeward, the rest of the Bœotarchs (who were eleven in number), not consenting to an engagement, since the Athenians were no longer in Bœotia (for they were just within the borders of the Oropian territory when they halted), Pagondas son of Æoladas, being Bœotarch of Thebes together with Arian-

<sup>1</sup> This is, I think, the true force of *παρελύπει* in this passage; and it has a somewhat similar one, Xen. Anab. II. 5. 29, *ἐβούλετο δὲ καὶ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἔχειν τὴν γυνήν, καὶ τοὺς παραλυποῦντας ἐκποδῶν εἶναι.*

thidas son of Lysimachidas, and having the command at the time, wished to fight the battle, and thought it best to run the risk; and so, calling the men to him separately, in their different battalions, that they might not all at once leave the arms that were piled, he tried to persuade the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and bring on the contest, by speaking to this effect:

92. "Men of Boeotia, it should not have even entered the thoughts of any of us your commanders, that it would not be right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no longer in Boeotia. For it is Boeotia that they intend to ravage, after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress in it: and so they are surely our enemies, wherever they may be found, and from whatever country they may have come to act as enemies would. But now, if any one has thought this the safer course, let him change his mind on the question. For prudence, in the case of men attacked by others, does not admit of such nice calculation as in the case of those who are enjoying their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting more. The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force that has invaded you, whether in your own or in your neighbor's territory. But against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is far more necessary than against any others. For, with respect to their neighbors, equality in the case of all men constitutes liberty; and against these men, most especially, who endeavor to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but of those also who are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to struggle to the very utmost? (for in the Eubœans across the strait, and in the greater part of the rest of Greece, we have an example of the position in which they stand toward them);<sup>1</sup> and to be convinced, that with others their neighbors fight about the boundaries of their land, but that in our case there will be fixed for the whole of it, if we are conquered, one boundary, not to be controverted; for they will invade it and take by force whatever we have. So much more dangerous neighbors have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with such as through confidence in their power attack those who are near them, as the Athenians are now doing, to march more

<sup>1</sup> For διακείμαι used in a similar manner, comp. Xen. Anab. II. 5. 27, ὁ γὰρ ἦν πάνν φιλικῶς οἰόμενος διακείσθαι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει. "That he was on a very friendly footing with him."



fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend themselves in their own territory; but to be less ready to grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have had a proof of this in the case of these very men; for by conquering them at Coronæa, when they got possession of our country through our own divisions, we won great security for Bœotia, which has lasted up to the present time. Remembering which, we ought, the older part of us, to come up to our former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers who then behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qualities that by birth belong to them; but to trust that the gods will be on our side, whose sanctuary they have lawlessly fortified, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after sacrificing, appear favorable to us; and so to meet these men in battle, and show them that what they want they must go and get by attacking such as will not resist them; but that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a struggle."

93. By thus exhorting the Bœotians, Pagondas persuaded them to go against the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp, led the army forward (for it was now late in the day). On approaching near to their forces, he placed his troops in a position where, in consequence of a hill intervening, the armies did not see each other; and there he drew them up, and made his arrangements for battle. When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received tidings of the advance of the Bœotians, he sent his troops, with orders to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them soon after, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, both to defend it if any one came against it, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Bœotians during the engagement. Against these the Bœotians posted a division to resist their charge; and when all was well arranged by them, they appeared over the hill, and halted in the order they intended to fight in, to the number of about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was held by the Thebans and those of the same division of Bœotia; the center by the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans,

and the other people round the lake; the left by the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The cavalry and light-armed were posted on each flank. The Thebans formed their line five-and-twenty deep; the rest, as might happen. These then were the forces and the dispositions of the Bœotians.

94. On the side of the Athenians, the heavy-armed formed their whole line eight deep, being equal in numbers to their adversaries, with the cavalry on each flank. As for light-armed regularly equipped, there was neither any present on that occasion, nor had the state ever raised any. Such as had joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those on the other side, had, for the most part, followed unarmed; inasmuch as there was a levy "en masse" of foreigners who were present, as well as of citizens; and on their first setting out for home, they did not, with a few exceptions, keep to their standards. When the armies were formed in line, and now on the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them, by speaking as follows:

95. "Athenians, my advice is given you in a few words, but it is equally availing to brave men, and is intended to remind, rather than exhort you. Let the thought then be entertained by none of you, that we are improperly running this hazard in another people's territory. For though in these men's territory, the struggle will be for the good of our own; and if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country, when deprived of the Bœotian horse; but in one battle you will both gain possession of this land, and confirm the liberty of that. Advance to meet them, then, in a manner worthy of the state in which each of you boasts that he has the first country in Greece; and of your fathers, who, by defeating these men in battle at Ænophyta, under Myronides, once got possession of Bœotia."

96. While Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men, and when he had reached the center of the line, but had not had time to go further, the Bœotians, having also been exhorted in few words by Pagondas, on that occasion as well as the former, raised their psœan, and advanced against them from the hill. The Athenians, on their side, also advanced to meet them, and closed with them at a run. The extremity of neither line

came into action; but both were in the same case, for water-courses were in their way: but the rest met in an obstinate engagement, shield to shield. And the Boeotian left, and as far as the center, was beaten by the Athenians, who pressed hard both the others posted there, and especially the Thespians. For the troops next to them in the line having given way, and the Thespians being thus surrounded in a narrow space, those of them who were killed were cut down while defending themselves hand to hand: and some of the Athenians also, being thrown into confusion through surrounding the enemy, failed to recognize their own men, and so killed each other. This part then of the Boeotian line was beaten, and retreated on that which was still fighting; but their right, where the Thebans were posted, had the advantage over the Athenians, and drove them back, and pursued them, though but gradually at first. It happened also, that Pagondas having secretly sent two squadrons of horse round the hill when his left was distressed, and these suddenly making their appearance, the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming against them, was seized with a panic; and so now on both parts of the field, owing to this supposition, and to the Thebans' pursuing them and breaking their line, the whole Athenian army took to flight. Some hurried to Delium and the sea-coast, others toward Oropus, others to Mount Parnes, and others as they severally had hope of saving themselves. The Boeotians, in the mean time, were pursuing them close, and putting them to the sword, especially the cavalry, both their own and the Locrian, which came to their succor just as the rout took place: but the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they would else have done, in consequence of night coming on before the business was over. The next day, the troops at Oropus and those at Delium, having left a garrison in it (for they still continued to hold it notwithstanding), returned home by sea.

97. The Boeotians, after erecting a trophy, taking up their own dead, stripping those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them, retired to Tanagra, and formed plans for assaulting Delium. Meanwhile, a herald from the Athenians, coming to ask back the dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, and told him that he would gain nothing before he himself had come back again. Then he went to the Athenians, and de-

livered the message of the Bœotians, viz., "that they had not acted right in violating the laws of the Greeks. For it was a principle acknowledged by all, that in an invasion of each other's territory, they should abstain from injuring the temples that were in it. But the Athenians had fortified Delium, and were living in it, every thing that men do in profane ground being done there; and they drew and used for ordinary purposes the water which was never touched by themselves, except to use in the laver of purification. In the god's behalf, therefore, as well as their own, the Bœotians appealed to the associated deities and to Apollo, and charged them to retire from the sanctuary, and then take back the dead which belonged to them."<sup>1</sup>

98. The herald having spoken to this effect, the Athenians sent their own herald to the Bœotians, and said, that as for the sanctuary, they had neither done it any injury, nor would they in future voluntarily damage it; for neither had they originally entered it for that purpose, but to avenge themselves from it on those who were rather injuring them. Now the law of the Greeks was, that whoever in any case had command of the country, whether more or less extensive, to them the temples always belonged, provided they received such honors as the occupiers had the power to pay, without limiting them to what were usual.<sup>2</sup> For the Bœotians, and most others who had expelled any people from their country and taken forcible possession of it, had proceeded against temples which originally belonged to others, and now held them as their own. And if the Athenians had been able to make themselves masters of the Bœotian territory to a greater extent, such would have been the case: but as it was, from the part in which they then were they would not, if they could help it, retire; as they considered that it belonged to them. The water they had disturbed under the pressure of necessity, which they had not wantonly brought on themselves; but they were compelled to use it while defending themselves against the Bœotians, who had first come against their country. And every thing, it was

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Hobbes and Bloomfield take it, "to carry away their property with them." But I think that there is a reference to this paragraph in the 7th and 8th of the next chapter; and in that case it can only bear the meaning which I have given to it.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "in addition to what were usual."

natural to suppose, done under pressure of war, or any other danger, would be considered as pardonable even in the eyes of the god. For the altars were a place of refuge in unintentional offenses; and transgression was a term applied to those who were wicked through no compulsion, and not to those who had ventured to do any thing in consequence of their misfortune. Nay, the Bœotians were much more impious in wishing to give back dead bodies in return for sanctuaries, than they were who would not at the price of sanctuaries recover things not suitable [for such bartering]. They begged, then, that they would simply tell them to take up their dead, not "after evacuating the territory of the Bœotians"—for they were no longer in their territory, but in one which they had won with their arms—but, "on making a truce according to the custom of their fathers."

99. The Bœotians replied, that "if they were in Bœotia, they might take up their dead after evacuating *their* country; but if in Athenian territory, then they knew themselves what to do:"<sup>1</sup> considering that the Oropian territory, in which the bodies happened to be lying (for the battle was fought on the borders), was indeed subject to Athens, and yet that the Athenians could not get possession of them without *their* consent. Nor, again, were they disposed, they said; to grant any truce for a country belonging to Athens; but they thought it was a fair answer to give, that "when they had evacuated the Bœotian territory, they might then recover what they asked." So the herald of the Athenians, after hearing their answer, returned without effecting his object.

100. The Bœotians immediately sent for dartmen and slingers from the Malian gulf, and having been reinforced since the battle by two thousand Corinthian heavy-armed, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, and some Megareans with them, they marched against Delium and assaulted the fortress, both attempting it in other ways, and bringing against it an engine of the following description, which was the means of taking it. Having sawn a great beam

<sup>1</sup> i. e., they might take them away when they pleased. But, as Arnold remarks, "The Bœotians knew all the time that this was merely vexatious; for the Athenians would not bury their dead without their leave, whether the ground which they occupied belonged to Attica or to Bœotia."

in two, they hollowed out the whole of it, and fitted it nicely together again, like a pipe, and hung by chains at the end of it a caldron, into which was placed an iron bellows-pipe, inclining from the beam, the timber also being for a considerable distance covered with iron. This they brought up from a distance on carts to that part of the wall where it had been chiefly built of the vines and timber; and when it was near, they applied great bellows to the end of the beam next themselves, and blew them. The blast passing closely confined into the caldron, which held lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch, produced a great flame, and set fire to a part of the wall; so that no one could any longer stand upon it, but they left it and took to flight; and in this way the fortress was taken. Of the garrison some were killed, and two hundred taken: of the rest the greater part got on board their ships, and returned home.

101. Delium having thus been taken on the fifteenth day after the battle, and the Athenian herald, without knowing any thing that had happened, having soon after come again respecting the bodies, the Bœotians restored them, and no longer made the same answer as before. There fell in the engagement of the Bœotians, not quite five hundred; of the Athenians, not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed and camp-followers a great number.

A short time after this battle, Demosthenes, having had no success with regard to Siphæ being betrayed to him, when he sailed thither at that time, and having still on board his ships the Acarnanian and Agræan forces, with four hundred Athenian heavy-armed, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon. But before all his ships reached the shore, the Sicyonians came against them, and routed those that had landed, and drove them back to their vessels, killing some, and taking others prisoners. Having erected a trophy, they restored the dead under truce. It was also about the same time as the affair at Delium, that Sitalces, king of the Odrysæ, died, after making an expedition against the Triballi, and being defeated in battle; and Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded to the kingdom of the Odrysæ, and the other parts of Thrace, over which Sitalces had reigned.

102. The same winter Brasidas with his allies Thraceward marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. On the site on which the town now stands

a settlement was before attempted by Aristagoras the Milesian, when flying from king Darius; but he was driven away by the Edonians: and then by the Athenians, two-and-thirty years later, who sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else would go; who were cut off by the Thracians at Drabescus. Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians went again, Hagnon son of Nicias being sent out as leader of the colony, and expelled the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot which before was called "Nine-ways." They set out for the purpose from Eion, which they occupied themselves at the mouth of the river, on the coast, at a distance of five-and-twenty stades from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis,<sup>1</sup> because, as the river Strymon flows round it on both sides, with a view to inclosing it,<sup>2</sup> he ran a long wall across from river to river, and built the town so as to be conspicuous both toward the sea and toward the land.

103. Against this town then Brasidas marched with his forces, starting from Arnæ in Chalcidice. Having arrived about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe empties itself into the sea, and there supped, he proceeded during the night. The weather was stormy, and it was snowing a little; on which account he hurried on the more, wishing to surprise the people of Amphipolis, except those who were to betray it. For there were residing in it some Argilians (this people are a colony from Andros), and some others, who were carrying on this intrigue together; some at the suggestion of Perdiccas, others at that of the Chalcidians. But most active of all were the Argilians, who lived close by, and had always been suspected by the Athenians of forming designs upon the place. For when the opportunity now presented itself, and Brasidas had come; as they had for sometime past been intriguing with their countrymen who resided there with a view to its being delivered up to him, so at that time they received him into their own town, and revolted from Athens, and took him forward that same night to the bridge over the

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, "a city looking both ways." For a description of it, see the memoir at the end of Arnold's 2d volume.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed Arnold in supposing that *διὰ* in this passage expresses final, rather than efficient cause, as it often does with an infinitive mood; at least I infer that such was his view of it, from the passages which he compares with it, *δι' ἀχθηδύνα*, ch. 40. 2, and V. 53, *διὰ τὴν ἐσπράξιν*.

river. The town stands further off than the passage of the river, and the walls did not reach down to it as they do now, but there was only a small guard posted there; which Brasidas easily drove in (partly from there being treason among them, and partly from the stormy weather and the suddenness of his attack), and then crossed the bridge, and was at once master of all the property outside the town belonging to the Amphipolitans, who had houses over the whole quarter.

104. His passage having thus taken by surprise those who were in the city, while of those who were outside many were made prisoners, and others took refuge within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspected by each other. Indeed it is said that if Brasidas would not have set his troops to plunder, but marched straightway to the town, he would probably have taken it. But as it was after establishing his army there, he overran the property outside; and when he found no result produced by those within, as he expected, he remained quiet. In the mean time, the party opposed to the traitors, prevailing by their numbers to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, sent with Eucles the general, who had come to them from Athens to defend the place, to the other commander Thraceward, Thucydides son of Olorus, the historian of this war, who was at Thasos (this island is a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requesting him to come to their relief. On hearing the news, he set sail with the greatest speed, with seven ships which happened to be there; wishing, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time, before any surrender was made, or, at any rate, to reach Eion.

105. In the mean time Brasidas, being afraid of the naval succor from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in those parts of Thrace, and by this means had influence among the chief persons on the mainland, made haste to get possession of the town beforehand, if possible; lest, if he came, the populace of Amphipolis, hoping that he would raise a confederate force from the sea and from Thrace, and so save them, should not then surrender to him. Accordingly he was willing to come to moderate terms with them, and made this proclamation; that of the Amphipolitans and Athenians in the town whoever would



might remain in possession of his property, sharing in a fair and equal government; and whoever would not, might depart and take out his property with him, within five days.

106. The mass of the people, on hearing this, rather changed their minds; especially as only a small number of Athenians were citizens of the place, the majority being a mixed multitude. There were also within the walls many relations of those who had been taken without; and they considered the proclamation to be reasonable, when measured by the standard of their fear. The Athenians took this view of it, because they were glad to go out, thinking that the danger was greater for them than the rest, and, besides, not expecting any speedy relief; the rest of the multitude, because they were not to be deprived of their franchise, on an equal footing, and were released from peril beyond their expectation. When therefore the partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated these proposals, on seeing that the populace had changed their minds, and no longer listened to the Athenian commander, who was present; the surrender was made, and they admitted him on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they delivered up the city; and Thucydides and his ships landed at Eion late on the same day. Brasidas had just taken possession of Amphipolis, and was within a night of taking Eion; for if the ships had not quickly come to his aid, in the morning it would have been in his hands.

107. After this, Thucydides arranged matters in Eion, so that it might be safe, both for the present time, if Brasidas should attack it, and in future; receiving into it those who had chosen to come there from up the country, according to the terms of the treaty. And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion, with a great number of boats, on the chance of taking the point of land which runs out from the wall, and so commanding the entrance into the place; and he attempted it by land at the same time; but was beaten off in both instances: at Amphipolis, however, he was putting every thing in readiness. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis, and Brauro his own wife: and not long after, Galepsus and CEsyme, colonies of the Thasians, did the same. Perdiccas also came immediately after the capture of Amphipolis, and took part in these arrangements.

108. When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, the Athenians were reduced to great fear, especially because the town was of service to them by supplying timber for ship building, and in point of payment of revenue; and because, though as far as the Strymon the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to them for reaching the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no further; as on the inland side a large lake, formed by the river, spread for a great distance, while in the neighborhood of Eion they were watched by cruisers: but now the passage was considered to have been rendered easy. They were also afraid that their allies would revolt. For Brasidas both showed himself moderate in other respects, and in his speeches every where declared that he was sent out to give freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, and what advantages it enjoyed,<sup>1</sup> and the gentleness of Brasidas, were most strongly encouraged to make innovations, and sent secret messages to him, desiring him to come to them, and each wishing to be the first to revolt. For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as that power afterward showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they wish; but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Bœotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nisæa with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them. Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedæmonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while

<sup>1</sup> *παρέχεται* has generally been supposed to refer to Brasidas; but the introduction of *ἐκείνου* before *πραότητα* in the next clause induces me to think that Amphipolis is its subject; and the sense of enjoying is one which it often bears. See 85. 4, *πόλιν ἀξιοδρεων παρεχομένους*.

Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedæmon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians did not comply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by the principal men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover the men taken in the island, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

109. The same winter the Megareans took and razed to their foundations the long walls in their country which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the territory called Acte. This territory runs out from the king's dike on the inner side of the isthmus, Athos, a high mountain which stands in it, being its boundary on the side of the *Ægean Sea*. Of the town it contains, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians close to the dike, facing the sea toward Eubœa; the others are Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium. These are inhabited by mixed races of men speaking two different languages, a small portion of them being Chalcidians, but the main part Pelasgians—a tribe of those Tyrrhenians who once settled in Lemnos and Athens—Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; and they lived in small towns. The greater part of them surrendered to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out against him; and, accordingly, he staid with his army in their territory, and laid it waste.

110. When they did not listen to his proposals, he marched straightway against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians, being invited by a few persons who were prepared to deliver up the town to him. Having arrived while it was yet night, and just about day-break, he sat down with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, distant from the town about three stades. Now by the rest of the town of the Toronæans, and by the Athenians who were in garrison in it, he was not observed; but his partisans, knowing that he would come, and some few of them having privately visited him, were watching for his arrival. And when they found that he was come, they took in to them seven light-armed men with daggers; (for such only was the number, out of twenty who were at first appointed to the work, that were not afraid to enter, their commander being Lysistratus, an Olynthian.) These having passed through the sea-ward wall, and escaped observation, went up

and put to the sword the garrison in the highest guard-house (for the town stands on a hill), and broke open the postern towards Canastræum.

111. Brasidas, meanwhile, after advancing a short distance, remained quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward a hundred targeteers, that when any gates were opened, and the signal raised which had been agreed on, they might be the first to rush in. These, having waited some time, and wondering at the delay, had come by degrees near the town; while those of the Toronæans within, who were preparing matters with the party that had entered, after the postern had been broken open by them, and the gates leading to the market-place opened by cutting through the bar, in the first place brought a party round to the postern and introduced them, that in their rear, and on both sides of them, they might suddenly strike terror into the townsmen, knowing nothing of what was going on. Next they raised the fire-signal as had been appointed; and then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates leading to the market-place.

112. And now Brasidas, on seeing the appointed signal, ordered his troops to rise, after giving a shout all together, and causing much consternation to those in the town, and ran at full speed. Some immediately burst in through the gates, others over some square timbers that happened to be lying by the wall, which had fallen and was being rebuilt, for the purpose of drawing up stones. Brasidas, therefore, and the greatest part of the troops turned immediately up to the highest parts of the town, wishing to take it from top to bottom, and securely; the rest of the multitude spread in all directions alike.

113. While the capture of Torone was being effected, the mass of the people, knowing nothing of the matter, was confounded; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with the proceedings, straightway joined those who had entered the town. When the Athenians (for there happened to be about fifty heavy-armed sleeping in the market-place) were aware of it, some few of them were killed in close combat; of the rest, some fled by land, others to their ships (for there were two keeping guard there), and escaped to Lecythus, the fort which they held themselves, having occupied a corner of the town running out into the sea, and cut off by its position on a narrow

isthmus. As many of the Toronæans also as were on their side, took refuge with them.

114. When it was now day, and the town was safely in his possession, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronæans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever wished should come out to his own property, and live in the town in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, and told them to evacuate Lecythus under truce, with their property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. They refused to evacuate it, but begged him to grant them a truce for one day, that they might take up their dead. He granted it for two days; during which he himself fortified the neighboring houses, and the Athenians their positions. Having convened also an assembly of the Toronæans, he said nearly the same things as at Acanthus; "that it was not right for them to regard as bad men, or traitors, those who had negotiated with them for the capture of the city; (for they had not done so to bring it into slavery, nor because they had been bribed, but for the advantage and liberty of the town;) nor for those who had taken no part in it to suppose that they would not reap the same benefits; for he had not come to destroy either city or individual. For this reason he had made the proclamation to those who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, as he had none the worse opinion of them for their friendship to *them*: and he thought that when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, they would not be less kindly disposed toward them, but far more so, inasmuch as they were acting more justly: but as it was, through want of such a trial, they were afraid of them. And he desired them all to prepare for being stanch allies, and for having to answer in future for whatever they did amiss: but as regarded the past, it was not the Lacedæmonians that were injured, but themselves rather, by others who were too strong for them; and so allowance was to be made for any thing in which they had opposed him."

115. Having thus addressed and encouraged them, on the expiration of the truce, he made his assault upon Lecythus; while the Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall, and from some houses that had battlements. For one day they beat him off; but on the next, when an engine was going to be brought up against them by the enemy, from which they in-

tended to throw fire on the wooden defenses, and when the army was now advancing where they thought they should best bring up the engine, and where the place was most assailable; the defenders placed a wooden tower on the wall opposite to them, and carried up on to it many jars and casks of water, with large stones, and a large party of men ascended it. But the building, having had too great a weight put on it, suddenly broke down, and making a loud noise, vexed more than it terrified those of the Athenians who were near and saw it; but those who were at a distance, and most of all those who were at the greatest, thinking that the place was already taken in that quarter, hurried away, and fled to the sea and to their ships.

116. When Brasidas perceived that they were deserting the battlements, and saw what was going on, he rushed up with his army, and immediately took the fort, and put to the sword as many as he found in it. The Athenians in this way evacuated the place, and went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is in Lecythus a temple of Minerva; and Brasidas had proclaimed, when he was about to make the assault, that to the man who first scaled the wall he would give thirty minæ of silver. Thinking, therefore, that the capture had been effected by other means than human, he presented the thirty minæ to the goddess, for the use of her temple; and having razed and cleared Lecythus, he devoted the whole, as sacred ground. During the remainder of the winter, he was settling the affairs of the places in his possession, and forming designs against others; and at the expiration of the winter, the eighth year of this war ended.

117. At the commencement of the spring of the following summer, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians immediately concluded an armistice for a year; the Athenians considering that Brasidas would then no longer win any more of their towns to revolt, before they had made their preparations for securing them at their leisure; and at the same time, that if it were for their interest, they might conclude a general peace: while the Lacedæmonians thought that the Athenians feared what they really were afraid of; and that after having a suspension of their miseries and suffering, they would be more desirous, from their taste of it, to effect a reconciliation, and, restoring their men, to make a treaty for a longer time. For

they deemed it of greater importance to recover their men<sup>1</sup> at a time when Brasidas was still prosperous: and, [on the other hand,] if he reached a still greater measure of success, and put matters on an equality, they were likely to lose those men, and while defending themselves with their others, on equal terms, still to run a risk of not gaining the mastery. An armistice was therefore concluded by them and their allies on the following terms:

118. "With regard to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we agree that any one who wishes, may have access to it, without deceit, and without fear, according to the laws of our respective countries. The Lacedæmonians, and such of the allies as are present, agree to this, and declare that they will, to the best of their power, persuade the Bœotians and Phocians to do so, by sending heralds to them on the subject.

"With regard to the treasures of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to find out such as unjustly meddle with them, uprightly and honestly acting in accordance with the laws of our forefathers, both we, and you, and such of the rest as may consent to this article; all acting in accordance with the laws of our respective countries. On these points, then, the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies agree, according to the terms mentioned.

"On the following points the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies agree, in case the Athenians make a treaty to that effect; that we shall each remain in our own territory, keeping what we now have; the garrison in Coryphasium confining themselves within the Buphras and Tomeus; that in Cythera holding no intercourse with the allied states, neither we with you, nor you with us; and that in Nisæa and Minoa not crossing the road, which runs from the gates leading from the temple of Nisus to that of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune straight to the bridge at Minoa (the Megareans and the allies being also bound not to cross this road), and the Athenians retaining the island taken by them,

<sup>1</sup> I have followed Göller in referring *τοις δὲ* to the troops which Sparta would still retain, in opposition to *τοῖς μὲν*, the prisoners whose services she would have lost. Others refer it to the Athenians, while Arnold thinks it corrupt.

without any communication on either side; and lastly, with regard to Troezen, that each party shall retain what they now possess, and as was arranged with the Athenians.

"With regard to the navigation of the sea, that along their own coast and that of their confederacy, the Lacedæmonians may sail, not in a ship of war, but in any other vessel rowed by oars, and carrying not more than 500 talents tonnage.

"That any herald, ambassadors, and attendants, as many as they may choose, on their way to the Peloponnese or to Athens, for bringing the war to a conclusion, and adjusting all claims, shall have free passage, going and returning, both by land and by sea. That deserters shall not be received in the mean time, neither free nor bond, neither by you nor by us. Further, that we shall give judicial satisfaction, both you to us and we to you, according to the laws of our respective countries, deciding all disputes by law, without recourse to hostilities.

"The Lacedæmonians and allies agree to these articles: but if you think any thing else either better or more just, come to Lacedæmon and explain your views; for neither the Lacedæmonians nor the allies will object to any thing you may say with justice. But let those who come, come with full powers to treat, as you also desire us. The truce shall continue one year."

"The people [of Athens] ratified the truce. The tribe Acamantis had the prytany;<sup>1</sup> Phœnippus was secretary; Nicias was chairman. Laches moved, 'that they do conclude the armistice (and may they do it for the good fortune of Athens!) on the terms agreed to by the Lacedæmonians and the allies.' And they agreed in the assembly of the people, 'that the armistice be for a year, commencing this very day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion; that, during that time, ambassadors and heralds shall proceed to each other's country, and discuss on what terms the war shall be brought to a conclusion. That the generals and prytanes having summoned an assembly of the people, the Athenians shall, in the first place, consult on the peace, and on the manner in which the envoys for putting an end to the wars shall be admitted. That the envoys now present in the city shall immediately bind themselves in the presence of the people, that

<sup>1</sup> For a full explanation of these terms, see Schömann, *De Comitibus Atheniensium*, sec. 15.



they will assuredly abide by this truce for the space of a year."

119. To these articles the Lacedæmonians agreed (their allies also swearing to them), with the Athenians and their allies, on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. Those who agreed to the articles and ratified them by libations, were the following: Of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenæus son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxidaidas; of the Corinthians, Æneas son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates, and Onasimus son of Megacles; of the Megareans, Nicasus son of Cecalus, and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; of the Athenians, the following generals, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. This then was the armistice which was concluded; and during it they were throughout holding conferences for a more general treaty.

120. About the time at which they were thus going backward and forward to each other, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. Now these Scionæans say that they are Palleneans from the Peloponnese, and that their first founders, while on their voyage from Troy, were carried to this place by the storm which the Achæans experienced, and there took up their abode. On their revolting, Brasidas crossed over to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead of him, and himself following at some distance in a skiff; that in case of his falling in with any vessel larger than the skiff, the trireme might come to his aid; while if another trireme of equal force came against them, he thought that it would not turn upon the smaller vessel, but upon the ship, and in the mean time he should make his escape. Having thus crossed over, and convened an assembly of the Scionæans, he spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone: and told them, moreover, that they were most deserving of praise, inasmuch as, though Pallene within the isthmus was cut off from succors by land through the Athenians occupying Potidæa, and they were virtually nothing else but islanders, they had of their own accord joined the banner of liberty, and had not through cowardice waited for compulsion to be applied to them, in the case of what was

manifestly for their own advantage. That this was a proof that they would also endure like men any other even of the greatest perils, if [by their so doing] their affairs should be arranged to their satisfaction; in short, that he should consider them as truly the most faithful allies of the Lacedæmonians, and show them all other proofs of his respect.

121. The Scionæans were elated by his language, and all alike taking courage, even those who before were not pleased with the business, resolved to carry on the war with spirit; and both received Brasidas with other marks of honor, and publicly crowned him with a crown of gold, as the liberator of Greece; while individually they decked him with garlands, and thronged to him as to a victorious athlete. At that time, after leaving them some guards, he crossed over again, and not long after sent them over a larger force; as he wished, in conjunction with them, to make an attempt on Mende and Potidæa, thinking that the Athenians would come to their relief, as though it were an island, and desiring to be beforehand with them. He was carrying on also some communications with those towns, with a view to their being betrayed to him. And thus he was meditating an attack on these places.

122. But in the mean time there came to him in a trireme the commissioners, who were carrying round intelligence of the armistice, Aristonymus on the side of the Athenians, and Athenæus on that of the Lacedæmonians. So the troops crossed over again to Torone; while they informed Brasidas of the truce, and all the allies of the Lacedæmonians Thraceward assented to what had been done. Now Aristonymus allowed all the other cases; but finding, on a calculation of the days, that the Scionæans had revolted after the date of the convention, he said that they would not be included in it. But Brasidas earnestly contended, on the other hand, that they had revolted before the truce was made, and refused to give the town up. So when Aristonymus reported their case at Athens, the people were immediately prepared to send an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedæmonians sent envoys and told them that they would be violating the truce; and laid claim to the town, in reliance on the statement of Brasidas; offering, at the same time, to let the question be decided by arbitration. The Athenians, however, did not wish to run the risk of arbitration, but to send the expedition as quickly as possible; be-

ing enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the power of the Lacedæmonians by land, which could not help them. And indeed the truth of the question respecting the revolt was rather as the Athenians maintained; for the Scionæans revolted two days after the truce was signed. Accordingly, at the instigation of Cleon, they at once passed a decree that they should reduce the Scionæans, and put them to death; and so, while they remained quiet from other undertakings, they were engaged in preparing for this.

123. In the mean time, Mende revolted from them, a town in Pallene, and a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas received them, not thinking that he was doing wrong, because they had clearly come over to him during the armistice: for in some points he himself also charged the Athenians with infringing the truce. And for this reason the Mendæans were the more emboldened, seeing the feelings of Brasidas warmly disposed toward them, and inferring as much from the case of Scione, since he would not give it up; and at the same time because those of them who contrived the revolt were a small party, and since thinking of it on that occasion, had never let it rest afterward, but were afraid of conviction for themselves, and forced the majority to it against their inclination. The Athenians, immediately hearing of it, were still far more enraged, and made their preparations against both the towns. And Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy-armed and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas in command of them all. And so they joined in making their preparations, believing that the Athenians would quickly be with them.

124. Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile made an expedition together the second time into Lynceus, against Arrhibæus; taking with them, the latter, the forces of the Macedonians under his dominion, and some heavy-armed troops of the Greeks living among them; the former, in addition to those of the Peloponnesians whom he had still left, the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and of the rest according to their respective strength. In all, the heavy-armed Greeks amounted to about three thousand; all the cavalry of the Macedonians with the

Chaloidians went with them, amounting to nearly a thousand, and a large multitude of the barbarians besides. Having invaded the country of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field against them, they also took up a position opposite to them. The infantry occupying a hill on each side, and the space between being a plain, the horse of both armies, in the first place, galloped down into it, and engaged in a cavalry action. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed having advanced first from their hill with their cavalry, and being ready for action, Brasidas and Perdiccas also, in their turn, led their forces against them, and engaged in battle, and routed the Lyncestians, and killed many of them; but the rest took refuge on the heights, and there remained quiet. After this, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, in expectation of the Illyrians, who were to join Perdiccas as mercenaries. Then Perdiccas wished to advance against the villages of Arrhibæus, and not to sit still; but Brasidas was anxious for Mende, lest if the Athenians should sail against it before his return, it should meet with some disaster; and as the Illyrians, moreover, had not joined them, he was not eager to advance, but rather to retreat.

125. In the mean time, while they were thus at variance, news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas, and joined Arrhibæus: so that now both parties thought it best to retreat through their fear of them, as they were men of a warlike character; but nothing being settled, in consequence of their quarrel, as to when they should march, and night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of the barbarians were immediately terrified (as great armies are wont to be panic-stricken for no certain cause); and thinking that many times more than had really come were advancing against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into sudden flight, and proceeded homeward. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of it, was compelled by them, on his learning it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped at a great distance from each other). In the morning, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæus were on the point of attacking him, he, on his side, drew his heavy-armed together into a square, and taking the light-armed multitude into the center, intended to retire. And he appointed his youngest men

to dash out, on whatever point they might charge them ; while he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the enemy that should fall upon them. Before the enemy came near, he addressed his men, as well as the short time allowed him, with the following exhortation :

126. "Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that in consequence of your being left alone, and because your assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you were thrown into consternation, I should not have given you, as I do, information at the same time as encouragement. But as it is, with respect to the desertion of our friends, and the superior numbers of our adversaries, I will endeavor, by a brief admonition and advice, to convince you of what is most important for you. For it is your proper character to be brave in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each case, but from your own native valor ; and to fear no number of your enemies whatever : since neither are the governments from which you come of such a character<sup>1</sup>—governments in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the smaller number the greater, having acquired their power by no other means than by being victorious in battle. But with regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid through inexperience, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from what I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained from hearsay, that they will not prove formidable. For with regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of strength, while they are in reality weak, when correct informa-

<sup>1</sup> I venture to differ from all the editors whose opinion I generally follow, in thinking that there is no need to consider *οὐ* as carelessly introduced here, either by Thucydides himself, or by his copyists. The perfect agreement of all the MSS. in retaining it renders the latter supposition exceedingly improbable ; and though our author is doubtless sometimes careless, there is no reason for assuming that he was so in this passage, if his words can be explained on any other view of them. And such, I think, is the case, if the relative clause be taken as more particularly referring to *πολιτειῶν*, instead of being regarded as explanatory of *τοιοῦτων*. The meaning of the latter word will then be "of such a character as to warrant your entertaining any such fear of superior numbers." When the passage is read with the stress on *πολιτειῶν*, which its prominent position seems to require, I can not but think that this interpretation will appear most natural.

tion is gained respecting them, it rather gives confidence to those who resist them: whereas in the case of those who have any solid advantage, men would meet them the more boldly from having no previous acquaintance with them. Now these men present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unacquainted with them: for they are formidable in their numbers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of their shouting; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a look of threatening. But to those who stand their ground against them, they are not what they seem; for they have no definite order, so as to be ashamed of leaving any particular position, when hard pressed; and their retreat and attack being considered equally honorable puts their courage also beyond the reach of proof; while their independent mode of fighting would most frequently afford a man a pretext for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider the probability of their frightening you without any danger to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; else they would have adopted that method instead of their present one. And in this way you clearly see, that all that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, though to the eye and to the ear very urgent. If, therefore, you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, you will the sooner reach a place of safety; and will know in future that to those who sustain their first attack, such rabbles only make a vaunting demonstration, by threatening at a distance; but in the case of those who yield to them, they are quick in displaying their courage in pursuit, when they can do it with security."

127. In this way did Brasidas exhort them, and began to lead off his forces. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed on him with much shouting and uproar, thinking that he was flying, and being determined to overtake and cut him off.<sup>1</sup> Then, when the reserve companies met them, at whatever point they charged; and Brasidas himself with his picked men withstood the pressure, and they had, contrary to their expectation, resisted their first rush, and, after that, received

<sup>1</sup> *Νομίσαντες* seems to be used here in a different sense with reference to the two infinitives which follow it. For its meaning with the latter, compare chap. 86. 2, οὐδ' ἄσαφῇ τῇν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν.

and repelled them when they came on, but retired themselves, when the enemy withdrew: then indeed the main body of the barbarians ceased attacking the Greeks with Brasidas in the open country; and having left a portion of their forces to follow and harass them, the rest advanced at a run against the flying Macedonians, cutting down such as they fell in with; and got in time to pre-occupy the narrow pass which runs between two hills, into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And when he was coming to just where the road now became impassable, they proceeded to surround him, with a view to cutting him off.

128. He, on perceiving it, gave orders to his band of three hundred to advance at a run to that one of the hills which he thought they might take more easily, as quickly as each man could, without observing any order; and to endeavor to dislodge from it the barbarians who were already upon it, before their main force that was surrounding him should join them there. Accordingly, they charged, and overpowered the party on the hill, and the main force of the Greeks now advanced more easily up to it; for the barbarians were frightened on finding their men on that side dislodged from the height, and no longer followed the main body, considering that they were now on the borders, and had escaped them. When Brasidas had thus reached the heights, he proceeded with greater safety, and arrived the same day at Arnissa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. And as the soldiers were enraged at the Macedonians having retreated before them, whatever yokes of oxen belonging to them they fell in with on the road, or whatever baggage that had dropped off (as was likely to happen in case of a retreat by night, and under an alarm), on their own authority they unyoked and cut down the cattle, and appropriated the baggage. From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and cherished in future a hatred of the Lacedæmonians, which was not, indeed, congenial with his feelings, because of his aversion for the Athenians; but he departed from his natural interests, and was contriving in what way he might soonest come to terms with the Athenians, and be rid of the Peloponnesians.

129. On his return from Macedonia, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende; and remaining quiet

quiet there, though he considered himself unable to cross over into Pallene, and assist it, he kept watch over Torone. For about the same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sent the expedition against Mende and Scione, as they were preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, and one thousand heavy-armed of their own, six hundred bowmen, one thousand Thracian mercenaries, and others of their allies from that country serving as targeteers, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, and Nicos-tratus son of Diitrephes. After advancing from Potidæa with their ships, they came to land opposite the temple of Neptune, and proceeded against the Mendæans. They, both themselves and three hundred Scionæans who had come to their aid, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy-armed in all, with Polydamidas their commander, were encamped outside the city on a strong hill. Nicias, with one hundred and twenty Methonæan light-armed, sixty picked men of the Athenian heavy-armed, and all the bowmen, attempted to come at them by a path running up the hill; but being wounded by them, was unable to force their position: while Nicos-tratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different approach, and from a more distant point, against the hill, which was difficult of access, was beaten back in utter confusion, and the whole force of the Athenians was within a little of being conquered. For that day, then, as the Mendæans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians retreated and pitched their camp; and the Mendæans, when night came on, returned into the town.

130. The day following, the Athenians sailed round to the side toward Scione, and took the suburb, and ravaged the land the whole day, no one coming out against them. For indeed there was some opposition of parties in the town; and the three hundred of the Scionæans, on the approach of night, returned home. The next day Nicias advanced with half the forces to the borders of the Scionæans, and laid waste the land, while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town, near the upper gates, by the way they go to Potidæa. There Polydamidas (as the arms of the Mendæans and their auxiliaries happened to be piled in that quarter) began to draw them up for battle, and exhorted the Mendæans to march out against the enemy. One of the popular faction replying



to him, in the spirit of party, that they would not go out, and did not want a war, and, when he had thus replied, being dragged to him by the hand, and roughly treated, the commons immediately took up their arms, and advanced in a great rage against the Peloponnesians, and those who had joined them in opposition to themselves. Having thus fallen upon them, they routed them, in consequence both of the suddenness of the charge, and of their alarm at the gates being opened to the Athenians; for they imagined that the attack had been made in consequence of some agreement with them. They then, as many as were not immediately killed, took refuge in the citadel, which was before held by themselves; while the Athenians (for by this time Nicias also had returned and was close to the town) rushed with all their forces into Mende, inasmuch as it had not thrown open its gates to them on the ground of any convention, and sacked it as though they had taken it by storm; the generals with difficulty restraining them from even butchering the inhabitants. Afterward they told the Mendæans to retain their civil rights, as usual, after having tried among themselves whomever they considered to have been the originators of the revolt: but the party in the citadel they cut off by a wall down to the sea on each side, and stationed troops to keep guard over them. When they had thus got possession of Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

131. The inhabitants of that town, both themselves and the Peloponnesians, marched out to oppose them, and were posted on a strong hill before the city, without the occupation of which by the enemy there was no possibility of investing them. So the Athenians attacked it vigorously, and having driven off by their charge those who were upon it, pitched their camp, and after erecting a trophy, prepared for the circumvallation of the place. Not long after, while they were now engaged in the work, the auxiliaries who were being besieged in the citadel of Mende having, during the night, driven in the guard by the sea-side, arrived at Scione; and most of them escaping through the troops encamped before it, threw themselves into the place.

132. While Scione was invested, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals, and concluded an arrangement with the Athenians, through his hatred of Brasidas in consequence of

the retreat from Lyncus; having begun to negotiate for it from that very time. And, as Isagoras the Lacedæmonian then happened to be on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, since he had come to terms with the Athenians, to give them some clear proof of his being a firm friend; and partly because he himself wished the Lacedæmonians never again to go to his territories; won over to his views his friends in Thessaly, (for he was always intimate with the principal men), and stopped the army and its equipments, so that they did not even try the mind of the Thessalians on the subject. Isagoras, however, Ameinias, and Aristeus, themselves came to Brasidas, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the state of affairs; and took from Sparta, in opposition to the spirit of their laws, some of their young men, with a view to appointing them to the command in the cities, instead of intrusting it to any that might happen to be there at present. Accordingly, he appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus to the command in Amphipolis, and Pasitolidas, son of Hegesander in Torone.

133. The same summer, the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, on a charge of their favoring the Athenians; having always wished to do it, but finding it more easy at that time, since all the flower of their population had fallen in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno at Argos was also burned down that same summer, in consequence of Chrysis the priestess having placed a lighted torch near the garlands, and fallen asleep after it; so that they all caught fire, and were in a flame before she perceived it. Chrysis immediately, the same night, fled to Phlius, in her fear of the Argives; who, according to the law laid down on the subject, appointed another priestess, by name Phæinis. The priesthood of Chrysis, at the time she fled, embraced eight years of this war, and to the middle of the ninth. And now, toward the close of the summer, Scione was entirely invested; and the Athenians, having left a garrison to keep watch over it, returned with the rest of their army.

134. The following winter, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians remained quiet, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies on both sides, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the district of Oresthis, and

the victory was doubtful; for each side having put to flight one of the enemy's wings which was opposed to them, they both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. Though, however, many had fallen on each side, and the battle was undecisive, and night interrupted the action, the Tegeans bivouaced on the field, and erected a trophy immediately; whereas the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and erected their counter-trophy afterward.

135. Toward the end of the same winter, and when it was now approaching to spring, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidæa. For he went thither by night, and planted a ladder against the wall, and so far escaped observation; the ladder having been planted just in the interval when the bell had been passed round,<sup>1</sup> before the man who passed it returned to that side. Afterward, however, on their immediately perceiving it, before his troops came up to the place, he led them back again as quickly as possible, and did not wait for the day to break. And so the winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

<sup>1</sup> Respecting this expedient for securing the vigilance of loops on guard, see Arnold's note.

## BOOK V.

1. THE following summer, the truce for a year continued till the Pythian games,<sup>1</sup> and then ended. During the suspension of arms, the Athenians expelled the Delians from their island, thinking that they had been consecrated when in a state of impurity from some crime of ancient date; and, moreover, that this had been the deficiency in their former purification of it; in which case I have before explained that they considered themselves to have performed it rightly by taking up the coffins of the dead. The Delians found a residence at Atramyctium in Asia, given to them by Pharnaces, as each of them arrived there.

2. After the armistice had expired, Cleon, having persuaded the Athenians to the measure, led an expedition against the Thrace-ward towns, with twelve hundred heavy-armed, and three hundred cavalry of the Athenians, a larger force of the

<sup>1</sup> For the arguments with which Arnold establishes, as I think, this interpretation of the passage, see his Appendix. All the later German editors, adopt, with little or no variety, the view of Heilmann, Böckh, and others, who suppose it to mean, that "in the following summer the truce was broken, and war renewed until the time of the Pythian games." In addition to what Arnold has observed respecting the unsuitableness of the pluperfect tense to such a mode of interpretation, it may be remarked that Thucydides applies the term *τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν* to the year's truce in the last chapter but one of the preceding book; and therefore it is much more natural that the same armistice should be intended by the same term in this and the following chapters. It seems evident too that there is an *opposition* expressed by the *μὲν* here and the *δέ* in the first line of the next chapter—the one sentence stating how long the truce continued, viz., until the Pythian games, and the other, what military measure was first executed after its expiration; while the chief event which occurred during its continuance is mentioned parenthetically between the two. Nor, again, does it seem at all like the style of Thucydides to allude so cursorily, and by anticipation, to the Pythian games, as the cause which put a final stop to hostilities, and to make no subsequent mention of them at all in what would be the natural place for doing so; but to lead his readers to conclude that the proposals for peace originated solely in the difficulties of both the great belligerent powers, and their natural anxiety to be released from them; which is the sum and substance of his history from chapters 13 to 17.

allies, and thirty ships. After landing in the first place at Scione, which was still being besieged, and taking thence some heavy-armed from the garrison, he sailed into the port of the Colophonians, belonging to the Toronæans, and at no great distance from their city. Thence, having learned from deserters both that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that those who were in it were not strong enough to give him battle, with his land forces he marched against the city, while he sent ten ships to sail round into the harbor. First, then, he came to the fortifications which Brasidas had raised anew round the city, from a wish to include the suburb, and so by taking down a part of the original wall had made it one city.

3. Pasitelidas, the Lacedæmonian commander, and the garrison that was there, went to the defense of the fortifications, and tried to resist the assault of the Athenians. When they were being driven in, and the ships that had been sent round were at the same time sailing into the harbor, Pasitelidas, fearing that the ships might find the city deserted by its defenders before he could reach it, and that if the fortifications were carried he might be made prisoner in them, left them, and ran into the city. But the Athenians from the ships had had time to take Torone, and their land forces, rushing after him, on the very first assault burst in with him through the part of the old wall that had been removed. And thus some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans they slew immediately in close combat, and others they took alive, with Pasitelidas the commander. Now Brasidas was coming to the relief of Torone; but hearing of its capture while on his way, he went back again, having been but forty stades short of arriving in time. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one by the harbor, the other near the fortifications; and sold into slavery the women and children of the Toronæans, while the men themselves, with the Peloponnesians, and whatever Chalcidians there were besides, seven hundred in all, they sent off to Athens; whence some of them afterward were dismissed, on conclusion of peace, while others were recovered by the Olynthians, through an exchange of prisoners. About the same time, too, the Boeotians took by treachery Panactum, a fortress of the Athenians on the borders. Cleon, after establishing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor, and sailed round Athos on his way to Amphipolis.

4. About this same time, Phæax, son of Erasistratus, with two colleagues, being commissioned by the Athenians, sailed with two ships as ambassador to Italy and Sicily. For on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, the Leontines had enrolled a large number of new citizens, and the commons were thinking of dividing the land. When the aristocratical party were aware of it, they called in the Syracusans, and expelled the commons; who wandered about as they severally happened; while the nobles entered into an arrangement with the Syracusans, and having abandoned and laid waste their own city, lived at Syracuse with the enjoyment of the franchise. Afterward some of them, in consequence of not being pleased, withdrew from Syracuse, and occupied a quarter of the city of Leontini, called Phocææ, and Bricinniaæ, which was a stronghold in the Leontine country. There the majority of the popular party who had been expelled, came to them, and having thus established themselves, they carried on the war from the fortifications. The Athenians, hearing this, dispatched Phæax, to try if by any means they might persuade the allies they had there, and the rest of the Sicilians if they could, to join in attacking the Syracusans, on the strength of their gaining such additional power, and thus might save the commons of Leontini. So Phæax came, and prevailed on the Camarinæans and Agrigentines; but when the question was settled against him at Gela, he did not then proceed to the others, as he found that he should not prevail on them; but having returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, and having on his route also visited Bricinniaæ, and encouraged its inhabitants, he sailed back again.

5. On his course to Sicily and return from it, he also communicated with certain cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with the Athenians. He likewise fell in with the Locrian settlers banished from Messina, who, after the pacification effected by the Sicilians, when the Messanians were divided into factions, and one of them had invited the Locrians to their aid, had been sent out for that purpose; and so Messina came into the hands of the Locrians for some time. Phæax then, having fallen in with these men on their way home, did them no harm, as proposals had been made to him by the Locrians for coming to terms with the Athenians.

For they were the only people of the allies who, when the Sicilians were reconciled to each other, did not make peace with the Athenians: nor would they have done it then, had they not been pressed by hostilities with the Itonæans and Melæans, who lived on their borders, and were a colony from them. So Phæax returned, and arrived at Athens some time after.

6. Now when Cleon, at the time we last mentioned him, sailed round from Torone to go against Amphipolis, making Eion the base of his operations, he assaulted Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, but without reducing it; but Galepus, the Thasian colony, he took by storm. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, that he might join him with an army according to the terms of their alliance, and others into Thrace, to Polles, the king of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could, he himself remained quiet in Eion, awaiting their arrival. On hearing this, Brasidas, on his side also, took up an opposite position on Cerdylum. This spot is in the Argilian country, being on the high ground on the other side of the river, not far from the city of Amphipolis; and every thing was distinctly seen from it; so that Cleon could not unobserved by him set out with his army; as he expected him to do, and despising the numbers of the Lacedæmonians, to march up with the forces he had with him against Amphipolis. At the same time he was getting ready fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries, and was calling all the Edonians to his aid, both targeteers and cavalry; and he had a thousand targeteers of the Myrcinians and Chalcidians, in addition to those in Amphipolis. All his heavy-armed force too was mustered, about two thousand in number, and three hundred Grecian horse. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas stationed himself on Cerdylum, while the rest were posted with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

7. Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected. For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmurs; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his

camp and led them forward. And he<sup>1</sup> adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm. Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoiter the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace. He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

8. Immediately that Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he too went down from Cerdylum, and entered Amphipolis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against the Athenians, he made none; being afraid of his own resources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so much in numbers (for they were pretty nearly equal), but in character; (for it<sup>2</sup> was the flower of the Athenian force that was in the field, and the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians;) but he prepared to attack them by means of a stratagem. For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the

<sup>1</sup> Or τῷ τρόπῳ may be understood, as by Haack and Arnold, "of the temper and habits of Cleon's mind." But the aorist tense of the verbs ἐχρήσατο, ἐπίστευσε, and ἡλπισεν seems intended to refer to the single fact of his having adopted a particular plan, and his reasons for doing it, rather than to a continued state of mind, which would rather take the imperfect. And the following description of that plan, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλῆι—ἀλλ' ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βία ἀλρήσων τὴν πόλιν, agrees, as closely as the different position of the parties rendered possible, with that of the arrangements for the decisive battle in Sphacteria, which were made by Demosthenes, but the credit of which Cleon would, of course, assume to himself. Compare especially IV. 32. 3, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις, καὶ μὴ ἔχῃσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτίξονται, ἀλλ' ἀμφίβολοι γίνονται τῷ πλήθει, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "the Athenian force that was in the field had gone forth pure;" i. e., free from all such things as might have marred their efficiency: χρηστοῖς καταλόγοις ἐκκριθέν, as he expresses it, VI. 31. 3.



equipment of the troops with him, which was such as necessity alone dictated,<sup>1</sup> he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, and despising them on sufficient grounds.<sup>2</sup> Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect:

9. "Men of the Peloponnese, with regard to the character of the country from which we are come, namely, that through its bravery it has always been a free country, and that you are Dorians about to engage with Ionians, to whom you are habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice. But with regard to the present attack, I will explain in what way I purpose making it; that the fact of your meeting the danger in small divisions, and not in one body, may not cause a want of courage by an appearance of weakness. For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while, without any order, they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them with regard to his own power,<sup>3</sup> not so much in an open manner and in

<sup>1</sup> "ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν,] i. e., not such as they would have wished, but such as they could get. Compare II. 70. 1, βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, and I. 61. 2, ξύμβασιν ἀναγκαίαν."—Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> Or, "and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds." For the different explanations of this strange construction which have been proposed, see Poppo's note, in his last edition; which has been completed since this translation was commenced, and will be always referred to in future, unless the larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position of the *τέ* seems to show that *καταφρονήσεως*, as well as *προόψεως*, is dependent upon *ἀνευ*, and therefore that the *μή* must be considered as redundant. Or is it possible that it could have been carelessly used with a double force, qualifying at once both *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος* and *καταφρονήσεως*; as it is in a somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2?

<sup>3</sup> "i. e., when it is deficient in actual strength, making up for it by art and by rapidity of movement."—Arnold.

regular battle-array, as with reference to his present advantage, that man would be most successful. And those stratagems by which one would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation. While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are thinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than of remaining; while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed on the center of their forces. And do you, Clearidas, afterward, when you see me now charging, and in all probability frightening them, take *your* division, both the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and suddenly opening the gates rush out against them, and make all haste to close with them as quickly as possible. For we may expect that in this way they will be most alarmed; since the force which follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than that which is already before him and engaged with him. And do you be a brave man yourself, as it is natural that you should, being a Spartan; and do ye, allies, follow him courageously; and consider that it is the proof of good soldiership to be willing, and to be alive to shame, and to obey your commanders. Reflect, too, that on this day you either gain your liberty, if you act bravely, and the title of confederates of the Lacedæmonians; or are slaves of the Athenians—if you fare as well as you possibly can, without being reduced to personal bondage, or put to death—and incur a more galling slavery than before, while you oppose the liberation of the rest of the Greeks. Do not you, then, act as cowards, seeing for how much you are struggling; and I will show you that I am not better able to give advice to others, than to carry it out in action myself.”

10. Having thus spoken, Brasidas himself prepared for marching out, and posted the rest of the troops with Clearidas at what were called the Thracian gates, to sally out after him, as had been arranged. His descent from Cerdylum having been observed, as also his sacrificing, when he was in the city—of which a view is commanded from the outside—near the temple of Minerva, and his being occupied with these measures, tidings were carried to Cleon (for he had gone forward at the time to look about him) that the enemy's whole force was visible in the city; and that under the gates were observed

many feet of horses and men, as though prepared to make a sally. On receiving this intelligence he came up to the spot; and when he saw that it was so, not wishing to come to a decisive engagement before his reinforcements also had arrived, and thinking that he should have time to retire, he at once gave orders for the signal to march back, and sent word to the troops on the retreat to draw off in the direction of Eion, moving on their left wing; which indeed was the only way they could. But when he thought there was a dilatoriness on their part, he himself made the right wing turn round, and presenting their exposed side to the enemy, began to lead off his troops. Upon this, Brasidas, marking his opportunity, and seeing that the Athenian force was on the move, says to his own company and the rest: "The men are not disposed to wait for us as is evident by the motion of their spears and of their heads; for those who have this going on among them do not generally receive the charge of their assailants. So then let somebody throw open for me the gates I have mentioned, and let us march out against them as quickly as possible, and with good courage." He, accordingly, sallied out by the gates near the stockade, the first in the long wall which was then standing, and ran full speed along the high road, where the trophy now stands, as you go by the strongest part of the position; and falling on the Athenians, who were both terrified by their own disorder and confounded by his boldness, in the center of their forces, he put them to the rout. Clearidas too, as had been arranged, sallied out after him by the Thracian gates, and rushed upon the enemy's troops. The consequence was, that by this unexpected and sudden charge on both sides, the enemy were thrown into confusion; and their left wing, on the side of Eion, which had already advanced some distance, immediately broke away and fled. When it was now on its retreat, Brasidas, in advancing along to attack the right wing, received a wound; and while the Athenians did not observe his fall, those who were near him took him up, and carried him off the field. The right of the Athenians, however, stood its ground better; and though Cleon, who from the first had no intention of making a stand, immediately fled, and was overtaken and killed by a Myrcinian targeteer, his heavy-armed retreated in a close body to the hill, and repulsed the charge of Clearidas twice or thrice, and did not

give way till the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse, with the targeteers, having surrounded them, and pouring their missiles upon them, put them to the rout. And so now the whole army of the Athenians, flying with great difficulty, and taking many different roads over the mountains, effected their return to Eion; excepting such as were killed either in the immediate action, or by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Those who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, carried him still breathing into the city; where he lived to hear that his troops were victorious, but after a short interval expired. The rest of the army, on returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and erected a trophy.

11. After this all the allies attended in arms, and interred Brasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of the present market-place. And ever since the Amphipolitans, having inclosed his tomb with a fence, have made offerings to him as to a hero, and have given him the honor of games and annual sacrifices. They also referred the settlement to him as its founder, demolishing the buildings of Hagnon, and obliterating whatever memorial of his founding the place was likely to remain: for they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver; and at the present time too, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while, on the other hand, they thought that Hagnon, in consequence of their hostility toward the Athenians, would not retain his honors either so beneficially or so agreeably to them. The dead they restored to the Athenians. There were killed, of the Athenians, about six hundred; of their adversaries, only seven; because the battle was not fought with any regular order, but was rather brought on by such an accidental occurrence and previous alarm as has been described. After taking up their dead, the Athenians sailed away home; while Clearidas and his party proceeded to settle matters about Amphipolis.

12. About the same time, toward the close of summer, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed to the Thracian towns, and on their arrival at Heraclea in Trachinia arranged whatever appeared to them not to be on a good footing. While they thus prolonged their stay in the place, this battle of Amphipolis happened to be fought; and so the summer ended.

13. The following winter, Ramphias and his companions immediately passed through the country as far as Pierius in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians forbade their advance, and as Brasidas, moreover, was dead, to whom they were leading the force, they turned back home; thinking the time for action had gone by; as both the Athenians had departed in consequence of their defeat, and *they* were not competent to execute any of *his* designs. But, most of all, they returned because they knew that the Lacedæmonians, at the time of their setting out, were more strongly disposed for peace.

14. It happened too, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither party any longer applied themselves at all to the war, but they were rather inclined for peace. The Athenians were so, as having received a severe blow at Delium, and again shortly after at Amphipolis; and as no longer having that confident hope in their strength, through which they would not before accept the offered treaty, thinking, in consequence of their present success, that they should come off victorious in the struggle. Besides, they were also afraid of their allies, lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on a larger scale; and they repented not having come to an arrangement, when they had a fine opportunity, after the events at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, wished for peace, because they found protracted beyond their expectation those hostilities by which they imagined that in a few years they should reduce the power of the Athenians, if they ravaged their land; and because they had met with the disaster on the island—such as had never yet befallen Sparta: and in consequence of their country being plundered from Pylus and Cythera; while their Helots also were deserting, and there was a constant apprehension lest even those that remained in the country, trusting in the support of those who were out of it, should, on the strength of the present state of things, adopt some revolutionary designs against them, as on a former occasion. It happened, too, that their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for them to carry on war at once with the Argives and Athenians. Besides, they suspected that some of the states in the

Peloponnesse would revolt from them to the Argives; as was really the case.

15. On these considerations both parties thought it best to conclude the arrangement; and particularly the Lacedæmonians, through the desire of recovering their men taken in the island; for those of them who were Spartans were of the highest rank,<sup>1</sup> and connected with themselves in the same way. They began therefore to negotiate immediately after their capture; but the Athenians being so successful, would not yet make peace on fair terms. When, however, they had been defeated at Delium, immediately the Lacedæmonians, finding that they would now be more ready to accept their proposals, concluded the armistice for a year, during which they should meet together, and consult respecting a treaty for a longer period.

16. And when, moreover, the defeat at Amphipolis had befallen the Athenians, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who on each side were most opposed to the cause of peace—the one, because he was successful and honored in consequence of the war; the other, because he thought, that if tranquillity were secured he would be more easily detected in his evil practices, and less believed in his calumniations—then the individuals who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely, Pleistanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who of all his cotemporaries was most generally successful in his military commands, were much more anxious for peace than ever. Nicias was so, because he wished, while he had met with no disaster, and was in high repute, permanently to secure his good fortune; and both at present to obtain a respite from troubles himself and give his countrymen the same, and to hand down to futurity a name for having continued to the end without subjecting the state to any disaster; and he thought that such a result is secured by freedom from danger, and by a man's committing himself as little as possible to fortune, and that such freedom from danger is afforded by peace. Pleistanax, on the other hand, took the same view, because he was

<sup>1</sup> Ὀμοίως.] The meaning of this word is considered very doubtful; but to me it appears to signify, that as the prisoners were men of the highest rank (or whatever the dignity might be which was intended by the word *πρώτοι*), so they were connected with those among themselves who were of the same rank.

calumniated by his enemies on the subject of his restoration, and was continually being brought forward by them as the object of religious scruple on the part of the Lacedæmonians, whenever they met with any defeat; as though it were owing to his illegal restoration that these things befell them. For they charged him with having, in concert with Aristocles, his brother, prevailed on the prophetess at Delphi to give the following charge to such Lacedæmonians as went, during a long period, to consult the oracle; "that they should bring back the seed of the demigod son of Jupiter from a foreign land to his own; else they would plow with a silver share."<sup>1</sup> And so they said that in the course of time, when he had gone as an exile to Lycæum (in consequence of his former return from Attica, which was thought to have been effected by bribery), and had then, through fear of the Lacedæmonians, half his house within the sanctuary of Jupiter, he induced them, in the nineteenth year of his exile, to restore him with the same dances and sacrifices as when they appointed their kings on first settling in Lacedæmon.

27. Being annoyed therefore by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no reverse was experienced, and when, moreover, the Lacedæmonians were recovering their men from the island, he too should give his enemies no handle against him; whereas, as long as there was war, the leading men must always be exposed to accusations from the occurrence of disasters; he was ardently desirous of the pacification. And so during this winter they were meeting in conference; and when it was now close upon spring, the terrors of an armament,<sup>2</sup> for which orders were sent round to the different states, as though for the purpose of building forts, were held forth by the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians might the more readily listen to them. And when, after these conferences had been held, and they had urged many claims against each other, it was agreed that they should make peace on restoring what they had respectively taken during the war; but that the Athenians should keep Nisæa; (for on their demanding back

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, that owing to the scarcity of provisions, they would have to buy them as dearly as though the implements used in raising them had been made of silver.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "an armament was shaken on high before them;" *i. e.*, held "in terror" over their heads; like a weapon brandished in a man's face.

Plataea, the Thebans said that it was not by force that they held the place, but in consequence of the inhabitants themselves having surrendered on definite terms, and not betrayed it to them; and the Athenians maintained that in the same way had *they* got possession of Nisæa), then the Lacedæmonians convened their allies; and when all the rest, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were displeased with what was being done, had voted for putting an end to the war, they concluded the arrangement, and made a treaty and bound themselves by oaths to the Athenians, and *they* to them, to the following effect:

18. 1st, "The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, with their allies, made<sup>1</sup> a treaty on the following terms, and swore to observe it, state by state. With regard to the temples common to the nation, that whoever wishes shall sacrifice, and go for that purpose, and consult the oracle, and attend the games, according to the custom of his fathers, whether proceeding by sea or land, without fear.

2d, "That the temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi, and the Delphians, shall be independent, self-taxed, and self-judged, as regards both themselves and their territory, according to their hereditary usage.

3d, "That the treaty shall be in force fifty years between the Athenians and their allies, and the Lacedæmonians and theirs, without guile or wrong, by land and by sea.

4th, "That it shall not be lawful to take the field for the purpose of inflicting injury, either for the Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, by any means whatever. But should any dispute arise between them, they must have recourse to justice and oaths, in whatever way they may arrange.

5th, "That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. That of all the cities, however, which the Lacedæmonians may restore to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to depart wherever they please,

<sup>1</sup> ἐποίησαντο.] I have not translated this, as Hobbes and Bloomfield do, as though it had the force of a perfect; because I think the aorist was purposely used in such passages with reference to those who would read the record at any *future* time; and not to those who then took part in making the treaty. Compare the use of the same tense for the same reason in the first line of the history, ἐυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον.



themselves and their property with them; and the cities shall be independent, only paying the tribute that was paid in the time of Aristides. That it shall not be lawful for the Athenians, or their allies, to take the field against them for their injury, after the treaty has been concluded. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. That these shall be considered as allies to neither party, neither the Lacedæmonians nor the Athenians; but if the Athenians gain the consent of the cities, then it shall be lawful for them to make them their allies, with their own free will. That the Mecenæans, Samæans, and Singæans shall inhabit their own cities, like the Olynthians and Acanthians; but that the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians.

6th, "That the Athenians, also, shall restore to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedæmonians that are in prison at Athens, or any where else in all the Athenian dominions; and shall release those of the Peloponnesians who are being besieged in Scione; and all others in that place who are allies of the Lacedæmonians; and whoever among the allies of the Lacedæmonians is in prison at Athens, or any where else in the Athenian dominions.

7th, "That the Lacedæmonians too, and their allies, shall in the same way restore whomever of the Athenians and their allies they may have in their hands.

8th, "That in the case of the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermyllians, and whatever other city the Athenians have possession of, respecting these and the rest they shall adopt such measures as they please.

9th, "That the Athenians shall take the oaths to the Lacedæmonians and their allies, state by state; and that every man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, according to his respective state. That the oath must be to this effect: 'I will abide by these arrangements and articles of the treaty, honestly and without guile.' That in the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedæmonians and their allies to the Athenians; and that on both sides the oath shall be renewed yearly. That the contracting parties shall erect pillars at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the temple<sup>1</sup> of Apollo at Amyclæ. That

<sup>1</sup> "The temple of Apollo at Amyclæ might as well be called at *Sparta*.

if they forget any thing, whatever it may be, and on whatever point, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Athenians and Lacedæmonians, by means of fair discussion, to change it in such manner as they please.

19. "The treaty commences from the ephoralty of Pleistolas, on the 27th of the month Artemisium, and from the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, on the 25th of the month Elaphebolion. Those who took the oaths and subscribed the treaty were as follows: on the side of the Lacedæmonians [Pleistanax, Agis], Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: on the side of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes."

20. This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter, when the spring was commencing, immediately after the city-festival of Bacchus, when just ten years had elapsed, with the variation of a few days,<sup>1</sup> since the invasion of Attica was first made, and this war commenced. But let every one regard this with reference to the periods of time, and not, as placing greater confidence in such a view, with respect to the enumeration of the public officers in the several places, or of the titles derived from any honorable appointment which serve to mark past events. For that gives no definite idea, as to who were in the commencement of their office, or in the middle of it, or whatever part it might be, when any event occurred. But if he reckon by summers and winters, as I have written my history, he will find that while each of these amounts to half a year,<sup>2</sup> there were ten summers and as many winters included in this first war.

21. Now the Lacedæmonians (for it fell to their lot to be the first to restore what they held) immediately released the men who were prisoners in their country; and sending as

as the temple of Juno was said to be at *Argos*, Thucyd. IV. 133. 2, although it was forty stadia distant from the city, Strabo, VIII. 6. 2; Herod. I. 31. 4."—*Arnold*.

<sup>1</sup> For an instance of *παράφέρω*, used in this intransitive sense, like *διαφέρω*, compare Dionys. Hal. Ant. I. 27, p. 73, Reiske, *τούτων ἡ γλῶσσα ὀλίγον παράφέρει*; as quoted in Bloomfield's note, 2d edition.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "having the virtue, or sum, of the year in half measure."

ambassadors to the countries Thraceward, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, commanded Clearidas to restore Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of the states to accept the treaty, as it had been severally arranged for them. They, however, would not, as they thought it not favorable to them; nor did Clearidas restore the city, wishing to oblige the Chalcidians, and declaring that he could not give it up in opposition to them. He, however, went in haste to Lacedæmon with ambassadors from that place, to defend himself, if Ischagoras and his party should bring any charge against him for not obeying; and at the same time from a wish to know whether the arrangement might still be altered: but when he found the treaty secured being sent back again himself by the Lacedæmonians, and ordered to deliver up the place, if possible, but if not, to bring out all the Peloponnesians that were in it, he set out with all speed.

22. Now the allies happened themselves<sup>1</sup> to be at Lacedæmon, and those of them who had not accepted the treaty were commanded by the Lacedæmonians to adopt it. They, however, on the same grounds as they had at first rejected it, refused to accept it, unless they made a more equitable one than that. So when they did not listen to them, they sent them away, and themselves proceeded to conclude an alliance with the Athenians; thinking that the Argives (since<sup>2</sup> they refused, on Ampelidas and Lichas going to them, to make a fresh treaty) would be by no means formidable without the support of the Athenians, and that the rest of the Peloponnesians would be most disposed to remain quiet; whereas they would have gone over to the Athenians, if they had had the power. Embassadors, therefore, having come from the Athenians, and a conference having been held, they came to an agreement, and oaths were taken, and this alliance concluded, on the following terms:

23. "The Lacedæmonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years.

<sup>1</sup> Arnold translates *αὐτοί*, "of their own accord;" but Poppe remarks, with truth, that this is in opposition to the statement that they had been summoned by the Lacedæmonians, ch. 17. 2, and 27. 1. He supposes, therefore, that it means "the allies, as well as Clearidas."

<sup>2</sup> For instances of the aorist, or the present, thus used after *φύναί*, Poppe refers to Xen. Anab. iv. 5. 15, and Hel. v. i. 32. Respecting the anacoluthon also in the following sentence, see his note, and that of Arnold.

2d, "That should any come as enemies against the territory of the Lacedæmonians, and do them injury, the Athenians shall assist them in such manner as they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and be punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

3rd, "That, again, should any come as enemies against the country of the Athenians, and injure them, the Lacedæmonians shall assist them in whatever manner they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

4th, "That should the slave population rise up against them, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their might, according to their ability.

5th, "That these articles shall be sworn to by the same persons as swore to the other treaty, on both sides. That they shall be renewed every year, by the Lacedæmonians going to Athens at the Dionysian festival, and by the Athenians going to Lacedæmon at the Hyacinthian. That they shall each erect a pillar, that at Lacedæmon near the statue of Apollo in the Amyclæum, and that at Athens in the citadel, near the statue of Minerva. That should the Lacedæmonians and Athenians choose to add to, or take away from, these terms of alliance, whatever they please so to do shall be consistent with the oaths of both parties."

24. The oath was sworn by the following on the side of the Lacedæmonians: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcínadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: and on the side of the Athenians, by Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This alliance was entered into not long after the treaty, and the Athenians restored to the Lacedæmonians the men taken from the island; and thus began the summer of the eleventh year. During these ten years, then, the first war was carried on continuously, and such is the history of it.

25. After the treaty, and the alliance between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of the ten years' war, in the ephorality of Pleistolas at Lacedæmon, and the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, those who had acceded to them were at peace; but the Corinthians, and some of the states in the Peloponnese, were trying to alter what had been done; and another disturbance immediately arose on the part of the allies against Lacedæmon. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians also, through not performing in some respects what had been agreed on, according to the treaty. And though for six years and ten months they abstained from marching against each other's territory, yet out of it, during the existence of a doubtful suspension of arms, they were doing one another the greatest possible damage. Subsequently, however, they were compelled to break the treaty concluded after the ten years' war, and again proceeded to open hostilities.

26. And the same Thucydides the Athenian has also written the history of these transactions in order, as they severally happened, by summers and winters, until the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the sovereignty of the Athenians, and took the long walls and Piræus. To the time of that event there were spent in the war seven-and-twenty years in all. With regard to the intervening arrangement, if any one shall object to consider it as a state of war, he will not estimate it rightly. For let him<sup>1</sup> regard it as it is characterized by the facts of the case, and he will find that there is no reason for its being deemed a state of peace; since during it they neither gave

<sup>1</sup> On this use of *δήρηται*, see Poppe or Bloomfield: With regard to the *τέ* in this clause, it is the opinion of Gölter that it refers to *καὶ* before *εὐρήσει*; but Poppe observes, in opposition to this, that the imperative *ἀδρείω* has a conditional force, as it frequently has in Greek, Latin, German, and French: "si quis spectaverit, inveniet;" and therefore that *τέ* has no force. Arnold and Bloomfield consider that it is answered by *ἔξω τε τούτων*. "First of all, the treaty was in itself practically inefficient, inasmuch as its very stipulations were not all fulfilled; and then there were mutual causes of complaint with respect to other matters, of which the treaty had made no mention."

nor received back all they had arranged to do; and besides this, there were offenses committed on both sides, as in the case of the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and other instances; and the Thraceward allies were in no respect less at war than before; while the Boeotians had only a truce from one ten days to another. Including, therefore, the first war of ten years, the suspicious cessation of hostilities which followed it, and the subsequent war which succeeded to that, any one will find that the number of years was what I have mentioned (reckoning by the great divisions of time), with only a few days' difference; and that such as positively asserted any thing on the strength of oracles, found this the only fact which proved true. At least I, for my own part, remember that all along, both at the beginning of the war, and till it was brought to a conclusion, it was alleged by many that it was to last thrice nine years. And I lived on through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and paying attention, in order to gain accurate knowledge on each point. It was also my lot to be banished my country twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and thus, by being present at the transactions of either party, and especially of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a more perfect acquaintance with each of them. The difference, then, which arose after the ten years, and the breaking up of the treaty, and the subsequent course of hostilities, I will now relate.

27. When, then, the fifty years' treaty had been concluded, and the alliance afterward, the embassies from the Peloponnese, which had' been summoned for that business, returned from Lacedæmon. Accordingly the rest went home; but the Corinthians repaired to Argos, and in the first place held communications with some of the Argives who were in office, to the effect that, since the Lacedæmonians, not for the good, but for the subjugation of the Peloponnese, had entered into treaty and alliance with the Athenians, who were before their bitterest enemies; the Argives ought to consider how the Peloponnese might be preserved; and to pass a decree, that any city of the Greeks that wished, being independent, and giving

<sup>1</sup> *ai συμμάχια.*] Poppo remarks, in his note on 48. 1, on this use of the plural noun with reference to a single alliance; but does not offer any explanation of it. Probably it arises from the separate ratification of the alliance by each of the two states; so that it may be regarded as a two-fold transaction.

judicial satisfaction for wrongs, on fair and equal terms, might enter into alliance with the Argives, on condition of defending each other's country: and that they should appoint a few persons as commissioners with full powers, instead of the discussion of the measure being held before the people; in order that those might not be known who had failed to persuade the multitude. And they asserted that many would come over to them for hatred of the Lacedæmonians. The Corinthians then, having suggested these things, returned home.

28. When those of the Argives who heard their proposals had reported them to the government and the people, the Argives passed the decree, and chose twelve men, with whom any one of the Greeks who wished should conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, neither of whom should have liberty to enter into treaty without the consent of the Argive people. The Argives acceded the more readily to these proposals, because they saw that they should have the war with the Lacedæmonians, (for their treaty with them was on the point of expiring), and also because they hoped to gain the supremacy of the Peloponnese. For at that time Lacedæmon was in very bad repute, and was despised in consequence of its misfortunes; while the Argives were in an excellent condition in all respects, as they had taken no part in the war against Athens, but had rather reaped the good fruits of having been in treaty with both sides. Thus, then, the Argives were admitting into alliance such of the Greeks as wished it.

29. The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a certain part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on; and they thought that the Lacedæmonians would not allow their sovereignty over it, since they had now leisure<sup>1</sup> to interfere; so that they gladly turned to the Argives, considering them to be a powerful state, and one which was always at variance with the Lacedæmonians, and under a democratical government like themselves. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of the Peloponnese also was thrown into commotion, with the idea that they too ought to do the same;

<sup>1</sup> The force of the *καί* before *σχολήν* appears to be, "leisure, as well as inclination."

as they thought that they had changed sides through knowing more than the rest. At the same time they were angry with the Lacedæmonians, both on other grounds, and because it had been mentioned in the treaty with Athens, that it should be consistent with their oaths to add to it, or take from it, whatever might seem fit to both states, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. For it was this clause, above all, that caused the excitement in the Peloponnese, and set them on suspecting that the Lacedæmonians, in concert with the Athenians, might wish to reduce them to slavery: for it was only just, they thought, that the alteration should have been referred to all the allies. The majority therefore, through fear, were eager to conclude the alliance with the Argives on their own part, respectively, as the Mantineans had done.

80. When the Lacedæmonians perceived this commotion which had arisen in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians were the advisers of it, and were themselves about to enter into treaty with Argos, they sent ambassadors to Corinth, wishing to prevent what was going to happen. They charged them therefore with suggesting the whole business; and said that if they withdrew from them, and became allies of the Argives, they would violate their oaths; and that they were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, when it had been declared, that whatever the majority of the allies decreed should be binding, unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes. The Corinthians, in the presence of all the allies who, like themselves, had not acceded to the treaty (for they had themselves previously invited them thither), spoke in reply to the Lacedæmonians; not indeed directly stating the injuries they had received, namely, that they had not recovered Solium from the Athenians, nor Anactorium—with any other point on which they considered themselves to be aggrieved; but urging as a pretext their determination not to betray the Thraceward Greeks; for they had taken oaths to them, both by themselves, when in the first instance they revolted, in concert with the Potidæans, and others afterward. They were not then, they said, violating their oaths to the allies by refusing to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; for since they had sworn to their Thrace ward friends, with appeals to the gods, they should not show a proper regard for their oaths, if they betrayed them.



Besides, it had been expressly mentioned, "unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes;" this, then, they considered an impediment on the part of the gods. Thus much they said on the subject of their former oaths: with regard to the Argive alliance, they would consult with their friends, and do whatever was right. So the envoys of the Lacedæmonians returned home. But there happened to be in Corinth at that time some ambassadors from the Argives also, who urged the Corinthians to enter at once into their confederacy, and not delay. They however, told them to come to the next congress which was to be held in their city.

31. Immediately after, there came also an embassy from the Eleans, who concluded an alliance with the Corinthians in the first place, and then proceeded thence to Argos, as they had been previously instructed, and became allies of the Argives. For they were at variance with the Lacedæmonians just then about Lepreum. For a war having before this arisen between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians, and the Eleans having been invited to alliance by the Lepreans, on condition of receiving half their territory, and having brought the war to a conclusion, the Eleans imposed on the Lepreans, who were themselves allowed to occupy the territory, the payment of a talent to the Olympian Jupiter. This they continued to pay till the Attic war broke out; when, on their ceasing to do so on the pretext of the war, the Eleans proceeded to compel them; on which they had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. When the case was thus submitted to the arbitration of the Lacedæmonians, the Eleans, suspecting that they should not have justice, renounced the reference, and laid waste the Leprean territory. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were independent, and that the Eleans were acting with injustice; and inasmuch as they had not stood by the arbitration, they sent into Lepreum a garrison of heavy-armed troops. So the Eleans, considering the Lacedæmonians to be receiving a city which had revolted from them, and alleging the agreement in which it had been declared, that whatever each party had when they entered on the Attic war, that they should also have when they retired from it; since they considered that they had not their due, they went over to the Argives; and thus they too,<sup>1</sup> as they had been previously instructed, concluded the

<sup>1</sup> καθάπερ προείρητο.] I do not think that this expression can signify,

alliance. Immediately after them the Corinthians and Thraceward Chalcidians also entered into alliance with the Argives; but the Boeotians and Megareans, holding each the same language as the other, remained quiet; being neglected<sup>1</sup> by the according to Bloomfield's translation of it, which Poppo approves, "in the manner aforesaid;" i. e., by communicating with the twelve Argive commissioners, ch. 28. Surely, if that had been the writer's meaning, he would have used the *perfect* tense, not the *pluperfect*. Haack's interpretation, therefore, must be the correct one, "as had been previously ordered by their countrymen." And in sec. 5, where the same words are repeated with reference to the Eleans, they may either refer to the decree passed by the state at large for its own course of policy; or the whole people may be said to have joined the Argive league, though it was done through the agency of its *embassadors*, in accordance with the commands they had received for the purpose.

<sup>1</sup> περιωρώμενοι.] To the interpretation of this word which Arnold adopts from Bishop Thirlwall, Poppo, in his last edition, objects that there was nothing in the terms of the peace to raise such a feeling in the minds of the Boeotians and Megareans. But surely they might share the jealousy and suspicion which, we are told, were excited throughout the whole of the Peloponnese by the clause of the treaty empowering Sparta and Athens to make alterations in it by themselves, without the consent of the allies in general. Chap. 29. 3. At any rate, such a clause seems quite incompatible with the supposition of the Megareans and Boeotians having been treated at this particular time, however they might have been in general, with that extreme respect and attention which Poppo speaks of, and which Göller and other commentators consider to be expressed by περιωρώμενοι. The absence of μέν and δέ, which one would certainly have expected, to mark the opposition between the two clauses, may in some measure be supplied by the adversative force which I have given to the καί; that conjunction in Attic writers sometimes passing into the signification of καίτοι. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. 759. 3. This difficulty would be entirely avoided, and a very appropriate meaning given to the whole sentence, if περιωρώμενοι could be taken in the sense of "left to themselves, not interfered with, permitted to do what they pleased." The verb is very frequently used in a manner closely approaching to this, as well as the cognate ones from which it borrows some of its tenses; but in such cases it is usually followed by a participle, infinitive, or adjective, which serves to limit its meaning to some particular case. If, however, it should be thought possible for it to have been here used without such limitation, it would give a very good reason why the states should prefer the Lacedæmonian alliance to that of the restless and meddling Athenians. It would also express an important difference between the case of the Megareans and Boeotians and that of the Eleans, with whose policy toward the Lepreans Sparta is mentioned as having interfered; and that of the Mantineans, who are expressly said to have abandoned their connection with her, because they expected similar interference. Ch. 29. 1, ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφῶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.

Lacedæmonians, and yet thinking that the democracy of the Argives was less suited to them, with their oligarchical form of government, than the constitution of the Lacedæmonians.

32. About the same period of this summer, the Athenians, having reduced the Scionæans to surrender, put the adult males to death; while they sold into slavery the women and children, and gave the territory for the Plateæans to occupy. On the other hand, they brought back the Delians to their country, from scruples arising from their disasters in different battles, and because the god at Delphi had so commanded them. At this time, too, the Phocians and Locrians commenced hostilities. And the Corinthians and Argives, being now in alliance, went to Tegea, to procure its revolt from the Lacedæmonians, seeing that it formed a considerable part of the Peloponnese, and thinking that, if it were added to them, they would command the whole of it. But when the Tegeans said they would do nothing in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, though hitherto very hearty in their measures, relaxed in their vehemence, and were afraid that none of the other parties might now come over to them. They went, however, to the Bœotians, and begged them to enter into alliance with themselves and the Argives, and act in all other respects in concert with them. With reference to the ten days' truces also, which had been made with each other by the Athenians and the Bœotians not long after the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty, the Corinthians desired the Bœotians to accompany them to Athens, and obtain the same for them also, on the same footing as the Bœotians; and in case of the Athenians not acceding to this, then to renounce the suspension of arms, and in future to make no truce without being joined by them. On the Corinthians preferring these requests, the Bœotians desired them to desist on the subject of the Argive alliance: they went with them, however, to Athens, but did not obtain the ten days' truce; as the Athenians answered, that they were already in treaty with the Corinthians, inasmuch as they were allies of the Lacedæmonians. The Bœotians, then, did not any the more on that account renounce their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians called on them to do so, and expostulated with them on the ground of their having agreed to do it. Between the Corinthians,

however, and the Athenians there was a suspension of arms without any actual truce.<sup>1</sup>

33. The same summer, the Lacedæmonians made an expedition with all their forces, under the command of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, their king, into the country of the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Mantineans, and who had invited their interference in the spirit of faction: intending also, if they could, to demolish the stronghold at Cypsela, which, being situated in the Parrhasian territory, the Mantineans had fortified and garrisoned with their own troops, for the annoyance of the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedæmonians therefore proceeded to ravage the land of the Parrhasians; while the Mantineans, having committed their city to the custody of Argive troops, themselves kept guard over their confederates' country. Being unable, however, to save the fort at Cypsela, and the towns in Parrhasia, they retired. The Lacedæmonians, after making the Parrhasians independent, and demolishing the fortress, returned home.

34. Moreover, in the course of the same summer, on the arrival of the troops from Thrace who had marched out with Brasidas, and whom Clearidas had brought back after the treaty was made, the Lacedæmonians decreed that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free, and live where they pleased; and not long after they settled them, together with the Neodamodes,<sup>2</sup> at Lepreum, which is situated on the borders of Laconia and Elis; for they were now at variance with the Eleans. But with regard to those of their own body who had been taken in the island, and had surrendered their arms, fearing they might suppose that they would be subjected to some degradation in consequence of their misfortune, and so, if allowed to retain their franchise, might attempt a revolution, they disfranchised them, even while some were hold-

<sup>1</sup> "By *ἀσπονδος* is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath. See II. 5. 7."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> "That the Neodamodes were a distinct class from the newly-enfranchised Helots seems clear from this passage and V. 67. 1.; and Müller's supposition is highly probable (*Dorier*, vol. ii. p. 45), that the latter after a time rose to the condition of the former; possibly in the next generation: so that the son of an enfranchised Helot became a Neodamode; like the distinction between *Libertus* and *Libertinus*."—*Arnold*.

ing offices ; and with a disfranchisement of such a kind that they could neither take office, nor have power to buy or sell any thing. Subsequently, however, in the course of time, they were again enfranchised.

35. The same summer also the Dians took Thyssus on the promontory of Athos, a colony of the Athenians. And during the whole of this summer there was intercourse indeed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, but both parties suspected each other, from immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, on the ground of their not mutually restoring the places specified. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell first to restore Amphipolis and the other towns, had not done so : nor did they make their Thraceward allies accede to the treaty, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians ; though they were continually saying that, in conjunction with the Athenians, they would compel those states to do so, if they would not of their own accord. They also pleaded in excuse the fact of the time not being specified, at which those who did not accede to it were to be considered as enemies to both sides. The Athenians therefore, seeing none of these things really performed, suspected that the Lacedæmonians had no upright intentions ; so that on their demanding back Pylus, they refused to restore it (nay, they even repented of having given them back their prisoners taken in the island), and kept the other places, waiting till they, on their part, performed for them what had been arranged. The Lacedæmonians said that they had done what was possible ; for that they had restored the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had recalled the troops in Thrace ; and whatever else they had in their power. With regard to Amphipolis, they were not, they said, masters of it, so as to give it up ; but they would endeavor to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians over to the treaty, and to recover Panactum ; and would restore as many of the Athenians as were prisoners in Bœotia. They required, however, that they should restore Pylus to them ; or if not that, should withdraw the Messanians and Helots, as they, on their part, had withdrawn their troops from Thrace ; and that the Athenians themselves should garrison it, if they would. So when conferences had been held, many and often, during this summer, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messanians, and the rest of the Helots, and all who

had deserted from Laconia; and they settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia. During this summer, then, there was peace and free intercourse with each other.

36. But the following winter (different ephors happening now to be in office, and not those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them being even opposed to it), when embassies had come from their confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were there, and they had held many discussions with one another, and come to no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and Xenares—those of the ephors who most wished to break up the treaty—held a private conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to pursue as far as possible the same policy; and that the Boeotians, after first entering into alliance with Argos themselves, should then endeavor to bring the Argives together with themselves into alliance with the Lacedæmonians. For in this way the Boeotians were least likely to be forced to accede to the Attic treaty; since the Lacedæmonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives even at the risk of the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedæmonians were always desirous that Argos should be their friend on fair terms; thinking that so the war out of the Peloponnese would be more easily conducted by them. They begged the Boeotians, however, to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians; that by getting back Pylus, if they could, in exchange for it, they might more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians.

37. The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus, and such of the Lacedæmonians as were friendly toward them,<sup>1</sup> these instructions to carry to their governments, went each their way. But two persons of the Argives, who held the highest office in their country, watched for them by the way, as they were returning; and having met them, entered into conversation with them on

<sup>1</sup> *πρό.*] More literally, "in the face of." Poppo adopts Dobree's explanation. "Pluris enim facturos Lacedæmonios Argivorum amicitiam et societatem quam Atheniensium inimicitiam ac fœderum cum ipsis junctorum violationem: i. e., magis illam cupere quam hanc metuere." For the force of *καλῶς*, in the next sentence, see Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> *ἀντοῖς.*] i. e., to the Boeotians and Corinthians, not to Xenares and Cleobulus, as Bloomfield supposes. Compare sec. 3.

the possibility of the Bœotians becoming their allies, as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for if that could be well arranged, they thought they might then, on advantageous terms, both carry on war and make peace, both with the Lacedæmonians, if they should wish it—holding the same language all together—and with whomever else it might be necessary. The Bœotian envoys were pleased at hearing this; for they happened to ask the same things as their friends in Lacedæmon had instructed them to propose. So when the men from Argos perceived that they listened to their suggestions, they said they would send ambassadors to the Bœotians, and went away. The Bœotians, on their arrival, reported to the Bœotarchs what had been said to them, both at Lacedæmon, and by the Argives who had met them: and the Bœotarchs were pleased, and were much more eager in the business, since it had turned out so luckily for them in both quarters, that their friends among the Lacedæmonians requested the same things as the Argives were anxiously wishing. Not long after, ambassadors came from Argos with the proposals that have been mentioned; whom the Bœotarchs sent back after assenting to their terms, and promising to send envoys to Argos on the question of the alliance.

38. In the mean time it was determined by the Bœotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the ambassadors from Thrace, in the first place, to bind themselves by oaths to each other, that assuredly, when occasion offered, they would assist the party which needed it; and that they would carry on war with none, or make peace, without common assent; and that so the Bœotians and Megareans (for they had the same object before them) should then enter into treaty with the Argives. But before the oaths were taken, the Bœotarchs communicated these resolutions to the four councils of the Bœotians, which have the sole power of ratifying measures; and recommended to them that oaths should be exchanged with such cities as wished to league with them for mutual assistance. However, the members of the Bœotian councils did not accede to the plan, fearing that they should do what was displeasing to the Lacedæmonians, if they leagued with the Corinthians, who had separated from them. For the Bœotarchs did not tell them of what had taken place at Lacedæmon, namely, that Cleobulus and Xenares, among the ephors, and their friends, advised them first to

enter into alliance with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to join the Lacedæmonians; as they imagined that though they should not mention it, the council would decree nothing different from what they had previously determined on,<sup>1</sup> and now recommended to their country. When the business had met with this check, the ambassadors from Corinth and Thrace departed without concluding any thing; while the Bœotarchs, who before intended, if they carried these measures, to attempt also to effect the alliance with the Argives, did not now bring the question of the Argives before the councils, or send to Argos the ambassadors they had promised; but there arose an indifference and procrastination in the whole business.

39. In the course of the same summer, the Olynthians assaulted and took Mecyberna, which was garrisoned by Athenians. After these events, conferences being continually held between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians respecting the possessions of each other which they still retained, the Lacedæmonians, hoping that, if the Athenians should receive back Panactum from the Bœotians, they would themselves recover Pylus, went on an embassy to the Bœotians, and begged them to deliver up to them Panactum and the Athenian prisoners that they might recover Pylus in exchange for them. But the Bœotians refused to deliver them up, unless they would make an especial alliance with them, as with the Athenians. Although therefore the Lacedæmonians were aware that they should be acting wrong to the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that they should make neither peace nor war with any but by mutual consent; yet, as they wished to receive Panactum from them, believing that so they should recover Pylus, and as the party which was anxious to break

<sup>1</sup> σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινούν. Arnold is followed by Poppo and Bloomfield in supposing that σφίσι refers to the subject of ψηφιεσθαι; but as his explanation does not, I think, remove the extreme harshness of such a construction, Gölter seems to be right in referring it to the Bœotarchs; except that I would not confine it, as he does, to Xenares and Cleobulus, but extend it to the whole number of them; and suppose that it is either governed by προδιαγνόντες, meaning, "the plan which they had already decided on for themselves, and now recommended to the councils;" or that it signifies "their countrymen;" the executive being identified with the people at large, as it appears to be in sec. 3. Οἱ βοιωτάρχαι—παρήνον γενέσθαι ὁρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ σφίσι ξυνομνύναι. If the former construction is preferred, σφίσι may be considered as a "dativus commodi." See Jelf, Gr. Gr. 59. 8.



up the treaty earnestly entered into the Bœotian negotiation; they concluded the alliance, when the winter was now closing and the spring at hand; and Panactum was immediately begun to be demolished. And thus ended the eleventh year of this war.

40. As soon as the spring of the next summer commenced, the Argives finding that the Bœotian ambassadors, whom they said they would send, did not come, and that Panactum was being demolished, and an especial alliance had been concluded by the Bœotians with the Lacedæmonians, were afraid that they might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to the Lacedæmonians. For they supposed that the Bœotians had been persuaded by the Lacedæmonians both to demolish Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; and that the Athenians were privy to these measures; so that they themselves had no longer power even to make alliance with the Athenians: whereas they hoped before, in consequence of the existing dissensions, that if their treaty with the Lacedæmonians should not continue, they would, at any rate, be in alliance with the Athenians. The Argives, then, were involved in these difficulties, and feared they might be engaged in war at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, Bœotians, and Athenians: and consequently, though they did not before accept the treaty with the Lacedæmonians, but entertained the proud hope that they should enjoy the supremacy over the Peloponnese; they sent as envoys to Lacedæmon, as quickly as they could, Eustrophus and Æson, who were considered to be the most acceptable persons to them; thinking to live in quiet by making a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, as they best could under present circumstances, whatever might be the arrangement.<sup>1</sup>

41. On the arrival of their ambassadors, they made proposals to the Lacedæmonians, as to the terms on which the treaty should be concluded between them. And at first the Argives claimed that they should have a judicial reference granted them, either to some state or individual, respecting the Cynurian territory; concerning which they have always been debating as it is border-land: (it contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by the Lacedæmonians.)

<sup>1</sup> Or, "on whatever terms they might be allowed." See Bloomfield's note.

Afterward, when the Lacedæmonians begged them not to mention that, but said that if they wished to make a treaty as before, they were ready to do so; the Argive ambassadors nevertheless induced the Lacedæmonians to agree to the following conditions; that at the present time they should make a treaty for fifty years; but that on either party giving a challenge, at a time when there was neither plague nor war in Lacedæmon or Argos, they should be at liberty to decide by battle the question of this territory—as on a former occasion, when each side claimed the victory for themselves—but not to pursue the fugitives beyond the frontiers, whether toward Argos or Lacedæmon. Now the Lacedæmonians at first considered this as mere folly; but afterward (for they were anxious on any terms to have Argos for a friend), they agreed to the conditions they demanded, and made a treaty with them in writing. Before, however, any thing was definitely arranged, the Lacedæmonians desired them to return first to Argos, and show it to their people; and if it pleased them, then to come at the Hyacinthia, to take the oaths. Accordingly they returned.

42. In the mean time, while the Argives were negotiating these matters, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromedes, Phœdimus, and Antimenidas, who were to restore Panactum to the Athenians, and to receive the prisoners from the Bœotians, and bring them back home, found Panactum demolished by the Bœotians themselves, on the pretext of there having been exchanged in former times between the Athenians and Bœotians, in consequence of a dispute about it, an oath that neither party should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in common. The men, however, whom the Bœotians held as prisoners taken from the Athenians, Andromedes and his colleagues received from them, and conveyed to Athens, and restored. They likewise announced to them the demolition of Panactum, thinking that so they restored that too;<sup>1</sup> for no enemy to the Athenians would in future inhabit it. On this announcement the Athenians expressed great indignation; thinking themselves wronged by the Lacedæmonians, both with regard to the demolition of Panactum, which they ought to have delivered up to them standing, and the intelligence of

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Poppo explains it, "that that very announcement was equivalent to restoring it."

their having on their own account made treaty with the Boeotians, though they formerly declared that they would join in compelling those who did not accede to the general treaty. They also looked for any other points in which they had departed from their compact, and considered themselves to have been overreached by them ; so that they gave an angry reply to the ambassadors, and sent them away.

43. When the Lacedæmonians, then, were in such a state of variance with the Athenians, those at Athens, again, who wished to do away with the treaty, were immediately urgent against it. Among others who were so was Alcibiades son of Clinias, a man who in age was still at that time a youth (as he would have been thought in any other state), but honored on account of the nobility of his ancestors. He considered that it was really better to side with the Argives ; though he also opposed the treaty in the bitterness of wounded pride, because the Lacedæmonians had negotiated through the agency of Nicias and Laches, having overlooked him on account of his youth, and not having shown him the respect suitable to the old connection of his family as their *proxeni*, which, having been renounced by his grandfather, he himself thought to renew by showing attention to the prisoners taken in the island. Considering himself therefore to be in every way slighted by them, he both spoke against the treaty in the first instance, saying that the Lacedæmonians were not to be depended upon, but were only making a treaty in order that by so doing they might deprive Athens of the Argives, and again come against them when left alone ; and at that time, when this difference had arisen, he immediately sent to Argos on his own account, urging them to come as quickly as possible with proposals for alliance, in company with the Mantineans and Eleans, since it was a fine opportunity, and he would co-operate with them to the utmost.

44. When the Argives received this message, and found that the alliance with the Boeotians had not been brought about in concert with the Athenians, but that they were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedæmonians ; they thought no more of their ambassadors at Lacedæmon, who were just at that time gone thither on the subject of the treaty, but paid more attention to the Athenians ; thinking that so, if they went to war, there would be on their side in it a state

which had been their friend from of old, and was under a democratical form of government, like themselves, and wielded a great power in the command of the sea. They immediately therefore sent ambassadors to the Athenians to treat of the alliance; and were also accompanied by envoys from the Eleans and Mantineans.

There came likewise with all speed, as ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians, persons who were thought to be favorably inclined toward the Athenians, namely Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; through fear that in their anger they might conclude the alliance with the Argives, and at the same time to ask back Pylus in exchange for Panactum, and to plead in excuse for the Bœotian alliance, that it had not been made for the purpose of hurting the Athenians.

45. By speaking in the counsel on these points, and declaring that they had come with full powers to effect a settlement of all their disputes, they made Alcibiades afraid that if they were to talk in the same strain to the popular assembly, they would win over the multitude, and the Argive alliance would be rejected. He adopted therefore the following device against them. He gained the confidence of the Lacedæmonians by giving them a solemn assurance, that if they would not acknowledge in the assembly that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylus to them (for he would himself persuade the Athenians to the measure, as he now opposed it), and would settle all other points of difference. It was with a wish to withdraw them from the influence of Nicias that he did this; and in order that by accusing them before the people, as having no sincere intentions, and never saying the same thing, he might cause the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, to be taken into alliance. And so it turned out. For when, on coming before the people and being asked that question, they did not say, as they had said in the council, that they were come with full powers, the Athenians could endure it no longer; but on Alcibiades' exclaiming against the Lacedæmonians much more vehemently than before, they both listened to him, and were ready straightway to bring forward the Argives and those who were with them, and take them into alliance. An earthquake, however, having occurred before any thing was finally settled, that assembly was adjourned.

46. In the one which was held next day, although the

Lacedæmonians had been outwitted, and he himself utterly deceived with regard to their confessing not to have come with full powers, Nicias nevertheless maintained that they ought rather to become friends of the Lacedæmonians, and, deferring their measures with the Argives, to send once more to them, and ascertain their intentions. He represented that it was to their own honor,<sup>1</sup> but to their rivals' discredit, for the war to be put off: for since their own affairs were in so good a condition, it was best to preserve their prosperity as long as possible; whereas to the Lacedæmonians, in their present misfortunes, it would be gain to run all hazards as quickly as possible. So he prevailed on them to send ambassadors, of whom he was himself one, to bid the Lacedæmonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum standing, with Amphipolis, and to give up their alliance with the Bœotians, if they refused to accede to the treaty; as it had been stipulated that they should make peace with none but by mutual consent. They told them also to say, that *they* too, if they had wished to act unjustly, might have already taken the *Argives* for their allies, since they were come to them for that very purpose. And whatever complaint they had against them, they gave instructions on the subject to Nicias and his colleagues, and then sent them off. When they came there, and, after delivering their other messages, finally declared, that unless they gave up their alliance with the Bœotians, in case of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians also would take as their allies the Argives and those who joined them; the Lacedæmonians refused to renounce the alliance with the Bœotians—the party of Xenares, the ephor, and all the rest who had the same views, having sufficient influence to secure that—but the oaths they renewed at the request of Nicias: for he was afraid of returning with all his objects unaccomplished, and of being exposed to censure (as indeed was the case), since he was considered as the author of the treaty with the Lacedæmonians. On his return, when the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedæmon, immediately they were enraged; and since they considered

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold, Poppo, and others explain it, "advising that hostilities should be deferred." For a very similar use of *ἐν* with an adjective, compare I. 137. 6, *ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἔμοι, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἢ ἀποκομιδῇ ἐγίγνετο*.

themselves injured, the Argives and their allies happening to be present (having been introduced by Alcibiades), they made a treaty and alliance with them on the following terms:

47. "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans made a treaty for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies in their respective dominions, to be observed without guile or injury, both by land and by sea. That it shall not be allowed to take up arms with a mischievous design, either for the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, against the Athenians, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, by any means whatever.

"That the following are the terms on which the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a hundred years.

"That in case of an enemy marching against the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the succor of Athens, according to whatever message the Athenians may send them, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all these states; and that no one of them shall be at liberty to terminate hostilities with that state, unless they all think fit to do so. That the Athenians likewise shall go to the succor of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, in case of an enemy marching against the Elean, Mantinean, or Argive territory, according to whatever message these states may send, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Athenians, Eleans, Mantineans, and Argives, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all of them; and that it shall not be lawful to terminate hostilities with that state, unless all the states think fit to do so.

"That they shall not allow armed troops to pass for hostile purposes through their own land, or that of the allies in their respective dominions, nor by sea, unless all the states, the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, have decreed that their passage be allowed.

"That to the troops going as succors the state which

sends them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their arrival in the state which sent them word to succor it, and on their return in the same way: but that in case of their wishing to avail themselves of their service for a longer time, the state which sent for them shall supply them with provisions at the rate of three Æginetan oboli a day for a heavy-armed soldier, a light-armed, or a bowman, and of an Æginetan drachma for a horseman.

"That the state which sent for them shall have the command, while the war is in its own territory; but that in case of the states resolving to make a joint expedition in any quarter, an equal share of the command shall be enjoyed by all the states.

"That the treaty shall be sworn to, by the Athenians on behalf both of themselves and their allies, but on the part of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by each several state. That they shall swear that oath respectively which is the most binding in their country, over full-grown victims, and the oath shall be to this effect; 'I will stand by this alliance according to the stipulations, honestly, without injury, and without guile, and will not violate it by any method or means whatever.' That the persons to take the oath shall be, at Athens, the council and the home magistrates, the prytanes administering it; at Argos, the council,<sup>1</sup> the eighty, and the *artynæ*, the eighty administering it; at Mantinea, the *demiurgi*, the council, and the other magistrates, the *theori* and the polemarchs administering it; at Elis, the *demiurgi*, the magistrates, and the six hundred, the *demiurgi* and *thesmophulaces* administering it. That the oaths shall be renewed, by the Athenians, on going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos, thirty days before the Olympic festival; by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, on going to Athens, ten days before the great Panathenaic festival.

"That the stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance, shall be inscribed on a stone pillar, by the Athenians, in the citadel; by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo; by the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter in the market-place: and that a brazen pillar shall be erected at their joint expense at Olympia, at the present festi-

<sup>1</sup> For what little is known of the several offices here mentioned, see Arnold's note, and the authorities quoted in it.

val. That should these states think it better to make any addition to the articles agreed on, whatever seems fit to all the states, on holding common deliberation, that shall be binding."

48. In this way were the treaty and alliances concluded; and yet that between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians was not renounced on this account by either party. But though the Corinthians were allies of the Argives, they did not accede to the new treaty. Nay, before this time, when an alliance was formed between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, to be at war and peace with the same states, they did not join the league, but said that they were content with the first alliance which had been made for purposes of defense, on condition of succoring one another, but not joining to attack any party. The Corinthians, then, thus stood aloof from their allies, and turned their thoughts again toward the Lacedæmonians.

49. The Olympic festival was held this summer, that at which Androstenes the Arcadian was victor the first time in the pancratium.<sup>1</sup> The Lacedæmonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists, as refusing to pay the fine to which the Eleans, by virtue of the Olympian law, had condemned them, alleging that they had attacked the fortress of Phyræus, and sent a body of their heavy-armed into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine imposed upon them was two thousand minæ, being two for each heavy-armed soldier, as the law ordains. But the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors, and pleaded that it had not been fairly imposed upon them; declaring that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at Lacedæmon, when they sent their troops into Lepreum. The Eleans, however, maintained that the cessation of arms in their country had already commenced (for they proclaim it among themselves first), and that while they were living in quiet, and not expecting any thing, as it was a time of truce, the Lacedæmonians had committed an injury upon them by surprise. The Lacedæmonians replied that there was no need of the Eleans having still proclaimed the truce at Lacedæmon, if they had thought them already guilty of injustice; but they had done so, as not thinking it; and they themselves had no longer gone any where to attack them. The Eleans, however,

<sup>1</sup> Consisting of wrestling and boxing.



adhered to the same statement, namely, that they could never be persuaded that they were not guilty; but that if they would restore Lepreum to them, they were ready to give up their own share of the money, and would themselves pay for them that which fell to the god.

50. When they did not comply, they required them again to do as follows: not to give back Lepreum, if they objected to it, but to mount on the altar of the Olympian Jupiter—since they were so anxious to have access to the temple—and swear before the Greeks that assuredly they would discharge the fine at a future period. But when they would not do this either, the Lacedæmonians were excluded from the temple—from the sacrifice and from the games—and made their offerings at home; while the rest of the Greeks, except the Lepreans, sent their deputations to the festival. However, the Eleans were afraid of their sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed company of their young men; while there also came to them a body of Argives and Mantineans, each a thousand strong, and some Athenian cavalry, that were at Argos, waiting for the festival. And a great alarm was produced in the assembly lest the Lacedæmonians should come in arms; especially after Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, was scourged on the course by the lictors,<sup>1</sup> because, on his horses being the winners, and the Boeotian people being proclaimed victor, on account of his having no right to enter the lists, he came forward on to the course, and crowned the charioteer, from a wish to show that the chariot was his. All therefore were now much more afraid, and thought there would be some disturbance. However, the Lacedæmonians kept quiet, and let the feast thus pass by. After the Olympic festival, the Argives and their allies repaired to Corinth, to beg that state to come over to them. Some Lacedæmonian ambassadors, too, happened to be there; and after there had been much discussion, nothing was accomplished at last; but an earthquake having occurred, they dispersed to their several homes. And so the summer ended.

51. The following winter the Heracleans in Trachinia fought a battle with the Ænianians, Dolopians, Maleans, and some of the Thessalians. For these nations were bordering on, and hostile to, their city; as it was against no other country but

<sup>1</sup> Or, "by the umpires," as Bredow, Haack and others think.

theirs that the place was fortified. Accordingly they opposed the city on its first settlement, by annoying it as far as they could; and at this time they defeated the Heracleans in the engagement, Xenares, son of Cnidis, a Lacedæmonian, being slain, and others of the Heracleans also cut off. And thus the winter ended, and the twelfth year of the war.

52. At the very commencement of the following summer, the Bœotians seized on Heraclea, when it was miserably reduced after the battle, and sent away Hegesippidas the Lacedæmonian, on the charge of governing it ill. They occupied the place through fear that, while the Lacedæmonians were distracted with the affairs of the Peloponnese, the Athenians might take it. The Lacedæmonians, however, were offended with them for what they had done. The same summer, Alcibiades son of Clinias, being one of the generals at Athens, having the co-operation of the Argives and the allies, went into the Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy-armed and bowmen; and taking with him some of the allies in those parts, both proceeded to settle in concert with them other matters connected with the alliance, marching about the Peloponnese with his troops, and persuaded the Patreans to carry their walls down to the sea; intending also himself to build a fort beside the Achæan Rhium. But the Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all to whose injury it would have been built, came against him, and prevented his doing it.

53. The same summer a war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives; nominally, about the offering to Apollo Pythæus, which the Epidaurians were bound to make, but did not, for certain lands by the river side;<sup>1</sup> (the Argives had the chief management of the temple;) but even independently of this charge, Alcibiades and the Argives thought it desirable to get possession of Epidaurus, if they could; both to insure the neutrality of Corinth, and thinking that the Athenians would find it a shorter passage for their succors through Ægina, than by sailing round Scyllæum. The Argives therefore prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, in order to exact the offering.

<sup>1</sup> I have adopted Poppo's reading, *παραποταμίων*, as Arnold himself confesses that the common one, *βοταμίων*, is perfectly inexplicable. Of Bloomfield's conjecture, *βοτανόμων*, "pastures," Poppo says, "refutatione non indiget."

54. The Lacedæmonians, too, at the same time marched out with all their forces to Leuctra, on their own borders, opposite Mount Lycæum, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, their king; but no one knew what was their destination, not even the cities<sup>1</sup> from which contingents were sent. When, however, the omens from their sacrifices were not favorable for crossing the border, they both returned home themselves, and sent word to their allies to prepare to take the field after the ensuing month; (that being the month Carneus, a holy period among the Dorians). On their retiring, the Argives marched out on the 26th of the month preceding Carneus;<sup>2</sup> and advancing that day the whole of the time, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and proceeded to lay it

<sup>1</sup> Duker and Poppo suppose the cities of Laconia to be here intended.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed Arnold's former interpretation of this very doubtful passage, as appearing less objectionable, on the whole, than any other that has been proposed; though he himself abandons it in his last edition. Gölter and Bloomfield put the comma after *ταύτην*, and read *ἐσέβαλλον*; but to this there is what appears to me an insuperable objection. Often as the verb *ἐσβάλλω* occurs in Thucydides, it is never used, when speaking of a country, to signify a continuance of offensive measures; but always expresses the one definite act of crossing an enemy's borders and invading his territory; and the case is the same with regard to the cognate substantive *ἐσβολή*. The imperfect tense therefore, though quite appropriate for expressing the ravages which troops continued to make when once in the country, is inappropriate with reference to the invasion itself; and could only be used with *πάντα τὸν χρόνον* on the supposition of the army retreating within its own frontier continually, and invading the country afresh; which is not only improbable in this particular instance, but in direct opposition to the first sentence of the next chapter: "*καὶ καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδάυρῳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν.*" Accordingly, in the very next chapter, sec. 2, we have the aorist *ἐσέβαλον* followed by the imperfect *ἐδῶν*; and as all the MSS. but two have the same reading here, there can be no doubt, I think, of its being the genuine one. Poppo objects to Gölter's explanation, but does not propose any thing himself. Bp. Thirlwall adopts that of Portus, Acacius, and Hoffmann; "although they have always kept that day holy." To this Arnold objects; "but can Thucydides have written *καὶ ἄγοντες* as signifying *καίπερ ἄγοντες*?" I certainly do not see why he could not, since he appears to have used a similar construction elsewhere; see VI. 16. 6, *ἐξ οὗ καὶ περιγεγόμενοι τῇ μαχῇ οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν βεβαίως θαρσύνουσι*; if not also 16. 4. But it is perhaps a more solid objection, that he never uses either *ἄγειν* with *ἡμέραν* in that sense (though he does with *ἐορτήν*); nor *πάντα τὸν χρόνον* to signify "the whole course of time," as distinguished from "the whole of the time," i. e., of some definite period; but either *αἰεὶ* or *διὰ παντός*. Nor, again, does the statement thus supposed to be made respecting the holy day rest on any thing but assumption.

waste. The Epidaurians invoked the aid of their allies; but some of them pleaded the month as an excuse, while others, even after coming to the borders of Epidaurus, remained inactive.

55. At the time that the Argives were in Epidaurus, deputations from the states assembled at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. And when the conference began, the Corinthians said that their words did not agree with their deeds; since *they* were sitting in council on the subject of peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each other under arms. Deputies therefore from each party ought first to go and separate the armies, and then come and speak again on the subject of peace. In compliance with this sentiment, they went and brought back the Argives out of the Epidaurian territory. They then assembled again, but could not even then come to any agreement; but the Argives again invaded Epidaurus, and laid it waste. The Lacedæmonians, too, marched out to Caryæ; and returned again, when the omens on that occasion also proved unfavorable to them. The Argives, after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Moreover, a thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians had come to their assistance, with Alcibiades as general; but on learning that the Lacedæmonians had ended their expedition, and that there was no longer any need for them, they returned home. And so the summer passed by.

56. The following winter, the Lacedæmonians eluded the vigilance of the Athenians in sending by sea to Epidaurus three hundred garrison troops, under command of Agesippidas. The Argives therefore went to the Athenians, and complained, that though it had been specified in the treaty that they should not allow an enemy to pass through their respective countries, they had allowed them to go there by sea; and therefore they should consider themselves aggrieved, if the Athenians, on their side, did not take the Messenians and Helots to Pylus, to annoy the Lacedæmonians. So the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, inscribed at the bottom of the Laconian pillar, that the Lacedæmonians had not adhered to their oaths; and they conveyed the Helots who were at Cranii to Pylus, to plunder the country; though in other respects they remained quiet. Now in the course of hostilities during this winter between the Argives and Epidaurians, no

pitched battle was fought, but there were only ambuscades and skirmishes, in which some were slain on each side, as might happen. When the winter was closing, and spring was now at hand, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, supposing that it would be left unguarded on account of the war, and intending to take it by storm; but returned unsuccessful. And thus the winter ended, and the thirteenth year of this war.

57. In the middle of the next summer, when the Lacedæmonians saw that the Epidaurians, who were their allies, were in distress, and that the other states in the Peloponnese had either separated from them, or were unfavorably disposed toward them; thinking that if they did not quickly prevent it, they would proceed to a greater degree of disaffection, they marched with all their forces, themselves and the Helots, against Argos, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. They were accompanied by the Tegeans, and as many others of the Arcadians as were in alliance with them. The allies in the rest of the Peloponnese also, and those beyond it, mustered at Phlius; the Bœotians with five thousand heavy-armed, the same number of light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and an equal number of *hamippi*; <sup>1</sup> the Corinthians with two thousand heavy-armed; the rest as might severally happen; but the Phliasians in full force, as the army was posted in their country.

58. Now the Argives had from the first been aware of the preparations of the Lacedæmonians; and when they were on their march for the purpose of joining the rest at Phlius, then they also took the field. They were reinforced by the Mantineans with their allies, and by three thousand heavy-armed of the Eleans. And as they advanced, they met the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium in Arcadia, and each army occupied a hill. The Argives then prepared to engage the Lacedæmonians, cut off as they were by themselves: but Agis broke up in the night, and eluding them, proceeded to the rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives, on finding this, marched, as soon as it was morning, to Argos first, and then to where they expected the Lacedæmonians with their allies would descend into their country, namely, the road running by Nemea. Agis,

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, light infantry who accompanied the cavalry into action. See Poppo's note.

however, did not take that road, as they expected him to do; but having given orders to the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he advanced by another and more difficult route, and so came down into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians had been ordered to descend by that leading to Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order that, if the Argives should advance into the plain against his own division, they might hang on their rear, and use their cavalry with effect. He then, having made these arrangements and entered the plain, proceeded to ravage Saminthus and other places.

59. The Argives, having discovered it, advanced from Nemea, when it was now day, to their succor; and falling in with the forces of the Phliasians and Corinthians, killed a few of the former, but themselves had rather more killed by the latter. And now the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians advanced, as they had been ordered, toward Nemea, and found the Argives no longer there; but they had gone down, on seeing their property ravaged, and were forming for battle; while the Lacedæmonians also were preparing to meet them. Now the Argives were intercepted in the midst of their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedæmonians and those with them excluded them from their city; above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and in the direction of Nemea the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. They had no cavalry with them;<sup>1</sup> for the Athenians alone of all the allies had not yet joined them. Now the mass of the Argives and their allies did not consider their present position so formidable; but fancied that the battle would be fought on favorable terms, and that they had intercepted the Lacedæmonians in their own country, and close by their city. But two individuals of the Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the *proxenus* of the Lacedæmonians, when the armies were now on the very point of engaging, went to Agis, and in a conference urged him not to bring on a battle; since the Argives were prepared to give and accept fair and equal arbitration for whatever complaints the Lacedæmonians had against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace for the future.

<sup>1</sup> Implying, of course, that the Athenians were the only people among the confederates who had any cavalry.

60. Those of the Argives who made these statements did so on their own authority, and not by order of the people; and Agis on his own discretion received their proposals; and without consulting, any more than *they* had, with the majority, but only communicating them to one of the officers who joined the expedition, granted a truce for four months, during which they were to fulfill their agreement. And so he immediately led back the army, without explaining the matter to any of the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians and allies followed, indeed, as he led them, out of respect for the law; but among each other they blamed him exceedingly, considering that when they had had an opportunity of fighting on favorable terms, and their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by infantry and cavalry, they were returning without having achieved any thing worthy of their preparations. For indeed this was the finest Grecian army that had ever been brought together up to that time; and it appeared such especially while it was still all united at Nemea, consisting of the Lacedæmonians in full force, the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and those, too, all picked men from their respective populations, and thinking themselves a match, not only for the Argive confederacy, but even for another such added to it. Thus then the army, finding great fault with Agis, withdrew, and dispersed to their several homes. But the Argives, on their side, blamed far more severely still those who had concluded the truce without consulting the people; as they too thought that the Lacedæmonians had escaped when they never could have had a finer opportunity of destroying them; since the contest would have been decided near their own city, and in concert with many brave allies. On their return therefore they began to stone Thrasyllus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all causes that may arise from any expedition, before they enter the city. He escaped by flying for refuge to the altar; his property, however, was confiscated by them.

61. After this, when the Athenian succors arrived, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred cavalry, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives being loath, notwithstanding their arrival, to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians, commanded them to go back, though they wished to make a communication to them, and did

not grant them a public audience, until the Mantineans and Eleans (for they were still there), by their entreaties, constrained them to do so. The Athenians then—Alcibiades being present as ambassador—spoke before the Argives and their allies to this effect; that it was not right for the truce<sup>1</sup> even to have been made, without the consent of the other allies; and that now, since their force had come so seasonably, they ought to proceed to hostilities. And having persuaded the allies by their arguments, they immediately marched against Orchomenus, all but the Argives, who, though persuaded to the measure, still staid behind at first; afterward, however, they also went. Thus they all sat down before Orchomenus, and besieged it, and made assaults upon it; being for other reasons desirous to get possession of it, and especially as some hostages from Arcadia were deposited there by the Lacedæmonians. The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the number of the hostile forces, and fearing, since no succors had arrived, that they might perish before they did, surrendered on condition of joining the confederacy, giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and delivering up those whom the Lacedæmonians had deposited with them.

62. After this, when the allies were now in possession of Orchomenus, they consulted to which of the remaining places they should proceed first. The Eleans urged them to go against Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans. The Eleans, being angry at their not determining to march against Lepreum, returned home; while the rest of the allies made preparations at Mantinea for proceeding against Tegea; and a party of the Tegeans themselves in the town were ready to give up the government to them.

63. As for the Lacedæmonians, when they had returned from Argos after concluding the four months' truce, they blamed Agis exceedingly for not having brought Argos into subjection to them, when there was so fine an opportunity as they thought had never before presented itself; for it was no easy thing to find so many and such allies collected together.

<sup>1</sup> καὶ γένοιτο.] Arnold and Poppo agree with Bauer in thinking that καὶ ought to have been put before αἱ σπονδαί; but may it not be intended to qualify γένοιτο alone, as I have taken it? in which case it stands just as it ought.



But when tidings also came of the capture of Orchomenus, they were far more enraged, and under the influence of anger resolved immediately (contrary to their general habit) that they ought to demolish his house, and fine him ten thousand drachmas. But he besought them to do none of these thing; for he would atone for his faults by good service when he next took the field, or they might then do to him whatever they pleased. Accordingly, they abstained from the fine and the demolition of his house, but passed a law at that time which had never before existed among them; for they chose ten Spartans to act as counselors with him, without whose consent he should have no power to lead an army out of the city.

64. Meanwhile intelligence reached them from their friends in Tegea, that unless they came there quickly, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and their allies, and that it had all but done so. Upon this then succor was given them by the Lacedæmonians and their helots in full force, with vigor, and in such a way as had never been done before. They advanced to Orestheum, in the Mænalian territory; and commanded those of the Arcadians who were their allies to muster and march close after them to Tegea; while they themselves, after coming all of them as far as Orestheum, from that place sent back home the sixth part of their force, for which were included those who were too old or too young for foreign service, to protect their property at home, and with the remainder of their army arrived at Tegea, where their allies from Arcadia joined them not long after. They also sent to the Corinthians, Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, with orders to reinforce them as quickly as possible at Mantinea. But to these the notice was short, and it was not easy, except in a body, and after waiting for each other, to cross the enemy's territory; for it closed up the communication, lying just in the way of it: however, they made all haste notwithstanding. The Lacedæmonians, meanwhile, taking with them their Arcadian allies who had joined them, invaded the territory of Mantinea, and having encamped near the temple of Hercules, laid waste the land.

65. The Argives and their allies, on seeing them, occupied a position that was strong and difficult of access, and drew up their troops for action. The Lacedæmonians and their allies immediately advanced against them, and proceeded to within

stone's throw or arrow-shot; when one of the elders called out to Agis, "that he was purposing to cure evil with evil;" meaning that his present unseasonable eagerness was intended to be a reparation of his culpable retreat from Argos. He then, whether in consequence of this exclamation, or because he was himself suddenly struck by some resolution, different from what he had before adopted, led his army back again with all speed, before the engagement had begun; and going into the Tegean country, diverted over that of the Mantineans the water about which the Tegeans and Mantineans are continually engaged in hostilities, as it causes a general injury to whichever country it falls into. His object was to bring the Argives and their allies down from the hill, on their coming to resist the diversion of the water, when they heard of it, and so to fight the battle on the plain. Accordingly, after staying there in the neighborhood of the water,<sup>1</sup> during that day, he turned it off. The Argives and their allies, on the other hand, were at first amazed at his sudden retreat, when at so short a distance from them, and did not know what to conjecture. Afterward, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight, while they themselves remained still, and did not follow them, they then began to blame their generals again; both because, on the former occasion, the Lacedæmonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; and now, when they were running away, no one pursued them; but with perfect quiet the enemy were saving themselves, while *they* were being betrayed. The generals, then, were at the moment confounded, but afterward they led them off from the hill, and having advanced on to the plain, pitched their camp, with the intention of advancing against the enemy.

66. The next day the Argives and their allies formed their line as they intended to engage, should they fall in with their

<sup>1</sup> Though it is true, as Arnold observes, that neither *βοηθούντας*, nor the participle in the other passages quoted by Poppo, is, strictly speaking, a present put for a future; yet the full meaning of those participles appears to be most naturally conveyed in English by the *sign* of the future, since they are expressive of intention; a force which the present indicative frequently has, and which might therefore be expected in the participle as well. For other instances of it in Thucydides, compare II. 65. 8, *διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσήκοντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τε λέγειν*. IV. 61. 1, *χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἐτοῖμα βλάπτοντας συμμαχούς τε ἐπάγεσθαι*, κ. τ. λ.

opponents; and the Lacedæmonians, on going back again from the water to the temple of Hercules, into their old encampment, see the enemy at a short distance from them, all by this time in order of battle, and advanced from the hill. The Lacedæmonians, then, were on this occasion in the greatest consternation they had ever experienced within their memory. For their preparations had to be made on a short notice; and immediately they fell into their ranks in a hurry, Agis, their king, giving all orders, according to the law. For when a king is at the head of an army, all commands are given by him; and he communicates to the *polemarchs* what is to be done, they to the *lochagi*, those to the *penteconters*, these again to the *enomotarchs*, and these to their *enomoty*; and thus their orders, whatever they wish to be done, pass in the same manner, and quickly reach the troops; for pretty nearly all the army of the Lacedæmonians, a small portion excepted, are officers over officers; and to attend to what is going on, is a duty incumbent on many.

67. On that occasion the Sciritæ formed their left wing; who alone of the Lacedæmonians have always that post by themselves. Next to them were the soldiers who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes with them. Then came the Lacedæmonians themselves, with their *lochi* posted one after the other; by their side the Arcadians of Heræa; after them the Mænalians; and on the right wing the Tegeans, with a few of the Lacedæmonians holding the extreme position. Their cavalry was posted on each wing. The Lacedæmonians, then, were drawn up in this way. On the side of their opponents, their right wing was occupied by the Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country; and by their side were the Arcadian allies. Then came the thousand picked men of the Argives, for whom the state had for a long time furnished at the public expense a course of training in military matters; next to them the other Argives; and after these, their allies the Cleonæans and Orneans; then the Athenians, holding the extreme left, and their own cavalry with them.

68. Such was the order of battle, and the preparation on both sides. The army of the Lacedæmonians appeared the larger of the two; but as for stating any number, either of the several divisions on each side, or of their collective force,

I could not do it with accuracy. For the number of the Lacedæmonians, on account of the secrecy of their government, was not known; and what of the others, in consequence of men's natural tendency to boasting with regard to their own numbers, was regarded with distrust. From the following mode of calculating, however, one may see the number of Lacedæmonians that was present on that occasion. There were engaged in the battle seven *lochi*, exclusive of the Sciritæ, who amounted to six hundred; and in each *lochos* there were four *pentecostyes*,<sup>1</sup> and in the *pentecosty* four *enomotia*. In the first rank of the *enomoty* there were four fighting men. In depth,<sup>2</sup> though they had not all been drawn up alike, but as each *lochagus* chose, they took their position on the field uniformly eight deep. And thus, along the whole line, the first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, besides the Sciritæ.

69. When they were now on the point of engaging, the following admonitions were then severally addressed to them by their own generals. To the Mantineans, that the battle would be fought for their country, and to decide on the question of empire and slavery—that they might not be deprived of the former after tasting it, and might avoid again tasting the latter. To the Argives, that they would fight for their original supremacy, and not to brook being forever deprived of their former equal share of the Peloponnese; and at the same time to avenge themselves on men who were their enemies, and near ones too, for many acts of injustice. To the Athenians, that fighting as they were in concert with many

<sup>1</sup> "The regular complement of the *enomotia* was twenty-four men, besides its captain; the *pentecosty* was composed of two *enomotia*, and the *lochos* of two *pentecostyes*."—*Arnold*. See his whole note on this passage.

<sup>2</sup> As the number of the ranks must have depended on that of the files, and have been the same throughout the army, if that were, or have differed, because that did; it is evident that any change which the commander-in-chief might have made in the previous dispositions of the several *lochagi*, must have affected the breadth of the ranks as well as the depth of the files, though the latter only is mentioned, or rather implied, by our author. The supposition of such a change is warranted by the variation in the tenses of the verbs; and is the only way of solving the difficulty noticed by *Dobree*—that the depth of the line in each *lochos* appears to be left to the discretion of its commander, even after the number of men in the front rank of all of them has been said to have been uniformly four; though after this had once been settled, the other must, of course, have been no less uniform. See *Poppo's* note.

brave allies, it was a glorious thing for them to show themselves inferior to none; and that by defeating the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnese, they would enjoy their empire more securely, and to a greater extent, while no one else would ever march against their country. To the Argives and their allies such were the admonitions that were addressed. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, both individually among themselves, and with their national war-songs, exhorted one another, as brave men, to remember what they had learned before; knowing that actual training for a long time previous was of more benefit than a brief verbal exhortation, however well expressed.

70. After this the conflict commenced; the Argives and their allies advancing with haste and impetuosity; the Lacedæmonians slowly, and to the music of many flute-players, placed among them according to custom, not with a religious object, but that they might advance evenly, stepping in time, and so that their line might not be broken, a thing which large armies are apt to do in their approaches to an enemy.

71. While they were yet closing in battle, King Agis resolved to execute a maneuver, as follows. All armies, on going into battle, are forced out too much on their right wing; because the men, in their fear, each shelter, as far as possible, their exposed side with the shield of the man who is posted next to them on the right, and think that the closer they are locked together, the more effectually they are protected. The man who primarily gives occasion to this is he who stands first on the right wing, through wishing continually to withdraw from the enemy his own unarmed side; and the rest follow him under the influence of the same fear. And so, on that occasion, the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritæ, and the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans further still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was larger than theirs. Agis therefore, being afraid that their left might be surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans were extending too far beyond it, gave orders for the Sciritæ and Brasidean soldiers to advance from their position with a part of their number, and equalize their line to that of the Mantineans; while into the void thus created he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs, to move over from the right wing with their *lochi*, and by throwing them-

selves into it to fill it up; thinking that their own right would still have an abundance of strength, and that the line opposite the Mantineans would be formed the more firmly.

72. Now as he gave these orders at the very moment of the charge, and on a sudden, the consequence was, that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move on (they were for this offense afterward banished from Sparta, being thought to have shown cowardice), and that so the enemy closed with them before any thing could be done; and moreover, that when he ordered the Sciritæ to rejoin their comrades, since the *lochi* did not move on to their support, neither could these now fill up the line. But when the Lacedæmonians were most decidedly and in every respect beaten in point of skill, at that very time they proved themselves no less superior in point of courage.<sup>1</sup> For when they had come to close quarters with their opponents, though the right wing of the Mantinéans broke their Sciritan and Brasidean corps, and the Mantineans and their allies, with the thousand picked men of the Argives, rushing in through the open and unclosed part of the line, cut up the Lacedæmonians, having surrounded and broken them, and drove them to the baggage wagons, and killed some of the veterans who were posted as a guard over them: though in this part of the field, I say, the Lacedæmonians were worsted, yet with the rest of their forces, and especially the center, where was King Agis, and around him the three hundred horsemen, as they are called,<sup>2</sup> they fell on the veterans of the Argives, and what are named the five *lochi*, with the Cleonæans, the Orneans, and those of the Athenians who were posted next to them, and put them to flight; the majority not having even waited to close with them, but having, on the approach of the Lacedæmonians, immediately given way, and some of them having been even trodden under foot, in their hurry to avoid being anticipated and overtaken.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Or, "proved that it was mainly through their courage that they won the victory."

<sup>2</sup> "He adds *καλούμενοι*, because, though called horsemen, they were really infantry. The actual cavalry were on the wings, as had been already stated, ch. 67. 1. These 'three hundred horsemen,' as they were called, were originally, we may suppose, so many chiefs, who fought round their king, not on foot, but in their chariots; this being the early sense of *ἵππεύς* and *ἵππότης*, as we find from Homer."—*Arnold*.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, "that the overtaking might not anticipate them." For

73. When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way on this side, their line was now broken off both ways;<sup>1</sup> while at the same time the right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans was surrounding the Athenians with the troops which outflanked them, and they were encompassed with danger on both sides, as they were being surrounded on one, and were already beaten on the other. Indeed they would have suffered most severely of all the army, if the presence of their cavalry had not been of service to them. It happened too, that Agis, on perceiving the Lacedæmonian left wing, which was opposed to the Martineans and the thousand Argives, to be hard pressed, gave orders for the whole army to advance to the support of the division which was being defeated. And when this was done, the Athenians meanwhile, as the enemy's forces passed on, and withdrew from them, escaped at their leisure, and with them the beaten division of the Argives. The Mantineans and their allies, on the other hand, and the picked men of the Argives, were no longer disposed to press on their adversaries; but seeing their own side defeated, and the Lacedæmonians advancing against them, they took to flight. And of the Mantineans many were slain, but of the picked Argives the great majority escaped. However, the flight and retreat were not hard pressed, nor to any great distance; for though the Lacedæmonians, until they have routed their enemies, fight for a long time, and stubbornly, as regards standing their ground; yet when they have routed them, they pursue but for a short time and for a little distance.

74. Of such a character then, and answering as nearly as possible to this description, was the battle—the greatest that had occurred for a very long time among the Greeks, and fought by the most considerable states. The Lacedæmonians,

the different explanations of this very doubtful expression, see Poppo's or Arnold's note. I have followed Heilman and Haack in considering τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν as the subject of φθῆναι (though it is, what Poppo calls it, "durior explanatio"); because in every other instance that I have observed, in which Thucydides uses the article τοῦ with an infinitive, whether with μὴ or without it, it expresses purpose, and not effect, or cause. See I. 4; II. 4. 2; 32. 1; V. 27. 2.; VIII. 14. 1; 39. 4. The only one of these passages which might seem an exception to what has been stated, is the second; and that is not really one, if τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν be joined with διώκοντας, as Poppo takes it.

<sup>1</sup> "i. e., by one part of it having advanced beyond it to pursue the enemy, and by another part having been beaten back behind it."—Arnold.

after piling their arms in front of the enemy's dead, immediately erected a trophy, and stripped the slain; and taking up their own dead carried them back to Tegea, where they were buried, while they restored the enemy's under truce. There were killed, of the Argives, Orneans, and Cleonæans, seven hundred; of the Mantineans, two hundred; and the same number of the Athenians including the Æginetans, with their generals. On the side of the Lacedæmonians, the allies did not suffer to such an extent that any number worth mentioning were killed; and of themselves it was difficult to learn the truth, but about three hundred were said to have fallen.

75. Now when the engagement was about to take place, Pleistoanax also, the other king, set out to their aid with those who were above and below the usual age for service, and reached as far as Tegea, but went back again on hearing of the victory. The Lacedæmonians sent, too, and turned back the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus; and having themselves returned and dismissed their allies, they kept the festival (for it happened to be the time of their Carnea). And the imputations which at that time were urged against them by the Greeks, both on the score of cowardice in consequence of their disaster in the island, and of their bad management and dilatoriness in other respects, they wiped out by this one action; having been, as was now thought, reduced by fortune, but still the same men at heart.

Now the day before this battle it also happened that the Epidaurians with all their forces invaded the Argive territory, and cut off in great numbers, when they came out to give them battle, those of the Argives who were left behind to keep guard. Moreover, when three thousand of the Elean heavy-armed had come after the battle to the succor of the Mantineans, and a thousand Athenians in addition to their former force, all these allies at once marched against Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians were keeping the Carnea; and dividing the work between them, they began a wall of circumvallation round the city. And though the rest abandoned the work, the Athenians finished it round the promontory called the Heræum, the part which had been assigned to them. And having all joined in leaving a garrison in this fortress, they returned to their several cities. And so the summer ended.

76. At the beginning of the following winter, the Lacedæ-



monians, after they had celebrated the Carnean festival, immediately took the field; and on arriving at Tegea, sent on to Argos proposals for an accommodation. For there had been there previously a party in their interest, and desirous of putting down the democracy at Argos; and since the battle had been fought, they were much better able to persuade the people at large to the proposed arrangement. Their wish was, after first concluding a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, then, in the second place, to enter into alliance with them; and so at length to attack the democracy. Accordingly, there came from the Lacedæmonians to Argos, Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, who was *proxenus* for the Argives, bearing two proposals, one as to the mode in which they should carry on hostilities, if they preferred it; the other, as to the footing on which they should remain at peace, if they preferred that. And after there had been much controversy on the subject (for Alcibiades also happened to be present), the party who negotiated for the Lacedæmonians, and who now ventured to do so openly, prevailed on the Argives to accept the proposal for an accommodation; which was to this effect:

77. "It seems good to the assembly of the Lacedæmonians to enter into agreement with the Argives on the following conditions:—That they shall restore their children to the Orchomenians, their men to the Mænalians, and the men deposited at Mantinea to the Lacedæmonians. That they shall evacuate Epidaurus, and demolish their fortification there: and that if the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared enemies to the Argives and Lacedæmonians, with the allies of both those states.—That if the Lacedæmonians have any children in their custody, they shall restore them to all the states.—That with respect to the offering to the god, the Epidaurians shall be at liberty to take an oath on the subject, and that the Argives shall allow them to do so.<sup>1</sup>—That the states in the Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be all independent, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That if any of those beyond the Peloponnese come against the Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, they shall repel the invader by common counsel,<sup>2</sup> on such

<sup>1</sup> ελευν γῆν.] For the various conjectures as to the true reading in this passage, see Poppo.

<sup>2</sup> ἀπόθι.] Or, as Arnold takes it, after Bredow, "any where."

terms as shall seem most just for the Peloponnesians.—That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedæmonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the allies of the Lacedæmonians and of the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—That the contracting parties shall show these conditions to the 'allies, and enter into agreement with them, if they seem satisfactory to them; but that if any thing else seem good to the allies they shall send them away home."

78. This proposal the Argives in the first place accepted, and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned home from Tegea. Afterward, when intercourse with each other was now held by them, not long subsequently the same party again contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians and conclude a treaty and alliance with the Lacedæmonians; which were to this effect:

79. "The following are the terms on which it seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives that a treaty and alliance should be concluded between them for fifty years.—That they shall afford to each other judicial decision of differences, on fair and equal terms, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That the other states in the Peloponnese shall participate in this treaty and alliance, as independent and self-governed, retaining their own possessions, and affording fair and equal judicial decisions, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedæmonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the Lacedæmonians, and the allies of the Argives on the same footing as the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—That if a common expedition to any quarter should be required, the Lacedæmonians and Argives shall consult upon it, deciding as may be most just for the allies.—That if any of the states, either in the Peloponnese or out of it, have any

<sup>1</sup> *συμβαλέσθαι*.] Bloomfield supposes "the allies" to be the subject of this infinitive; but it surely must be the parties to which *ἐπιδείξαντας* refers. The same parties must also be the subject of *ἀπιάλλειν* in the following sentence: but their object in thus sending them away is doubtful; whether it was that the ambassadors might consult their governments on the objections they had made to the treaty; or, that they might not, by their intrigues, attempt to unsettle the relations between Argos and Lacedæmon. The latter appears to me more accordant with the brief and summary expression, *οἰκὰδ' ἀπιάλλειν*.

points of dispute, whether concerning their borders or any thing else, they shall be judicially decided.'—That if any of the allied states should have a quarrel with another, they shall have recourse to the arbitration of whatever third state may be thought impartial by both.—That the private citizens in each state shall have their causes tried according to the institutions of their fathers."

80. This then was the treaty and alliance that was concluded; and whatever belonging to each other they had taken in the war, or whatever other ground of difference existed between them, they came to a settlement of all such matters. And as they now arranged their measures in concert, they adopted a resolution not to receive any herald or embassy from the Athenians, unless they withdrew from the Peloponnese, and evacuated their forts; and neither to make peace nor carry on war with any except conjointly. And besides conducting their other measures with vehemence, they both of them sent ambassadors to the Thraceward towns, and to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join their league. He did not, however, immediately separate from the Athenians; but purposed doing so, because he saw that the Argives had also; for he himself was originally from Argos. They likewise renewed their former oaths with the Chalcidians, and bound themselves by new ones. Moreover, the Argives sent ambassadors to the Athenians, commanding them to evacuate their fortress in Epidaurus. They therefore, seeing themselves to be but few against many who had joined in garrisoning it, sent Demosthenes to lead their men out of it; who having arrived, and instituted, by way of pretext, a gymnastic contest outside the fortress, when the rest of the garrison had gone out, shut the gates upon them. Afterward, having renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves gave up the fortress.

81. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Argives from the confederacy, the Mantineans, after first holding out, and then

<sup>1</sup> διακριθῆμεν. Or, as Arnold takes it, simply "brought to an issue," of whatever kind it might be. Poppo agrees with Bloomfield that only an appeal to legal principles is here intended by the word; but observes that it is a less definite term than ἐς πόλιν—ἐλθεῖν, the method prescribed when both the contending states were members of the leagues; as including the decisions, not only of a third state, but also of the Delphian oracle, the Amphictyons, and of individual referees.

finding themselves unable to do so without the Argives, came to terms on their part also with the Lacedæmonians, and relinquished their sovereignty over the cities.<sup>1</sup> And now the Lacedæmonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, took the field together, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves went and put the government of Sicyon into the hands of a smaller number than before, and then both of them together also put down the democracy at Argos, an oligarchy being established, in accordance with the interests of the Lacedæmonians. These things occurred at the close of the winter, when spring was now near at hand; and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

82. The following summer, the inhabitants of Dium on Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Achaia, which before had not been suitable to their views. And now the commons party at Argos gradually combining and recovering their spirits, made an attack upon the oligarchical party, having watched their opportunity, when it was just the time of the Lacedæmonian Gymnopædiæ. And a battle having been fought in the city, the commons gained the victory, and slew some of them, and banished others. The Lacedæmonians, while their friends had been sending for them a long time before, did not go; but at length put off the Gymnopædiæ, and marched to their aid. On hearing at Tegea that the oligarchical party had been defeated, they would not advance any further, though entreated by those who had escaped; but returned home, and kept the Gymnopædiæ. Afterward, when ambassadors had come both from the Argives in the city and from those driven out of it,<sup>1</sup> and when the allies also were present, and much had been said on both sides, they decided that the party in the city were in the wrong, and resolved to march against Argos; but much delay and procrastination ensued. In the mean time the commons at Argos were afraid of the Lacedæmonians, and as they courted the alliance of Athens again, and thought that it would be of the greatest service to them, they built long walls to the sea; that if they should be excluded from the use of the land, the importation of things by

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, their subject allies, mentioned ch. 33. 58. 1, and elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> *ἀγγέλωρ.*] Bekker, Poppo, and Arnold all think this word corrupt; while Gölle understands by it a party in Argos who were in constant communication with Sparta: but surely that is a very forced interpretation.

sea, through the help of the Athenians, might be of benefit to them. Some of the cities in the Peloponnese were also privy to their building these walls. The Argives therefore were engaged in the work with all their population, themselves, their wives, and their slaves; while there came to them from Athens carpenters and stone-masons. And so the summer ended.

83. The following winter, when the Lacedæmonians were aware of their building the walls, they marched against Argos, both themselves and their allies, excepting the Corinthians; communications being also held with them from Argos itself. The leader of the army was Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. With regard, then, to the advantages which they thought they had secured in the city itself, nothing more came of them; but the walls that were being built, they took and demolished. And having taken Hysia, a town in the Argive territory, and put to the sword all the free-men they got into their hands, they returned and dispersed to their respective cities. After this, the Argives, in their turn, marched against the Phliasian country, and laid it waste before they returned, because they harbored their exiles; for the greater part of them had settled there. The<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> All the editors agree in thinking different parts of this sentence corrupt, and propose various emendations of it; but none of them, in my humble opinion, has struck at the root of the evil, which lies, I think, in the verb *κατέκλῃσαν*. The idea of the Athenians "blockading" a whole country so extensive as Macedonia appears too extravagant to be admitted; particularly as no proof is adduced of *κατακλείειν* being ever used in such a sense; but it always refers to men being "shut up" in particular places. Until Bloomfield therefore brings forward an instance of its being so employed, he must not assume that his reading of the passage "yields an excellent sense, and one not open to any well-founded objection." Krüger's conjecture *κατελήσαν* would suit the passage admirably; but Poppo observes that the active form of the compound verb is never used, and that the simple verb would be going too far from the traces of the common text. To rectify this evil, I venture to propose *καὶ ἄλῃσαν*; retaining *Μακεδονίας* as a partitive genitive, and adopting Gölter's punctuation and reading of *Περδίκκα*; so that the whole passage would run thus: *Καὶ ἐλῃσαν δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶρος καὶ Μακεδονίας Ἀθηναῖοι, Περδίκκα ἐπὶ καλ. κ. τ. λ.* Though δὲ after *καὶ* is not used so frequently by Thucydides as by Xenophon and some other writers, it occurs in three other places, if not more; namely, I. 132. 2; II. 36. 1; and VII. 56. 3, at the beginning of a paragraph in the last instance, in a manner exactly similar to what is proposed here. *Καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιός ὁ ἀγὼν κατὰ τε ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.* I may add, that this reading is perhaps confirmed by, or at any rate agrees very well with, the next notice we

Athenians ravaged, too, during the same winter a part of Macedonia also, charging Perdiccas with the league he had entered into with the Argives and Lacedæmonians; and with the fact that when they had prepared to lead an army against the Thraceward Chalcidians and Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, he had proved false to his allies, and the armament was chiefly broken up in consequence of his having deserted the cause. He was therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war.

84. The next summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized three hundred men, who were still thought to be suspicious characters, and to favor the cause of the Lacedæmonians; and these the Athenians deposited in the neighboring islands within their dominions. The Athenians also undertook an expedition against the island of Melos, with thirty ships of their own, six of the Chians, two of the Lesbians, sixteen hundred of their own heavy-armed, three hundred bowmen, twenty mounted archers, and about five thousand five hundred heavy-armed of the allies and the islanders. Now the Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians, and would not submit to the Athenians, like the rest of the islanders, but at first remained quiet as neutrals, and then, when the Athenians tried to compel them by devastating their land, went openly to war with them. The generals therefore, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes, and Tisias son of Tisimachus, having gone and encamped in their territory with this armament,<sup>1</sup> before injuring any part of the land, first sent ambassadors to hold a conference with them. These the Melians did not introduce to their popular assembly, but desired them to state the objects of their mission before the magistrates and the few. The ambassadors of the Athenians then spoke as follows:

85. *Ath.* "Since our words are not to be addressed to your populace, in order that the many may not be deceived, forsooth, by hearing at once in one continuous oration persuasive and irrefutable arguments (for we know that this is the

have of Perdiccas, VI. 7. 4, where it is again mentioned that the Athenians *ἐκακούργουν τὴν Περδίκκου*.

<sup>1</sup> *στρατοπεδευσόμενοι ἐς τὴν γῆν.*] A concise form for what is more fully expressed by *διαβάντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο*, VIII. 25. 1; and by *καταπλεύσαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο*, VIII. 79. 4.—*Porpo*.

meaning of your introducing us to the few), do ye who are seated here in congress pursue a still more cautious method. For do not ye, either, make one continuous speech on the several topics, but immediately taking us up at whatever does not appear to be advanced in accordance with your interest, decide that question. And first tell us if you are pleased with what we propose." The commissioners of the Melians made this reply:

86. *Mel.* "The fairness of thus calmly instructing each other is open to no objection: but your preparations for war, which are already here, and not merely coming, appear to be at variance with it. For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what will be said; and that the issue of the conference will in all probability bring us war, if we are stronger in the justice of our cause, and therefore refuse to submit; or slavery, if we are convinced by you."

87. *Ath.* "If now you have met to argue upon suspicions of the future, or to do any thing else but to consult<sup>1</sup> for your country with a view to its preservation, according to what is present and before your eyes, we will stop; but if for this object we will speak."

88. *Mel.* "It is but natural and pardonable for men so circumstanced to have recourse to many things, both in thinking and speaking. However, this our meeting is held with a view to our preservation; and let the discussion proceed, if you please, in the way which you propose."

89. *Ath.* "We then shall not ourselves advance fair pretenses, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of having overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you because we are being injured—and so make a long speech which would not be believed; nor do we wish you to think of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the standard of the Lacedæmonians, though you were their colony; or that you have done us no wrong. But we advise you, according to the real sentiments of us both, to think of getting what you can; since you know, and are speaking to those who know, that, in the language of men, what is right is estimated by equality of power to compel; but what is possi-

<sup>1</sup> *βουλευσόντες.*] The active form of this verb occurs again, ch. III. 2, where Arnold explains it as expressing the act of the government, consulting for the safety of its subjects. Poppo, however, refers to a similar usage of it, IV. 41. 1, where there is apparently no such force intended.

ble is that which the stronger practice, and to which the weak submit."

90. *Mel.* "So far then as our opinion goes,<sup>1</sup> it is for our advantage (for we must, since you have so prescribed, speak of what is expedient, to the neglect of what is right) that you should not take away what is a common benefit; but that for every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable should also be considered right; and that if he can gain assent to something which falls short of strict justice, he should have the benefit of it. And this is not less for your interest; inasmuch, as you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern for inflicting the heaviest vengeance upon you."<sup>2</sup>

91. *Ath.* "Nay, for our part, we are not disheartened about the end of our empire, even should it be brought to an end. For it is not those who rule over others, like the Lacedæmonians, that are to be feared by the vanquished. Nor is it with the Lacedæmonians that we have to struggle, but with the possibility of our subjects in any quarter by themselves attacking and overpowering those who have had rule over them. So on this point let the danger be left to us. But that we are come here for the benefit of our empire, and that we shall also speak on the present occasion for the preservation of

<sup>1</sup> I have not followed Arnold's reading in this passage, though Bekker and Gölter also adopted it; because it seems improbable that *ἡ μὲν*, the reading of nearly all the MSS., should have been a mistake of the copyists for one so much easier, and so different from it, as *ἡμεῖς*. At the same time I am far from certain whether *ἡ μὲν*, that which I have preferred, on the authority of Herman, Poppo, and Bloomfield, be really the true one; for in no other passage in Thucydides, I believe, has *ἡ* the force which is here given to it; and though Bloomfield quotes one instance of its being so used by Xenophon, he is there writing, not as a historian, but as a philosopher; and so uses it, as it is very commonly used by philosophical writers in later times. Should this objection be thought to have any weight, I would venture to propose *ἡμῖν*, which comes nearer to the various readings of the MSS. than *ἡμεῖς*; and gives a sense in exact accordance with what follows: for *καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν*, at the beginning of the next paragraph, would stand in strong opposition to it: "For us, then, we certainly think it advantageous—and it is no less for your interest also." It may perhaps be regarded as some corroboration of this conjecture, that the scholiast quoted by Arnold uses *ἡμῖν* in his paraphrase: *νομίζομεν ἡμῖν προσήκειν μὴ καταλύειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.*

<sup>2</sup> This is pretty nearly the interpretation of the passage given by Bauer, and sanctioned by Poppo. For the many others that have been adopted, see the note of the latter.



your country, on these points we will give you proofs ; since we wish to maintain our own sovereignty over you without trouble, and to have you preserved for the advantage of us both."

92. *Mel.* "And how then could it prove advantageous for us to serve, as it is for you to govern?"

93. *Ath.* "Because you would have the benefit of submitting before you suffered the last extremities ; while we should be gainers by not destroying you."

94. *Mel.* "But would you not accept our proposals, on condition of our remaining quiet, and being friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side?"

95. *Ath.* "No ; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our weakness, but your hatred, of our power."

96. *Mel.* "And do your subjects then take such a view of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases your colonists, and in some cases having revolted from you, have been reduced to subjection?"

97. *Ath.* "Why, for an argument resting on justice they think that neither of us are at a loss ; but that on the ground of their power they escape, and we, through fear, abstain from attacking them. So that, besides our ruling over more subjects, you would also through your subjection confer security upon us ; especially by the fact that you who are islanders, and weaker too than some others, did not escape our dominion, who have the command of the sea."

98. *Mel.* "And do you consider that there is no security in that other case ? (For here again, as you have excluded us from appeals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations of your advantage, we too must explain what is expedient for us, and so endeavor to persuade you, if the same happen to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to the present case, they reckon that some time or other you will proceed against them also ? And by that course what do you do, but aggrandize your present enemies, and bring those upon you against their will who would never else be likely to become hostile to you ?"

99. *Ath.* "Why, we do not consider those who live any where on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will

long delay taking precautions against us, to be so formidable to us as those who are islanders any where without being under our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule are now exasperated against us. For it is these who would most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and us into danger that was evident beforehand."

100. *Mel.* "Surely then, if you run such a risk not to be deprived of your empire, and those who are already in subjection, to be released from it; for us who are still free it were great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every thing before we submit to it."

101. *Ath.* "No; not at least if you take a sensible view of the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for honor, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating for your preservation, to avoid resisting those who are far stronger than yourselves."

102. *Mel.* "But we know that warlike measures sometimes come to more impartial results than might have been expected from the different numbers on each side. And in our case to yield is immediate despair; but by making an effort there is yet hope of our keeping ourselves up."

103. *Ath.* "Hope, which is the solace of danger, when entertained by those who have abundant means, though it may injure, yet does not ruin them. But in the case of those who risk all they have on a throw<sup>1</sup> (for it is naturally an extravagant passion), it is only found out at the time of their ruin, and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it is found out. Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging on one single turn of the scale, be desirous of this fate, nor of

<sup>1</sup> ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτόυσι.] Ducas and Gölter take ἐς ἅπαν separately from τὸ ὑπάρχον, but Poppe agrees with Arnold in uniting them, and thinks with Bloomfield that κύβην is properly understood with ἀναρριπτόυσιν. He also approves of Scholefield's explanation of the following part of the sentence: "Neque destituit, quamdiu ab eâ cognitâ cavere poterit aliquis; sed tum demum, cū periculo nullum relinquitur remedium." I can not, however, but think that a much more natural interpretation is that of Portus and Krüger, whom I have followed. Nor is the sense given by them to ἐλλείπει so entirely destitute of authority as has been supposed; for the verb is used in exactly the same manner, Eur. El. 609, σὺ δ', ἐκ βάθρων γὰρ πῶς ἀνήρῃσαι, φίλοις οὐδ' ἐλλείλοισας ἐλπιδ', ἴσθι μὲν κλύων. In the present passage we may perhaps understand ἀντὶ after it, so that the preposition may have its proper force. Bekker, in his edit. of 1832, proposes to read οὐκέτι λείπει.

resembling the greater part of mankind, who, when they might have been saved by human means, after visible hopes have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such as are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting upon them."

104. *Mel.* "Difficult indeed even we, be well assured, consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that in point of fortune we shall, by the favor of the gods, not be worsted, because we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and that our deficiency in power will be made up by our Lacedæmonian allies; who are under a necessity of succoring us, if for no other reason, yet on account of our connection with them, and for very shame."

105. *Ath.* "As regards then the favor of heaven, we trust that we too shall not fall short of it: since we are not requiring or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with respect to the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves. For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that, in obedience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor were the first to carry it out when enacted; but having received it when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force forever, we only avail ourselves of it; knowing that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would do the same. And so, with regard to the gods, we are with good reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion respecting the Lacedæmonians, according to which you trust, that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will assist you; though we bless your simplicity, we do not admire your folly. For with respect to themselves, and the institutions of their country, the Lacedæmonians do indeed to a very great extent practice virtue; but with respect to others, though we might descant at length on their conduct toward them, speaking most concisely we should declare, that of all the men we are acquainted with, they most evidently consider what is agreeable to be honorable, and what is expedient to be just. And yet such a view of things is not in favor of your present unreasonable hopes of safety."

106. *Mel.* "But it is on this very ground that we now rely on their sense of interest, and believe that they will not betray us Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the confidence of those Greeks who wish them well, while they help those who are hostile to them."

107. *Ath.* "Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honor are practiced with danger; a course on which the Lacedæmonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture."

108. *Mel.* "Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would regard them as less hazardous than in the case of others;<sup>1</sup> inasmuch as we lie near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be."

109. *Ath.* "Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedæmonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea."

110. *Mel.* "But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation. Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country."

<sup>1</sup> ἐς ἄλλους.] Arnold thinks that perhaps παρακινδυνεύσαι or παραβαλεῖν may be substituted for the kindred substantive κινδύνους, so as to avoid the harsh construction of κινδύνους ἐς ἄλλους, "pericula propter alios suscepta," as Scholefield renders it. But there seems no necessity for any such change, if ἐς be taken in the more general sense of relation, which it frequently admits of. Compare 105. 1, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσειως τῶν δ' ἐς σοῦς αὐτοῦς βουλήσεως. The same senso must, I think, be attributed to the genitive τῆς γνώμης in the last clause of the chapter. though Poppo objects to it, and proposes to substitute either the dative or accusative.

111. *Ath.* "On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others. But it strikes us that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this. For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful as the attendant on folly than on fortune. Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard, and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful. Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting,<sup>1</sup> which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful."

<sup>1</sup> The construction of this sentence, according to the common reading, is abandoned as desperate by all the editors. Göller and Bloomfield substitute *ιστε* for *εσται*, but Poppo protests strongly against the change. With due deference to such authorities, I would venture to ask, whether the text, as it stands, may not be explained by supposing *βουλεύεσθαι* to be understood with *εσται*—the infinitive being suggested by the indicative at the end of the antecedent clause—and referring *ἡν*, not to *πατρίδος*, as has been done hitherto, but to *βουλῇν*. 'Ες μίαν would then stand without its substantive, as it does Hom. Il. 2. 379, though in a

112. So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, having been left to themselves, as they still thought pretty nearly the same as they had maintained in the discussion, gave the following answer: "We neither think differently from what we did at first, Athenians, nor will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which has now been inhabited seven hundred years; but trusting to the fortune which, by the favor of heaven, has hitherto preserved it, and to the help of man, especially of the Lacedæmonians, we will endeavor to save ourselves. But we propose to you that we should be your friends, and the enemies of neither party; and that you should retire from our country after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both sides."

113. Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said: "Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as appears to us, consider what is future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already occurring, because you wish it; and having staked and relied most on [such things as<sup>1</sup>] Lacedæmonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will also be most disappointed."

114. So the Athenian ambassadors returned to their forces: and their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to their proposals, immediately proceeded to apply themselves to war; and having divided the work between the different states, inclosed the Melians with lines on all sides. Afterwards, the Athenians left a part of their own troops and the allies, to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with the main body of the forces. Those who were left behind remained and besieged the place.

115. About the same time an Argive force invaded the

different sense. Or, if that be considered a difficulty, it would perhaps be nothing inconsistent with the frequently careless style of Thucydides to suppose a confusion of two expressions, so that both *ἦν* and *μίαν* should be left in concord with *βουλῇν*. The sense of the passage would certainly be more natural, and the construction easier, if *ἦς* could be substituted for *ἦν*: but as MSS. afford no authority for the change, and as it does not appear absolutely necessary, it might be considered rash to adopt it.

<sup>1</sup> These words are, I think, implied by the omission of the article before the following nouns.

Phliasian territory, and being intercepted by an ambuscade of the Phliasiens and their allies, were cut off to the number of eighty. And now the Athenians at Pylus took great spoils from the Lacedæmonians; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians, though even then they did not renounce the treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of their people who pleased might plunder the Athenians. Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities with the Athenians for some private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market-place, and slew some of the men;<sup>1</sup> and having carried in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and kept quiet; while the Athenians made better provision for the guard in future. And so the summer ended.

116. The following winter, the Lacedæmonians intended to march against the Argive territory, but returned on finding, when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not favorable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Argives, suspecting a certain party in their city, seized some of them, while others escaped them. About the same time, the Melians again took a part of the Athenian lines in another direction, the garrison not being numerous. A fresh force having afterwards come from Athens in consequence of these occurrences, under the command of Philocrates son of Demeas, and the inhabitants being now vigorously blockaded, after there had also been some treachery practiced by their own men, they surrendered at discretion to the Athenians; who put to death all the Melian adults they took, and made slaves of the children and women. As for the country, they afterward sent out five hundred colonists, and inhabited it themselves.

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, of the besieging force. See Bloomfield's note.

## BOOK VI.

1. THE same winter the Athenians wished to sail again to Sicily, with a larger armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and bring it into subjection to them, if they could; the mass of the people being ignorant of the size of the island, and the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians; and that they were undertaking a war not much inferior in magnitude to that with the Peloponnesians.

For the voyage round Sicily in a merchant vessel is one of not much less than eight days; and though it is of such extent,<sup>1</sup> it is only excluded by the space of about twenty stades of sea from being mainland.

2. Now it was settled originally in the following manner, and these were all the nations that occupied it. The earliest people said to have lived in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Læstrygonæ; with regard to whom, I can neither tell their race, nor whence they came into it, nor whither they departed out of it: but let that suffice which has been said by the poets, and which every body in any way knows of them. The Sicanians appear to have been the first who settled in it after them; indeed, as they themselves assert, even before them, as being the aboriginal population; but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus, in Theria, by the Ligurians. And it was from them that the island was at that time called Sicania, having previously been called Trinacria; and still, even to this day, they inhabit Sicily in its western districts. But on the capture of Troy, some of the Trojans, having escaped the Greeks, came in vessels to Sicily, and having settled in the

<sup>1</sup> "The reasoning employed in the words *ποσάυτην οὖσα* is very much in the style of the geography of Herodotus. The notion is, that so large an island ought to have been in the midst of a wide sea, proportioned to its own magnitude; and not to have been so close upon the coast, as to seem a sort of appendage to the mainland."—*Arnold*.



neighborhood of the Sicanians, they were all together called Elymi, and their cities, Eryx and Segesta. There were also settled with them some of the Phocians, who, while returning from Troy, were carried by a tempest, first to Libya, and then from that country to Sicily. The Sicels, again, went over into Sicily from Italy (for it was there that they used to live), while flying from some Opicans; crossing on rafts (as is probable, and reported to have been the case), having watched an opportunity for the passage, when the wind set down the strait;<sup>1</sup> or, perhaps, having sailed to it in some other way. Even to this day there are still Sicels in Italy; and it was in this way that the country was called Italy, after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had that name. Having gone, then, to Sicily with a great host, and being victorious in battle over the Sicanians, they compelled them to remove to the southern and western parts of it, and caused the island to be called Sicily, instead of Sicania, and occupied the best parts of the land; having held them, after they crossed over, nearly three hundred years before any Greeks came into Sicily; and still, even to this day, they retain the central and northern parts of the island. There were also Phœnicians living around<sup>2</sup> the whole of Sicily, having occupied promontories on the sea-coast, and the small islands adjacent, for purposes of trading with the Sicels: but after the Greeks sailed to it in great numbers by sea, in addition to those already there, they evacuated the greater part of them, and lived in Motya, Solois, and Panormus, near the Elymi, having united with them, both from confidence in their alliance, and because from that quarter the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. As regards barbarians, then, so many of them were there that inhabited Sicily, and in such a manner.

3. Of the Greeks, on the other hand, some Chalcidians of Eubœa first sailed with Thucles as the leader of the colony, and founded Naxos, and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Or, "set steadily in that direction," i. e., was favorable.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as Poppo explains it, "*all about* the whole island." But the words immediately following are in favor of the other interpretation. Compare ch. 85. 2, *καίπερ νησιώτας ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.*

<sup>3</sup> "The epithet *ἀρχηγέτης* or *ἀρχαγέτας*, as the Dorians wrote the word, was given to Apollo, because the Chalcidian colony had sailed to Sicily by his direction. See Scholiast on Pindar, Pyth. V. 80."—Arnold.

which is now outside the city, and on which, when any deputies to the games sail from Sicily, they first sacrifice. Syracuse was founded the next year by Archias, of the family of Hercules at Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island; on which, being no longer surrounded with water, the inner city now stands; and at a later period the outer one also was inclosed within the wall, and became populous. Moreover, Thucles and the Chalcidians from Naxos set out in the fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, and having expelled the Sicels by arms, re-settled Leontini, and after it Catana, the Catanians themselves having chosen Evarchus as their founder.

4. At the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after settling in a place beyond the river Pantacyas, Trotilus by name, and subsequently removing thence, and uniting for a short time with the Chalcidians at Leontini, and being driven out by them, he founded Thapsus, and then he himself died; while the rest, being expelled from Thapsus, effected a settlement at Megara, called the Hyblæan, Hyblo, a Sicel king, having given up the place to them and led them in. After inhabiting it two hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled from the city and country by Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after their settlement, they founded Selinus, having sent Pamillus for the purpose, who came from Megara, their mother-city, and joined them in founding it. Gela, again, was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, who led a common colony, in the forty-fifth year after the founding of Syracuse. The name of the city was taken from the river Gelas, but the spot where "the city," [properly so called], now stands, and which was first fortified, is named Lindii.<sup>1</sup> The institutions established among them were Dorian. Just about a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the Geloans settled Acragas, [or Agrigentum], naming the city from the river Acragas: they made Aristonous and Pystilus the leaders of their colony, and gave it the institutions of the Geloans. Zancle, again, was originally founded from Cuma, the Chalcidian city in the country of the Opici, by some freebooters who went there; but afterward a great

<sup>1</sup> "So named because Antiphemus and his Rhodian companions had principally come from Lindus in Rhodes. See Herod. VII. 153. 2."—*Arnold*.

number went from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa, and shared with them in the occupation of the land; its founders being Perieres and Cratæmenes, one from Cuma, the other from Chalcis. As regards its name, it was at first called Zancle by the Sicels, because the site resembles a reaping-hook in figure, and the reaping-hook is called by the Sicels *zanclos*. Afterward, these settlers were expelled by some Samians and other Ionians, who landed in Sicily while flying from the Medes; and again, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, having not long after expelled the Samians, and colonized their country with a mixed population, changed its name to Messana, after his own original country.

5. Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Saco, and most of those who went to the colony were Chalcidians, though there were also united with them some exiles from Syracuse, who had been defeated in a strife of factions—the Mylætidæ, as they are called. The language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Dorian; but the Chalcidian were the prevailing institutions. Acrae and Casmenæ were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenæ nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was in the first instance founded by the Syracusans, just about a hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse, its founders being Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinæans having been driven out after a war by the Syracusans on account of their revolting from them, some time after, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, having received their territory as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, himself acting as a founder, re-settled Camarina. And having again been depopulated by Gelo, it was settled for the third time by the Geloans.

6. So many were the nations of Greeks and barbarians that inhabited Sicily, and such was the size of the island against which the Athenians were eager to make an expedition; being desirous (to mention their truest motive) of gaining dominion over the whole of it; but at the same time wishing, as a plausible pretext, to succor their own kinsmen, and the allies they had gained besides. Above all, they were instigated by ambassadors from the Segestans, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For being borderers of the Selinuntines, they had gone to war with

on certain questions respecting marriage rights, and for the debated territory; and the Selinuntines, having taken the Syracusans for their allies, were pressing them hard with hostilities both by land and sea. Consequently the Segestans reminded the Athenians of their alliance, which had been renewed in the time of Laches and of the former war with the Selinuntines, and begged them to send a fleet and assist them; adding many other things, and, as the sum and substance of "that if the Syracusans should be unpunished for the depopulation of Leontini, and by ruining such of the Athenians as were still left should themselves obtain the whole power of Sicily; there would be danger of their some time or other coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of Dorians, on the strength of their connection, and, moreover, as auxiliaries, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them, and so joining in the destruction of the Athenian power. were wise therefore, in concert with the remaining allies, to assist the Syracusans: especially as they would themselves furnish money sufficient for the war." The Athenians, hearing these things in their assemblies from the Segestans and their supporters, who were repeatedly alleging them, passed a decree on the subject; sending ambassadors, in the first place, to inquire about the money, whether it were already laid up, as they reported, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to ascertain what was the state of the war with the Selinuntines.

The ambassadors of the Athenians, then, were thus sent to Sicily. The same winter, the Lacedæmonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, having made an expedition into the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land, and took some herds of oxen, and carried off some corn. They also settled Argive exiles at Orneæ; and having left them a few men and the rest of their forces also, and made a truce for some time, on condition of the Orneatæ and the Argives not injuring each other's land, they returned home with their army. The Athenians having come no long time after with thirty ships and six hundred heavy-armed, the Argives, in connection with the Athenians, taking the field with all their forces, besieged the men in Orneæ one day; but at night, the

Or, "voted to send," etc., according to Bekker's and Poppo's reading *ἐμψαλ*, instead of *πέμψαντες*.

army having bivouacked at some distance, they escaped out of it. The next day, the Argives, on finding this, razed Ornesæ and returned, and the Athenians afterward went home with their ships. Moreover, the Athenians took by sea some of their own cavalry, and the Macedonian exiles who were with them, to Methone, the country bordering on Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. The Lacedæmonians therefore sent to the Chalcidians Thraceward, who had a truce with the Athenians from one ten days to another, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they would not. And so the winter ended, and the sixteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

8. The following summer, as soon as the spring commenced, the ambassadors of the Athenians came from Sicily, and the Segestans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships which they were to beg them to send. And the Athenians having held an assembly, and heard from the Segestans and their own ambassadors a seductive and untrue report on the other subjects, and also, with regard to the money, that it was provided in abundance in the temples and the treasury; they voted to send sixty ships, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes, as commanders, with full powers, to assist the Segestans against the Selinuntines, and to join in re-founding Leontini, should they gain any advantage in the war, and to carry out all other measures in Sicily, as they should deem best for the Athenians.—On the fifth day after this, an assembly was again held, to consider in what way the preparations for the ships should be most quickly made, and whatever else was wanted by the generals be voted them for the expedition. Nicias then, who had been chosen against his will to take the command, and thought that the state was not well advised, but, on a trifling and specious pretext, was coveting the whole of Sicily—an arduous design to achieve—came forward with a wish to divert the Athenians from it, and advised them to the following effect:

9. "This assembly was, it is true, convened to consider the subject of our preparations, namely, in what way we ought to make the expedition to Sicily. My opinion, however, is, that we ought still to consider this very point, whether it be better to send out our ships; and not on such slight deliberation on

matters of great moment, at the instigation of aliens, to take upon ourselves a war, with which we have nothing to do. And yet I, for my own part, receive honor from such a policy, and have less fear than others for my own personal safety: (though I consider that man to be an equally good citizen who takes some forethought both for his person and his property; for such a man would, for his own sake, be most desirous that his country also should prosper :) nevertheless, neither aforetime have I ever spoken contrary to my convictions, for the sake of being honored above others, nor will I now, but as I think best, so will I speak. And though against your inclinations my words would be powerless, should I advise you to keep what you have, and not expose your present possessions to danger for things which are uncertain and future; yet that neither are you timely in your haste, nor the objects of your ambition easy to attain, on these points I will give you instruction.

10. "I say then, that you wish, though leaving many enemies behind you here, to bring hither fresh ones besides, by sailing there. And you fancy, perhaps, that the treaty that has been made by you affords some ground of confidence. But though, as long as you remain quiet, that will, indeed, be a treaty—in name (for to this condition have certain persons here and among your enemies brought it by their intrigues), yet if we are ever defeated with any considerable force, those who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us; seeing, in the first place, that the arrangement was made of necessity by them, under circumstances of disaster, and of greater discredit to them than to us; and, secondly, that in this very arrangement we have many subjects open to debate. There are some, too, who have not yet acceded even to this composition, such as it is, and those not the least powerful states; but some of them are at war with us downright, and, in the case of others, because the Lacedæmonians remain quiet at present, they too are restrained by truces from one ten days to another. But probably, if they should find our power divided (which we are now so anxious to bring about), they would with all their might attack us, in conjunction with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would in time past have valued most highly.<sup>1</sup> Every one therefore ought to look to

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "above many things." Compare I. 33.

this, and not presume to run risks with a state so unsettled, and to grasp at another empire before we have secured the one we have; seeing that the Chalcidians Thraceward, though they have revolted from us so many years, are still unsubdued; and there are some others on the different coasts of the mainland who yield us but a doubtful obedience. And so we are quick to succor the Segestans, who are our allies, forsooth, as being injured; but on those by whose revolt we have ourselves long ago been injured, we still defer to avenge ourselves.

11. "And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in subjection by us; but the former, even if we conquered them, we should hardly be able to govern, so far off and so numerous as they are. But it is folly to go against men whom we could not keep under, if we conquered them; while, if we did not succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position as we were before making it. Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us. For at present they might, perhaps, come either as separate states, to oblige the Lacedæmonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire: for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians, and by the same principle.<sup>1</sup> And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time: but if we should meet with any reverse, they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is furthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested. And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained), you have despised them,

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, their wish to rescue the cities from the yoke of Syracuse, as they had done from that of Athens.

and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily. You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedæmonians are doing ought but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time. So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us by the spread of oligarchical principles.<sup>1</sup>

12. "We ought to remember, too, that we have but lately recovered a little from a great pestilence and war, so as to be somewhat recruited both in our property and persons; and that it is but fair for us to expend these here at home, on ourselves, and not on these exiles who are begging your aid; whose interest it is to utter specious falsehoods, and contending at their neighbors' risk, while they themselves only contribute words, either to show no proper gratitude if they succeed, or if in any instance they fail, to ruin their friends along with them. And if there be any one who is pleased at being appointed to command, and therefore urges you to make the expedition, looking to his own interest alone (especially as he is yet too young for office), in order that while he is admired, for his horse-keeping, he may also receive from his appointment some benefit on the score of expense; do not, either, allow that man to exhibit his own individual splendor at the peril of the state; but consider that such men injure the public interests, while they squander their private possessions; and that this is a business of great importance, and not one for a young man to deliberate upon, and rashly to take in hand.

13. "I am alarmed, indeed, when I see such characters sitting here at present by the side of that same individual, in compliance with his bidding; and in return I bid the older men—whichever of them may have one of those characters sitting by him—not to be put down through shame, in order to avoid being thought a coward if he should not vote for going

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold renders it, "in the way of oligarchy," i. e., threatening us, not with the loss of our conquests, but with a change of government.



to war; nor, as their opponents themselves might feel, to be madly enamored of what they do not possess; being convinced that in very few things do men succeed through desire, but in very many through forethought; but in behalf of their country, as exposing itself to the greatest danger it has ever done, to give their support to the opposite side, and vote that the Siceliots keep the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries with which no one can find fault—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along shore; and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep; and that while they enjoy their own possessions, they shall also settle their own quarrels; and that we tell the Segestans in particular, that since they went to war with the Selinuntines in the first instance without consulting the Athenians, they may also make peace with them by themselves: and that we do not in future make alliance, as we have been accustomed, with men whom we shall assist when they are unfortunate, and when we ask assistance ourselves, shall not obtain it

14. "And do you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the state, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put this to the vote, and take a second time the opinion of the Athenians; reflecting, if you feel afraid to move the question again, that the violation of the law would not, with so many abettors, involve any guilt; but that you would be acting as a physician to the state, when it has taken bad counsel; and that good government consists in this—for a man to do his country as much good as possible, or, at least, to do it voluntarily no harm."

15. To this effect spoke Nicias. Of the Athenians, the greater part who came forward advised making the expedition, and not annulling what had been decreed; though there were some also who spoke against it. But the man who most earnestly recommended the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias, who at once wished to thwart Nicias—both as being in other respects opposed to him in politics, and because he had alluded to him in a disparaging manner—and was most anxious to take the command, and hoped by that means to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and at the same time, in consequence of his success, to promote his own private interests in point of fame and wealth. For, being held in high repute by the citizens, he indulged his inclinations on too large a scale for his existing

means, with regard to keeping horses, and all other expenses. And this too was what afterward mainly caused the destruction of the Athenian state. For being alarmed at the extent of his disregard for the laws in his own person, with respect to his mode of life, and of his designs in the measures he severally undertook, in whatever business he might be engaged, the greater part of the people became his enemies on the belief of his aiming at tyranny; and though in his public capacity he conducted the war most ably, yet being severally offended at his habits in his private life, and committing the administration to others, after no long interval they brought their country to ruin. However, at that time he came forward, and advised the Athenians as follows :

16. "It is both befitting,<sup>1</sup> Athenians, for me, more than others, to enjoy command (for with this topic must I commence my speech, since Cleon has attacked me upon it), and at the same time, I deem myself worthy of it. For those things about which I am so assailed with clamor,<sup>2</sup> confer honor on my ancestors and myself, and benefit on my country at the same time. For the Greeks considered our state to be greater than they had ever done, even beyond its actual power, through the splendor of my display as its deputy to the Olympic games; (whereas they hoped before that it had been exhausted by the war); inasmuch as I entered seven chariots—a number which no private individual had ever yet entered—and gained the first prize, and was second and fourth, and provided every thing else in a style worthy of my victory. For according to the usual view of them, such things are a subject of honor; while, from the practice of them, an idea of power is also formed. And again, whatever distinction I gain at home by my exhibitions of choruses,<sup>3</sup> or in any other way, it is naturally envied by my fellow-citizens, but for foreigners this too has an appearance of power.<sup>4</sup> And this is no useless folly, when a

<sup>1</sup> "προσῆκει μοι, 'on account of my wealth, birth, and magnificent expenditures;' ἄξιος ἅμα νομίζω εἶναι, 'on account of my personal worth and tried services.'—Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> Or, to use a more colloquial expression, "cried out against."

<sup>3</sup> On the whole subject of the χορηγίαι, see Böckh Public Econ. of Athens, vol. ii. p. 207, Eng. Trans.

<sup>4</sup> Arnold translates this—and Bloomfield borrows his version—"this appears to be even strength:" but the position of the καὶ seems to me to be incompatible with such a sense; reading, as they both do αὐτῇ, instead of αὐτῇ.

man benefits at his own costs, not himself only, but his country also. Nor is it unfair for one who prides himself on his own prosperity, to refuse to be on an equality with the mass; since in the same way he who is unfortunate shares his calamities with no one else. But as we are not courted when in adversity, by the same rule let a man also submit to be slighted by the prosperous; or let him treat the unfortunate as on an equal footing, [when he is in prosperity,] and so claim the like treatment in return, [when he is himself in adversity]. I know, however, that men in such circumstances, and all who ever surpassed others in splendor of any kind, though disliked in their own life-time, most of all in their dealings with their equals, and then with the rest of the world also, have yet left to some of those who came after them a desire to claim connection with them, even where there were no grounds for it; and a subject for glorying to the country they belonged to, not as for aliens, or offenders, but as for countrymen, who had achieved glorious things. And in my case, who aim at such things, and am therefore in private assailed with clamor, consider, with regard to public affairs, whether I administer them in a manner inferior to any one else, or not. For having united the most powerful states of the Peloponnese, without any great danger or expense to you, I brought the Lacedæmonians to a single day's struggle for their all at Mantinea; in consequence of which, although they were victorious in the battle, they do not ever now feel any firm confidence in themselves.

17. "In this way, then, did my youth and preternatural folly, as it is thought, deal with the power of the Peloponneseans by means of suitable arguments; and, gaining<sup>1</sup> credit by my vehemence, obtained their assent. And now too be not afraid of it; but while I am still in the flower of it, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves fully of the services of each of us. And with regard to the expedition to Sicily, change not your determination from an idea that it would be undertaken against a great power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that its cities are populous; and they easily admit changes in their government, and adopt new ones. And for this reason no one is furnished, as though in behalf of his own country, either with arms for the person, or with ordinary

<sup>1</sup> For other modes of interpreting this sentence, see Poppo's note.

resources, as regards the country;<sup>1</sup> but whatever each one thinks that he can get from the people, either by persuading them through his oratory, or by factious measures, and will so find a home in another land, in case of his not being successful, with that he provides himself. It is not likely, then, that a populace of such a character should either listen to any counsel with one heart, or apply themselves to action in common: but they would severally side with whatever was said to please them; especially if they are torn by factions, as we hear. Again, with regard to heavy-armed troops, neither have the Siceliots so many as are boasted of, nor did the rest of the Greeks prove so numerous as they severally reckoned themselves; but Greece had very much misstated them, and was with difficulty equipped with them in sufficient numbers on the outbreak of this war. The states in those parts, then, from what I learn by report, are of this character, and still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians,

<sup>1</sup> τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ—κατασκευαίς.] "This would refer not only to public works for the defense of the country, such as forts, or the fortifications of the city itself, but to what we should call ordinary improvements, such as roads, bridges, etc., and perhaps ornamental buildings, whether temples or theaters."—*Arnold*. I can not but think that in addition to these objects of expenditure, if not before them all, reference is made to the slaves, cattle, and implements, with which the land ought to be stocked, but was not, in consequence of the unsettled state of the country. As οἷδεῖς seems to refer to *individuals*, not to states, in the preceding clause, it would naturally refer to them in this also; as ἕκαστος also does in the following sentence. And with regard to this signification of κατασκευή, it is one which both the noun and the verb formed from it repeatedly convey in Xenophon's political and economical treatises; e. g., *De Vectigalibus*, IV 11, ὅπως θαρσύντες μὲν ὅτι πλείστον ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀργύρια ἄγωμεν, θαρσύντες δὲ κατασκευαζόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς. And again, 41, Εἰ δὲ τινες αὐτοὺς φοβούνται, μὴ ματαῖα ἂν γένοιτο ἡ κατασκευή, εἰ πόλεμος ἐγερθεῖ—τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς πόλεμον κτῆμα χρησιμώτερον ἀνθρώπων. And in the same way, Thucydides himself uses the verb particularly with reference to slaves, as though they formed the chief stock in the country, in another speech which he puts into the mouth of Alcibiades; ch. 91. 7, Οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατασκευάσται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμῖς, τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα τὰ δ' αὐτομάτα, ἤξει. I think therefore that in the present passage also by the expression τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομιμῶς κατασκευαίς he means the different parts of an agricultural property, and more especially the slaves, which formed the most valuable and important part, while a country was in a peaceful and prosperous condition; but one so likely to be lost in a period of war and revolution, that the Siceliots, according to the view of their unsettled state which Alcibiades here gives, would have very little inducement to invest their money in them.

who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them—and those here will not prove an obstacle, if you take a right view of the matter. For our fathers had these very men, whom they say you would leave behind you in hostility when sailing there, and the Mede beside, as their enemies; and still they won their empire; though strong in nothing else but the superiority of their fleet. And as things stand now, never yet were the Peloponnesians more hopeless with regard to us; and even if they are ever so confident, for invading our country indeed they are strong enough, even though we do not undertake the expedition; but with their naval force they can not hurt us, [though we do undertake it;] for we have a fleet left behind that is a match for them.

18. "On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succor them. For since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their coming here to attack us. And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since if all should remain quiet, or nicely choose<sup>1</sup> whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is. For men do not only defend themselves against a superior when he has attacked them, but also strike the first blow, to prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to portion out exactly how far we wish to hold dominion; but since we are in our present position, we must form designs against some, and not give up others; because we should be subjected to the rule of another party, if we did not ourselves rule over others. Nor must you take the same view of quiet as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh institutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that we shall rather aggrandize our possessions here, if we go in quest of those there, let us make the expedition; that we may both

<sup>1</sup> Or, "make distinctions of race in choosing," etc.; according to the reading *φωλακρῖνοι*, which Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield adopt.

prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians, by being seen, regardless of present peace, to sail even against Sicily; and at the same time by either ruling, as we most probably shall, over the whole of Greece, through being joined by those there or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both ourselves and our allies will be benefited. And as for security, whether for remaining there, in case of any success, or for returning, our fleet will provide us with it: for by sea we shall be superior to all the Siceliots put together. And let not the non-interfering policy which Nicias recommends in his speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you from your purpose; but acting in your usual order, just as our fathers, by consulting young with old, raised the state to its present height, do ye now too, in the same manner, endeavor to advance it; being convinced that youth and old age, can do nothing without each other; but that the period of levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness will have most power when joined together; and that the state, if it remain quiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and its skill in every thing grow dull; while by entering into contest it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find self-defense habitual to it, not in word, but rather in deed. My decided opinion then is, that I think a state of no inactive character would most quickly be ruined by change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely, who regulate their affairs in accordance with their existing habits and institutions, even though they may be of an inferior character, with the least variation."

19. To this effect spoke Alcibiades. When the Athenians had heard him and the Segestans and some Leontine exiles, who, coming forward, begged and entreated them to assist them, reminding them of their oaths, they were much more eager for the expedition than before. So Nicias, perceiving that he could not now turn them from it by the same arguments as he had used before, but might perhaps change their purpose by the amount of armament, if he should command a numerous one to be prepared; he came forward again, and addressed them as follows:

20. "Since I see you, Athenians, altogether bent on making the expedition, may these things turn out as we wish: at the present time, however, I will declare to you what my opinion

is. We are about to go then, as I learn from report, against cities which are great, and not subject one to another, or in want of a change, like that by which men would gladly pass from a state of violent slavery to an easier condition instead of it; which will reasonably refuse to accept our dominion instead of freedom, and are many in number, considering that they are in one island, even those of Greek origin. For besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on the strength of their connection with Leontini, there are seven others, and those equipped with every thing in a style just agreeing with our own power, and most of all, those against which we are more especially sailing, namely, Selinus and Syracuse. For there are in them many heavy-armed, and bowmen, and dartmen, with many triremes, and crowds to man them. They have money too, partly in private funds, and partly in the temples also at Selinus; while the Syracusans have also first-fruits paid them by certain barbarian tribes. But what they most of all excel us in is, that they possess many horses, and use corn of native growth, and not imported.

21. "Against such a power then we require, not only a marine<sup>1</sup> and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves. But it were disgraceful to return by compulsion, or to send for fresh supplies afterward, through having inconsiderately formed our plans at first. On the contrary, we must go against them with sufficient forces, knowing that we are about to sail far from our own country, and not on an expedition of the same kind as when you have gone at different times, in the character of allies, against any of your subjects in these parts, where supplies of additional necessities were easily obtained from the friendly territory; but departing to a land al-

<sup>1</sup> *ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς*] i. e., a force consisting only of the few fighting men on board the ships. Or even if the seamen themselves were joined with them, yet their want of arms and training for land service would render them a very inefficient and weak force against the troops of Syracuse, on shore, however efficient they might be on their own element.

together alien to you, from which for as many as four months in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come here.<sup>1</sup>

22. "I think therefore that we ought to take many heavy-armed, both of our own and of our allies, whether those who are subject to us, or any in the Peloponnese that we may be able either to prevail upon by argument, or to take into our pay; many bowmen also and slingers, to offer resistance to the Sicilian horse; and that in ships we should have a very decided superiority, in order that we may the more easily bring in what is necessary: while we take our corn from home also in merchant vessels, namely, wheat and parched barley, with bakers from the mills, compelled, in proportion to their numbers, to serve for pay; that should we any where be detained by stress of weather, the force may have provisions; (for so numerous as it is, it will not be one for every city to receive). All other things too we must provide, as far as we can, and not depend upon others; but, most of all, we must take from home as much money as possible. For as for that of the Segestans, which is asserted to be there in readiness, believe that it is in the way of assertion, more than in any other way, that it will be ready.

23. "For supposing us to go hence, not only provided on a scale equal to the enemy (excepting, at least, their heavy-armed fighting force<sup>2</sup>), but even surpassing them in all respects; yet scarcely even then shall we be able to subdue that country, and to save this. Indeed we must consider that we are going to found a city among aliens and enemies; and

<sup>1</sup> *μηνῶν, οὐδὲ τεσσάρων.*] I can not at all agree with Poppo's remark: "Οὐδέ insolentius trajectum cum vv. ἄγγελον ῥάδιον ἐλθεῖν jungendum est." That would certainly give a suitable and more easy sense to the passage, but if the position in which *οὐδέ* stands in the great majority of the MSS., and which Poppo himself retains, be the correct one, it seems impossible that it should qualify any other word than *τεσσάρων*; and in that case its force appears to be what is here attributed to it.

<sup>2</sup> *Τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σίτον.*] Arnold thinks that *τοῦ σίτου* would be a better reading; but there is no necessity at all for such a change, if the article be taken as only distinguishing the *class* of provisions here spoken of from another, viz., the corn they took with them, in opposition to that which they would get in Sicily, and which is mentioned in the words immediately preceding, *ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥῆον ἐσκομίζώμεθα*.

<sup>3</sup> "Because as on the one hand it was impossible for the Athenian expedition to match the Syracusan infantry in point of numbers, so on the other hand they were so superior in discipline, that even with a great disparity of numbers they were fully able to cope with them."—Arnold.



such men must either, the first day they land, be at once masters of the country, or know that if they fail to do so, they will find every thing opposed to them. For myself then, being afraid of this, and knowing that on many points we must take good counsel, and on still more have good luck (and that is difficult for such as are but men), I wish to sail from home committing myself as little as possible to fortune, and secured against failure by our preparations, according to all reasonable hopes. For this I consider to be at once most safe for the state at large, and conducive to the preservation of us who will go on the expedition. But if any one think otherwise, I resign the command to him."

24. Thus much spoke Nicias, thinking that he should either deter the Athenians by the vast scale of his measures, or that if he were compelled to join the expedition, he should in this way sail on it most safely. They, however, had not their desire for the voyage taken from them by the burdensome nature of the preparations, but were much more eager for it than ever; and the result proved just contrary to what he had expected; for it was thought that he had given them good advice, and that now certainly they would have even abundant assurance of success. And so all alike were seized with a longing to go on the expedition: the elder, from a belief that they should either subdue the places against which they were about to sail, or that a large force would meet with no misfortune: those in the prime of life, from a desire of foreign sights and spectacles, and because they were in good hope of returning safe from it: the mass of the people and of the soldiery, from thinking that they should both make money at present, and gain additional power, from which an unfailing fund for pay would be obtained. So that owing to the excessive desire of the majority for the measure, even if any one were not pleased with it, he was afraid that by voting against it he might appear ill-affected to the state, and therefore held his peace.

25. At last one of the Athenians came forward, and calling on Nicias, said that he ought not to make excuses and to procrastinate, but to say now before them all, what forces the Athenians should vote him. He then, though reluctantly, said that he would deliberate more leisurely on the question, in concert with his colleagues: as far, however, as he saw at present, they should not sail with less than a hundred triremes.

(as many of the Athenian ships as might be thought fit would carry the heavy infantry, while others must be sent for from the allies), with not fewer than five thousand heavy-armed in all, of the Athenians and the allies, and even more, if at all possible; and that they<sup>1</sup> would get ready and take with them the rest of the armament in proportion, both archers from home and from Crete, slingers, and whatever else should be thought proper.

26. The Athenians, after hearing him, immediately voted that the generals should be invested with full powers to make arrangements, both concerning the number of troops, and every thing connected with the whole expedition, as they might judge to be best for Athens. After this, the preparations began to be made; and they both sent to the allies, and threw up their muster-rolls at home. The city had lately recovered itself from the plague, and from continued hostilities, as regarded both the number of young men who had grown up, and the accumulation of money in consequence of the truce; so that every thing was the more easily provided. And thus they were engaged in preparations.

27. In the mean time, of all the stone Mercuries in the city of Athens (they are, according to the fashion of the country, those well-known square figures, numerous both in private and sacred door-ways), the greater part had their faces mutilated in one night. The perpetrators of this offense were known to no one; but search was made for them, with great rewards for information offered at the public expense. Moreover, the people voted, that if any one knew any other act of impiety to have been committed, whoever wished, whether citizen, alien, or slave, should without fear give information of it. And they took the matter up more seriously<sup>2</sup> than it deserved; for it was considered to be an omen of the expedition, and also to have been done on the strength of a conspiracy for bringing about a revolution, and for putting down the democracy.

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, according to Arnold's explanation, "they, including himself who was to command the expedition;" according to Haack's and Poppo's, Nicias himself and his colleagues. The latter seems the more natural of the two.

<sup>2</sup> Or the comparative may, perhaps, mean "more seriously than they would have done under other circumstances." Or it may be used here, as in other places, with a force scarcely distinguishable from that of the positive.

28. Information therefore was given by some naturalized aliens, and slaves who were in personal attendance on their masters, though not at all respecting the Mercuries, yet of certain mutilations of other images which had before been perpetrated by some young men in a drunken frolic: and, moreover, that in certain private houses the mysteries were celebrated in mockery. In this charge they implicated Alcibiades; and those took it up who were most hostile to him, as being an obstacle to their own taking the permanent lead of the people. Thinking therefore, that if they expelled him, they would have the first place, they magnified the business, and raised an outcry, to the effect that both the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Mercuries had been done for the abolition of democracy; and that there was none of all these things that had been executed without his assistance: alleging in proof of the assertion his general contempt for the law in his personal habits, so opposed to the spirit of democracy.

29. He at once defended himself against these charges, and was ready to submit to trial, as to his being guilty of any of these things, before going on the expedition (for by this time all things necessary for the armament had been provided), and if he had done any of these things, he was willing to be punished; but if he were acquitted, to take the command. He protested, too, that they should not listen to slanders against him in his absence, but put him to death at once if he were guilty; and that it was more prudent not to send him out at the head of so large an armament, with such an accusation attaching to him, before they had decided the question. But his enemies being afraid of the army, lest he should have its good wishes, if at once brought to trial; and lest the people should relent, who courted him, because for his sake the Argives and some of the Mantineans were joining in the expedition; they wished to put it off, and earnestly dissuaded the measure, by bringing forward other orators, who urged that at present he should sail, and not delay the departure of the army, but should on his return take his trial within such a number of days as might be appointed. For they wished to have him sent for, and brought home for trial on a graver charge, which they could more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was resolved that Alcibiades should sail.

30. After this, when it was now midsummer, the departure

Sicily took place. Now to the greater part of the allies, the provision ships, and the smaller craft, and all the other vessels that accompanied them, orders had before been given to muster at Corcyra, with a view to their crossing the Ionian Sea in a body from that place to the Iapygian foreland. The Athenians themselves, and such of the allies as were present, went down to the Piræus on an appointed day, as soon as it was light, and proceeded to man their ships for the purpose of putting out to sea. The whole multitude too (so to speak), was in the city, both of citizens and foreigners, went down to meet them. The natives accompanied, respectively, those who were related to them, whether friends, kinsmen, or sons; and at that once with hope and with lamentations; with hope, that they would attain what they went for; but with lamentations, as doubtful if they should ever again see their friends, and they remembered on how long a voyage they were set out from their country. At the present time too, when they were now to take leave of each other on a perilous undertaking, the thought of the dangers struck them more forcibly than when they were voting for the expedition: though, nevertheless, they were cheered by the sight of their own strength, through the numbers of each part of the armament which they beheld. As to the foreigners, and the rest of the multitude, they went to see the sight, as that of an event worthy of their notice, and surpassing belief.

This armament which first sailed out,<sup>1</sup> going from a city, and consisting of a Grecian force, was the most numerous and splendid of all up to that time. Yet in number of ships and of heavy-armed, that against Epidaurus under Cimon, and the same when going against Potidæa under Alcibiades, was not inferior to this: for there were in it four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians themselves, three thousand horse, and a hundred triremes, with fifty of the Argives and Chians, while many allies besides joined in the expedition. But they were dispatched on a short voyage and

[*πρῶτη αὐτῇ πρῶτη.*] I have followed Gölle's and Arnold's interpretation of these words in preference to that of Poppe, who joins *πρῶτη πολυτελεστάτη δὲ*, and renders the passage thus: "Hic enim fuit primus sumptuosissimus profectus;" which appears to imply there could be *more than one* expedition that was *the most costly* of all to that time. Unless "primus" is intended by him to express first; and not time; which does not seem probable.

with scanty preparation: whereas this expedition started with the expectation of its being a long one, and was equipped for both kinds of service, whichever might be required, with ships and land-forces at the same time. The fleet was elaborately fitted out, at great expense both on the part of the captains and of the state. For the treasury gave a drachma a day to each seaman, and furnished empty vessels, sixty fast sailers and forty transports; while the captains provided the best crews for them, and gave gratuities in addition to the pay from the treasury, to the *thranitæ*,<sup>1</sup> and to the petty officers; and made use besides of expensive ensigns and equipments; each one of them being in the highest degree desirous that his own ship should excel most in beauty and fast sailing. The land-forces, on the other hand, were selected from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in great attention to their arms and personal accouterments. The consequence was, that there was at once a rivalry among themselves, in the arm of the service to which they were severally appointed; and that with the rest of the Greeks it was imagined to be a display of power and resources, rather than an armament raised against an enemy. For if any one had reckoned the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals; with regard to the state, what sums it had already spent upon it, and what it was sending out in the hands of the generals; and with regard to individuals, what each had laid out on his personal equipment, and, in the case of a captain, on his ship, with what he was likely to lay out still; and, moreover, what it was probable that every one had provided, independently of his pay from the treasury, toward the expenses of a voyage expected to be so long; and what each soldier or trader took with him for the purpose of exchange [if all these sums, I say, had been calculated]; it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. And the expedition was no less celebrated through men's astonishment at its boldness, and the splendor of its appearance, than for the superiority of the armament, compared with

<sup>1</sup> *θρανίταις*.] *i. e.*, the highest of the three banks of rowers in a trireme, whose labor was greater in proportion to the greater length of the oars they worked. Göller supposes *ἐπηρείταις* in this passage to signify "the servants of the sailors," and Poppe agrees with him, if the text be allowed to be sound. I have followed Arnold's interpretation. See his note on the passage.

those whom they were going to attack; and from the fact of its being the longest passage from their own country that had hitherto been undertaken, and with the greatest hope of future advantages in comparison with their present means.

32. Now when the ships were manned, and every thing was put on board that they meant to set sail with, silence was proclaimed by trumpet, and they offered the prayers which are usual before putting out to sea; not ship by ship singly, but all together, responding to a herald; having mixed bowls of wine through the whole armament, and both seamen and their officers making oblations with gold and silver goblets. They were joined also in their prayers by the rest of the multitude on shore, both the citizens and whoever else was there that wished them well. When they had sung their hymn, and finished their libations, they weighed anchor; and having at first sailed out in a column, they then raced each other as far as Ægina. And thus they hastened to reach Corcyra, where the remaining force of the allies was also assembling.

Now tidings of the expedition were brought to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time received no credit at all. Nay, even when an assembly was held on the subject, both by others were speeches to the following effect delivered (some believing the report of the Athenian expedition, while some contradicted it), and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, coming forward to them, from a conviction that he had accurate information on the subject, addressed to them the following advice:

33. "I shall, perhaps, appear to you, as some others have done, to speak what is incredible concerning the reality of the expedition that is coming against us: and I know that those who either make statements, or bring reports, which do not seem to be credible, not only fail to convince, but are also thought to be foolish. Nevertheless I will not, through fear of this, hold my tongue when the state is in danger, since I am myself at any rate, persuaded that I speak with more certain knowledge than others. For the Athenians, much as you are surprised at it, have set out against us with a large force both for sea and land service, nominally, on account of an alliance with the Segestians, and for the purpose of settling the Leontines, but really through desire for Sicily, and most of all for our city, thinking that if they get this, they will easily get the rest also. With a conviction, then, that they will quickly

be here, consider how with your present resources you may best defend yourselves, and may neither through despising the matter be taken off your guard, nor through disbelieving it neglect the common weal. But if, on the other hand, I appear to any one to speak credibly, let him not be struck with consternation at their boldness and power. For neither will they be able to do us more harm than they receive, nor, because they are coming against us with a great armament, are they on that account without advantage for us; but it is much better with respect to the rest of the Sicelioti (for they will be the more willing, in their consternation, to join our alliance), and in case of our either defeating them, or repulsing them without their obtaining the objects of their ambition (for certainly I am not afraid of their gaining what they expect), it will prove the most glorious achievement, for us, and one which, by me at least, is not unexpected. For few have been the great armaments, either of Greeks or barbarians, which have gone far from home and proved successful. For they come not in greater numbers than the natives of the country and those who live near it (since all league together through fear), and if they fail through want of provisions in a foreign land, even though they fail chiefly through their own fault, they nevertheless leave a proud name to those who were the objects of attack. Just as these very Athenians, when the Mede, contrary to expectation, was so signally defeated, grew great on the strength of the report, that it was against Athens that he had come. And there is reason for hoping that in our case the result may be the same.

34. "With good courage, then, let us both make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachment of some of them, and endeavor to enter into friendship and alliance with others; while we dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to prove that the danger is common to all; and to Italy, that either we may gain their alliance for ourselves, or they may refuse to receive the Athenians. I think it better, too, that we should also send to Carthage. For this is nothing unexpected by them; but they are always in fear that they may some time or other find the Athenians coming against their country; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that if they abandoned these places, they would themselves be brought into trouble, they might be willing to assist us; at least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or

other. And they are more able to do it, if they please, than any men of the present day; for they possess most gold and silver; and it is by means of these that war, like every thing else, prospers. Let us likewise send to Lacedæmon and Corinth, begging them to come hither to our aid as quickly as possible, and to stir up the war there. And what I think the most expedient course, though you, through your habitual love of quiet, would be least quickly persuaded to adopt it, shall, notwithstanding that, be mentioned. If then we Siceliots—all in one body, if possible; but if not, as many as possible in concert with us—would launch the whole of our present navy, with two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they will not have to fight about Sicily before they have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea; we should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on considering that we are starting from a friendly country as its guardians (for Tarentum is ready to receive us), but that for them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament; which would hardly remain in order through so long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it came on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body; then, if they use their oars, we shall fall on them when they are wearied; or if we should not choose to do so, we may also retire to Tarentum: while they having crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, would be at a loss what to do in uninhabited regions; and would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they attempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their armament, and would be dispirited, from having no certainty whether the cities would receive them or not. I therefore, for my part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consideration, they would not so much as put out from Corcyra; but would either, after deliberating and reconnoitering how many we are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of the year into winter; or, in consternation at the unexpected result, break up the expedition: especially since the most skillful of their generals, as I hear, is taking the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return,



if any considerable resistance were seen on our part. We should be reported too, I am quite sure, as being more than we really are;<sup>1</sup> and in accordance with what is told them are men's feelings also affected; and of those who are beforehand in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack them see beforehand that they will defend themselves, they stand in greater fear, considering them equal to the danger. And this would be the case now with the Athenians. For they are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance; with good reason contemning us, because we did not join the Lacedæmonians in destroying them. But if they saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at the power which we really possess. Be persuaded, therefore, to show this boldness, if possible; but if not, then, as quickly as possible, to get ready all other resources for the war; and to think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds; but that, for the present, to consider those preparations most safe which are made with a feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would prove most to your advantage. For those men are both coming against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, and all but here."

35. Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at great strife one with another; some maintaining that the Athenians would by no means come, and that what he said was not the truth; others asking what they could do, if they did come, which they would not suffer on a larger scale in return. Others, again, treated the matter with utter contempt, and turned it to ridicule; while there were but few who believed Hermocrates, and were afraid of what was coming. Athenagoras, who was a leader of the people, and most influential with the multitude at the present time, then came forward to them and spoke as follows:

36. "With regard to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so senseless, and to be reduced into subjection to us by coming here, is either a coward, or ill affected toward his country. But with regard to those who bring such things, and fill you with such excessive fear, I wonder at them, not

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "on the side of more, or excess;" like ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, I. 10. 3

their audacity, but for their folly, if they imagine that they are not seen through. For being afraid themselves, they wish to throw the whole city into consternation, in order that they may get their own terror thrown into the shade by the general alarm. And now this is the real value of these reports: they do not arise in a natural way, but are concocted by men who are always raising commotions here. But you, if well advised, should not look at and estimate probabilities by the news which these persons bring, but by what men of talent and great experience, as I presume the Athenians are, would be likely to do. It is not probable that they, leaving the Peloponnesians behind them, and not having yet brought the war at home to a conclusion, should voluntarily come here for another so arduous; since, in my opinion, they are quite contented with *us*, with so many and so great cities as we have, are not going against *them*.

7. "But, indeed, if they should come, as they are said to be coming, I consider Sicily more competent to bring the war to termination than the Peloponnese (inasmuch as it is so well provided in all respects), and our city by itself far stronger than the army which is now, as they say, coming against us, even though it came twice as large as it is. For I am sure that neither will any horses accompany them, or be provided for them here, except some few from the Segestans, nor will they be armed equal in number to our own, coming, as they have done, on board ship. For it is a great thing for the ships themselves, lightly-laden, to perform so long a voyage hither; and for all the other provisions required for such a city (which will be no few), to be furnished. So I am then am I from believing this, that I think if they came to another city as large as Syracuse in their possession, and were there on our borders carried on the war, they would hardly avoid utter ruin: much less then, surely, with the aid of Sicily hostile to them (for it will league together); with an army established in the country from on board ship; and while they are not permitted by our cavalry to advance far from their wretched tents, and such poor equipments as they are compelled to put up with. In short, I do not think they would even effect a landing; so far superior do I consider our forces to be.

8. "But the Athenians, as I tell you, being aware of this,

are engaged, I am well assured, in preserving their own possessions; and it is persons here that are making up these stories of what neither is, nor could ever be, the case. And I am not now for the first time convinced of them, but have ever been so, that they wish to terrify your populace by such tales as these, and still more wicked ones, if not even by deeds; and so themselves to have the rule of the city. And in truth I am afraid, lest some time or other, by making many attempts, they should even succeed; while we are ill-disposed, before we are in the act of suffering, to take precautionary measures against them, and after finding them out, to proceed against them. And so by these means our city is seldom at rest, but is involved in many feuds and conflicts—not more frequently with its enemies than with itself—and sometimes in tyrannies and unprincipled cabals. But I will endeavor, if only you will follow my advice, to let none of these things occur in our time; by convincing you who form the mass of the people, and by chastising those who plot such things; not only when convicted in the acts (for it is difficult so to catch them), but also for what they have the wish, though not the power, to do. For we must avenge ourselves on our enemy, not only for what he does, but beforehand also, for his intention to do it; inasmuch as if we were not first in guarding against him, we shall be first in suffering. With regard to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall reprove them on some points, watch them on others, and warn them on others; for in this way I think I shall best deter them from their evil practices. And, indeed, what is it (a question which I have often asked) that ye really wish, ye young men? Is it to enjoy power at once? But that is not lawful; and that law was so enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than with a wish to degrade you when competent for the task. Well then, is it to avoid being under the same laws with the people at large? And how then is it right for the same people not to be thought worthy of the same privileges?

39. "Some one will say, that a democracy is neither a sensible nor an equitable thing, but that those who have property are also most competent to rule best. But I say, in the first place, that 'democracy' is a name for all, but 'oligarchy' for only a part; and, in the second place, that though the rich are the best guardians of property, the intelligent would be the

best counselors, and the mass of the people the best judges after hearing measures discussed; and that all these things, both severally and collectively, have their due share allotted to them in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, admits, indeed, the many to a share of dangers, but of advantages it not only enjoys the larger part, but even takes away and keeps the whole. And this is what the powerful and young among you desire—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

40. "Nay then at length, even now, O ye dullest of all men<sup>1</sup> (for of all the Greeks I know, are you either most senseless, if you are not sensible that you are coveting evil things; or most unprincipled, if you know it, and still dare to pursue them):—nay then, I say, either acquire that knowledge, or change those principles, and so advance the interest of the city, which is the common interest of all. For consider, that those who are good among you will share that in an equal, or even greater degree, than the mass of the people in the city; but that if you wish any thing else, you run a risk of being deprived of all. And have done with such reports as these, knowing that they are brought to those who are aware of, and will not tolerate, your designs. For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will resist them in a manner worthy of itself; and we have generals who will look to these matters. And if none of the reports be true (which is my opinion), it will not lay a voluntary slavery on itself, by being panic-struck at your intelligence, and by choosing you as its rulers; but will look at the circumstances itself, and consider the words spoken by you as equivalent to deeds; and will not be deprived of its present liberty by listening to you, but will endeavor to preserve it by being cautious in its actions, and not allowing you to go unpunished."

41. To this effect spoke Athenagoras. One of the generals then rose up, and would no longer permit any one else to come forward, but himself spoke on the subject before them to the following effect: "It is neither prudent for any parties to utter calumnies against each other, nor for those who hear them to admit them; but rather to see, with regard to the intelligence brought to us, how we may prepare, both each man

<sup>1</sup> I have attempted to translate this passage as it is found in the MSS., but must refer to the different editors for the emendation which they propose for what they all agree in thinking the corrupt part of it.

severally and the whole city together, to defend ourselves well against the invaders. And even supposing it not to be required, there is no harm, at any rate, in the state being equipped with horses, and arms, and every thing else in which war rejoices. And we ourselves will undertake to attend to and examine these things, and to send round to the cities, both for observation, and whatever else may appear to be expedient. To some of them, indeed, we have already attended; and whatever we discover, we will lay before you." After the general had said thus much, the Syracusans departed from the assembly.

42. Now the Athenians were by this time at Corcyra, themselves and all their allies. And in the first place, the generals reviewed the armament a second time, and made their dispositions, as they were to come to their moorings, and to form their camp; making three squadrons, and allotting one to each of their body, that they might not, by sailing in company, be at a loss for water, and ports, and provisions, on their touching any where; and that they might in other respects be more orderly and easy to control, by being put under a particular commander, according to the several squadrons. They next sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to ascertain which of the cities would receive them; with orders to come out again and meet them, that they might know this when they put in.

43. After this, the Athenians at length weighed anchor, and proceeded to cross over from Corcyra to Sicily, with the following force; viz.—a hundred and thirty-four triremes, in all, and two Rhodian fifty-oared galleys (a hundred of these were Athenian vessels, sixty of which were fast sailers, the rest troop ships; the remainder of the fleet being composed of Chians, and the other allies); of heavy-armed, in all, five thousand one hundred (of which there were raised by the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred, and seven hundred Thetes<sup>1</sup> serving as Epibatæ on board the ships; the rest of those who joined the expedition being allies, some of them sent by their subjects, others by the Argives, to the number of five hundred, with two hundred and fifty Mantipeans, who were also mercenaries); of archers, in all, four hundred and

<sup>1</sup> *θητες*.] *i. e.*, men included in the lowest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people, and which consisted of all whose land brought in less than two hundred medimni of corn yearly. See note<sup>1</sup> p. 167.

eighty (eighty of which were Cretans); of Rhodian slingers, seven hundred; of light-armed Megareans, who were exiles, one hundred and twenty; and one horse transport, carrying thirty horses.

44. Such was the amount of the first armament which sailed over for the war. For these troops thirty ships of burden, laden with corn, carried provisions, with the bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all the tools for building fortifications; and also one hundred boats, which, together with the ships of burden, were pressed into the service; while many other boats and ships of burden followed the armament voluntarily, for purposes of commerce; all of which proceeded at that time to cross the Ionian Gulf from Corcyra. When the whole armament had made the coast at the Iapygian foreland, and Tarentum, and as they severally could, they sailed along the coast of Italy, as the cities did not afford them a market, or the protection of their walls, but only water and anchorage (and Tarentum and Locri not even these), until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. There they at once mustered, and pitched a camp outside the city (as they would not receive them within the walls), in the sacred inclosure of Diana, where they afforded them a market; and having drawn up their ships ashore, they remained quiet. They then entered into communication with the Rhegians, calling upon them, as Chalcidians, to assist the Leontines, who were Chalcidians also. They, however, said that they would join neither party, but whatever the rest of the Italiots should collectively determine, that they would do. The Athenians then turned their attention to the state of things in Sicily, considering in what way they would best deal with them; and at the same time were waiting for the arrival from Segesta of the ships which had been sent on in advance; wishing to know respecting the money, whether there were such a sum as the messengers stated at Athens.

45. To the Syracusans, in the mean time, reports were being brought from all quarters, and from those who had been sent by them to reconnoiter came positive intelligence that the ships were at Rhegium; and on the belief of this, they began to make preparations with all their heart, and were no longer incredulous. Accordingly they sent about to the Sicels, in some cases, guards; in others, ambassadors; and were putting

garrisons into the stations of the *peripoli*<sup>1</sup> in their country; while in their city they were seeing if the equipments were complete, by examining arms and horses; and were settling every thing else, in expectation of a war that was quickly coming on them, and all but present.

46. Now the three ships sent on in advance came from Segesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with tidings that the other money which they had promised was not there, but that only thirty talents were to be seen. The generals then were immediately in a state of great despondency, because this their first hope had disappointed them; as had the Rhegians also, by their unwillingness to join their standard—the people they had first attempted to persuade, and for whom it was most natural to assist them, as they were of the same race as the Leontines, and always favorably disposed toward themselves. Nicias, indeed, was prepared for the tidings from the Segestans, but by the other two it was quite unexpected. For the Segestans had recourse to the following contrivance, at the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to see the state of their funds. They took them to the temple of Venus at Eryx, and showed them the treasures deposited there, consisting of bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and other articles of furniture in no small quantity; which being made of silver, presented, with a value really trifling, a much greater show of wealth. And in their private receptions of the triremes' crews, having collected the cups both of gold and silver that were in Segesta itself, and borrowed those in the neighboring cities, whether Phœnician or Grecian, they each brought them to the entertainments, as their own. And thus, as all used pretty nearly the same, and great numbers of them were every where seen, it created much astonishment in the Athenians from the triremes; and on their arrival at Athens they spread it abroad that they had seen great wealth. Those, then, who had been themselves thus outwitted, and had at that time persuaded the rest, were severely blamed by the soldiers, when the report went abroad that there was not at Segesta the money they had expected.

47. The generals now took counsel on the present state of affairs. The opinion of Nicias was, that they should sail to Selinus with all their forces, that being the object for which

<sup>1</sup> See note, p. 266

they had, most of all, been sent: and in case of the Segestans supplying money for the whole armament, that then they should determine accordingly; otherwise, that they should beg them to give provisions for their sixty ships, the number which they had asked for; and remaining there should bring the Selinuntines to terms with them, either by force or by treaty; and so, after coasting along by the other cities, and displaying the power of the Athenian state, as well as proving their zeal in the cause of their friends and allies, they should sail back home (unless they should be able, on a sudden, and without expecting it, either to do the Leontines service, or to bring over some of the other cities);—and not expose their state to danger by spending its own resources.

48. Alcibiades, on the other hand, said that they ought not, after sailing from home with so large a force, to return with dishonor and without effecting their purpose; but to send heralds to all the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and endeavor also to get some of the Sicels to revolt from the Syracusans, and to gain the friendship of others among them, with a view to obtaining corn and troops; but first of all to win over the Messanians (for they lay just in the passage and approach to Sicily, and there would be a harbor for them there, and the most suitable station for observing the enemy). When, then, they had brought over the cities, and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, then they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, if the latter did not come to terms with Segesta, and the former permit them to settle the Leontines.

49. Lamachus, again, urged that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and immediately fight the battle under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were most unprepared and panic-struck. For every armament was most formidable in the first instance; but if it spent much time before coming into sight, men grew bold again in spirit, and felt more contempt for it even on its appearance. If, then, they attacked them on a sudden, while they were still with terror looking for them, they would gain the most decided advantage over them, and strike fear into them in every way; by their sight of the forces (for they would appear most numerous at the present time), by their expectation of what they would suffer, and, most of all, by the immediate peril of the en-



gagement. It was probable, too, that many would be surprised outside the city in consequence of their not believing that they would come; or, if<sup>1</sup> they were now carrying in their effects, yet the army would be in no want of property, if it sat down in superior force before the city. And so the rest of the Siceliots would then the more shrink from entering into alliance with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians; and would not put off, while they waited to see which party would be the stronger. As for a naval station, he said that after retiring [from before Syracuse], and bringing their ships to anchor, they should establish one at Megara; which was an uninhabited place, at no great distance from Syracuse either by sea or land.

50. Though Lamachus spoke to this effect, he nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades sailed across in his own ship to Messana, and made proposals to them for forming an alliance; but when he did not prevail on them, but they answered that they could not receive him within their city, though they would afford him a market outside, he sailed back again to Rhegium. Then the generals immediately joined in manning sixty ships out of the whole number, and, taking provisions for them, coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium with one of their own body. On the Naxians' receiving them within their city, they coasted on to Catana; and when the inhabitants refused to admit them (for there was in that place a party that favored the cause of the Syracusans), they proceeded to the river Terias. Having spent the night there, the next day they sailed in column toward Syracuse, with the rest of the ships; for ten of their squadron they had sent on before, to sail into the great harbor, and observe whether there were any fleet launched; and to proclaim from their ships, "that the Athenians were come to reinstate the Leontines in their own country, on the ground of alliance and kindred; and therefore that such of them as were in Syracuse should withdraw from it, and without any apprehension join the Athenians, as friends and benefactors." So when this proclamation had been made, and they had reconnoitered the city, the harbors, and the features of the country which they would have to make the base of their operations in the war, they sailed back again to Catana.

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold renders it, "while they were carrying," &c.

51. An assembly having been held there, the inhabitants did not admit the armament, but told the generals to come in and say what they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking, and the attention of those in the city was turned to the assembly, the soldiers, without being observed, broke through a postern which had been ill built up in the wall, and entering the city, stationed themselves in the market-place. When those of the Catanæans who favored the Syracusans saw the army within the walls, being immediately very much alarmed, they secretly went out of the place, as they formed but a small party, while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians, and begged them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and having now put out with all their armament for Catana, on their arrival there established themselves in their camp.

52. Now tidings were brought to them, both from Camarina, that if they went there the inhabitants would go over to them; and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. They coasted along, therefore, with all their force, in the first instance, to Syracuse; and when they found no fleet manning, they again proceeded along the shore toward Camarina; and having brought to at the beach, sent a herald to the people. They, however, did not admit them, saying that their agreement on oath was to receive the Athenians when they sailed to them with only a single ship, unless they should themselves send for more. Being thus unsuccessful, they sailed back again; and after they had landed on a part of the Syracusan territory, and the cavalry from Syracuse had come to the rescue, and killed some stragglers of the light-armed, they went back to Catana.

53. There they found the ship Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades—to order him to sail back and defend himself against the charges which the state brought against him—and for some others of the soldiers, who with him had been informed against, as being guilty of impiety with regard to the mysteries, and some of them with regard to the Mercuries also. For the Athenians, after the armament had sailed away, made no less investigation into what had been done in the case of the mysteries and in that of the Mercuries; and as they did not test the character of the informers, but in their suspicious<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Or, according to Poppo's reading, πάντα, "taking, or regarding, every thing in a suspicious light."

mood admitted all who came forward, on the credit of unprincipled men, they arrested and threw into prison very excellent citizens, thinking it more expedient to sift the matter and find it out, than that, in consequence of the bad principle of an informer, an accused person, even though he had a good character, should be unquestioned, and escape. For the commons, knowing by report that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had proved galling at last, and, moreover, that it had not even been put down by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedæmonians, were always afraid, and took every thing suspiciously.

54. For the daring deed of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love-adventure, by relating which, at some length, I shall show that neither other people nor the Athenians themselves give any accurate account of their own tyrants, or of what has happened among them. For when Pisistratus had died at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as the generality suppose, but Hippias, that was eldest of his sons, and obtained the government. Now Harmodius being in the flower of youth and beauty, Aristogiton, a citizen of middle rank in the city, was enamored of him, and enjoyed his favor. Harmodius, then, being solicited by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, and not prevailed upon, denounced him to Aristogiton. He, lover-like, being exceedingly indignant, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him by force, immediately formed a design (such as he could in the position he held), for putting down the tyranny. In the mean time, Hipparchus, having again solicited Harmodius with no better success, would not indeed offer any violence to him, but prepared to insult him in some secret way or other, as though it were not on that account. For neither in his general government was he severe toward the mass of the people, but conducted it without exciting any odium; and, for tyrants, these men in the greatest degree studied virtue and intelligence; and though they exacted from the Athenians only a twentieth of their income, they adorned their city in a beautiful manner, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. The state enjoyed, too, the laws which had been previously enacted, in all other respects, except that they always took care that one of their own family should hold the offices. Among

others of them who held the yearly archonship at Athens, was Pisistratus, son of the Hippias who had been tyrant, who bore his grandfather's name, and dedicated, while archon, the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people having afterward made an addition to the length of that in the market-place, obliterated the inscription on the altar; but that in the Pythian precinct is even still visible, though in faded letters, to this purport:

"Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, here,  
In Pythian precinct, marked his archon year."

55. Now that Hippias, as being the eldest son, succeeded to the government, I both positively assert, because I know it by report more accurately than others, and one may also learn it from this very fact. He alone of the legitimate brothers appears to have had children; as both the altar shows, and the pillar commemorating the wrong committed by the tyrants, placed in the Athenian citadel, on which is inscribed the name of no child of Thessalus, or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, who were born to him of Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides. For it was natural that the eldest should have married first. And he is the first mentioned on the pillar<sup>1</sup> after his father, and that, too, not unnaturally, as he was the eldest next to him, and enjoyed the tyranny. Nor, again, do I think that Hippias would ever have obtained the tyranny with such ease at the moment, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and Hippias had had to establish himself in it on the same day. But owing to his former habit, both of striking fear into the citizens, and of paying strict attention to his mercenaries, he retained his sway with superabundant security, and was at no loss, as though he had been a younger brother, and so had not previously been familiar with the constant exercise of power.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ στήλῃ.] As I do not think that *πρώτη* can bear the meaning which Arnold, though with great doubt, proposes to give it, and as no other editor professes to understand its force, I have not translated it at all.

<sup>2</sup> ἐννεχῶς ὠμιλῇται τῇ ἀρχῇ.] These words seem to refer to the *temporary* exercise of power which he might have enjoyed as archon for a year, in opposition to the *permanent* exercise of it as tyrant, which he would *not* have enjoyed, had he been the younger son of his father.

But it was the lot of Hipparchus, because he was rendered famous by the sad fate which befell him, to receive also in succeeding ages the repute of having enjoyed the tyranny.

56. So then, when Harmodius had resisted his solicitation, he insulted him, as he intended. For after summoning a sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, they rejected her when she came, saying that they had not summoned her at all, as she was not worthy of the honor.<sup>1</sup> Harmodius being very indignant at this, Aristogiton also was, for his sake, much more exasperated than ever. And now all their other arrangements had been made with those who were to join them in taking the business in hand; but they were waiting for the great Panathenaic festival, on which day alone it was not considered a suspicious circumstance that those of the citizens who had conducted the procession should meet together in arms; and they were themselves to begin, but the rest immediately to join in aiding them against the body-guards. The conspirators were not numerous, for security's sake; for they hoped that if any number whatever dared to make the attempt, even those who were not before privy to it would be willing at the moment, inasmuch as they had arms in their hands, to join in effecting their own freedom.

57. When, therefore, the festival arrived, Hippias, with his body-guard, was arranging outside of the walls, in what is called the Ceramicus, how the several parts of the procession were to proceed. And when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippias (for he was easy of access to all), they were alarmed, and thought that some information had been laid against them, and that they would be almost immediately arrested. They wished, therefore, to avenge themselves beforehand, if possible, on the man who had aggrieved them, and for whose punishment they were exposing themselves to all that danger; and so they rushed straightway within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium, at once fell on him in a reckless manner, under the influence of the most vehement passion, inspired by love in the

<sup>1</sup> Either because her family was of Phœnician extraction, which excluded her from an honor confined to pure Athenians; or because her immoral character, as they insinuated, incapacitated her for an employment in which none but virgins of unblemished reputation could take a part.

one case, and by insult in the other, and smote him, and slew him. Now one of them, namely, Aristogiton, escaped from the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was seized afterward, and disposed of in no gentle manner. Harmodius was immediately slain on the spot.

58. When the news were brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he proceeded immediately, not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the procession, before they were aware of the matter, in consequence of their being at some distance from the spot; and with his countenance feigned to suit the occasion, so as not to betray his feelings, he pointed out a certain spot, and desired them to retire into it without their arms. Accordingly they withdrew, supposing that he would deliver an address to them; while he, after commanding his guards to remove the arms, immediately picked out such men as he was disposed to think guilty, and whoever was found with a dagger; for it was only with shield and spear that they were accustomed to make their processions.

59. In this manner both the original conspiracy was entered into by Harmodius and Aristogiton for a love offense, and their rash venture attempted through their alarm at the moment. After this, the tyranny was more severe on the Athenians than before; and Hippias, being now in greater apprehension, both put to death many of the citizens, and kept his eye also on foreign states, in whatever quarter he had a prospect of a safe retreat being secured for him, in case of any revolution. At any rate, he married his daughter Archedice to Æantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus—Athenian as he was,<sup>1</sup> to a Lampsacene—because he saw that they had great influence with king Darius. There is a monument to her at Lampsacus, with this inscription:

“Beneath this dust Archedice finds peace,  
Whose sire was Hippias, peerless once in Greece.  
She, though of tyrants daughter, sister, bride,  
And mother, ne’er was lifted up with pride.”

With regard to Hippias, having retained the tyranny at Athens

<sup>1</sup> i. e., to a native of a place so very far beneath his own country in reputation. Compare III. 59. 6, *μη Πλαταιῆς οντες—Θηβαίους—παράδοθηναι*: where, as in many other places, the omission of the article with the name of a people expresses something respecting the character of the people, whether good or bad.

three years longer, and being deposed in the fourth year by the Lacedæmonians and the banished Alcmaeonidæ, he went, under treaty, to Sigeum, then to Æantides at Lampsacus, and thence to the court of king Darius, from which also he set out twenty years after, when now an old man, and accompanied the Median forces to Marathon.

60. Reflecting, then, on these things, and recalling to mind all that they knew by report concerning them, the Athenian people were wrathful at that time, and suspicious of those who had incurred accusation on the subject of the mysteries, and thought that every thing had been done on the strength of a conspiracy for establishing an oligarchy, or a tyranny. So when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many persons of consideration were already in prison, and the matter appeared not to be stopping, but they were daily proceeding to greater severity and more numerous arrests; under these circumstances one of the men in confinement, who was thought to be the most guilty of them, was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to give information, whether true or not; for suppositions are entertained both ways, and the certain fact respecting those who had done the deed no one was either able to state then, or has since been able. By his arguments then he persuaded him that he ought, even if he had not done the deed, both to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and to stop his country from its present suspiciousness; for that his preservation was more sure, if he confessed with a promise of impunity, than if he denied it, and were brought to trial. Accordingly he informed both against himself and some others, respecting the Mercuries; and the Athenian people having gladly ascertained, as they supposed, the truth of the matter, and having been before indignant at the thought of not discovering those who had plotted against their commons, immediately set at liberty the informer and his companions, such as he had not accused; while with regard to those who were charged with the crime, having brought them to trial, they executed all of them who were seized, and having passed sentence upon those who had fled, proclaimed a reward in money for any one who slew them. By this course, though it was doubtful whether those who suffered had been punished unjustly or not, yet the rest of the community were manifestly benefited.

61. With regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians took a severe view of the case, being instigated by his enemies, the same men as had also attacked him before his going on the expedition. And when they fancied they were in possession of the truth respecting the Mercuries, they thought much more than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been done by him with the same design, and in connection with the plot against the democracy. For a small force of Lacedæmonians happened too, just at the time when they were in commotion on these subjects, to have advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Bœotians. They thought, therefore, that it had come by agreement, through his agency, and not on account of the Bœotians; and that if they had not, in consequence of the information they had received, been beforehand in the arrest of the party, the city would have been betrayed to them. One night, indeed, they even slept in arms in the Temple of Theseus within the walls. The friends, too, of Alcibiades, at Argos, were at the same time suspected of a design to attack the popular government; and those persons of the Argives who had been deposited in the islands the Athenians on that occasion gave up to the Argive commons to put to death on that account. Thus on all sides there arose suspicion against Alcibiades; and consequently wishing to bring him to trial, and put him to death, in this way they sent the ship *Salaminia* to Sicily, both for him and for the rest who had been informed against. Their orders were, to charge him to accompany the vessel home to plead his defense, but not to arrest him; for they were at the same time careful to avoid raising a commotion among both their own soldiers in Sicily and their enemies, and especially wished the Mantineans and Argives to remain there, whom they considered to have been prevailed on by Alcibiades to join them in the expedition. He then, with his own ship and those who had been accused with him, sailed away in the company of the *Salaminia* from Sicily, as though to return to Athens. But when they had reached Thurii, they followed it no further, but left the vessel and concealed themselves, being afraid of going home to trial with such a prejudice existing against them. The crew of the *Salaminia* for some time made search for Alcibiades and his companions, but when they were nowhere to be found, they departed on their voy-



age back. Alcibiades, therefore, being now an outlaw, crossed not long after on board a boat from Thurii to the Peloponnese; and the Athenians, when they were not forthcoming, 'passed sentence of death upon him and those with him.

62. After these things, the remaining generals of the Athenians in Sicily, having made two divisions of the army, and each taken by lot one of them, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Segesta; wishing to know whether the Segestans would give the promised money, and at the same time to inspect the condition of the Selinuntines, and to learn the state of their differences with the Segestans. And so, coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left hand, on the side toward the Tyrrhene gulf, they landed at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in that part of the island. When they would not receive them, they proceeded on their voyage; and as they coasted along, took Hyccara, which, though a Sicanian town, was engaged in war with the Segestans, and was a petty sea-port. Having taken the inhabitants of the town for slaves, they gave it up to the Segestans (for some of their cavalry had joined them), and they themselves returned by land through the country of the Sicels, till they came to Catana; while their ships sailed along the coast with the prisoners on board. Nicias, however, coasted along straightway from Hyccara to Segesta; and after transacting his other business, and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They then sold their slaves, from which they realized a hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round to the allies of the Sicels, giving orders to send them troops. With half of their own force, too, they went against Hybla, in the territory of Gela, which was hostile to them, but did not take it. And thus the summer ended.

63. The following winter, the Athenians at once began to prepare for their advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, for marching against them. For when they did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, attack them immediately; as every day went on, they regained their courage more. And when they were seen to be sailing on the other side of Sicily, far away from them, and had gone to Hybla, and made an attempt on it without taking it by storm, they despised them still more, and called on their gen-

<sup>1</sup> ἐπίμυρ δίκη.] Literally, "by a deserted, or abandoned trial." See Herman. Pol. Ant. 144.

erals—acting as a multitude is wont to do when full of confidence—to lead them against Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Moreover, Syracusan parties of horse, sent out to reconnoiter, were continually riding up to the Athenian armament, and asking them, among other insulting expressions, whether they had come themselves to settle with them in a strange country, rather than to reinstate the Leontini.

64. The Athenian generals were acquainted with these things, and wished to draw them as far as possible from their city with their whole force, and themselves, in the mean time, to coast along with their ships by night, and quietly occupy a place for encampment in a favorable position, knowing that so they would be better able to do it than if they should land from their ships in face of an enemy prepared to receive them, or should be known to be going by land (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous, while they themselves had none, would do great mischief to their light-armed and mob of camp-followers); and that thus they would take a position where they would not be annoyed by the cavalry in a degree worth speaking of; (for some Syracusan exiles who accompanied them told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they actually occupied.) The generals, therefore, adopted the following stratagem in furtherance of their wishes. They send a person who was a faithful friend to them, and no less in the interest of the Syracusans, according to *their* opinion. This man was a Catanian, and said that he was come from certain individuals in Catania, with whose names they were acquainted, and whom they knew to be still left in the town among those who were well affected to them. He stated; then, that the Athenians passed the night at some distance from their arms, within the walls of the city, and that if the Syracusans would come with all their force early in the morning of an appointed day to attack their armament, the Catanians would close the gates on

<sup>1</sup> Οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες καὶ εἰ.] Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield, all bracket the καὶ in this passage, as utterly marring the sense of it; while Arnold only objects to the interpretation of the Scholiast, without attempting to explain it himself. In support of the translation which I have ventured to give, compare I. 143. 4, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννησίου μέρος τι τηρεῖν καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν, and VII. 28. 4, Αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπύναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶ μέρους καθέσασαν, κ. τ. λ. In the latter passage the idea of excess is distinctly asserted, after being previously implied, as in the other passages, by the words οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ.

the men who were with them, and would fire their ships, while the Syracusans would easily take the armament<sup>1</sup> by an attack on their stockade. There were many, too, of the Catanians, he said, who would co-operate with them in this, and were already prepared to do so, namely, the party from which he had himself come.

65. The generals of the Syracusans, besides feeling confident in other respects, and intending, even without this, to make their preparations for marching to Catana, gave far too inconsiderate credence to the man, and immediately fixing a day on which they would be there, dismissed him; while they themselves (for by this time the Selinuntines and some other of their allies had also come) gave orders for all the Syracusans to march forth in a body. When their preparations were made, and the time at which they had agreed to come was near at hand, they set out for Catana, and bivouaced on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory. The Athenians, on learning their approach, took the whole of their own force, with such of the Sicels, or any other people, as had joined them, and putting them on board their ships and boats, sailed by night to Syracuse. And thus, when the morning came, the Athenians were landing on the ground opposite the Olympieum, for the purpose of securing their camp, and at the same time the Syracusan cavalry, having ridden up first to Catana, and found that the whole armament had put to sea, returned and carried the news to the infantry, when they all turned back together, and went to the aid of the city.

66. In the mean time, as the march they had to make was a long one, the Athenians quietly pitched their camp in a favorable position, where they would be able to commence an engagement just when they pleased, and the Syracusan horse would cause them the least annoyance, both during the action and before it. For on one side they were flanked by walls, houses, trees, and a marsh; on the other, by cliffs. They also felled the trees near to them, and carrying them down to the sea, fixed a palisade by their ships; while with rude stones

<sup>1</sup> τὸ στράτευμα.] I see no reason at all for altering this, as Arnold proposes, into τῶ στράτευματι; as it evidently refers to all the other forces of the Athenians left behind in their camp, in opposition to the heavy infantry represented as being in the town. Compare 63. 3, where the term is undoubtedly used with reference to the encampment of the Athenians.

and wood they hastily erected a fort at Dascon, where their position was most open to the enemy's attack, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were making these preparations, no one came out from the city to stop them; but the Syracusan cavalry was what first came against them, and afterward all the infantry was mustered. And at first they advanced near the camp of the Athenians; then, when they did not go out against them, they withdrew, and crossed the road to Helorus, and there encamped for the night.

67. The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, and made their dispositions as follows: The right wing was held by the Argives and Mantineans, the center by the Athenians, and the remainder of the line by the rest of the allies. Half of their force was posted in advance, drawn up eight deep; the other half, close upon their tents, in a hollow square, which was also formed eight deep, with orders to look out where any part of the army might be most distressed, and go to its support. Within this body of reserve, too, they placed the camp-followers. The Syracusans, on the other hand, drew up their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the Syracusans in full force, and as many allies as had joined them: (they were reinforced most extensively by the Selinuntines; next to them, by the Geloan cavalry, to the number of two hundred in all; and by about twenty horse, and fifty archers, from Camarina.) Their cavalry they posted on their right flank, amounting to not less than twelve hundred, and by their side the dartmen also. The Athenians being about to commence the attack, Nicias advanced along the line, and addressed the following exhortation to them, both in their several nations, and collectively:

68. "What need is there, soldiers, that we should have recourse to long exhortation, who are come here for the same struggle? For our force itself seems to me more capable of supplying confidence than well-spoken words with a weak army. For where we have in the field Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the prime of the islanders, on what grounds ought

<sup>1</sup> "We are all engaged in one common cause, and the sight of each other should mutually encourage us."—*Arnold*. As οἱ πάντες seems to refer to the whole force, and not to the general only who was addressing them, χρῆσθαι must be taken in a sense sufficiently wide to include both the speaker and his hearers.

we not, with allies so brave and numerous, to entertain every one a strong hope of victory? especially as we are opposed to men who are defending themselves in a promiscuous crowd, and not chosen troops, as we are; and, moreover, against Siceliots, who despise us indeed, but will not receive our attack, because they have less skill in arms than boldness. Let this thought, too, be entertained by each of you; that we are far from our own land, and with no friendly country near us, but such as yourselves win by fighting. And so I offer to you an admonition, the very reverse of the exhortation which our enemies are, I well know, addressing to each other. For *they* are urging, that the battle will be for their country; but *I*, that it will be fought in what is *not* our country, but where you must conquer, or not easily get away; for their cavalry will press upon us in great numbers. Remembering, then, your own high character, make a spirited attack on your opponents, and regard your present necessity and difficulties as more formidable than the enemy."

69. Nicias delivered this address, and immediately led on his troops. As for the Syracusans, they were not expecting to engage at present, and some of them, as their city was close at hand, had actually gone away to it; and these, although they went to the aid of their comrades in haste, and at a full run, were too late [to take their proper place in the ranks], but posted themselves as each one came up to the main body. For in truth they were not deficient in zeal, or in daring, neither in this battle, nor in the others; but though not inferior in courage, so far as their military science served, yet in consequence of that failing them, they reluctantly abandoned their resolution also. Although, therefore, as I have said, they did not imagine that the Athenians would be the first to make an attack, and although they were compelled to defend themselves on a short warning, they took up their arms, and immediately advanced to meet them. And in the first place the stone-throwers, and slingers, and archers on each side began skirmishing, and successively routed each other, as light troops might be expected to do. Then there were priests bringing forward the usual victims for sacrifice, and trumpeters stirring on the heavy-armed to the charge. And so they advanced; the Syracusans, to fight for their country, and their own personal safety at present, and freedom in future;

the Athenians, on the side of their opponents, to fight for another people's land, that they might win it as their own; and to avoid weakening their own by defeat—the Argives and the independent allies, to join them in securing the objects they had come for, and by means of victory to look again on the country that was already theirs—while the subject allies showed a ready zeal, most of all, for their immediate safety, which was hopeless unless they conquered; then, as a secondary consideration, for the chance of serving on easier terms, in consequence of having assisted to reduce a fresh country under the Athenian dominion.

70. When they had come to close combat, they withstood each other's attacks for a long time. And there happened to come on at once both thunder, and lightning, and heavy rain: so that to those who were fighting for the first time, and had had very little acquaintance with war, even this helped to increase their fear; while to the more experienced party these occurrences appeared to be produced simply by the season of the year, but the fact of their opponents not being defeated caused far greater alarm. But when the Argives had first driven in the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians had repulsed those opposed to them, the rest of the Syracusan army was now also broken and put to flight. The Athenians did not pursue them to any great distance (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous and unbroken, kept them in check, and by charging their heavy infantry, wherever they saw any pursuing in advance of the rest, drove them back again). However they followed them in a body as far as was safe, and then returned again, and erected a trophy. The Syracusans, on the other hand, having collected themselves again on the Helorine road, and put themselves in as good order as present circumstances would permit, sent, notwithstanding their defeat, a garrison to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might take some of the treasures that were there; while the rest of them returned into the city.

71. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but after carrying their own dead together, and laying them on a funeral pile, passed the night on the ground. The next day they restored to the Syracusans their dead, under a truce (there had fallen, of them and their allies, about two hundred and sixty), and collected the bones of their own (about fifty

of themselves and their allies having been killed), and with the spoils of the enemy sailed back to Catana. For it was winter, and they thought it impossible at present to carry on war before Syracuse, till they had sent for cavalry from Athens, and also raised some from their allies in the country, to avoid being utterly defeated by the enemy's horse. They wished too, at the same time, to collect money in the island, and to get a supply from Athens; as also to win over some of the cities to their cause, which they hoped would more readily listen to them after the battle; and to provide themselves with corn and every thing else they might require, with a view to attacking Syracuse in the spring.

72. They, then, with these intentions sailed off to Naxos and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their dead, held an assembly. And now came forward to them Hermocrates son of Hermon, a man at once second to none in general intelligence, and who had proved himself able in war through his experience, and a person of signal bravery. He encouraged them and told them "not to submit in consequence of what had happened; for it was not their spirit that was vanquished, but their want of discipline that had been so injurious. They had not, however, been so much inferior to their enemies as might have been expected; especially since they had been matched against the first of the Greeks—mere amateurs,<sup>1</sup> so to speak, against regular workmen. They had also been much hurt by the great number of their generals and the multiplicity of orders (for their generals were fifteen in number), and also by the tumultuous insubordination of the troops in general. But should only a few men of experience be elected generals, and prepare their heavy-armed force for serving during that winter, by furnishing with arms those who did not possess any, in order that they might be as numerous as possible, and by compelling them to attend to their training also; they would, he said, in all probability have the advantage over their enemies; since courage they already possessed, and discipline for the execution of their measures would thus have been acquired. For

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Bloomfield renders it, "raw-hands." See his note. Poppo reads *χειροτέχνος*, and renders the passage, "Quod cum iis qui primi Græcorum peritia (Fei militaris) essent, idiotæ, propemodum dixim operarii, pugnassent."

both these things would improve; their discipline being practiced in the midst of dangers; and their courage growing more confident than ever from being accompanied by the assurance of science. They ought, then, to elect their generals both few in number and invested with absolute authority; taking to them the oath, 'that assuredly they would allow them to command as they might think best.' For so what ought to be kept secret would be more effectually concealed; and every thing else would be prepared in due order and without listening to any excuses."

73. The Syracusans, after hearing this speech, voted every thing as he advised; and elected Hermocrates himself as general, with Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestes, these three. They also dispatched envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon; that an allied force might join them, and that they might persuade the Lacedæmonians, for their benefit, to carry on the war with the Athenians more decidedly, by open measures; that either they might be compelled to return from Sicily, or might less easily send fresh succors to their army now there.

74. As for the Athenian forces at Catana, they sailed immediately to Messana, in expectation of its being betrayed to them. But the intrigues that were being carried on did not come to any thing. For Alcibiades, when he was now summoned home, and had left his command, knowing that he would be outlawed, gave information of the intended movement, to which he was privy, to the friends of the Syracusans in Messana; and they had both previously put to death the men implicated in it, and at that time such as were on the same side, breaking out into sedition, and taking up arms, prevailed so far as to prevent their admitting the Athenians. When they, therefore, after staying ten days, were suffering from the severe weather, had no provisions, and found none of their plans succeed, they retired to Naxos, and having made a palisade round their encampment, took up their winter quarters there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for both money and cavalry, to join them in the spring.

75. The Syracusans, on their part, both built in the course of the winter a wall to their city, along the whole quarter looking toward Epipolæ, including the Temenites, to prevent their being circumvallated so easily as they would



with a less circuit, in case of their being defeated; and also fortified Megara as an out-post, and another in the Olympieum. They fixed palisades, too, along the edge of the sea, at all points where there were facilities for landing. And as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched in full force to Catana, and both ravaged part of their land, and after burning the tents and encampment of the Athenians, returned home. Hearing, moreover, that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of that alliance concluded under Laches, to try if by any means they might win them over to their side, the Syracusans also sent a counter-embassy. For they had suspicions of the Camarinæans, both that they had not sent heartily what they sent to join in the first battle; and that for the future they would not wish to assist them any more, since they saw that the Athenians had been successful in the engagement, but would be persuaded to join the invaders on the strength of their former friendship. On the arrival therefore at Camarina of Hermocrates and some others from Syracuse, and of Euphemus and others from the Athenians, an assembly of the Camarinæans having been convened, Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them beforehand against the Athenians, addressed them as follows:

76. "It was not, Camarinæans, from any fear of your being terrified at the present forces of the Athenians that we came on this embassy, but rather from apprehension that the words which would be spoken by them before you heard any thing from us might prevail upon you. For they are come to Sicily on the pretext, indeed, which you hear, but with the purpose which we all suspect; and, in my opinion, they are wishing, not to restore the Leontines to their home, but to eject us from ours. For surely it is not consistent that they should depopulate the cities in Greece, but re-settle those in Sicily; and that they should care for the Leontines, who are Chalcidians, because of their connection with them, but keep in slavery the Chalcidians in Eubœa, from whom these are a colony. But the method is the same, by which they both gained possession of those places, and are attempting to do so with these. For after they had been appointed leaders, by the free choice both of the Ionians and of all who were of Athenian origin, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the

Mede; by charging some of them with failure in military service, others with mutual hostilities, and others on any specious plea which they severally had to urge, they reduced them to subjection. And so they did not withstand the Mede for the sake of liberty—neither these men for that of the Greeks, nor the Greeks for their own—but the former did it to enslave the Greeks to themselves, instead of to the Mede; the latter, to get a new master, one not more unwise, but more wise for evil.

77. "But, open as the Athenian state is to accusation, we are not come at the present time to prove before those who know this already, in how many respects it is committing injustice; but much rather to censure ourselves, because, with the warnings given us by the Greeks in those quarters, how they were enslaved through not assisting one another, and with the same sophisms being now practiced on ourselves—their re-instatement of their Leontine kinsmen, and succors to their Segestan allies—we will not unite together, and show them that the people here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines and islanders, who are always passing to a new master, either the Mede or some one else, and still kept in slavery, but free Dorians from the independent Poleponnese now living in Sicily. Or do we wait till we have separately been subdued, city by city? knowing, as we do, that in this way only are we vincible; and seeing them have recourse to this method, so as to set some of us at variance with words; to set others at war through hope of finding allies; and to injure others by saying something flattering to them, as they severally can. And do we then think, that if our distant fellow-countryman is destroyed before us, the danger will not come to each of ourselves also, but that he who suffers before us keeps his misfortune to himself?

78. "If, again, the thought has presented itself to any one, that although the Syracusans are hostile to the Athenians, he himself is not; and if he consider it a hardship to incur dangers for our country, let him reflect that it is not for ours especially, but in like manner for his own also that he will fight in ours; and that he will do it with proportionately greater safety, inasmuch as he will not enter on the struggle after we have been first ruined, but with us for allies, and not left by himself. And let him consider that the wish of the Athenians is, not to chastise our enmity, but, making us their

excuse, to secure no less his own friendship.<sup>1</sup> If, moreover, any one envies us, or is afraid of us (for to both these feelings are more powerful states exposed), and for this reason wishes Syracuse to be brought down, that we may be taught moderation, but yet for his own safety's sake would have it escape destruction, he indulges a wish beyond the limit of human power. For it is not possible for the same man to be alike the arbiter of his own desire and of fortune. And should he fail in his views, then, while lamenting<sup>2</sup> his own misfortunes, he might, perhaps, some time or other, wish again to envy our advantages. But that will be impossible if he abandon us, and will not take his part in the same perils; which are incurred, not for names, but for realities; for though nominally he would preserve our power, he would really secure his own safety. And it was reasonable that you especially, Camarinæans, who live on our borders, and are the next to incur the danger, should have provided for this, and not have joined us remissly, as you are now doing; but rather that you should yourselves have come to us; and what you would have entreated, while calling us to your aid, if the Athenians had first come against Camarina, that ought you now, on the same principle, to have come and urged on us an exhortation, that we should on no point submit. But neither have ye, hitherto, nor the rest, bestirred yourselves for these objects.

79. "But through cowardice, perhaps, you will study what is just, both toward us and toward the invaders, and allege that there is an alliance between you and the Athenians. Yes, but you did not conclude that to the injury of your friends, but in case any of your enemies might attack you; and to assist the Athenians, surely, when they were wronged by others, and not when they were themselves wronging their neighbors, as they are now. For not even do the Rhegians, although of Chalcidian extraction, consent to join in the reinstatement of the Chalcidian Leontines. And it is a strange thing if they, suspecting the real meaning of this fine pretense, are wise without any reason to offer for their conduct, while you, with a reasonable<sup>3</sup> plea to urge, choose to assist your na-

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, so to reduce the power of every state in the island, that none shall have any alternative but to remain the faithful allies of Athens."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> ὀλοφύρθεις,] or, as Pontus and Poppe take it, "lamented."

<sup>3</sup> εὐλόγῳ προφάσει.] Εὐλογος is so constantly used to signify what

tural enemies, and, in concert with your bitterest foes, to ruin men who are still more your natural connections. Nay that is not just; but rather, to assist us, and not to be afraid of their armament. For it is not formidable if we all take our stand together; but only if, on the contrary, we are separated from each other, which they are so anxious to effect: since even when they came against us alone, and were victorious in battle, they did not achieve what they wished, but quickly went away again.

80. "Surely then, if we were united, it were not reasonable for us to be disheartened: but we ought to enter more heartily into alliance, especially as succors will join us from the Peloponnese also, the inhabitants of which are altogether superior to these men in military matters. And no one should think that forethought of yours to be *fair* to us, while it is *safe* for you; I mean your assisting neither party, as being allies of both. For it is not fair in fact, as it is in profession. For if it be through your not siding with us that both the sufferer is defeated and the conqueror gains the victory, what else do ye but refuse, by the self-same standing aloof, to aid the one party for their preservation, and to prevent the other from behaving basely? And yet it were honorable for you, by joining those who are injured, and at the same time your own kinsmen, to guard the common interest of Sicily, and not to permit the Athenians, your friends forsooth, to do wrong. In short, we Syracusans say, that it is of no use to afford certain information, either to you or to the rest, about what you know yourselves, as well as we; but we entreat you, and at the same time protest, if we do not prevail on you, that we are plotted against by Ionians, who are always our enemies, while we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if the Athenians reduce us to subjection, though it is by your decisions that they will gain the victory, it is in their own name that they will enjoy the honor; and they will receive no other prize for the victory than those men who put the victory into their hands. If, on the other hand, we are the conquerors, you will

really is reasonable, in opposition to *εὐπρεπής*, what only *appears* to be so, that I can not agree with Arnold and Poppo, who give a different sense to it in this passage; the former rendering it "with a seeming reasonable pretext;" the latter, "*utentes probabili (seu speciosa) excusatione (quâ vestram rationem tueamini).*"

also have to submit to the punishment due to the authors of our dangers. Consider, then, and choose at once, either immediate slavery without any peril, or the chance of gaining the victory with us, and so avoiding a disgraceful submission to these men as your masters, as also of escaping our enmity, which would be of no trivial kind."

81. Hermocrates spoke to this effect; and after him, Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, as follows:

82. "Though we are come hither for the purpose of renewing our former alliance, yet as the Syracusan orator has attacked us on that head, we must also address you on the subject of our empire, to show that we enjoy it on just grounds. The strongest proof, then, of this he himself has mentioned, in his assertion that the Ionians have ever been hostile to the Dorians. And such too is the case. For we, who are Ionians, considered, with regard to the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, and more numerous than ourselves, and living near us, in what way we might be least subject to them. And after the Median invasion, having got a fleet, we released ourselves from the empire and supremacy of the Lacedæmonians; since they had no more right to command us than we them, except so far as they were at present more powerful. Thus having been ourselves appointed leaders of those who were before under the king, we so continue; considering that in this way we should least fall under the power of the Peloponnesians, by having a force with which to defend ourselves; and, to speak accurately, not having unjustly, either, reduced the Ionians and islanders to subjection, whom the Syracusans say that we have enslaved, though our kinsmen. For they came against their mother-country, against us, I mean, in company with the Mede; and could not bring themselves to revolt from him, and to sacrifice their property—as *we* did, when we evacuated our city—but chose slavery themselves, and to bring the same on us also.

83. "Wherefore we are worthy of the empire we enjoy, because we supplied the most numerous fleet, and showed uncompromising zeal in behalf of the Greeks; and because these men, by so readily acting as they did, even in favor of the Mede,<sup>1</sup> inflicted injury on us; while at the same time we aim at gaining strength against the Peloponnesians. And we make

<sup>1</sup> i. e., of one so utterly opposed to the good of Greece.

no fine professions of justly enjoying dominion, either as having by ourselves overthrown the barbarian, or as having faced danger for the liberty of these men, more than for that of all, and of ourselves at the same time. For in no one is it an invidious thing to provide for his own safety. And now, having come hither also for the sake of our own security, we see that these same things are expedient for you likewise. And we prove it from what these men state to our prejudice, and what you, in your too great alarm, suspect; knowing that those who through fear are suspicious,<sup>1</sup> though pleased at the moment by the charms of oratory, yet afterward attend to their real interests in what they undertake. For we have said that we hold our dominion there under the influence of fear, and that for the same reason we are come to put the states here on a safe footing, in concert with our friends; and not to enslave them, but rather to prevent their being so treated.

84. "And let no one suppose that we are interesting ourselves in you without any connection existing between us; since he must know that through your being preserved, and resisting the Syracusans (being not too weak to do so), we should be less readily hurt by their sending a force to the Peloponnesians. In this way, then, you are connected with us in the greatest degree; and on this account too it is reasonable that we should reinstate the Leontines, not as subjects, like their kinsmen in Eubœa, but in as powerful a condition as possible; that from their own country, living as they do close to these men's borders, they may in our behalf be annoying to them. For in Greece we are by ourselves able to cope with our enemies; and the Chalcidians, after whose subjugation the orator says that we are inconsistently giving liberty to those here, are advantageous to us by being without any armament, and only paying us money; but the people here, both the Leontines and our other friends, by being left as independent as possible.

85. "To an individual, however, who has absolute power, or to a state that holds dominion, nothing is inconsistent that

<sup>1</sup> "Hermocrates had endeavored to excite the jealousy of the Camarinaeans, by telling them, that the Athenians did but pretend to aid the Leontines, while their real object was the subjugation of all Sicily. 'Such language,' says Euphemus, 'may possibly beguile you for the moment; but when you come to act, you will follow your real interests.'"—*Arnold*.

is profitable, nothing reckoned as kindred that does not command confidence; but in every case, as opportunity may serve you must become either a foe or a friend. And in our case, our advantage here consists in this—not that we should reduce our friends to weakness, but that, owing to the strength of our friends, our foes should be powerless. Nor ought you to doubt this. For even in the case of our allies in those parts, as they are severally useful to us, so we govern them: the Chians and Methymnæans as independent, on condition of their supplying ships; the greater part of them on more stringent terms, subject to contribution of money; but others, although they are islanders and easy to reduce, as allies on terms of entire freedom, because they lie in favorable positions around the Peloponnese. So that here also it is natural that we should regulate them with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they are aiming at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you on the strength of your suspicions of us, themselves to sway the empire of Sicily, by force, or through your forlorn condition, when we have departed without gaining our object. And it must be so, if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, when united, be any longer easy for us to manage, nor would these men want strength to deal with you, when we were not here.

86. "And whoever does not think this to be the case, the very fact itself convicts him of being wrong. For on a former occasion you called us to your aid by holding out to us no other fear, than that, if we permitted you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves also should be exposed to danger. It is not right therefore now, that you should refuse to be persuaded by that self-same argument by which you wished to persuade *us*; or that, because we are come with a larger armament, you should be suspicious of us; but much rather, that you should mistrust these men. We, at least, have no power to remain among you without your support; and even if we should show ourselves base, and bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you under our dominion, both on account of the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of keeping guard over cities so great in extent, and of an inland character, as regards their resources. These men, on the other hand, living near you as they do, not in a camp, but in a city far

stronger than our force here present, are constantly plotting against you : and when, in each particular case, they have got an opportunity, they do not let it slip (as they have shown both in other instances, and in that of the Leontines), and at the present time they have the hardihood to urge you, as though you were void of sense, against those who are preventing this, and who have held up Sicily hitherto from sinking under them. But we, in opposition to them, urge you to a far more real safety, begging you not to betray that which is secured to both of us by each other ; and to consider, that while for them, even without any allies, the way to you is always open, you will not often have a chance of defending yourselves in conjunction with so large a force of auxiliaries ; of which, if through your suspicions you allow it to depart, either unsuccessful, or, perhaps, even defeated, you will wish yet to see even a very small portion, when its presence will no longer accomplish any thing for you.

87. " But neither do ye, Camarinæans, nor the rest, be persuaded by these men's calumnies. For we have told you the whole truth concerning these things about which we are suspected, and will still remind you briefly of them, and so try to persuade you. We say then, that we exercise dominion over the men in those parts to avoid being subject to another ; but that we liberate those who are here, to avoid being hurt by them ; that we are compelled to meddle with many things, because we have also many things to guard against ; and that we came, both now and before, as allies to those of you here, who were being injured, not without being invited, but after receiving an invitation. And do not ye, either as judges of what is done by us, or as moderators, attempt to divert us (which would now be difficult), but so far as any thing in our meddling policy and disposition is at the same time profitable for *you*, that take and make the most of it. And believe that it is not equally injurious to all, but that to a large majority of the Greeks it is even beneficial. For every one in every place, even where we are not already present, both he who thinks that he will suffer wrong, and he who is meditating to commit it, through having a prospect ever closer at hand, the one of obtaining help from us against his injurer, the other, that if we come, they<sup>1</sup> run the risk of not being free from alarm, both,

<sup>1</sup> I see no reason, either for changing ἀδεεῖς into ἀδεές, as Dobree and



I say, are alike compelled, the one, to be moderate against his own will, the other, to be saved without his own exertion. This security, then, which is common to all who require it, and which is now presented to you, do not ye reject; but, acting like others, instead of constantly guarding against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take at length your equal share in plotting against them."

88. To this effect spoke Euphemus. Now the Camari-næans had felt on the subject as follows: Toward the Athenians they were well inclined, except so far as they might think that they would subjugate Sicily, but with the Syracusans they had always, in the spirit of borderers, been at variance. Being, however, more afraid of the Syracusans, who were close at hand, lest they might even without their assistance gain the ascendancy, they both sent them in the first instance that small body of horse, and determined for the future to do more actual service for the Syracusans (though as sparingly as possible); but for the present, that they might not seem to show less respect for the Athenians—since they had even proved the stronger in the battle—they resolved to give a verbal answer that should be fair to both parties. Having, therefore, adopted this counsel, they answered, "That since mutual hostilities were being carried on by parties who were both in alliance with them, they thought it to be most consistent with their oaths to aid neither party for the present." And so the ambassadors on each side returned.

The Syracusans were now preparing their forces for war, while the Athenians encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, to get as many as possible to join them. Now such of the Sicels as lived more on the plains, and who were subject to the Syracusans, in most cases stood aloof from them; but those who occupied the interior, their homes having before this always been independent, immediately, with a very few exceptions, sided with the Athenians, and carried down corn for the army, and in some cases money also. Against those who did not come over to them the Athenians made an expedition, and compelled some, but were prevented from compelling others, by the Syracusan's sending them garrisons, and coming to their aid. Having moved their station for the winter from Naxos

Arnold wish to do, or for taking the word with an active signification though it may possibly be so used sometimes.

to Catana, and having raised again the camp which had been burned down by the Syracusans, they remained there the rest of that season. They sent at this time a trireme to Carthage with proposals of friendship, on the chance of their obtaining any help, and another to Tyrrhenia, as some of its cities had of their own accord offered to join them in the war. They also dispatched messengers about to the Sicels, and likewise to Segesta, desiring that they would forward to them as many horses as possible; while they also prepared for the circumvallation bricks, iron, and all other requisites, intending tocommerce hostilities in the spring. The Syracusan ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been dispatched to Corinth and Lacedæmon, both endeavored, as they coasted along, to persuade the Greeks of Italy not to look with indifference on the proceedings of the Athenians, since they were aimed equally at themselves, and when they were come to Corinth, delivered an address to them, begging for assistance on the ground of their connection. The Corinthians immediately, in the first place, themselves voted to assist them with the greatest zeal, and then sent envoys with them to Lacedæmon, to join in persuading that people also both to carry on the war with the Athenians more openly at home, and to send succors to Sicily. Accordingly the ambassadors from Corinth came to Lacedæmon, and Alcibiades also, with his fellow-exiles, who had crossed straightway on board a vessel of burden from Thuria to Cyllene, in the Elean territory, in the first instance, and then afterward, when the Lacedæmonians themselves had sent for him, proceeded to Lacedæmon under treaty; for he was afraid of them, owing to the part he had taken in the Mantinean business. And the result was, that in the Lacedæmonian assembly the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, by urging the same request, prevailed on the people there. But when the ephors and the authorities, though they purposed sending ambassadors to Syracuse, to urge them to make no terms with the Athenians, were not disposed to assist them, Alcibiades came forward, and exasperated and instigated the Lacedæmonians by addressing them as follows:

89. "It is necessary that I should first address you on the subject of the prejudice felt against me, that you may not, through your suspicions, attend to me the less on matters of

public interest. When, then, our ancestors<sup>1</sup> had, on the ground of some quarrel or other, renounced their connection with you as your *prozeni*, I myself, from a wish to resume it, paid attentions to you, both in other respects, and in the case of your misfortune at Pylus. And when I continued thus zealous, you, at the time you were concluding peace with the Athenians, conferred influence on my enemies, by negotiating through them, but brought dishonor on me. For these reasons it was with justice that you received harm at my hands, both when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and on whatever other occasion I opposed you. And now, if there be any one who at that time, while he was suffering, was unfairly angry with me, let him look at the question in the true light, and be led to a different conviction. Or if there be any one who formed a worse opinion of me, because I rather attached myself to the popular party, let him not on this ground, either, suppose that he was with good reason offended at me. For we have always been foes to tyrants; and all that are opposed to the dominant faction are called by the name of 'people.' It was from this, then, that our taking the lead of the populace continued; and besides, as the state was under a democratical government, it was necessary on most occasions to follow the existing order of things. However, we endeavored to be more moderate in politics than suited the intemperate spirit which had before prevailed. But there were others, both in times of old and now, who led on the multitude to more evil courses—the very party which also banished me. But in our case it was the whole body of the people that we headed; thinking it right to assist in preserving that form of government under which the country was most great and free, and which we had received. For with regard to democracy, all of us who had any sense knew what it was; and I myself, perhaps, better than any ὄνε, <sup>2</sup>in

<sup>1</sup> ἡμῶν.] Arnold accounts for the use of the plural here and in other parts of the chapter by supposing the speaker to join with himself some relations, as well as personal friends, who had been banished with him.

<sup>2</sup> ὅσω καὶ λοιδορήσαιοι.] I have given what appears to be the meaning of this passage; though it is doubtful whether it can be extracted from the Greek as it now stands. Arnold supposes that "some words have been lost before λοιδορήσαιοι, so that the words οὐδενὸς αὐν χειρὸν properly belong to that verb, and after ὅσω καὶ there should be supplied μάλλον ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἡδίκημαι." But this is perhaps a more ingenious than

proportion as I could also abuse it more. But of an acknowledged absurdity nothing new could be said; and yet to put it aside did not appear to us safe, while you, as our enemies, were so closely besetting us.

90. "With regard then to your prejudices against me, such were the facts: but with regard to what you must deliberate upon, and I, on whatever point I am better informed, must advise, now learn from me. We sailed to Sicily, in the first place, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could; after them, again, the Italiots; and then also to make an attempt on the dominion of the Carthaginians, and on their own city. If either all or most of these schemes proved successful, then we intended to attack the Peloponnesians, after bringing here the united force of the Greeks that had joined us in those parts, taking many barbarians into our pay—both Iberians and others of those nations, confessedly the most warlike<sup>1</sup> barbarians at the present day—and building many triremes in addition to what we have (since Italy contains timber in abundance). Blockading the Peloponnesians with these round its coasts, and at the same time attacking it with our soldiers on the land side, after taking some of the cities by storm, and walling in others, we hoped with ease to reduce it; and after that to enjoy the sovereignty of the whole Grecian race. And as for money and provisions, to render each of these measures more practicable, the newly-

safe correction. I had myself conjectured, before I found that Bloomfield had done the same, that καὶ might be a corruption of κἄν, a contraction which occurs ch. 92. 4; and this very slight change is perhaps sufficient to remedy the evil. Though γινώσκωμι is probably understood with ἂν in the preceding clause, I can not think that it could ever have been expressed, as Bloomfield proposes to do; at least not in the position which he would give to it, immediately after λουδορῆσαιμι, thus giving by the concurrence of the two optatives a most unmusical termination to the paragraph. With regard to the word ὅσω, it seems doubtful whether it is to be considered as qualifying a comparative understood, as the commentators suppose, or as used absolutely, as in some other passages of our author, signifying "inasmuch as;" e. g., chap. 92. 4, κἄν φίλος ὦν ἱκανῶς ὀφελοῖν. ὅσω τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερα ἤκαζον. If the former be the real construction, it is possible that the whole expression, οὐδενος ἂν χειρὸν, was intended to be supplied from the preceding clause; and so there would be no necessity for even the slight alteration of καὶ into κἄν.

<sup>1</sup> Μαχιμωτάτους.] Poppe reads μαχιμωτάτων, "of the barbarians confessedly the most warlike," etc., "which," says Arnold, "undoubtedly affords an easier sense."

acquired places in those quarters would by themselves supply sufficient, independently of our revenues from these parts.

91. "Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now sailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows with the greatest accuracy what we purposed by it : and the generals who still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out in the same way. But that the people there will not escape their attack, unless you succor them, you must now learn. The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, might still even now gain the victory, if united in one body. But the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been in battle with all their forces, and hemmed in by sea at the same time, will be unable to hold out against the Athenian armament now there. And if that city is taken, the whole of Sicily also is in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway ; and the danger which I just now mentioned as impending from that quarter, would in no long time fall upon you. Let no one then think that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnese also, unless you quickly adopt these measures ; unless, I mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, as, after working their own passage, shall immediately act as heavy infantry ; and also, what I consider to be still more serviceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, both to discipline their present forces, and to compel those who are unwilling to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the greater confidence, and those who are doubting between the two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also carry on hostilities here in a more decisive manner ; that the Syracusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may offer the greater resistance ; and that the Athenians may the less easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose you must fortify Decelea, in Attica ; a blow of which the Athenians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they think they have not experienced in the present war. And in that way would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them those things which he knows them to fear most : for it is but reasonable that every people should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear them accordingly. But with regard to the difficulties which, while you benefit yourselves, you will create for your opponents by thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will

briefly mention the chief. Whatever then the country is stocked with, the greater part will come to you, either through being captured, or of their own accord.<sup>1</sup> They will also at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, with the advantages they now derive from their land and their courts of justice;<sup>2</sup> but, especially, of the revenue from the allies, which will be less regularly paid by them, when they consider that the war on your part is now vigorously prosecuted, and so think lightly of them. To have each of these things done with greater speed and spirit rests with you, Lacedæmonians; for that they are possible I am very confident, and I do not think that I shall be proved to have been mistaken.

92. "And now, I beg that I may not be the worse thought of by any among you, because I am now strenuously attacking my country with its bitterest enemies, though I formerly had a reputation for patriotism; and that my words may not be suspected on the score of an exile's forwardness. For though I am an exile, as regards the villainy of those who banished me, I am not one, as regards assistance to you, if you will be persuaded by me; and the party hostile to me was not you, who only hurt your foes, but rather they who compelled their friends to become their foes. My patriotism, too, I keep not at a time when I am being wronged,<sup>3</sup> but only while I enjoyed my civil rights in security. Nor do I consider myself to be going against what is still my country, but much rather to be recovering that country which is mine no more. And the patriot, in the true sense, is not that man who, when he has unjustly lost his country, abstains from aggression upon it,

<sup>1</sup> τὰ δ' αὐτόματα.] *i. e.*, the slaves, which I believe to be chiefly alluded to by the expression οἷς ἡ χώρα κατεσκευάσται (see note on ch. 17. 3), though it may also include, as Arnold supposes, cattle, sheep, farm-houses, trees, and other articles of dead as well as live stock.

<sup>2</sup> ἀσπημίῳν.] *i. e.*, in various fees and fines; on which, see Boeckh Publ. Econ. 1. p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> ἐν ᾧ.] Or, as Arnold renders it, "in a state where," etc.; but the expression is much more commonly significant of time than of condition. Compare I. 39, Οὗς χρῆν ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσίεναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἡδύκημεθα οὗτοι δὲ κινδονεύουσι, μηδ' ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς—αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἔχετε, πάλαι δέ, κ. τ. λ. There is, however, so close a connection between the ideas of a particular period and of the circumstances by which it is characterized, that it is sometimes of comparatively little importance which of the two is supposed to be expressed.

but he who, because of his longing for it, endeavors by all means to regain it. Thus, as far as I am concerned, I beg you, Lacedæmonians, fearlessly to command my services, both for danger and trouble of every kind; knowing that argument which is advanced by all, namely, that if as your enemy I did you very great harm, I might also as your friend do you great service; inasmuch as I *know* the plans of the Athenians, while I only *guessed* yours. I beg, too, that on your own part also, being convinced that you are consulting about your greatest interests, you will not shrink from the expedition both against Sicily and Attica; that by joining them with a small part of your forces, you may at once preserve the great states in Sicily, and overthrow the present and future power of the Athenians; and may afterward live in security yourselves, and enjoy a voluntary supremacy over the whole of Greece, resting not on force but on affection."

93. Such was the address of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians, who of themselves were previously intending to make an expedition against Athens, but were still acting with delay and circumspection, were far more determined when he had informed \*them of these several particulars, and when they considered that they had heard them from the man who had most certain knowledge of them. So that they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and to immediately sending some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed therefore Clearidas to the command of the Syracusans, they instructed him to deliberate with that people and the Corinthians, and to provide for succors reaching them on as large a scale, and with as much speed, as present circumstances permitted. Accordingly he desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to let the rest, as many as they purposed sending, be equipped and in readiness to sail, when the proper time came. Having arranged these points, they returned from Lacedæmon.

Now, too, arrived the Athenian trireme from Sicily, which the generals had sent for money and cavalry. And when the Athenians had heard their request, they resolved to send both the supplies for their armament and the cavalry. And so the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

94. At the very commencement of the spring of the next

summer, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and coasted along toward the Sicilian Megara, from which the Syracusans, in the time of their tyrant Gelo (as I have before mentioned), drove out the inhabitants, and themselves continue to occupy the territory. Having landed therefore, they ravaged the country; and after going against a fort of the Syracusans without taking it, they again proceeded both with their land force and ships to the river Terias, and advancing inland, both laid waste the plain, and fired the corn. After falling in with a small body of the Syracusans, killing some of them, and erecting a trophy, they returned to their ships. When they had sailed back to Catana, and supplied themselves with provisions there, they went with their whole force against Centotripa, a town of the Sicels, and returned after getting possession of it by capitulation, burning at the same time the corn of the Inessæans and Hyblæans. On their arrival at Catana, they found the horsemen come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number, without their horses, but with their equipments in expectation of horses being provided there, with thirty mounted archers, and three hundred talents of silver.

95. The same summer the Lacedæmonians also marched against Argos, and went as far as Cleonæ, but, on the occurrence of an earthquake, returned. The Argives, after this, made an incursion into the Thyrean country, which lies on their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedæmonians, which was sold for no less than five and twenty talents. The commons of the Thespians also, this same summer, and not long after what has been mentioned, having attacked those in office among them, did not get the better; but Theban succors having arrived, some of them were made prisoners, and others fled the country and went to Athens.

96. The Syracusans, the same summer, hearing that the cavalry had joined the Athenians, and that they were about to march against them, and thinking that unless the Athenians were masters of Epipolæ, a precipitous tract, and lying right above their city, they could not, even if defeated in battle, be easily circumvallated, they determined to guard the ap-

<sup>1</sup> Τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν.] i. e., the openings in the cliff at different points by which the ridge might be ascended, and particularly the ascent by Eurycius.—*Arnold*. On the topography of Syracuse, and the military operations before it, see his excellent Memoir in his third volume; as well as the other authorities quoted by Poppo in his note on ch. 98. 2.



proaches to it, that the enemy might not gain the heights without their observation; for no other way could they, as they thought, effect it. For the rest of the position rises high, sloping down to the city, and being all visible within it: and so it is called by the Syracusans, from lying above the rest, "Epipolæ," [or "Overton"]. They then went out at day-break with all their forces into the meadow along the course of the river Anapus (Hermocrates and his colleagues having just come into office as their generals), and held a review of their heavy-armed, having first selected from those troops a chosen body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to be a guard for Epipolæ, and quickly to muster and present themselves for whatever other service they might be required.

97. The Athenians, on the other hand, held a review the day following this night, having already, unobserved by them, made the coast with all their armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, about six or seven stades from Epipolæ, and having landed their soldiers, and brought their ships to anchor at Thapsus; where there is a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus, being not far from the city of Syracuse, either by land or by water. The naval armament of the Athenians lay quiet at Thapsus, having thrown a stockade across the peninsula; but the land forces proceeded at full speed to Epipolæ, and had time to ascend it, on the side of Euryelus, before the Syracusans, on perceiving it, could come to them from the meadow and the review. They came, however, against them, both the rest, as quickly as each could, and Diomilus, with his six hundred: but they had a distance of not less than five and twenty stades to go, before they came up to them from the meadow. Falling on them therefore, under these circumstances, in considerable disorder, and being defeated in an engagement at Epipolæ, the Syracusans returned into the city, Diomilus being killed, and about three hundred of the rest. After this, the Athenians having erected a trophy, and restored to the Syracusans their dead under a truce, came down the next day to the city itself; but when

<sup>1</sup> ἐξηράζοντο, καὶ ἔλαθον, κ. τ. λ.] "They had landed their men during the night, and had then stationed their ships at Thapsus; while the soldiers, as soon as it was light, after a brief muster of their force, hastened to ascend to the Hog's Back behind Epipolæ."—Arnold.

they did not come out against them, they returned, and built a fort on Labdalum, on the highest point of the cliffs of Epipolæ, looking toward Megara, to be a magazine for their baggage and treasures, whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall.

98. Not long after, there came to them from Segesta three hundred cavalry, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and some others, while there were already two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had received some horses from the Segestans and Catanæans, and had bought others; so that altogether a body of six hundred and fifty cavalry was mustered. Having established a garrison in Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syca, where they posted themselves, and built with all speed the central point of their wall of circumvallation.<sup>1</sup> They struck the Syracusans with consternation by the rapidity of their building; and consequently they resolved to march out against them and give them battle; and not allow them to proceed with the work. When they were now being drawn up in battle-array against each other, the Syracusan generals, perceiving that their forces were broken, and did not easily fall into line, led them back again into the city, excepting some part of their cavalry. These, staying behind, prevented the Athenians from carrying their stones, or dispersing to any great distance; until one tribe<sup>2</sup> of the Athenian heavy-armed, with all their cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan horse, killed some of them, and erected a trophy for this cavalry action.

99. The next day some of the Athenians were building the wall to the north of the central point, while others were collecting stones and timber, and laying them along the line, to the point called Trogilus; keeping in the direction in which their wall of

<sup>1</sup> *ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον.*] To avoid appearing to assert that the whole line of circumvallation was at once completed, I have rendered *κύκλον* in this passage by one of the terms applied to it in Arnold's note; where he says that "*ὁ κύκλος* which is spoken of as finished, was on the one hand a part of the circumvallation, but was also a complete work in itself—something, that is, of an intrenched camp, which was to be the point of junction and key of the two lines which were to run respectively to the sea by Trogilus, and to the great harbor," etc.

<sup>2</sup> We learn from Herodotus, VI. 111. 2, that the soldiers belonging to the different tribes at Athens, were not mixed together in an engagement, but were kept separate; an arrangement which appears from ch. 100. 1, to have been observed by the Syracusans also.

circumvallation would be completed in the shortest distance from the great harbor to the sea. The Syracusans meanwhile, at the suggestion of Hermocrates, more than of their other generals, were no longer disposed to run the risk of general actions with the Athenians, but thought it better to build a counter-wall in the direction in which they intended to carry their works; thinking that if they anticipated them with this, there would be an interruption to their lines; and that, if at that time they should come to oppose them, they themselves would send a part of their forces against them, and have time to occupy the approaches beforehand with their palisade, while the Athenians would cease from their work, and all turn their attention to them. They went out, therefore, and proceeded, to build beginning from their city, and carrying a cross wall below the Athenian lines, cutting down the olives of the sacred ground, and erecting wooden towers. The ships of the Athenians had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the great harbor, but the Syracusans still commanded the sea-shore, and the Athenians conveyed their provisions from Thapsus by land.

100. When the Syracusans thought that those parts of their counter-work which had been completed by means of palisades and masonry were sufficient, and when the Athenians did not come out to stop them, as they feared that the enemy would more easily contend with them when they were divided, and at the same time were hurrying to complete their own wall of circumvallation; the Syracusans, having left one tribe to guard the building, returned into the city. The Athenians, in the mean time, destroyed their pipes which ran under ground into the city, carrying water for drinking; and having watched when the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at mid-day, and some of them had even gone away into the city, while those in the stockade<sup>1</sup> were keeping but a careless guard, they appointed three hundred picked men of themselves, and a chosen body of the light troops, armed for the purpose, to run suddenly at full speed to the counter-work while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, one with one of the generals to the city, in case they should come to the rescue, the other with the other general to the stockade near the postern. Accordingly the three hundred assaulted and

<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῷ σταυρώματι.] "Apparently a stockade in advance of the cross wall, ὑποτείχισμα, and covering the approach to it."—Arnold.

took the stockade, the guard evacuating it, and taking refuge in the outworks around ~~Tenarites~~. Their pursuers also burst in with them, but, after getting in, were forcibly driven out again by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians were slain there. And now the whole army having returned, threw down the wall, tore up the palisades, transferred the pales to their own lines, and erected a trophy.

101. The next day the Athenians, setting out from their lines, began to build at the cliffs over the marsh, which on this side of Epipolæ looks toward the great harbor, and in which direction their wall of circumvallation would be finished in the shortest distance by their going down over the plain and the marsh to the harbor. The Syracusans meanwhile went out, and on their part also began again to interrupt the line by a palisade, commencing from the city across the middle of the marsh; and at the same time dug a ditch parallel with it, that it might not be possible for the Athenians to carry their wall of circumvallation as far as the sea. They, after their work at the cliff was completed, again assaulted the palisade and the ditch of the Syracusans. They had ordered their fleet to sail round from Thapsus to the great harbor of Syracuse, while they themselves descended at dawn from Epipolæ into the plain, and laying doors and planks over the marsh, where the mud was most firm,<sup>1</sup> crossed it upon them, and in the morning carried the palisade, excepting a small part of it, and the ditch, and afterward the remaining part. On this occasion a battle was fought, in which the Athenians were victorious, those of the Syracusans posted on the right wing flying to the city, those on the left, to the river. Wishing to intercept the passage of these, the three hundred chosen troops of the Athenians pressed on at full speed to the bridge; but the Syracusans were alarmed, and as the greater part of their forces were there, closed on these three hundred, routed them, and drove them in on the right wing of the Athenians. By their charge the tribe posted first on the wing was also thrown into panic; on observing which, Lamachus came to their assistance from their left, with a few archers and the Argives, and having crossed the ditch in advance, and being cut off from the rest, with only a few who had crossed with him, was killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans im-

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "where it was muddy and most firm."

medically snatched up, and had time to get over the river into a place of security; while their own troops retreated, as the rest of the Athenian force was now coming against them.

102. Meanwhile, those of them who had at first fled for refuge to their city, when they saw what was going on, resumed their courage, and coming thence, themselves drew up against the Athenians in front of them, and sent a part of their numbers to the lines on Epipolæ, thinking they should take them while unguarded. And they did, indeed, take and destroy their outwork<sup>1</sup> of a thousand feet in length, but the lines themselves Nicias prevented their taking, as he happened to have been left behind in them through illness. He ordered the servants to set fire to the engines, and all the timber that had been thrown down in front of the wall; as he knew that for want of men they could not escape in any other way. And such was the result; for the Syracusans no longer came against them on account of the fire, but withdrew again. Indeed, by this time succors had gone up to the lines from the Athenians below, who had repulsed the enemy in that part; and at the same time their ships from Thapsus were sailing, as they had been ordered, into the great harbor. At the sight of this, those on the heights retreated with all speed, and the whole army of the Syracusans retired into the city, thinking that they would no longer be able with their present force to prevent the building of the wall down to the sea.

103. After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, restoring their dead to the Syracusans under a truce, and receiving

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ δὲκάπλευρον προτείχισμα.] Arnold supposes this to have been "a sort of redoubt, or covering outwork, raised before that part of the line on which the Athenians were at work, to protect the workmen, and to cover the stones, timber, cranes, scaffoldings, and other things used for the building." But the expression seems more suitable for a stationary outwork, than for one which, according to this description, would be moved about as the building progressed; and the last passage in which the building operations are mentioned, transfers them from Epipolæ to "the cliff, which formed the southern extremity of the high ground above the valley of the Anapus." (See ch. 101. 1, with Arnold's note on it). It would therefore be better, perhaps, to consider the outwork in question to have been intended as an additional defense for the central point of the lines, τὸν κύκλον, in which Nicias might naturally have been left, as the place of greatest security. The engines and timber which were not required for immediate use, might have been kept near the redoubt for the same reason.

back those who had fallen with Lamachus, as well as himself. And as they now had with them their whole force, both naval and military, they began from Epipolæ and the cliffs, and circumvallated the Syracusans down to the sea with a double wall. Provisions were now brought for the armament from all parts of Italy. Many of the Sicels too, who before were looking to see how things went, came as allies to the Athenians; as did also three fifty-oared galleys from Tyrrhenia. And every thing else was prospering, so as to give them hope. For the Syracusans no longer thought that they could escape by military measures, since no assistance had reached them from the Peloponnese; but were proposing terms of capitulation, both among themselves and to Nicias: for he alone held the command since the death of Lamachus. No decision, indeed, was come to; but, as was natural for men who were in difficulties, and besieged more closely than before, many discussions were held with him, and still more in the city. For they also entertained some suspicion of one another, in consequence of their present misfortunes, and deposed the generals under whose command these things had befallen them—thinking that it was either through *their* bad fortune, or treason, that they were suffering—and chose others in their stead, namely, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

104. In the mean time, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were now off Leucas, wishing to come to the aid of Sicily with all speed. When therefore tidings were carried to them of an alarming nature, and all concurring in the same falsehood, namely, that Syracuse was by this time entirely circumvallated, Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily; but wishing to save Italy, he himself, and Pythen the Corinthian, with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships, crossed the Ionian Sea as quickly as possible to Tarentum; while the Corinthians having manned, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian vessels, were to sail after them. Gylippus, then, having first gone on an embassy from Tarentum to Thuria, on the ground of his father's having formerly been presented with the franchise there, and not being able to bring them over, weighed anchor, and coasted along Italy. Having been caught, when opposite the Terinæan gulf, by a wind which in this quarter blows violently and steadily from the north, he was carried out to sea,

and after enduring exceedingly foul weather, again made Tarentum, and there drew up and refitted such of his ships as had suffered from the tempest. Nicias, on hearing of his approach, despised the number of his ships (as had been the feeling of the Thurians also), and thought that they were sailing more like a piratical armament than any thing else; and so at present he took no precautions against him.

105. About the same period of this summer, the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, themselves and their allies, and ravaged the greater part of the country. The Athenians went to the assistance of the Argives with thirty ships; and it was these that broke their treaty with the Lacedæmonians in a most decisive manner. For before this they only joined in hostilities with the Argives and Mantineans by plundering excursions from Pylus, and by landing on the other coasts around the Peloponnese, rather than on the Laconian; and though the Argives often desired them only to touch at Laconia with their heavy-armed, and to withdraw after devastating it with them ever so little, they would not do it. But at that time, having landed under the command of Pythodorus, Læspodias, and Demaratus, at Epidaurus Limera, Prasias, and other places, they ravaged part of the territory, and so rendered the excuse of the Lacedæmonians more plausible now for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the Athenians had with their fleet withdrawn from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also, the Argives having made an irruption into the Phliasian territory, ravaged part of their land, killed some of their men, and returned home.

## BOOK VII.

1. GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. And now, on receiving more correct information, namely, that Syracuse was not yet entirely invested, but that it was still possible for a party coming with troops to enter it on the side of Epipolæ, they deliberated whether they should keep Sicily on their right hand, and so run the risk of sailing into it; or whether, keeping it on the left hand, they should first sail to Himera, and take with them both the people there, and any other forces that they might prevail on to join them, and so proceed by land. They determined, then, to sail for Himera, especially as the four Athenian ships had not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias, on hearing of their being at Locri, notwithstanding his contempt for them, had sent out. Having anticipated therefore this guard-squadron, they crossed over the strait, and after touching at Rhegium and Messana, arrived at Himera. While they were there, they persuaded the Himeræans to join them in the war, and both themselves to accompany them, and to furnish arms for such of the seamen from their ships as had none (for they had drawn up their ships on shore at Himera). They also sent and desired the Selinuntines to meet them at a certain place with all their forces. That people promised to send them a force of no inconsiderable amount, as did the Geloans also, and some of the Sicels, who were ready to join them with much greater forwardness, both in consequence of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king over some of the Sicels in that part, and a man of considerable influence, was a friend of the Athenians, and because Gylippus was thought to have come from Lacedæmon in a spirited manner. Thus Gylippus took with him those of his own seamen and *Epibatæ* who were provided with arms, about seven hundred in number, the Himeræan heavy and light troops, together mustering about a thousand, with a hundred



horse, some light-armed and horse of the Selinuntines, a few Geloans, and a thousand Sicels in all, and so advanced against Syracuse.

2. The Corinthians, meanwhile, were coming to their assistance from Leucas with their other ships as quickly as they could, and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who had put to sea last of all with a single vessel, arrived first at Syracuse, though but a little before Gylippus. Finding them on the point of holding an assembly to consult on bringing the war to a conclusion, he prevented their doing so, and reassured them by saying that there were other ships still sailing up, and Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, sent by the Lacedæmonians in command of them. Upon this the Syracusans were reassured, and immediately went out in full force for the purpose of meeting Gylippus; for by this time they perceived him actually near at hand. He, having taken on his passage Jetæ, a fortress of the Sicels, and having formed his men for battle, arrived at Epipolæ; after mounting which, on the side by Euryelus, where the Athenians also had ascended at first, he advanced in company with the Syracusans against the Athenian lines. He happened to have come at so critical a time, that a double wall of seven or eight stades length had already been completed by the Athenians, extending to the great harbor, except for a short distance near the sea, which they were still building. For the rest of their lines, to Trogilus on the other sea, stones had already been laid for the greater part of the distance, and some points were left half finished, while others were entirely completed. To such extreme danger had Syracuse been reduced.

3. The Athenians, though thrown into consternation at first by the sudden attack made upon them by Gylippus and the Syracusans, quickly drew up for battle. Gylippus halted near them, and sent on a herald to tell them that if they chose to depart from Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce to that effect. They, however, paid no attention to him, and sent him back again without giving any answer. After this, they made their preparations against each other. And Gylippus, seeing the Syracusans in disorder and not easily falling into line, drew off his forces more into the open ground; while Nicias did not lead the Athenians against them, but remained still near his own wall.

When Gylippus found that they were not advancing, he withdrew his army to what is called the citadel of Temenites, and there they stationod themselves for the night. The next day he took the greater part of his forces, and drew them up near the walls of the Athenians, to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, while he sent a detachment to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and put to the sword all the men he found in it; the place not being within sight of the Athenians. On the same day, too, a trireme of the Athenians, moored off the harbor, was taken by the Syracusans.

4. After this, the Syracusans and their allies, commencing at the city, began to build upward along Epipolæ a single wall in a cross direction, that the Athenians, if they could not stop their progress, might no longer be able to invest them. The Athenians had by this time gone up to the heights, after completing their wall down to the sea; and there being one weak part in the Athenian wall, Gylippus took his forces by night and made an attack upon it. When the Athenians were aware of his approach (for they happened to be bivouacking outside), they advanced to meet him; on observing which, he led back the troops on his side as quickly as he could. The Athenians having then raised it higher, themselves kept guard at this point, and now disposed the other allies along the rest of the works as they were severally to man them. Nicias determined also to fortify what is called Plemyrion, a headland opposite the city, which runs out beyond the great harbor, and narrows its mouth. If this were fortified, he thought that the introduction of provisions would be more easily effected; as they would carry on their blockade from a less distance, near the port<sup>1</sup> occupied by the Syracusans, and would not, as now, put out against them from the bottom of the great harbor, in case of their stirring at all with their fleet. And he now paid more attention to the maritime operations of the war, seeing that their affairs by land were more hopeless since the arrival of Gylippus. Having, therefore, crossed over with a body of troops and his ships, he completed the building of three forts; in which were deposited the greater part of the stores; the larger boats and the fast-sailing ships being now also moored there. And in consequence of this, it was chiefly at that time

<sup>1</sup> i. e., the lesser port, as it was called, to distinguish it from the greater, in which the Athenian fleet now lay.

that the wasting of the crews first began. For as they had but a scanty supply of water, and that not close at hand; and, moreover, as the sailors from time to time went out to gather firewood, they were cut off by the Syracusan horse, which had the command of the country. For a third part of their cavalry had been posted by the Syracusans in the small town in the Olympieum, with an eye to the troops on Plemyrion, to prevent their marching out to commit ravages. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships also were sailing to the island, and sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locri, Rhegium, and the approaches to Sicily.

5. Gylippus, on the other hand, was at once building the wall across Epipolæ—making use of the stones which the Athenians before had thrown down along the line for their own use—and leading out continually the Syracusans and their allies, and drawing them up before the works; while the Athenians formed their line against them. When Gylippus thought it a favorable opportunity, he commenced the attack; and, having closed in battle, they fought in the space between the works, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use. When the Syracusans and their allies had been thus defeated, and had taken up their dead under truce, and after the Athenians had erected a trophy, Gylippus called his army together, and said, that “the fault was not theirs, but his own; for he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and dart-men by his arrangements for the battle, which he had made too far within the works: wherefore he would now lead them again to the charge. And he begged them to make up their minds to this view of the case—that they would not have the worse, as regarded forces, and that with respect to resolution, it would be intolerable if they should not determine, Peloponnesians and Dorians as they were, to get the better of Ionians, and islanders, and a mixed rabble of men, and to drive them out of their country.

6. After this, when a favorable opportunity presented itself, he led them a second time against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought, that even if the Syracusans should not wish to commence an engagement, it was necessary for themselves not to permit their wall to be carried past their own: for by this time the enemy’s work had all but passed the

termination of the Athenian lines; and if it went on any further, it was at once all the same to them, whether they were continually fighting and victorious, or did not fight at all; and therefore they advanced to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led his heavy-armed further beyond the fortifications of the two parties than before, and so engaged them, posting his cavalry and dart-men on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the works connected with both walls terminated. During the battle the cavalry charged the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was defeated by the Syracusans, and driven within their lines. The following night they had time to build up to the Athenian works, and to pass them; so that now they could no longer be stopped by the enemy, while they deprived *them*, even if victorious, of all chance of investing the city in future.

7. After this, the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, having eluded the observation of the Athenian guard-force, sailed into harbor, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and joined the Syracusans in completing the remainder of their works up to the cross wall.<sup>1</sup> And now Gylippus went away into the rest of

<sup>1</sup> *ῥυπετεῖχισαν τὸ λοιπόν*, κ. τ. λ.] Gölter and Bishop Thirlwall understand this of the completion of the Syracusan counter-work, which they suppose to have been before left in an imperfect state, at some points where the position was naturally stronger than at others, but to have been now carried to an uniform height up to the Athenian wall, here called *τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*, as running at right angles to the counter-work. This, however, appears to be an exceedingly doubtful interpretation of the passage, like every other that has been proposed. For the supposition of the counter-work having been left in an imperfect state has nothing whatever to support it in our author's description of it in the preceding chapters, which would naturally, I think, lead one to just the opposite conclusion. Nor does the description of the actual surface of Epipolæ, as given in Arnold's Memoir, make it probable that there would be, in the course of the wall, any points of such natural strength as to have encouraged them to dispense, even for a time, with the ordinary means of securing their work; as it does not appear probable that it passed over any of the "four decided slopes of rock," by which alone the "gradual and almost imperceptible ascent" is broken. And although *ἐγκάρσιον*, as "a mere relative expression," might be applied to either of the two works whose relative position it describes, it is surely most improbable, that after using it as our author undoubtedly, I think, does in every other passage with reference to the work of the Syracusans, he should in this single instance employ it in the very contrary manner. On

Sicily for forces, intending to raise them both for sea and land service; and at the same time to bring over any of the cities that was either not hearty in the cause, or had hitherto stood entirely aloof from the war. Other ambassadors of the Syracusans and Corinthians were also sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, in order that a fresh force might be sent over to them, in whatever way might answer best, whether in merchantmen, or boats, or any how else: since the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements. Moreover, the Syracusans proceeded to man and practice a fleet, for the purpose of making an attempt in that way also, and were in other respects much more full of confidence.

8. Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's strength and their own difficulties were every day increasing,

these grounds I think that Arnold's hypothesis is, on the whole, more probable; viz., that he alludes to some additional work carried out by the whole force of the Syracusans from the city wall, to join, and so strengthen, the counter-wall. Or, if this should be thought inconsistent with the terms in which the counter-wall is afterward described, ch. 42. 4, the joint operations here spoken of may perhaps refer more generally to the building of out-works, extending at intervals up to it; especially as three such *προειχίσματα* are actually mentioned as existing there (ch. 43. 4), though we are not expressly told when they were raised. With regard to the verb *συνείχισαν* being used with reference to the nominative *αἱ νῆες*, I can not agree with Arnold that "this is not the way in which Thucydides commonly writes;" or suppose, for this reason at least, that "something has dropped out of the text." The other conclusion mentioned by him seems much more probable, viz., "that the whole passage was written carelessly." There would seem to be no abstract reason why actions should not be attributed to ships, which could only have been performed by the men in them; in the same way as they are continually attributed by our author to countries, cities, etc. And the following passages, among others which might be quoted, appear to prove that "this is the way in which Thucydides writes," at least not unfrequently:—I. 116. 1, *ἐτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν (ἡ ε., τῶν νεῶν) ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιηγέλλονσαι βοηθεῖν.* II. 69. 1, *ἐτέρας δ' ἐξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελησάνδρον στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτα τε ἀργυρολογῶσι καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἑώσιν, κ. τ. λ.* III. 33. 1, 3, *ὥφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμινίας καὶ Παράλου ἐτι περὶ Κλάρων ὁρμών, — αὐτάγγελοι δ' αὐτὸν ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἢ τε Πύραλος καὶ ἡ Σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν.* Bloomfield most strangely misrepresents the meaning both of Thucydides and of Bishop Thirlwall, by giving in his note, as the translation of *μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*, the words, "beyond the interval where the two walls converged toward each other;" which are evidently intended by the historian thus misquoted to be explanatory of *ἐξω τῶν ρεγχῶν*, ch. 6. 2.

sent, on his side also, to Athens; having, indeed, on many other occasions sent messengers at the time of their several operations; but doing so then especially, because he thought that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those at home recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no small reinforcement, there was no hope of preservation for them. Fearing, however, that those who were sent by him, either through incapacity for speaking, or through being deficient in sense,<sup>1</sup> or from a wish to say something to please the multitude, should not report the real facts of the case, he wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any other, the Athenians would learn his own sentiments without their being at all obscured by the messenger, and so would deliberate on the true state of the case. Accordingly, those whom he sent departed with the letter and all that they were to say; while he himself attended to the affairs of the armament, being engaged now in precautionary measures, rather than in perils voluntarily incurred.

9. At the close of the same summer, Evetion, an Athenian general, having in concert with Perdiccas marched against Amphipolis with a numerous body of Thracians, did not take the city, but after bringing round some triremes into the Strymon, blockaded it from the river, making his approaches from Himereum. And thus the summer ended.

10. The following winter, the messengers of Nicias arrived at Athens, where they stated by word of mouth what had been told them, answered whatever further question any one asked, and delivered the letter; which the secretary of state came forward and read to the Athenians, being to the following purport:

11. "With our former operations, Athenians, you have been made acquainted by many other letters; but at present, it is especially seasonable that you should deliberate with a knowledge of the position we are in. When, then, we had in many engagements defeated the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls in which we are now lying Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, came with an army from the Peloponnese and some of the cities in Sicily. And though

<sup>1</sup> γνώμης.] In corroboration of Arnold's argument for this reading in preference to μνήμης, compare the three requisite qualifications of an orator, mentioned II. 60. 5, *ὅς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων, εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων*, κ. τ. λ.

in the first battle he was beaten by us, in the one fought the next day we were driven from the field by numerous cavalry and dart-men, and retired within our walls. At present, therefore, we have ceased working at our line of circumvallation, in consequence of the enemy's numbers, and are lying still; (for we should not, indeed, be able to avail ourselves of all our force, since the guarding of our lines has exhausted a considerable part of our heavy-armed;) while they, on the other hand, have carried past us a single wall, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-work with a large force, and take it. And the consequence is, that we who are thought to be besieging others, are rather being besieged ourselves, as far as operations by land are concerned; for we can not even go out far into the country because of their horse.

12. "They have also sent ambassadors to the Peloponnese for fresh troops, and Gylippus is gone to the cities in Sicily, to persuade some of them which are at present neutral to join in the war, and to bring from others, if he can an additional land force, as well as naval armament. For they intend, as I hear, at the same time to attempt our walls with their army, and to attack us by sea with their fleet. And let none of you think it strange that I say *by sea* also. For although (as the enemy also are aware), our fleet was at first in fine condition, as regards both the soundness of the ships and the completeness of their crews, yet now both the ships are leaky, from having already been at sea so long a time, and the crews have been wasted; it being impossible to haul up and careen the vessels, because those of the enemy, being more than equal in number, are continually causing expectation of their sailing against us. For they are seen practicing, and it rests with them to make the attack [when they please]; and they have greater facility of careening their ships, since they are not engaged in blockading others.

13. "We on the other hand, could scarcely enjoy this advantage, though with a great superabundance of ships, and though we were not compelled, as at present, to keep guard with all of them. For if we relax our watching even in a slight degree, we shall have no provisions; since even now we find difficulty in bringing them in past their city. On this account our crews have been wasted and are still wasting; as some of

our seamen, in consequence of their fetching wood, of foraging, and of distant watering, are cut off by their cavalry; while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing desert from us, and those of the foreigners who went on board as pressed men straightway depart to the several cities; while those, again, who were at first elated by the high pay, and supposed that they were going to make money, rather than to fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and every thing else on the side of the enemy offering resistance to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can (and Sicily is a large country);<sup>1</sup> while in some instances, by engaging in traffic themselves, after persuading the captains to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed the perfection of our navy.

14. "For you, to whom I am writing know that the flower of a crew is limited in number," and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time. But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses (for your tempers are difficult to command), and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews (which the enemy can do from many quarters), but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless. If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being starved out.<sup>2</sup> I might, it is true, have had more agreeable things than these to write to you, but none more useful, if it is necessary for you

<sup>1</sup> And, therefore, as he implies, "there were so many points of refuge open to them that their escape was easily effected." See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> *ὅτι βραχεία ἀκὴ πληρώματος.*] Or, as others take it, "the bloom of a crew is but of brief duration." But that statement has been already made in the preceding chapter, sec. 3; and the words which follow are evidently intended to explain this expression.

<sup>3</sup> *ἐκπολιορκηθέντων.*] Literally, "compelled to surrender;" but the correctness of Arnold's version, which I have adopted, seems proved by the passage quoted by him from I. 134. 2, *ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῶ.*



to deliberate with a clear knowledge of affairs here. And besides, knowing as I do your temper, that you wish, indeed, to receive the most pleasing statement, but find fault afterward, should any thing in consequence of them turn out different to what you expected, I thought it safer to lay the truth before you.

15. "And now be assured of this, that for the business on which we first came here, neither your troops nor your generals have become inadequate: but since the whole of Sicily is being united together, and a fresh force is expected by them from the Peloponnese, you must now deliberate with a conviction that your troops are not a match even for their present enemies, but that you must either recall these, or send in addition to them another armament not less numerous, both military and naval, and no small sum of money, as well as some one to succeed me, since I am unable to remain at my post in consequence of a nephritic disease. And I think that I may claim some consideration at your hands; for when I was in health, I did you much service during the periods of my command. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the very commencement of spring, and without any delay; since the enemy will in a short time provide themselves with the succors from Sicily, and though not so quickly with those from the Peloponnese, yet if you do not pay attention to them, in some respects they will elude your observation, as before, and in others will anticipate you."

16. Such was the purport of Nicias's letter. The Athenians, after hearing it, did not allow him to resign his command, but till the arrival of others who were elected as his colleagues, they joined with him two of those who were there on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus, that he might not in his illness bear the labor alone; while at the same time they voted to send fresh forces, both naval and military, composed of Athenians on the muster-roll, and of their allies. They also elected as his colleagues, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon son of Thucles; the latter of whom they dispatched to Sicily immediately, about the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and orders to tell the troops there that succors would come to them, and that attention would be paid to their interests.

17. Demosthenes, in the mean time, staid behind, and made

preparations for the expedition, intending to start as soon as it was spring; while he sent the allies word to levy troops, and got ready at home money, ships, and heavy-armed. The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise round the Peloponnese, and to keep guard that none might cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnese to Sicily. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors came to them, and brought a more favorable report of affairs in Sicily, thinking that they had not been unseasonable in sending their former squadron, were now much more encouraged, and prepared, on their part, to dispatch heavy-armed troops for Sicily in vessels of burden, as the Lacedæmonians did likewise from the rest of the Peloponnese. The Corinthians manned also five and twenty triremes, to try the result of a battle with the squadron keeping watch at Naupactus, and that the Athenians there might be less able to prevent their transports from putting out, having to keep an eye upon the Corinthian line of triremes drawn up against them.

18. The Lacedæmonians prepared, too, for the invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their own previous resolution, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, since they had heard of the reinforcements about to be sent from Athens to Sicily; that they might be stopped by an incursion being made into the country. Alcibiades also kept urgently advising them to fortify Decelea, and not to let the war rest. But most of all had they gained confidence, because they thought that the Athenians, being engaged in a twofold war with both themselves and the Siceliots, would be more easily subdued; and also because they considered them to have first broken the truce. For in the former course of hostilities they thought the guilt lay more on their own side, both because the Thebans had entered Plataea during a time of truce; and because, when it had been specified in the former treaty, that none should take up arms against others, if they were willing to submit to a judicial decision, they themselves had not listened to the Athenians when appealing to such a decision. On which account they considered that they were justly unsuccessful, and made both their misfortune at Pylus, and whatever other might have befallen them, a subject of serious reflection.<sup>1</sup> But when the Athenians

<sup>1</sup> Or, "of religious scruple," as in some other passages.

had set out from Argos with those thirty ships, and ravaged a part of Epidaurus, Prasiæ, and some other places, at the same time that they were also spreading devastation from Pylus;<sup>1</sup> and when they refused to intrust the matter to arbitration, though the Lacedæmonians as often as differences had arisen concerning any of the debatable points in the treaty, appealed to a judicial decision; then, indeed, the Lacedæmonians thought that the violation of the law, which in the former instance had been committed by themselves, had now, again, come in the same way to attach to the Athenians, and they were, therefore, eager for hostilities. Accordingly, during this winter they sent round to their allies orders for iron, and were getting all the tools ready for building their fort. At the same time they were themselves raising supplies, and compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do so, with a view to dispatching in the merchantmen succors to those in Sicily. And so the winter ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

19. The following spring, at its very commencement, the Lacedæmonians and their allies made a very early incursion into Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. In the first place, then, they ravaged the parts of the country about the plain, and then proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the contingents of the different states. The place is distant from the city of Athens about a hundred and twenty stades, and about the same, or not much more, from Bœotia. Now the fortress was raised for the annoyance of the plain and the richest parts of the country, being visible as far as Athens. Thus, then, the Peloponnesians in Attica, and their allies, were engaged with their building. Those in the Peloponnese, about the same time, were sending off their heavy-armed troops to Sicily in the merchantmen, the Lacedæmonians having picked for the purpose the best of the Helots and Neodamodes,

<sup>1</sup> ἐλστεύοντο.] Or, as Arnold renders it, "they, the Lacedæmonians, were continually being plundered;" referring to V. 14. 2, ληστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου. Poppeo prefers the active sense, and is inclined to admit ἐλίστευον, as Becker has done on the authority of one MS., the middle form not being used elsewhere. As both the preceding and following verbs refer to the Athenians, the change of subject is certainly very harsh, if ἐλστεύοντο be referred to the Lacedæmonians; even more so, I think, than in that remarkable instance which occurs II. 3. 3.

amounting both together to seven hundred, with Eccritus, a Spartan, in command of them, and the Bœotians, three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xeno and Nico, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. These started among the first from Tænarus, in Laconia, and put out into the open sea. Not long after them, the Corinthians dispatched five hundred heavy-armed, some from Corinth itself, and some hired from Arcadia besides, having appointed Alexander a Corinthian to the command of them. The Sicyonians also sent off, at the same time with the Corinthians, two hundred heavy-armed under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. In the mean time the five and twenty ships of the Corinthians, which had been manned in the winter, were stationed in opposition to the twenty Athenian vessels at Naupactus, till they had got these heavy-armed on board the merchantmen out to sea: for which purpose, indeed, they had been originally manned, that the Athenians might not attend to the merchantmen so much as to the triremes.

20. Meanwhile the Athenians, at the time of the fortification of Decælea, and at the very commencement of the spring, sent thirty ships to cruise round the Peloponnese, under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, who was ordered to go to Argos also, and call for a contingent of their heavy-armed to go on board, according to the terms of their alliance. Demosthenes, too, they dispatched to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian ships, and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian heavy-armed from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as they could possibly raise from the several places; while they also supplied themselves from the other subject allies with whatever they could get in any quarter that would be of service for the war. Moreover, he was instructed, as he sailed round, to join Charicles first in his military measures on the coast of Laconia. So Demosthenes, after sailing to Ægina, waited for any part of the armament that might have been left behind, as well as for Charicles to fetch the Argive troops.

21. In Sicily, about the same period of this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse, bringing from the cities which he had persuaded to join him as large a number of troops as he respectively could. And now, having called the Syracusans together, he said that they ought to man as many ships as possible, and try the experiment of a sea-fight; for that he

hoped to produce thereby a result worth the risk, toward the issue of the war. Hermocrates, too, most earnestly joined him in trying to persuade them, in order that they might not want courage for attacking the Athenians by sea; observing, "that that people had no more than themselves enjoyed an hereditary and perpetual experience at sea, but had become a naval power after being, even more than the Syracusans, an inland one; and only because they were compelled to do so by the Medes. And to men of a daring character like the Athenians, those who were daring in opposition to them would appear most formidable: for the terror with which that people paralyzed their enemies, not, in some cases, by being superior to them in power, but by attacking them with confidence, *they*,<sup>1</sup> too, would in the same way strike into their opponents. And he was well assured, he said, that the Syracusans, by unexpectedly daring to offer resistance to the navy of the Athenians, would in a greater degree gain advantage from the surprise of the enemy on that account, than the Athenians by their skill would harm the unskillful Syracusans. He urged them therefore to proceed to the trial with their fleet, and not to shrink from it." Accordingly the Syracusans, at the persuasion of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and whoever else joined them, resolved on the sea-fight, and proceeded to man their ships.

22. When Gylippus had prepared the fleet for action, he took the whole army under cover of the night, and himself intended to assault by land the forts on Plemyrion, while at the same time, according to agreement, thirty-five of the Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the great harbor, and forty-five sailed round from the lesser, where their arsenal was situated; wishing to effect a junction with those within, and at the same time to sail against Plemyrion, in order that the enemy might be disconcerted by an attack on both sides. The Athenians, on the other hand, having with all speed manned sixty ships to oppose them, with five and twenty of them engaged the five and thirty of the Syracusans that were in the great harbor, and with the remainder went to meet those that were sailing round from the arsenal. Thus they immediately entered into action before the mouth of the

<sup>1</sup> καὶ σφᾶς, κ. τ. λ.] Or, "they" (i. e., the Athenians) "would themselves also be subject to before their enemies;" supposing, as Dobree does, that σφᾶς is here equivalent to *αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους*.

great harbor, and for a long time resisted each other, the one side wishing to force an entrance, the other being anxious to prevent them.

23. In the mean time Gylippus, when the Athenians in Plemyrion had gone down to the sea, and were paying attention to the naval engagement, surprised them by suddenly at daybreak assaulting the forts, of which he took the largest first, and then the other two; their garrisons not having awaited his attack, when they saw the largest easily carried. From the first that was taken the men escaped with difficulty to their camp, as many of them as took refuge in their boats and merchantmen; for as the Syracusans were getting the better in the engagement with their ships in the great harbor, the fugitives were chased by one trireme, and that a fast sailer; but when the other two forts were taken, at that time the Syracusans, in their turn, were now being beaten, and so those who were flying out of the forts sailed along shore with greater ease. For the Syracusan ships that were fighting before the mouth of the harbor, having forced their way through those of the Athenians, sailed in without any order, and being entangled with one another, transferred the victory to the Athenians; who routed both these, and those by which they were at first being defeated in the harbor. They also sank eleven of the Syracusan ships, killing most of the men on board of them, excepting those whom they took prisoners from three vessels; while on their own side three ships were lost. After hauling up the wrecks of the Syracusans, and erecting a trophy on the small island in front of Plemyrion, they withdrew to their own encampment.

24. But although the Syracusans had thus fared with regard to the sea-fight, they were still in possession of the three forts on Plemyrion, and erected three trophies for them. One of the two forts last taken they razed, but the other two they repaired, and held with garrisons. In the capture of the forts many men were killed, and many made prisoners, and a large amount of property in all was taken: for inasmuch as the Athenians used them as a magazine, there was in them much property and corn belonging to merchants, and much also belonging to trierarchs, since there were taken in them, besides other things, masts for forty triremes, with the rest of their equipments, and also three triremes which had been drawn up

on shore. Indeed, what most and principally ruined the army of the Athenians was the taking of Plemyrion; since ever the entrance into the harbor was no longer secure for carrying in provisions: (for the Syracusans, blockading them at that point with their vessels, prevented it, and their getting them in was now always effected by battle); and in other respects it struck consternation and dismay into their forces.

25. After this, the Syracusans sent out twelve ships, with Agatharchus, a Syracusan, on board of them as commander. One of these went to the Peloponnesee, carrying ambassadors, both to tell of their own affairs, "of the hopes they were full of, and to excite them to the still more vigorous prosecution of the war in those parts. The other eleven ships sailed to Italy, hearing that some vessels laden with treasure were on their way to the Athenians. Having fallen in with these vessels, they destroyed most of their contents, and burned a quantity of timber in the Caulonian territory, which had been got ready for the Athenians. After this they came to Locri, and while lying at anchor there, one of the merchantmen from the Peloponnesee put in to shore, carrying a heavy-armed band of Thespians. Having taken these on board their ships, the Syracusans coasted on homeward. The Athenians, with their twenty vessels at Megara, being on the look-out for them, took one ship with its crew; the rest they could not overtake, but they escaped from them to Syracuse. There was also some skirmishing in the harbor about the piles which the Syracusans had driven in the sea in front of the old docks, in order that their ships might lie at anchor within them, and the Athenians might not sail against them, and injure them by their charge. For the Athenians having brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden, carrying wooden towers and screens, from their boats fastened ropes round the piles, and raised them with windlasses, and tore them up, or, diving down, sawed them in two. The Syracusans plied their missiles on them from the docks, and the men on the ship of burden discharged theirs in return; and at last the Athenians removed the greater part of the piles. But the most dangerous part of the stockade was that out of sight: for there were some of the piles which they drove that did not rise above the surface of the sea, so that it was dangerous to approach, lest any one, through not seeing them beforehand, might strike his ship

on them, as on a sunken rock. But even in the case of these, divers went down and sawed them off for a reward; but the Syracusans made, notwithstanding, a fresh stockade. Many other also were the contrivances which they employed against one another, as was natural with the armaments lying near, and opposed to, each other; and they were engaged in skirmishes, and attempts of every kind. The Syracusans also sent to the cities embassies composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedæmonians, with tidings of the capture of Plemyrion, and to state, with regard to the sea-fight, that it was not so much by the power of the enemy as by their own confusion that they had been beaten; while, in other respects, they were to inform them that they were in good hope, and to call upon them to come to their aid, both with ships and troops, as the Athenians also were expected with a fresh force, and if they could but destroy their present armament before it came, there would be an end to the war. The parties in Sicily, then, were thus engaged.

26. Demosthenes, on the other hand, when the armament had been collected by him with which he was to sail to Sicily to the aid of the force there, having put to sea from Ægina and sailed to the Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. After receiving the heavy-armed troops of the Argives on board their ships, they sailed to Laconia, and in the first place ravaged a part of Epidaurus Limera. Then, landing on the coast of Laconia, opposite Cythera, where stands the Temple of Apollo, they fortified a certain place in the form of an isthmus, in order that the Lacedæmonian Helots might desert to them there, and at the same time foraging parties might make incursions from it, as from Pylus. And now, immediately after assisting to occupy this spot, Demosthenes sailed on for Corcyra, that he might take up some of the allies there also, and proceed as quickly as possible on his voyage to Sicily. Charicles, on the other hand, waited until he had entirely fortified the place; when, having left a garrison there, he, too, afterward returned home with his thirty ships, and the Argives at the same time.

27. There came also to Athens this same summer, to serve as targeteers, a body of Thracians who carry swords, of the tribe of the Dii, thirteen hundred in number, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes; but as they had come



too late, the Athenians determined to send them back again to Thrace, the country they had come from, as it seemed too expensive to keep them for the war carried on from Decelea, since each of them received a drachma a day. For since Decelea had been first fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and afterward was occupied for the annoyance of the country by garrisons coming from the states at successive periods, it greatly injured the Athenians, and was among the principal things that ruined their interests, both by the destruction of property and the loss of men. For previously the invasions were but of brief duration, and did not prevent their enjoying their territory at other times; but then, when the enemy were continually stationed there for their annoyance, and sometimes attacked them with a more numerous force, while at other times the regular garrison of necessity<sup>1</sup> made incursions on the land, and forayed it, Agis, the Lacedæmonian king, being also present (who made no by-work of the war), the Athenians suffered severely in consequence; for they were deprived of their whole country, and more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them being artisans; and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost. Their horses also, as the cavalry were daily on the move, making excursions to Decelea and keeping guard in the country, were either lamed by being worked on rocky ground, and that continually, or were disabled by wounds.

28. The conveyance also of provisions from Eubœa, which was before effected more quickly by land from Oropus, through Decelea, was now carried on with great expense by sea, round Sunium. Indeed the city required every thing alike to be imported; and instead of being a city, it was reduced to a garrison. For the Athenians were harassed by keeping guard on the fortifications, in succession by day, and all of them (excepting the cavalry) by night—some being on duty where the arms were piled, and others on the walls—both summer and winter alike. But what pressed hardest on them was, that they were engaged in two wars at once, and had arrived at such a pitch of obstinate animosity as no one would have believed if he had heard it before it actually occurred. For that even when besieged by the Peloponnesians from the fortress in their country, they should not

<sup>1</sup> ἐξ ἀνάγκης,] i. e., for their own support.

even then have withdrawn from Sicily, but have proceeded, in their turn, to besiege Syracuse in the same manner, a city not less than Athens, considered by itself; and that they should have exhibited to the Greeks so unexpected a display of power and daring, that whereas, in the beginning of the war, some of them thought they might hold out one year, some two, some even three, but no one longer, if the Peloponnesians should invade their country, they *now*, in the *seventeenth* year after the first invasion, went to Sicily, when distressed by hostilities in every way, and entered upon another war besides, not less important than that which they already had with the Peloponnese,<sup>1</sup> [who, I say, would have believed this before it actually took place?] It was owing to these things, then, to the great injury which Decelea inflicted on them, and the other great expenses which befell them, that they were reduced to straits for want of money; and it was at this time that they imposed on their subjects the tax of the twentieth<sup>2</sup> on all sea-borne commodities, instead of the tribute, thinking that thus a larger amount of money would be raised by them. For their expenses were not on the same scale as before, but much greater, inasmuch as the war also was greater, while their revenues were being destroyed.

29. These Thracians, then, who came too late for Demosthenes, as they did not, in consequence of their present want of money, wish to incur expense, they immediately sent back, having commissioned Diitrephes to convey them, and instructed him at the same time to inflict by their means whatever harm he could on the enemy during the voyage along shore (for they were to pass through the Euripus). Accordingly he landed them at Tanagra, and carried off some plunder in a hurried manner; and then in the evening sailed across the Euripus from Chalcis in Eubœa, and landing them in Bœotia, led them against Mycalessus. During the night he bivouacked unobserved near the Temple of Mercury, distant from Mycalessus about sixteen stades, and at daybreak assaulted the town, which was not a large one, and took it; having fallen on the inhabitants while off their guard, and not

<sup>1</sup> Owing to the length of the sentence in the original, the apodosis was forgotten. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> τὴν εἰκοστὴν.] "An ad valorem duty of five per cent. on all commodities carried by sea to or from any port in the Athenian dominion."  
—Arnold.

expecting that any one would ever march up the country so far from the sea to attack them; their wall, too, being weak, and in some parts even fallen down, while in other parts it was built but low; and the gates, moreover, being open through their feeling of security. The Thracians, then, having burst into Mycalessus, plundered both private houses and temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither old age nor youth, but killing one after another all they met with, both children and women, nay, further, even cattle and beasts of burden, and whatever other living things they saw. For the Thracian race, like the most blood-thirsty of the barbarians, is most so when secure from resistance. And thus on that occasion there was no little confusion in other respects, and every form of butchery was exhibited. And in particular, they attacked a boys' school, the largest that was in the place (which the children had just entered), and cut them all to pieces. And this disaster, which fell on the whole town, was inferior to none in extent, while it was more unexpected and shocking than any other.

30. When the Thebans were aware of it, they marched to the rescue, and having overtaken the Thracians when they had not at present advanced any great distance, they both recovered their plundered property, and having struck them with panic pursued them down to the sea, where their boats which conveyed them were lying at anchor. And they slew the greatest part of them during their embarkation, as they could not swim, and as those on board the boats, on seeing what was going on ashore, moored them out of bow-shot. For in the rest of the retreat the Thracians advanced in no contemptible manner to meet the Theban horse, which first fell upon them; and closing their ranks, according to their native tactics, defended themselves against them; and thus only a few were killed in that part of the affair. Some portion of them also were surprised in the city, through their eagerness in plundering, and perished. Altogether, there fell of the Thracians two hundred and fifty out of thirteen hundred; while of the Thebans and the rest who joined in attacking them they slew about twenty, horse and foot together, and among the Thebans, Scirphondas, one of the Bœotarchs. On the side of the Mycalessians a considerable part of the population was cut off. With regard, then, to Mycalessus, which experienced, considering its extent, a calamity not less lamentable,

than any which happened in the war, such were the things which occurred there.

31. Now Demosthenes being at the time on his voyage for Corcyra, after he had built the fortifications on the side of Laconia, fell in with a merchant vessel anchored at Phea in the Elæan territory, in which the Corinthian heavy-armed were to cross over to Sicily; and he destroyed the ship itself, but the men escaped from it, and having subsequently got another, proceeded on their voyage. After this, having come to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took on board a body of heavy-armed, sent for some of the Messenians from Naupactus, and then crossed over to the opposite coast of Acarnania, on the continent, to Alyzia and Anactorium, which the Athenians had in their own hands. While he was in these parts, he was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, who had been sent out with treasure at the time that has been mentioned, during the winter, and told him, among other tidings, that he had heard, when already on his voyage, that Plemyrion had been taken by the Syracusans. Conon, too, who was in command at Naupactus, came to them with information that the five and twenty Corinthian ships stationed opposite to the Athenian<sup>1</sup> squadron did not give up hostilities, but were prepared for an engagement. He begged them, therefore, to send him some ships, as his own eighteen were not competent to fight the enemy's five and twenty. Accordingly Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent with Conon the ten best sailers of all they had, to join those at Naupactus. They themselves at the same time made preparations for the muster of their forces, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, urging them to man fifteen ships, and enlisting heavy-armed troops (for he now shared the command with Demosthenes, and had turned back again, in consequence of his election), and Demosthenes raising slingers and dart-men from the parts about Acarnania.

32. As for the ambassadors who had gone at the time mentioned—after the taking of Plemyrion—from Syracuse to the cities, they had prevailed on them to join their side, and had raised and were just about to lead off the force, when Nicias, receiving early intelligence of it, sent to those of the Sicels

<sup>1</sup> *οφείον.*] In this and in many other similar passages, the reflective pronoun is used in the plural with reference to the *countrymen* of the speaker in general, rather than to himself individually.

who held the passes, and were in alliance with the Athenians, namely, the Centotripes, Alicyæans, and some others, to beg them not to give free passage to the enemy, but to unite together and prevent their marching through their country, since there was no other by which they would attempt to do so, as the Acragantines would not grant them a passage through theirs. When, therefore, the Siceliots were even on their march, the Sicels, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, laid an ambuscade for them in three different places, and falling upon them while off their guard and without any notice, killed about eight hundred of them, with all the ambassadors except one, namely, the Corinthian, who led to Syracuse those that had escaped, to the number of fifteen hundred.

33. About that same time the Camarinæans also came to their help with five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred dart-men, and three hundred bow-men. The Geloans, too, sent a squadron of five ships, four hundred dart-men, and two hundred horse. For by this time pretty nearly the whole of Sicily—excepting the Acragantines, who were neutral—the rest, I say, who before had waited to see the result of events, now united with the Syracusans, and assisted them against the Athenians. The Syracusans, then, after the disaster in the Sikel country had befallen them, ceased for the present from attacking the Athenians. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, on the other hand, their forces being now ready both from Coreyra and the continent, crossed the Ionian gulf with all their army to the Iapygian foreland. Starting thence, they touched at the Choerades islands, lying off Iapygia, and took on board their ships some Iapygian dart-men, one hundred and fifty in number, of the Messapian tribe; and after renewing an old friendship with Artas, who also had provided them with the dart-men being one of their chieftains, they arrived at Metapontum in Italy. After persuading the Metapontines to send with them, on the strength of their alliance, three hundred dart-men and two triremes, with this addition to their armament they coasted along to Thuria. There they found the opponents of the Athenians recently expelled in consequence of a sedition. And as they wished to muster there the whole army, in case any part had been left behind, and to review it, as well as to persuade the Thurians to join them as zealously as possible in the expedition, and to have

considering their present position, the same foes and friends as the Athenians, they waited awhile in Thuria, and were prosecuting these designs.

34. About the same time, the Peloponnesians in the five and twenty ships, who, to secure the passage of the merchantmen to Sicily, were anchored over against the fleet at Naupactus, having made their preparations for a sea-fight, and having manned some additional ships, so that they were now but little inferior to the Athenian force, stationed themselves off Erineus in Achæa, in the territory of Rhypa. And the place in which they were stationed being in the form of a crescent, their land forces which had come to their assistance from the Corinthians, and from their allies on the spot, were ranged on the projecting headlands on both sides; while the ships occupied the intervening space, blocking up the entrance. The commander of the fleet was Polyantbes, a Corinthian. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with three and thirty ships, under the command of Diphilus. The Corinthians at first remained stationary, but afterward, having raised their signal for battle, when there appeared to be a favorable opportunity, they advanced upon the Athenians, and engaged them. For a long time they resisted each other; at length three ships on the side of the Corinthians were destroyed, while on that of the Athenians none was absolutely sunk, but some seven were disabled, being struck prow to prow, and having their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, which were provided with stronger cheeks<sup>1</sup> than usual for this very purpose. After fighting on equal terms, so that either party might claim the victory (though the Athenians, nevertheless, had got possession of the wrecks, through the wind driving them out into the open sea, and the Corinthians no longer advancing against them), they separated from each other, and there was no pursuit made, nor were any prisoners taken on either side: for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians easily effected their escape, as they were fighting near shore, and no ship on the side of the Athenians went down. When, however, the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Cor-

<sup>1</sup> τὰς ἐπωρίδας.] "The word is known only in its technical sense, as signifying two beams, projecting from a ship's head, on each side of her beak, from which the anchors were suspended, something like what are called in our ships the 'cat-heads.'"—*Arnold*. I have borrowed from *Jobree* the word by which I have rendered ἐπωρίδας.

inthians immediately erected a trophy, as conquerors; because they had disabled a greater number of their enemy's ships, and considered that they were not beaten, for the very same reason that the other party considered them not to have conquered: for the Corinthians regarded themselves as having the advantage if they were not decidedly beaten, and the Athenians considered them to be worsted, because they were not decidedly conquerors. But when the Peloponnesians had sailed off, and their troops had dispersed, the Athenians erected a trophy on their side also, as having gained the victory, in Achæa, at about twenty stades distance from Erineus, where the Corinthians were stationed. And so ended the sea-fight.

35. Now Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians were prepared to join them in the expedition with seven hundred heavy-armed and three hundred dart-men, gave orders for the ships to coast along toward the Crotonian territory; while they themselves having first reviewed all the land forces on the river Sybaris, proceeded to lead them through the Thurian country. When they were on the banks of the river Hylia, and the Crotonians sent to them, and said that they should not choose the army to pass through their territory, they descended toward the shore, and encamped for the night by the sea, at the mouth of the Hylia, their ships also meeting them at the same point. The following day, having put their men on board, they coasted along, touching at all the cities, excepting Locri, until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory.

36. The Syracusans, in the mean time, hearing of their approach, wished to make a second attempt with their fleet and other forces on shore, which they were collecting for this very object, being desirous of striking a blow before they came. Now they had equipped the rest of their navy according as they saw, from the result of the former sea-fight, that they would obtain any advantage; and having cut down their ships' prows into a less compass, they made them firmer than usual, by fixing stout cheeks to them, and attaching stays<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The epotides were laid on the bow or stem of the vessel, and were partly within and partly without the frame of the hull, just as a ship's bowsprit is at present. For the length of six cubits, whether from the prow, as Dobree understands it, or from the inner extremity of the epotides, they supported these cheeks by a set of spars (*ἀντηρίδας*) that went from the cheeks to the ship's side, both inside and outside the ship."—*Arnold*.

from these to the ships' sides, for the length of six cubits both inside and outside the vessel; in the very same way as the Corinthians had equipped their ships ahead against the squadron at Naupactus, and then proceeded to engage it. For the Syracusans thought that in this way they would have an advantage against the Athenian vessels, which were not in the same manner built to resist them, but were slight ahead (because they did not charge prow to prow so much as on the side, after taking a circuit); and, moreover, that the battle being fought in the larger harbor, against a great number of ships in no great space, would be in their favor; for that by charging stem to stem they would stave in their prows, striking as they would with solid and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones. Nor would the Athenians in their narrow room have opportunity of sailing round or cutting through their line,<sup>1</sup> the maneuvers of their naval science in which they most confided; for they themselves, to the best of their power, would not allow them to cut through their line, and the want of room would prevent their making a circuit. And what was before thought to be want of skill in masters, namely, to charge stem to stem, was the very method they would chiefly adopt; for they would have the advantage in it; as the Athenians, if forced out of the line, would have no means of backing water in any direction but toward shore, and that, too, at only a short distance from them, and for a short space, namely, just opposite their own encampment. The rest of the harbor they should themselves command; and the enemy, if forced at any point, by crowding together into a confined space, and all to the same point, would run foul of each other, and be thrown into confusion (the very thing, indeed, which most hurt the Athenians in all their sea-fights, since they had not, like the Syracusans, the power of retreating over the whole harbor). And as for making a circuit into clearer sea-room, since they themselves commanded the entrance from, and the retreat into, the open deep, they would not be able to do it; especially as Plemyrion would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbor was not large.

<sup>1</sup> περίπλουν—διέκπλουν.] These maneuvers, as well as the ἀνάκρουσις afterward mentioned, were different methods of giving the ship a momentum required for a second attack. See Arnold's notes on I. 49. 3, and II. 89. 12.



37. Having adopted such contrivances to suit their own degree of knowledge and power, and at the same time feeling now more assured in consequence of their former battle, the Syracusans prepared to attack them at once by land and by sea. Those of their land forces which were in the city Gylippus led out a little before, and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, at that part of it which looked toward the city; while the troops from the Olympieum, both all the heavy-armed that were there, and the horse and light-armed of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall on the other side; immediately after which, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians thought at first that they would make an attempt on the land side alone, but when they saw their fleet also suddenly coming against them, they were thrown into alarm; and some were making preparations on and in front of the walls to meet the attack, while others marched out against those who with all speed were coming from the Olympieum and the parts outside the city—both horse in great numbers and dart-men—and others proceeded to man the ships, and at once ran to the beach to oppose the enemy. And when they were manned, they put out against them with seventy-five vessels, those of the Syracusans being about eighty in number.

38. For a great part of the day they continued advancing and retiring and making attempts upon one another; and when neither party could gain any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenians' ships, they separated; and the troops at the same time withdrew from the walls. The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, without showing at all what were their plans for the future. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack them again, compelled the captains to refit their ships, whichever of them had at all suffered; and stationed merchantmen before the stockade which had been fixed in the sea in front of their ships, to serve the purpose of an inclosed harbor. These vessels he placed at intervals of two hundred feet from each other, that if any ship were hard pressed, it might have means of retreating in safety and sailing out again at leisure. The Athenians, then, continued to make these preparations during the whole day until the night.

39. The day following, the Syracusans engaged the Athenians at an earlier hour, but on the same plan of attack, both by sea and by land. And being opposed in the same manner with their ships, they again continued making attempts upon each other for a great part of the day; until Aristo son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, and the most able master the Syracusans had, persuaded their naval commanders to send to those who had the direction in the city, and beg them to remove as quickly as possible the supply of things for sale, and to bring it to the sea-side; and whatever eatables any one had, to compel all to come *there* and sell them; that so they<sup>1</sup> might enable them to land their seamen and take their dinner immediately by the side of their ships, and, after a short interval, again the very same day to attack the Athenians, when they were not expecting it.

40. They, then, in compliance with this request sent a messenger, and the market was prepared: upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and sailed to the city, landing immediately, and taking their dinner: while the Athenians, supposing that they had retreated to the city because they were worsted by them, went ashore at their leisure, and were engaged both with other matters and with providing their dinner, imagining that for that day at least they would not have to fight again. But the Syracusans having suddenly manned their ships, sailed out against them a second time; while *they*, in much confusion, and most of them unrefreshed, went on board without any order, and with great difficulty put off to meet them. For some time they forbore from attacking each other, and stood on their guard; but afterward the Athenians did not choose through their own act to be worn out with fatigue by waiting there, but to attack them as quickly as possible; and so they advanced with a cheer, and commenced the action. The Syracusans received them, and charging with their ships stem to stem, as they had determined beforehand, with their beaks equipped as they were, they stove in the Athenian vessels to a considerable extent of the foreships, while the dart-men fighting on their decks inflicted great damage on the Athenians, and still more those Syracusans who

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῖς.] "According to the rule given in the note on III. 98. 1, the dative expresses the action in its relation to another party, namely, the Syracusan government."—*Arnold*.

were sailing about in their small boats, falling close in upon the oars of the enemy's ships, sailing up to their sides, and thence discharging their darts upon the seamen.

41. At length, by fighting in this way with all their might, the Syracusans gained the victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as those vessels; but then the beams that were hung from the merchantmen over the passages between them, with dolphins attached to them,<sup>1</sup> stopped their progress. Two, however, elated by their victory, came up close to them, and were destroyed, one of them being captured with its crew. After the Syracusans had sunk seven Athenian ships and disabled many more, having taken some of the men prisoners and killed others, they retired, and erected trophies for both the engagements; entertaining now a confident hope that by sea they were very decidedly superior, and thinking that they should conquer the enemy's land forces also. Accordingly they began to prepare for making another attack in both ways.

42. At this time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succors from Athens, consisting of above seventy-three ships (including the foreign ones) and about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and the allies, with dart-men, both Grecian and barbarian, not a few, slingers, bow-men, and the rest of the armament on a large scale. No slight consternation was produced at the moment among the Syracusans and their allies, at the thought that they were to have no final deliverance from their dangers, seeing that there was newly come, none the less for the fortification of Decelea, an armament equal, or nearly so, to the first, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great on all sides; while in the former Athenian forces fresh confidence (considering their late misfortunes) had now sprung up. Demosthenes, on the other hand, seeing how matters stood, thought that it was not possible for him to waste the time, and so to experience the fate which Nicias had done. For although that general spread terror on his first arrival, he was despised, through not immediately attacking Syracuse, but spending the winter at Catana, and Gylippus anticipated his success by arriving with forces from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have

<sup>1</sup> *i. e.*, heavy weights made something in the form of that fish.

sent for at all if he had immediately attacked them ; for while fancying themselves a match for him, they would at once have discovered their inferiority, and have been invested ; so that, even if they had sent for them, they would not then have done them the same service. Reviewing these things, then, and thinking that he himself too was decidedly most formidable to the adversary at the present time, even the very first day, Demosthenes wished, as quickly as possible, to avail himself to the utmost of the present dismay of their forces. And seeing that the counter-wall of the Syracusans, by which they had prevented the Athenians from circumvallating them, was but a single one, and that if any one had carried the ascent to Epipolæ, and then the camp on it, the work might easily be taken (for no one at all would so much as wait his attack), he was in a hurry to make the attempt. And this he thought was his shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion ; for he would either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, or lead back the armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both the Athenians who joined the expedition and the whole state. In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged a part of the Syracusan territory, about the Anapus, and were superior in force, as they had originally been, both by land and by sea (for in neither way did the Syracusans come out against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum).

43. Afterward, Demosthenes resolved first to make an attempt on the counter-work with engines. But when the engines, after he had brought them up, were burned by the enemy who were making a defense from the wall, and they were beaten back when charging at many points with the rest of his forces, he determined to delay no longer ; but having gained the assent of Nicias and the rest of his colleagues, according to the plan he had formed, he proceeded to the attempt on Epipolæ. Now, in the day-time it seemed to be impossible for them to approach and make the ascent unobserved. But having issued orders for five days' provisions, and taken all the stone-masons and carpenters, with all the other apparatus besides, both arrows and every thing else that was necessary for them, should they succeed, to have while they were building, he himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the whole force, after the first watch of the night, and advanced against

Epipolæ, Nicias being left behind in the lines. When they had come up to the hill on the side of Euryelus, the same way that the former army also had in the first instance made the ascent, they escaped the observation of the Syracusan guard, and having gone to the fort of the Syracusans which was there, they took it, and put part of the garrison to the sword. But the greater part fled immediately to the camps (of which there was three on Epipolæ, in outworks, one composed of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of their allies), and informed them of the attack, and told it to the six hundred Syracusans who had formed the original guard at this part of Epipolæ. They immediately went against them; and Demosthenes and the Athenians falling in with them, routed them, though they made a spirited resistance. They then immediately pressed on, that they might not be retarded in their present eagerness for accomplishing the objects they had come for: while others of them proceeded, as their first measure, to take the counter-wall of the Syracusans, and pull down its battlements. The Syracusans and their allies, as well as Gylippus and his division, went to the rescue from the outworks; and as they had had this daring attack made on them in the night, they engaged the Athenians in some dismay, and were at first compelled to retreat. But when the Athenians were now advancing in greater confusion, as having gained the victory, and were anxious to pass as quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy which had not yet been engaged, that they might not rally again through their relaxing in the attack; the Bœotians were the first to oppose them, and both broke them by their charge, and put them to flight.

44. Now the Athenians were by this time in much disorder and perplexity; but on this subject it was not easy for me to ascertain from either side, in what way each event occurred. For in the day-time the parties engaged have, indeed, a clearer knowledge, though not a perfect one even then, for each man barely knows what happens in his own part of the field. But in a night engagement (and this was the only one which occurred between great armies during this war), how could any one have a distinct knowledge of any thing? For though there was a bright moon, they only saw one another (as was natural they should by moonlight) so as to discern the form of the body before them, but to mistrust their knowledge

of its being that of a friend. And there were no few heavy-armed on each side moving in a narrow space. Thus on the side of the Athenians some were even now being defeated, and others coming up unconquered for their first attack. A large part, too, of the rest of their forces had only just ascended, and others were still ascending, so that they did not know on what point to advance. For in consequence of the rout which had taken place, every thing in front was now in confusion, and it was difficult to distinguish orders through the uproar. For the Syracusans and their allies, on gaining the advantage, were cheering each other with no little shouting (it being impossible, during the night to express themselves in any other way), and at the same time were receiving the charge of their assailants; and the Athenians were in search of one another, and thought that whoever met them was a foe, even though he might be a friend, belonging to those who were now flying back. And by their frequently asking for the watchword, because they could not by any other means distinguish them, they both caused great confusion on their own side by all asking at once, and made it known to the enemy; while theirs, on the other hand, they did not so easily discover, because, as they were victorious and not dispersed, they were better recognized by each other. So that if they fell in with any of the enemy with the advantage of numbers on their own side, the Syracusans escaped from them, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword; but if they themselves [in such a case] did not answer, they were put to the sword. But what especially and in the greatest degree hurt them, was the singing of their hymns; for as it was very similar on each side, it occasioned perplexity. For the Argives, the Corcyraeans, and all the Dorian race that were with the Athenians, struck terror into them whenever they raised their pæan; and so did the enemy, likewise. Thus having, at last, when once they were thrown into disorder, come into collision with each other in different parts of the army, friends with friends, and countrymen with countrymen, they were not only full of fear, but even closed in battle with each other, and were with difficulty parted. And now, as they were being pursued, the greater part threw themselves down the cliffs, and perished; as the way down again from Epipolæ was narrow. And when those who escaped from the heights had reached the

plain, though many of them, especially such as belonged to the former armament, through their greater acquaintance with the localities, escaped safely to the camp, some of those who had lately arrived lost their way, and wandered about the country; and these, when it was day, the Syracusan horse intercepted, and put to the sword.

45. The next day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolæ, where the enemy's approaches had been made, and the other on the spot where the Boeotians first withstood them, while the Athenians recovered their dead under truce. No few were killed, both of themselves and their allies, though still more arms were taken than in proportion to the number of the dead; for of those who were compelled to leap down the cliffs unencumbered by their shields, though some perished, yet others escaped with their lives.

46. After this, the Syracusans being again, as before, restored to confidence on the strength of such unexpected good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was torn by factions, to induce the city to join them, if he could; while Gylippus again went by land to the other parts of Sicily to bring more forces, being in hope of even taking the Athenian lines by storm, since the affair on Epipolæ had turned out as it did.

47. The Athenian commanders, in the mean time, consulted on the disaster which had befallen them, and on the want of vigor which at present on all accounts prevailed in their camp; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their attempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in the country. For they were suffering with sickness from two different causes, both because this was the season of the year at which men are most liable to disease, and at the same time, too, because the position in which they were encamped was marshy and unfavorable, while they were also distressed because every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthenes, then, was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but, according to the plan with which he had hazarded the attack on Epipolæ, since that had failed, he gave his vote for departing, and not wasting the time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might command the superiority with the squadron that had lately joined them, at any rate. He said, too, that it would be more benefi-

cial to the state to carry on the war against those who were building fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue; nor, again, was it right for them to waste large sums of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Such, then, was the view entertained by Demosthenes.

48. Nicias, however, though he too considered their circumstances to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weakness by words, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to their enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in conjunction with many;<sup>1</sup> for so they would far less elude their observation in executing it, whenever they might wish. To a certain extent, also, the affairs of the enemy, judging from what he, more than others, knew of them, still afforded some hope that they would be worse than their own, should they persist in carrying on the siege; for so they would exhaust them by want of funds; especially, too, as they had now, with their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. A party in Syracuse, also, which wished to surrender the city to the Athenians, was sending messengers to him, and urging him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, he was in fact waiting because he was still inclined both ways, and wished to see his course more clearly; but in the speech openly made by him on that occasion he said, "that he refused to withdraw the forces; for he well knew that the Athenians would not put up with such a step on the part of the generals—their returning, he meant, without a vote from themselves to authorize it. Besides, those who would vote in their case, would not give their verdict from seeing the facts, as they themselves had done, instead of hearing them from the invectives of others; but whatever calumnies any clever speaker threw upon them, by those would they be persuaded. Many too, nay, even the greater part of the soldiers present on the spot, who were now clamoring about their perilous condition, would, he said, on arriving there, raise the very contrary clamor, namely, that their generals had utterly betrayed them for money, when they returned. For himself, then, he did not wish (knowing as he did the Athenian character and temper) to die under a dishonorable charge and by an unjust sentence

<sup>1</sup> μετὰ πολλῶν,] i. e., with the Taxiarchs and Trierarchs, who attended when a regular council of war was held. Compare ch. 50. 3.



at the hands of the Athenians, rather than run the risk, in his own individual case, of meeting his fate at the hands of the enemy, if it must be so. As for the affairs of the Syracusans, however, he knew that they were in a still worse condition than their own. For supporting mercenaries as they had to do with their funds, and at the same time spending them on guard-posts, and maintaining, moreover, a large navy, as they had now done for more than a year, they were in some respects ill provided, and in others would be still more at a loss, as they had already expended two hundred talents, and still owed many more; and should they lose any part whatever of their present forces through not giving them supplies, their cause would be ruined, as it was supported by voluntary aid, rather than by compulsory exertions, like theirs. He maintained, therefore, that they must continue to carry on the siege, and not go away defeated in point of money, wherein they were decidedly superior."

49. Such were the views which Nicias was positive in stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance with the state of affairs in Syracuse, and their want of money; and because there were some who were desirous that the state should fall into the hands of the Athenians, and were sending messages to him not to raise the siege; and at the same time, because he was influenced by confidence in his fleet,<sup>1</sup> at any

<sup>1</sup> *θαρσήσει κρατηθείς.*] I have given what appears to me the only sense that this participle can bear, though different from any that has been attributed to it by others. Compare the somewhat similar use of the verb *ἡσσωμαι*, in the sense of "yielding," or "giving way to," e. g., III. 38. 5, *ἡδονῇ ἡσσωμένοι*; and with a genitive, IV. 37. 1, *ἡσσηθείεν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ*. If, however, it should be thought that neither this meaning, "nor" (to use the words of Arnold) "any other, can be fairly extracted from the sense as it now stands," I should be disposed to adopt a rather bolder emendation than the mere substitution of *κρατυθείς*, which Bauer and so many others after him have admitted, but which, as Poppo observes, leaves the passage scarcely less strange in its phraseology than before. From the fact that six MSS. have γ' ἄν, instead of γοῦν, it seems probable that an infinitive mood originally formed part of the sentence; and I venture therefore to propose the following correction: *καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν* (or γ' ἄν, whichever may be preferred) *ναυσὶν ἢ πρότερον θαρσήσας κρατῆσειν*, taking *κρατῆσειν* in the same absolute sense as *κρατεῖν* has already borne in a very similar passage, ch. 47. 3. If the objections urged by Göller against understanding *μᾶλλον* before *ἢ* be thought valid, his correction ᾗ may be admitted; "from feeling confident that they should at any rate have the advantage at sea, as they had formerly;" i. e., before their recent defeat in the naval engagement.

rate more than before. Demosthenes, however, would not at all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure *them*; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favor of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land. In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view. But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.

50. In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicanus had come to Syracuse; and though Sicanus had failed in winning Acragas (for while he was still at Gela, the party friendly to the Syracusans<sup>1</sup> had been driven out), yet Gylippus came with fresh troops raised from the rest of Sicily, and with the heavy-armed which had been sent out from the Peloponnese in the spring, on board the merchantmen, and had arrived at Selinus from Libya. For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and the Cyrenæans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into alliance with the Euesperitæ, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the latter people; and after coasting along thence to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which the distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, and arrived at Selinus. Immediately on their arrival, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both sides, by

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "the party for the Syracusans, for friendship with them," as Arnold renders it. See his note.

sea and by land. When the Athenian generals, on the other hand, saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed through the sickness of the men, they repented of not having removed before. And as even Nicias did not now oppose them in the same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote on the question, they gave orders, as secretly as they could, for all to sail out of their station, and to be ready when the signal should be given. And when, after all was in readiness, they were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be at the full. The greater part, therefore, of the Athenians, urged the generals to stop, regarding the matter with religious scruple; and Nicias (for he was somewhat over-addicted to superstition, and such feelings) declared that he would not now so much as consider the matter, with a view to moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, he had waited thrice nine days. And so the Athenians, having been stopped on this account, remained in the country.

51. When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land (for they would not else have meditated sailing away), and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon; but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships, therefore, and practiced as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favorable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

52. On that day, then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.

Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much toward the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the center of the Athenians, intercepted *him* also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbor, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.

53. When Gylippus saw the enemy's ships defeated, and carried beyond the stockades and their own station, wishing to cut off the men that were landing from them, and that the Syracusans might more easily tow off the vessels, through the land being in possession of their friends, he ran down to meet them at the break-water with some part of his army. The Tyrrhenians (for it was they who were keeping guard at this point) seeing them coming on in disorder, advanced toward them, and fell upon and routed their van, and drove them into what was called the marsh of Lysimelea. Afterward, when the force of the Syracusans and their allies had now come up in greater numbers, the Athenians also advanced against them, being afraid for their ships, and entered into action with them, and defeated and pursued them to some distance, killing a few heavy-armed. They saved also the greater part of their own ships, and brought them together alongside their station; eighteen of them, however, the Syracusans and their allies captured, and put all the men to the sword. Wishing also to burn the rest of them, they filled an old merchantman with faggots and pine-wood, and having thrown fire into it, and the wind blowing right on the Athenians, they let the vessel drift toward them. The Athenians, alarmed for their ships, contrived, on the other hand, means for checking and extinguishing it; and having stopped the flames and the near approach of the merchantman, they thus escaped the danger.

54. After this, the Syracusans erected a trophy, both for their sea-fight, and for the interception of the heavy-armed above, at the wall, where they also took the horses; while the Athenians did the same for the rout of those of the infantry whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and for that which they themselves effected with the rest of their army.

55. When the victory had now been so decisive on the side

of the Syracusans, even at sea (for before this they were afraid of the ships newly come with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in a state of utter despondency; and great was their disappointment, but far greater still their regret, for having made the expedition. For these were the only states they had hitherto attacked with institutions similar to their own, and living under a democracy like themselves; possessing, too, ships, and horses, and greatness: and as they were not able either to introduce any change, as regarded their government, to create dissension among them, by which they might have been brought over, nor to effect that by means of their forces (though they were far superior<sup>1</sup>), but had failed in most of their attempts, they were even before this event in perplexity; and after they were defeated even at sea, which they could never have expected, they were far more so still.

56. The Syracusans, on the other hand, immediately began to sail without fear along the harbor, and determined to close up its mouth, that the Athenians might not in future sail out, even if they wished it, unobserved by them. For they were no longer attending to their own preservation merely, but also to the prevention of the enemy's escape; thinking (as was the fact) that with their present resources their own cause was decidedly the stronger; and that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies both by land and sea, the victory would appear for them a glorious one in the eyes of the Greeks. For of the rest of the Greeks some in that case were straightway liberated, and others released from fear (as the remaining power of the Athenians would no longer be able to bear the war that would afterward be waged against them), while they themselves also, being regarded as the authors of this would be greatly admired, both by the rest of the world, and

<sup>1</sup> *κρείσσουνς*.] I have taken this as a nominative case, with Arnold and others, rather than as an accusative, as Poppo is inclined to do in his larger edition; because the superiority of the Athenian forces at the beginning of their operations is quite evident from many other passages, even besides those referred to in Arnold's note; and the use of the participle *ἐπελθόντες* at the beginning of the section is more suitable to the commencement of the siege than to the later period of it, when the Syracusans could with truth be said to be superior to their assailants. Besides, *όντες* is found after *κρείσσουνς* in three of the MSS. With regard to the construction of *ἐκ παρασκευῆς*, it seems to depend upon *προσῆγεσθαι* understood from the preceding *προσῆγοντο*, as Bloomfield observes in the note to his translation.

by posterity. And the contest was indeed worth encountering, both on these grounds, and because they were winning the victory, not only over the Athenians, but over the other numerous allies also; and, again, not winning it by themselves, but also in company with those who had joined in assisting them; having taken the lead, too, with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and given their own city to stand the first brunt of the danger, and paved the way, in great measure, for their naval success. For the greatest number of nations met together at this single city, excepting the whole sum of the confederates assembled, during the war, at the city of Athens or of Lacedæmon.

57. For the following were the states on each side that repaired to Syracuse for the war, coming against Sicily, or in its behalf, to assist the one side in winning, and the other in keeping possession of the country; taking their stand with one another, not so much on the ground of right, or of kindred, but as they were each circumstanced with respect either to expediency or to necessity. The Athenians themselves went willingly, as Ionians against the Dorians of Syracuse; and with them went, as their colonists, having the same language and institutions as themselves, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Æginetans, who then occupied Ægina; as also the Hestiaeans, who inhabited Hestiaeæ, in Boeotia. Of the rest, some were serving with them as subjects; others in consequence of their alliance, although independent; and others as mercenaries. Among their subjects and tributaries were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians, of Eubœa. From the islands were the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians: from Ionia, the Milesians, Samnians, and Chians. Of these, the Chians joined as independent allies, not being subject to tribute, but supplying ships. All these were chiefly Ionians, and descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians, who were Dryopes; and though subject, and going from necessity, still they followed at any rate as Ionians against Dorians.<sup>1</sup> Besides these, there were of Æolic race, the Methymnæans, subject to supplying ships but not tribute; and the Tenedians and Æni-

<sup>1</sup> Implying that the present were not the original inhabitants of it.

<sup>2</sup> *ἰωνεὺς γὰρ ἐπὶ Δωριεῶσι.*] "That is, it was not unnatural or irksome to them to serve against their natural enemies, although it was not in a quarrel of their own."—*Arnold*.

ans, who were tributaries. These, although Æolians, were by compulsion fighting against Æolians, namely, the Bœotians, their founders, who were on the Syracusan side. But the Plateans alone fought as Bœotians right in the face of Bœotians,<sup>1</sup> as might have been expected, for the hatred they bore them. Of Rhodians and Cytherians, again, both of Doric race, the Cytherians, though colonists of the Lacedæmonians, were fighting in concert with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, who were Argives by race, were compelled to wage war against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and the Geloans, who were even their own colonists, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians followed, indeed, as independent allies, but still, on account of their insular position, rather by constraint, because the Athenians commanded the sea. The Corcyræans, though not only Dorians but even Corinthians, followed openly against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the one and kinsmen of the other; by compulsion, according to their specious profession, but rather with good will, for the hatred they bore the Corinthians. The Messenians, too, as they are now called, at Naupactus, and also from Pylus, which was then held by the Athenians, were taken to the war. Moreover, some few Megarean exiles, owing to their misfortune, were fighting against the Selinuntines, who were Megareans. Of the rest the service was now more of a voluntary nature. For it was not so much on account of their alliance, as out of hatred for the Lacedæmonians, and for their own individual advantage at the moment, that the Argives followed in company of the Ionian Athenians to fight as Dorians against Dorians. While the Mantineans, and other mercenaries from Arcadia, went as being accustomed to go against the enemies who at any time were pointed out to them; and thought, for the sake of gain, that the Arcadians, who at that time came with the Corinthians, were no less than others their foes. The Cretans and Ætolians also came for consideration of pay;

<sup>1</sup> *καταντικρύ*.] Such is perhaps the force of the word, in the absence of any instance in which Thucydides uses it for *ἀντικρύς*. Otherwise the meaning of "absolute" or "downright Bœotians," would suit the passage much better, as distinguishing between the Plateans who actually lived in the country, and those before mentioned who were only colonies from it.

and it happened in the case of the Cretans, that although they had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, they now came, not *with* their colonists, but *against* them—not by choice, but for pay. There were also some Acarnanians who served as auxiliaries, partly from motives of interest, but mainly as being allies, through their friendship with Demosthenes, and their good-will toward the Athenians. These, then, were within the boundary of the Ionian gulf.<sup>1</sup> Of the Italiots, on the other hand, the Thurians and Metapontines, as they had been overtaken by such necessities at that time, owing to those seasons of faction, joined in the expedition; and of the Siceliots, the Naxians and Catanians. Of barbarians, there were the Segestans, who indeed invited them to their aid, with the greater part of the Sicels; and of those out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenians, on account of a quarrel with the Syracusans, and some Iapygian mercenaries. Such and so many were the nations that were serving with the Athenians.

58. To the aid of the Syracusans, on the other hand, came the Camarinæans, who lived on their borders; the Geloans, who lived next to them; and then (for the Acragantines were neutral) the Selinuntines, who were situated on the further side of the island. These occupied the part of Sicily opposite to Libya, but the Himeræans the side toward the Tyrrhenian sea, in which they are the only Greek inhabitants, and from which they were the only auxiliaries of the Syracusans. Such then were the Grecian communities in Sicily that joined in the war, being all Dorians and independent. Of the barbarians, there were the Sicels alone, such of them as had not gone over to the Athenians. Of the Greeks beyond the limits of Sicily, there were the Lacedæmonians, who supplied a Spartan leader, while the rest of the troops were Neodamodes and Helots; (the term Neodamode being now equivalent to free;) the Corinthians, who alone of all the allies joined with both sea and land forces; the Leucadians, also, and Ambraciots, for the sake of their connection with them; while mercenaries were sent from Arcadia by the Corinthians, and some Sicyonians, who were pressed into the service. From beyond the Peloponnese,

<sup>1</sup> τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλῳ ὁρίζονται.] i. e., who were separated by that sea from the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. Compare VI. 13, τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας, ὡς περὶ νῦν ὄροις, χωρμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλῳ, κ. τ. λ.



some Boeotians joined them. Compared, however, with these who came as auxiliaries, the Siceliots themselves supplied larger numbers in every branch of the service, inasmuch as they were powerful states; for numerous heavy-armed, ships, and horses, and an abundant crowd<sup>1</sup> besides, were collected by them. And compared, again, with all the rest put together, as one may say, the Syracusans by themselves furnished more numerous levies, both from the greatness of their city, and because they were in the greatest peril.

59. Such were the auxiliaries collected on either side, which, by this time, had all joined both parties, and there were no subsequent additions to either.

The Syracusans and their allies, then, reasonably conceived that it would be a glorious prize for them, after their recent victory in the sea-fight, to capture the whole armament of the Athenians, great as it was, and not to let them escape either way, neither by sea nor land. They began therefore immediately to close up the great harbor, the mouth of which was about eight stades across, with triremes ranged broadside, and merchant-vessels, and boats, mooring them with anchors; while they prepared every thing else, in case the Athenians should still have courage for a sea-fight, and entertained no small designs with regard to any thing.

60. The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbor, and having received intelligence of their other plans, thought it necessary to hold a council. Accordingly the generals and the Taxiarchs assembled to deliberate on their difficulties, arising both from other causes, and especially because they had neither any more provisions for their immediate use (for, thinking that they were going to sail away, they had sent before to Catana, and commanded them to bring them no longer), nor were likely to have them in future, unless they should gain the command of the sea. They determined therefore to evacuate the upper part of their lines, and having inclosed with a cross wall just by the ships the least space that could be sufficient to hold their stores and their sick, to garrison that, while with the rest of their troops, making every one go on board, they manned all their ships, both such as were sound and such as were less fit for service; and after a naval engagement, if they were victorious, to proceed to Catana;

<sup>1</sup> ὅμιλος,] i. e., of light-armed irregulars.

but if not, to burn their ships, throw themselves into line, and retreat by land, in whatever direction they would soonest reach some friendly town, whether barbarian or Grecian. They, then, having resolved on these things, acted accordingly; for they gradually descended from their upper lines, and manned all their ships, having compelled to go on board whoever, even in any degree, seemed of age for rendering service. Thus they were manned in all about a hundred and ten ships; on board which they embarked a large number of bow-men and dartmen, taken from the Acarnanian and other mercenaries, and provided every thing else, as far as it was possible for them, when acting upon a plan which necessity alone dictated, such as the present. When most things were in readiness, Nicias, seeing the soldiers disheartened by their decided defeat at sea, and wishing, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, to hazard a final battle as speedily as possible, assembled them, and on that occasion<sup>1</sup> addressed them all together first, and spoke as follows:

61. "Soldiers of the Athenians, and of the other allies, the coming struggle will be common alike to all—for the safety and country of each of us, no less than of the enemy; since if we now gain a victory with our fleet, each one may see his native city again, wherever it may be. Nor should you be disheartened, or feel like the most inexperienced of men, who, after failing in their first attempts, ever after have the anticipation of their fear taking the color of their disasters. But as many of you here as are Athenians, having already had experience in many wars, and all the allies who have ever joined us in our expeditions, remember the unexpected results that occur in warfare; and make your preparations with a hope that fortune may at length side with us, and with a determination to renew the conflict in a manner worthy of your numbers, which you see yourselves to be so great.

62. "Now whatever we saw likely to be serviceable against the confined space of the harbor, with reference to the crowd

<sup>1</sup> παρεκελεύσατο τότε πρώτον.] I have retained the old reading τότε, though all the editors have changed it into τε, because I think it is by no means inexpressive, if taken with πρώτον; the two words being intended, in my opinion, to make a marked distinction between the speech addressed by Nicias "on that first occasion," to all the troops together, and that which he afterward addressed to the trierarchs by themselves. See ch. 69. 2, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, κ. τ. λ.

of ships that there will be, and the enemy's troops upon their decks, from which we suffered before, every thing has now been looked to and prepared by us also, as far as present circumstances would allow, with the co-operation of the masters of our vessels. For great numbers of bowmen and dartmen will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not have used had we been fighting in the open sea, as it would have interfered with the display of our skill through the weight of our ships; but in the present *land-fight* which we are compelled to make on board our ships, these things will be of service. We have also ascertained the different ways in which we must adapt the structure of our vessels for opposing theirs, and especially against the stoutness of their cheeks, from which we received most damage, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent the ship's retiring<sup>1</sup> again after it has once charged, if the soldiers on board them do their duty. For to this necessity are we reduced, that we must maintain a land-fight on board our fleet; and it seems to be our interest neither to retire ourselves, nor to suffer them to do it; especially as the shore, except so far as our troops occupy it, is in possession of the enemy.

63. "Remembering this, then, you must fight on as long as you can, and not be driven to land, but determine, when one ship has closed with another, not to separate before you have swept off the soldiers from your enemy's deck. And this exhortation I offer to the soldiers not less than to the sailors, inasmuch as this work belongs more to those upon deck. And we have still even now a general superiority with our troops. On the other hand, I advise the seamen, and entreat them too at the same time, not to be too much dismayed by their misfortunes, as we have now superior resources on our decks, and a larger number of ships. Consider, too, how well worth preserving is that pleasure enjoyed by those of you, who, being hitherto considered as Athenians, even though you are not, from your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our customs, were respected through Greece, and enjoyed no less a share of our empire as regarded the benefits you derived from it, and a far greater share as regards being feared by our subjects, and being secured from injuries. Since then

<sup>1</sup> τὴν πάλιν ἀκάκρουν.] i. e., retiring in order to gain the momentum required for a fresh attack. See note on ch. 36.

you alone, as free men, share our empire with us, abstain, as just men, from now utterly betraying it. And with contempt for Corinthians, whom you have often conquered, and for Siceliots, none of whom presumed, while our fleet was in fine condition, so much as to stand up against us, repel them, and show that, even when attended by weakness and misfortunes, your skill is superior to the fortunate strength of any others.

64. "Those of you, again, who are Athenians, I must remind of this also, that you left behind you no more such ships in your docks, nor so fine a body of heavy-armed troops; and that if any thing else befall you but victory, your enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those of our countrymen who are left behind there will be unable to defend themselves against both their opponents on the spot and those who will join them; and thus at the same time you who are here will be at the mercy of the Syracusans (and you know with what feelings you came against them), and those who are there at home at that of the Lacedæmonians. Being brought then to this one struggle for both parties, fight bravely now, if you ever did; and reflect, both individually and collectively, that those of you who will now be on board your ships represent both the army and the navy of the Athenians, all that is left of your country, and the great name of Athens: in behalf of which, whatever be the point in which one man excels another, either in science or courage, on no other occasion could he better display it, so as both to benefit himself and to contribute to the preservation of all."

65. Nicias delivered this exhortation to them, and immediately commanded them to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans, on the other hand, were able to perceive, from the sight of their very preparations, that the Athenians were about to engage them at sea, and the device of throwing the grappling-irons had also been previously reported to them. They prepared themselves therefore on all other points severally, and on this also; for they covered over with hides their prows and a considerable space of the upper part of the vessel, so that the grapple, when thrown, might slip off, and not obtain any hold on them. And now, when every thing was ready, their generals, together with Gylippus, exhorted them by speaking as follows:

66. "That our former achievements have been glorious ones,

Syracusans and allies, and that this struggle will be for glorious results in future, most of you seem to us to be aware (for you would not else have devoted yourselves so eagerly to it), and if any one is not as sensible of it as he ought to be, we will prove it to him. For when the Athenians had come to this country, for the subjugation of Sicily in the first place, and then, if they succeeded, for that of the Peloponnese also, and the rest of Greece; and when they possessed the largest empire enjoyed hitherto, either by Greeks of former times or of the present, you were the first men in the world who withstood their navy with which they had borne down every thing, and have already conquered them in some sea-fights, and will now, in all probability, conquer them in this. For when men have been put down in that in which they claim to excel, their opinion of themselves in future is far lower than if they had never entertained such an idea at first; and failing through the disappointment of their boasting, they give way even beyond the degree of their power. And such, probably, is now the feeling of the Athenians.

67. "But in our case, both the opinion we entertained before, and with which, even while we were yet unskillful, we were full of daring, has now been confirmed; and from the addition to it of the thought that we must be the best seamen in the world, since we have conquered the best, each man's hope is doubled. And, generally speaking, it is the greatest hope that supplies also the greatest spirit for undertakings. Again, those points in which they are imitating our equipments are familiar to our habits, and we shall not be awkward at each of them:<sup>1</sup> whereas, on their side, when many soldiers are on their decks contrary to their custom, and many dartmen, mere land-lubbers<sup>2</sup> (so to speak), Acarnanians and others, have gone on board their ships, who will not so much as know how to discharge their weapons while

<sup>1</sup> ἀνάρμοστοι.] or, as others take it, "unprepared against each of them."

<sup>2</sup> χερσαῖοι.] I have ventured to use a rather slang term, because the qualifying expression, ὥς εἰπεῖν, which is added in the original, seems to imply that χερσαῖοι was employed by him with a similar meaning of reproach. The meaning of σφάλλω, as used just below, seems borrowed from the unsteady reeling motion of an intoxicated person; the simile used by the Psalmist with reference to mariners tossed in the storm, "they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end." Or it may mean to "embarrass."

stationary, how can they avoid swaying the ships, and falling all into confusion among themselves, by not moving according to their own fashion? For neither will they derive any benefit from the superior number of their ships (if any of you be afraid of this, I mean the idea of his not going to fight them with an equal number); for many ships in a small space will be less effective for executing any of the movements they may wish, while they are most liable to be injured by our preparations. On the contrary, be assured of this, which is most true, according to the certain information which we believe we have received. It is through the excess of their miseries, and from being forced to it by their present distress, that they are induced to make a desperate effort; not so much from confidence in their resources, as from hazarding a chance, in whatever way they can, that they may either force their passage and sail out, or afterward retreat by land; since, at any rate, they could not fare worse than at present.

68. "To avail yourselves then of such confusion, and of the very fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has betrayed itself, let us close with them in wrath, and consider that the feeling of those men is most lawful, with regard to their enemies, who determine, when taking vengeance on their aggressor, to glut the animosity of their heart: and that we too shall have an opportunity of avenging ourselves on our foes—the very thing which is every where said to be most sweet. For that they are our foes, and our bitterest foes, you all know; inasmuch as they came against our country to enslave it, and if they had succeeded, would have imposed on our men all that was most painful; on our children and wives all that is most dishonorable; and on our whole country the title which is most degrading. Wherefore no one ought to relent, or deem it gain that they should merely go away without danger to us. For that they will do just the same, even if they gain the victory. But that, through our succeeding (as we probably shall do) in our wishes, these men should be punished, and should leave a more secure liberty for the whole of Sicily, which even before enjoyed that blessing; this is a glorious object to contend for. And of all hazards those are most rare, which, while they cause least harm by failure, confer most advantage by success."

69. The Syracusan commanders and Gylippus having in their turn thus exhorted their men, immediately manned the

ships on their side also, since they saw that the Athenians were doing it. Nicias, on the other hand, being dismayed at the present circumstances of himself and his colleagues, and seeing how great and how close at hand now their peril was, since they were all but on the point of putting out; considering, too (as men usually feel in great emergencies), that in deed every thing fell short of what they would have it, while in word enough had not yet been said by them; again called to him each one of the Trierarchs, addressing them severally by their father's name, their own, and that of their tribe; begging each one who enjoyed any previous distinction, from personal considerations not to sacrifice it, nor to obscure those hereditary virtues for which his forefathers were illustrious; reminding them too of their country—the most free one in the world—and the power, subject to no man's dictation, which all enjoyed in it with regard to their mode of life; mentioning other things also, such as men would say at a time now so critical, not guarding against being thought by any one to bring forward old and hackneyed topics, and such as are advanced in all cases alike, about men's wives and children and country's gods, but loudly appealing to them, because they think they may be of service in the present consternation. Thus he, thinking that he had addressed to them an exhortation which was not so much a satisfactory one, as one that he was compelled to be content with, went away from them, and led the troops down to the beach, and ranged them over as large a space as he could, that the greatest possible assistance might be given to those on board toward keeping up their spirits. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who went on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, put out from their own station, and immediately sailed to the bar at the mouth of the harbor, and the passage through it which had been closed up,<sup>1</sup> wishing to force their way to the outside.

<sup>1</sup> τὸν † παραλειφθέντα † δέκκλουν.] As some correction of this reading seems necessary, I have preferred that which is adopted by Arnold, καταληφθέντα, to that which Bekker proposes, περιλειφθέντα: because it seems far more probable from the next chapter that no passage at all was left by the Syracusans. If there had been, why should the Athenians, when they had defeated the squadron at the harbor's mouth, have attempted to break the fastenings of the vessels which formed the bar (sec. 2), instead of sailing out at once, as some of them probably would have done, under their present circumstances, if the passage had been

70. The Syracusans and their allies, having previously put out with pretty nearly the same number of ships as before, proceeded to keep guard with part of them at the passage out, and also round the circumference of the whole harbor, that they might fall upon the Athenians on all sides at once, while their troops also at the same time came to their aid at whatever part their vessels might put in to shore. The commanders of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each occupying a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians in the center. When the Athenians came up to the bar, in the first rush with which they charged they got the better of the ships posted at it, and endeavored to break the fastenings. Afterward, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the engagement was going on no longer at the bar alone, but over the harbor also; and an obstinate one it was, such as none of the previous ones had been. For great eagerness for the attack was exhibited by the seamen on both sides, when the command was given; and there was much counter-maneuvering on the part of the masters, and rivalry with each other; while the soldiers on board exerted themselves, when vessel came in collision with vessel, that the operations on deck might not fall short of the skill shown by others. Indeed every one, whatever the duty assigned him, made every effort that he might himself in each case appear the best man. And as a great number of ships were engaged in a small compass (for indeed they were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space that had ever been known, since both of them together fell little short of two hundred), the attacks made with the beaks were few, as there were no means of backing water, or cutting through the enemy's line; but chance collisions were more frequent, just as one ship might happen to run into another, either in flying from or attacking a second. So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge, those on her decks plied their javelins, arrows and stones in abundance against her; but when they came to close quarters, the heavy-open for them. Bloomfield indeed thinks that the mere fact of a Syracusan squadron having been posted near the mouth of the harbor proves that there must have been an opening left. But surely this is a very weak proof; for knowing as they did that the Athenians would break down the bar if they possibly could, it was a very natural precaution to defend it with a division of their fleet.



armed marines, fighting hand to hand, endeavored to board each other's ships. In many cases too it happened, through want of room, that on one side they were charging an enemy, and on the other were being charged themselves, and that two ships, and sometimes even more, were by compulsion entangled round one. And thus the masters had to guard against some, and to concert measures against others—not one thing at a time, but many things on every side—while the great din from such a number of ships coming into collision both spread dismay and prevented their hearing what the boat-swains said. For many were the orders given and the shouts raised by those officers on each side, both in the discharge of their duty, and from their present eagerness for the battle: while they cried out to the Athenians, “to force the passage, and now, if ever they meant to do it hereafter, to exert themselves heartily for a safe return to their country;” and to the Syracusans and their allies, “that it would be a glorious achievement for them to prevent the enemy's escape, and by gaining the victory to confer honor on their respective countries.” The commanders, moreover, on each side, if they saw any captain in any part unnecessarily rowing astern, called out to him by name and asked him, on the side of the Athenians, “whether they were retreating because they considered the land, which was in the possession of their bitterest enemies, as more their own than the sea, which had been won with no small trouble?” on that of the Syracusans, “whether they were themselves flying from the flying Athenians, whom they knew for certain to be anxious to escape from them in any way whatever?”

71. The troops on shore too, on both sides, when the sea-fight was so equally balanced, suffered a great agony and conflict of feelings; those of the country being ambitious now of still greater honor, while their invaders were afraid of faring even worse than at present. For, since the Athenians' all was staked on their fleet, their fear for the future was like none they had ever felt before; and from the unequal nature of the engagement they were also compelled to have an unequal view of it from the beach. For as the spectacle was near at hand, and as they did not all look at the same part at once, if any saw their own men victorious in any quarter, they would be encouraged, and turn to calling on the gods not to deprive

them of safety ; while those who looked on the part that was being beaten, uttered lamentations at the same time as cries, and from the sight they had of what was going on, expressed their feelings more than those engaged in the action. Others, again, looking on a doubtful point of the engagement, in consequence of the indecisive continuance of the conflict, in their excessive fear made gestures with their very bodies, corresponding with their thoughts, and continued in the most distressing state, for they were constantly within a little of escaping, or of being destroyed. And thus among the troops of the Athenians, as long as they were fighting at sea on equal terms, every sound might be heard at once, wailing, shouting, "they conquer," "they are conquered," and all the other various exclamations which a great armament in great peril would be constrained to utter—very much in the same way as their men on board their ships were affected—until at length, after the battle had continued for a long time, the Syracusans and their allies routed the Athenians, and pressing on them in a decisive manner, with much shouting and cheering of each other on, pursued them to the shore. Then the sea forces, as many as were not taken afloat, put into the land at different parts, and rushed from on board to the camp : while the army, no longer with any different feelings, but all on one impulse, lamenting and groaning, deplored the event, and proceeded, some to succor the ships, others to guard what remained of their wall ; while others, and those the greatest part, began now to think of themselves, and how they should best provide for their own preservation. Indeed their dismay at the moment had been exceeded by none of all they had ever felt. And they now experienced pretty nearly what they had themselves inflicted at Pylus : for by the Lacedæmonians' losing their ships, their men who had crossed over into the island were lost to them besides : and at this time for the Athenians to escape by land was hopeless, unless something beyond all expectation should occur.

72. After the battle had been thus obstinately disputed, and many ships and men destroyed on both sides, the Syracusans and allies, having gained the victory, took up their wrecks and dead, and then sailed away to the city, and erected a trophy. The Athenians, from the extent of their present misery, did not so much as think about their dead or their

wrecks, or of asking permission to take them up, but wished to retreat immediately during the night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias, and expressed it as his opinion that they should still man their remaining ships, and force their passage out, if they could, in the morning; alleging that they still had left more ships fit for service than the enemy; for the Athenians had about sixty remaining, while their adversaries had less than fifty. But when Nicias agreed with this opinion, and they wished to man them, the seamen would not embark, through being dismayed at their defeat, and thinking that they could not now gain a victory. And so they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

73. But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their purpose, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so large a force, after retreating by land and settling any where in Sicily, should choose again to carry on the war with them, went to the authorities, and explained to them that they ought not to suffer them to retreat during the night (stating what he himself<sup>1</sup> thought), but that all the Syracusans and allies should at once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard beforehand at the narrow passes. But though the magistrates also agreed with him in thinking this, no less than himself, and were of opinion that it ought to be done, yet they thought that the people, in their recent joy and relaxation after the labors of a great sea-fight, especially, too, as it was a time of feasting (for they happened to celebrate on this day a sacrifice to Hercules), would not easily be induced to listen to them; as the majority, from excessive gladness at their victory, had fallen to drinking during the festival, and would, they expected, rather obey them in any thing than in taking arms, just at present, and marching out. When, on consideration of this, it appeared a difficulty to the magistrates, and Hermocrates could not then prevail upon them to attempt it, he afterward devised the following scheme. Being afraid that the Athenians might get the start of them by quietly passing during the night the most difficult points of the country, he sent cer-

<sup>1</sup> ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἑδόκει.] I see no reason whatever for any such alteration of αὐτῷ, as Bauer and Dobree propose; as the words evidently refer to the fact mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that Hermocrates had himself suspected (ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν) what he stated to the magistrates as the design of the Athenians.

tain of his own friends with some cavalry to the Athenian camp, as soon as it grew dark. These, riding up to within hearing, and calling to them certain individuals, as though they were friends of the Athenians (for there were some who sent tidings to Nicias of what passed within the city) desired them to tell that general not to lead off his army by night, as the Syracusans were guarding the roads; but to retire leisurely by day after making his preparations. They then, after delivering this message, returned; while those who heard it reported the same to the Athenian generals.

74. They, in accordance with the information, stopped for the night, considering it to be no false statement. And since they had not, as it was, set out immediately, they determined to remain over the next day also, that the soldiers might pack up, as well as they could, the most useful articles; and though they left every thing else behind, to take with them, when they started, just what was necessary for their personal support. But the Syracusans and Gylippus had marched out before with their troops, and were blocking up the roads through the country where it was likely the Athenians would advance, as well as guarding the passages of the streams and rivers, and posting themselves for the reception of the army, in order to stop it where they thought best; while with their ships they sailed to those of the Athenians, and towed them off from the beach. Some few indeed the Athenians themselves had burnt, as they had intended; but the rest they lashed to their own at their leisure, as each had been thrown up on any part of the beach, and, without any one trying to stop them, conveyed them to the city.

75. After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought they were sufficiently prepared, the removal of the army took place, on the third day after the sea-fight. It was a wretched scene then, not on account of the single circumstance alone, that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, and while both themselves and their country were in danger, instead of being in high hope; but also because, on leaving their camp, every one had grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel in his heart. For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw a friend on the ground, he was struck at once with grief and fear. And the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, were to the living a much more sorrowful spectacle.

than the dead, and more piteous than those who had perished. For having recourse to entreaties and wailings, they reduced them to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and appealing to each individual friend or relative that any of them might any where see; or hanging on their comrades, as they were now going away; or following as far as they could, and when in any case the strength of their body failed, not being left behind without many<sup>1</sup> appeals to heaven and many lamentations. So that the whole army, being filled with tears and distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from an enemy's country, and although they had both suffered already miseries too great for tears to express, and were still afraid for the future, lest they might suffer more. There was also among them much dejection and depreciation of their own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city starved out and attempting to escape; and no small one too, for of their whole multitude there were not less than forty thousand on the march. Of these, all the rest took whatever each one could that was useful, and the heavy-armed and cavalry themselves, contrary to custom, carried their own food under their arms, some for want of servants, others through distrusting them; for they had for a long time been deserting, and did so in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what they carried was not sufficient; for there was no longer any food in the camp. Nor, again, was their other misery, and their equal participation in sufferings (though it affords some alleviation to endure with others), considered even on that account easy to bear at the present time; especially, when they reflected from what splendor and boasting at first they had been reduced to such an abject termination. For this was the greatest reverse that ever befell a Grecian army; since, in contrast to their having come to enslave others, they had to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home, they had to start on their return with omens the very contrary of these; going by land, instead of by sea, and relying on a military rather than a naval force. But nevertheless, in conse-

<sup>1</sup> Οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων.] Arnold thinks that "the negative must be twice repeated," as if it were οὐκ ἄνευ οὐκ ὀλίγων, just as "non modo" in Latin is used instead of "non modo non." Or, may it be considered as a confusion of two expressions, viz., οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν and μετ' οὐκ ὀλίγων!

quence of the greatness of the danger still impending, all these things seemed endurable to them.

76. Nicias, seeing the army dejected, and greatly changed, passed along the ranks, and encouraged and cheered them, as well as existing circumstances allowed; speaking still louder than before, as he severally came opposite to them, in the earnestness of his feeling, and from wishing to be of service to them by making himself audible to as many as possible.

77. "Still, even in our present circumstances, Athenians and allies, must we cherish hope; for some men have, ere now, been preserved even from more dreadful circumstances than these. Nor should you think too meanly of yourselves, or yield too much to your misfortunes and present sufferings, which are beyond your desert. For my own part, though I am not superior to any of you in strength (for you see what a state I am in through disease), and though I consider myself to be second to none, whether in my private life or in other respects, yet now I am exposed to every danger, like the very meanest. And yet I have lived with much devotion,<sup>1</sup> as regards the gods, and much justice and freedom from reproach, as regards men. And therefore my hope is still strong for the future; and my calamities do not terrify me, so much as they might. Nay, they may perhaps be alleviated; for our enemies have enjoyed enough good fortune; and if we displeased any of the gods by making this expedition, we have already been sufficiently punished for it. Others also, we know, have ere now marched against their neighbors; and after acting as men do, have suffered what they could endure. And so in our case it is reasonable now to hope that we shall find the wrath of the gods mitigated; for we are now deserving of pity at their hands, rather than of envy. Looking, too, on your own ranks, what experienced and numerous men of arms there are with you, advancing in battle-array together, do not be too much dismayed, but consider that you are yourselves at once a city, wherever you may settle; and that there is no other in Sicily that would either easily resist your attack, or expel you when settled any where. With regard to the march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to that yourselves; with no other consideration, each

<sup>1</sup> νόμιμα.] Compare the use of the cognate participle, ch. 86. 5, τῇν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

of you, than that whatever the spot on which he may be compelled to fight, on that he will have, if victorious, both a country and a fortress. And we shall hurry on our way both by day and night alike, as we have but scanty provisions; and if we can only reach some friendly town of the Sicels (for they, through their fear of the Syracusans, are still true to us), then consider yourselves to be in security. And a message had been sent forward to them, and directions have been given them to meet us, and bring a fresh supply of provisions. In short, you must be convinced, soldiers, both that it is necessary for you to be brave men—since there is no place near, which you can reach in safety, if you act like cowards—and, at the same time, that if you escape from your enemies now, the rest of you will gain a sight of all you may any where wish to see; and the Athenians will raise up again, though fallen at present, the great power of their country. For it is *men* that make a city, and not walls, or ships, without any to man them."

78. Nicias, then, delivered this exhortation, and at the same time went up to the troops, and if he saw them any where straggling, and not marching in order, he collected and brought them to their post; while Demosthenes also did no less to those who were near him, addressing them in a similar manner. They marched in the form of a hollow square, the division under Nicias taking the lead, and that of Demosthenes following; while the baggage-bearers and the main crowd of camp followers were inclosed within the heavy-armed. When they had come to the ford of the river Anapus, they found drawn up at it a body of the Syracusans and allies; but having routed these, and secured the passage, they proceeded onward; while the Syracusans pressed them with charges of horse, as their light-armed did with their missiles. On that day the Athenians advanced about forty stades, and then halted for the night on a hill. The day following they commenced their march at an early hour, and having advanced about twenty stades, descended into a level district, and there encamped, wishing to procure some eatables from the houses (for the place was inhabited), and to carry on with them water from it, since for many stades before them, in the direction they were to go, it was not plentiful. The Syracusans, in the mean time, had gone on before, and were blocking up the pass in ad-

vance of them. For there was a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side of it, called the *Acraeum Lepas*. The next day the Athenians advanced, and the horse and dartmen of the Syracusans and allies, each in great numbers, impeded their progress, hurling their missiles upon them, and annoying them with cavalry charges. The Athenians fought for a long time, and then returned again to the same camp, no longer having provisions as they had before; for it was no more possible to leave their position because of the cavalry.

79. Having started early, they began their march again, and forced their way to the hill which had been fortified; where they found before them the enemy's infantry drawn up for the defense of the wall many spears deep; for the pass was but narrow. The Athenians charged and assaulted the wall, but being annoyed with missiles by a large body from the hill, which was steep (for those on the heights more easily reached their aim), and not being able to force a passage, they retreated again, and rested. There happened also to be at the same time some claps of thunder and rain, as is generally the case when the year is now verging on autumn; in consequence of which the Athenians were still more dispirited, and thought that all these things also were conspiring together for their ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their troops to intercept them again with a wall on their rear, where they had already passed; but they, on their side also, sent some of their men against them, and prevented their doing it. After this, the Athenians returned again with all their army into the more level country, and there halted for the night. The next day they marched forward, while the Syracusans discharged their weapons on them, surrounding them on all sides, and disabled many with wounds; retreating if the Athenians advanced against them, and pressing on them if they gave way; most especially attacking their extreme rear, in the hope that by routing them little by little, they might strike terror into the whole army. The Athenians resisted this mode of attack for a long time, but then, after advancing five or six stades, halted for rest on the plain; while the Syracusans also went away from them to their own camp.

80. During the night, their troops being in a wretched



condition, both from the want of all provisions which was now felt, and from so many men being disabled by wounds in the numerous attacks that had been made upon them by the enemy, Nicias and Demosthenes determined to light as many fires as possible, and then lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but in the opposite direction to where the Syracusans were watching for them, namely, to the sea. Now the whole of this road would lead the armament, not toward Catana, but to the other side of Sicily, to Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that direction, whether Grecian or barbarian. They kindled, therefore, many fires, and began their march in the night. And as all armies, and especially the largest, are liable to have terrors and panics produced among them, particularly when marching at night, and through an enemy's country, and with the enemy not far off, so *they* also were thrown into alarm; and the division of Nicias, taking the lead as it did, kept together and got a long way in advance; while that of Demosthenes, containing about half or more, was separated from the others, and proceeded in greater disorder. By the morning, nevertheless, they arrived at the sea-coast, and entering on what is called the Helorine road, continued their march, in order that when they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might march up along its banks through the interior; for they hoped also that in this direction the Sicels, to whom they had sent, would come to meet them. But when they had reached the river, they found a guard of the Syracusans there too, intercepting the pass with a wall and a palisade, having carried which they crossed the river, and marched on again to another called the Erineus; for this was the route which their guides directed them to take.

81. In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, as soon as it was day, and they found that the Athenians had departed, most of them charged Gylippus with having purposely let them escape; and pursuing with all haste by the route which they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they overtook them about dinner-time. When they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were behind the rest, and marching more slowly and disorderly, ever since they had been thrown into confusion during the night, at the time we have mentioned, they immediately fell upon and engaged them; and the Syracusan horse surrounded them with greater ease from their

being divided, and confined them in a narrow space. The division of Nicias was as much as fifty stades off in advance; for he led them on more rapidly, thinking that their preservation depended, under such circumstances, not on staying behind, if they could help it, and on fighting, but on retreating as quickly as possible, and only fighting as often as they were compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, was, generally speaking, involved in more incessant labor (because, as he was retreating in the rear, he was the first that the enemy attacked), and on that occasion, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he was not so much inclined to push on as to form his men for battle; until, through thus loitering, he was surrounded by them, and both himself and the Athenians with him were thrown into great confusion. For being driven back into a certain spot which had a wall all round it, with a road on each side, and many olive-trees growing about, they were annoyed with missiles in every direction. This kind of attack the Syracusans naturally adopted, instead of close combat; for to risk their lives against men reduced to despair was no longer for their advantage, so much as for that of the Athenians. Besides, after success which was now so signal, each man spared himself in some degree, that he might not be cut off before the end of the business. They thought too that, even as it was, they should by this kind of fighting subdue and capture them.

82. At any rate, when, after plying the Athenians and their allies with missiles all day from every quarter, they saw them now distressed by wounds and other sufferings, Gylippus with the Syracusans and allies made a proclamation, in the first place, that any of the islanders who chose should come over to them, on condition of retaining his liberty: and some few states went over. Afterward, terms were made with all the troops under Demosthenes, that they should surrender their arms, and that no one should be put to death, either by violence, or imprisonment, or want of such nourishment as was most absolutely requisite. Thus there surrendered, in all, to the number of six thousand; and the whole of the money in their possession they laid down, throwing it into the hollow of shields, four of which they filled with it. These they immediately led back to the city, while Nicias and his division arrived that day on the banks of the river Erineus;

having crossed which, he posted his army on some high ground.

83. The Syracusans, having overtaken him the next day, told him that Demosthenes and his division had surrendered themselves, and called on *him* also to do the same. Being incredulous of the fact, he obtained a truce to enable him to send a horseman to see. When he had gone, and brought word back again that they had surrendered, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with the Syracusans, on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent on the war, on condition of their letting his army go; and that until the money was paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did not accede to these proposals, but fell upon this division also, and surrounded them on all sides, and annoyed them with their missiles until late in the day. And they too, like the others, were in a wretched plight for want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless, they watched for the quiet of the night, and then intended to pursue their march. And they were now just taking up their arms, when the Syracusans perceived it and raised their pæan. The Athenians, therefore, finding that they had not eluded their observation, laid their arms down again; excepting about three hundred men, who forced their way through the sentinels, and proceeded, during the night, how and where they could.

84. As soon as it was day, Nicias led his troops forward; while the Syracusans and allies pressed on them in the same manner, discharging their missiles at them, and striking them down with their javelins on every side. The Athenians were hurrying on to reach the river Assinarus, being urged to this at once by the attack made on every side of them by the numerous cavalry and the rest of the light-armed multitude (for they thought they should be more at ease if they were once across the river), and also by their weariness and craving for drink. When they reached its banks, they rushed into it without any more regard for order, every man anxious to be himself the first to cross it; while the attack of the enemy rendered the passage more difficult. For being compelled to advance in a dense body, they fell upon and trode down one another; and some of them died immediately on the javelins

and articles of baggage,<sup>1</sup> while others were entangled together, and floated down the stream. On the other side of the river, too, the Syracusans lined the bank, which was precipitous, and from the higher ground discharged their missiles on the Athenians, while most of them were eagerly drinking, and in confusion among themselves in the hollow bed of the stream. The Peloponnesians, moreover, came down to them and butchered them, especially those in the river. And thus the water was immediately spoiled; but nevertheless it was drunk by them, mud and all, bloody as it was, and was even fought for by most of them.

85. At length, when many dead were now heaped one upon another in the river, and the army was destroyed, either at the river, or, even if any part had escaped, by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, placing more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and desired him and the Lacedæmonians to do what they pleased with himself, and to stop butchering the rest of the soldiers. After this, Gylippus commanded to make prisoners; and they collected all that were alive, except such as they concealed for their own benefit (of whom there was a large number). They also sent a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who had forced their way through the sentinels during the night, and took them. The part of the army, then, that was collected as general property, was not large, but that which was secreted was considerable; and the whole of Sicily was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken on definite terms of surrender, like those with Demosthenes. Indeed no small part was actually put to death; for this was the most extensive slaughter, and surpassed by none of all that occurred in this Sicilian war. In the other encounters also which were frequent on their march, no few had fallen. But many also escaped, nevertheless; some at the moment, others after serving as slaves, and running away subsequently. These found a place of refuge at Catana.

86. When the Syracusans and allies were assembled together, they took with them as many prisoners as they could, with the spoils, and returned to the city. All the rest of the

<sup>1</sup> i. e., some died immediately on the javelins, while others fell over the loose articles of baggage, and being too weak to regain their footing, were floated down the stream

Athenians and the allies that they had taken, they sent down into the quarries, thinking this the safest way of keeping them: but Nicias and Demosthenes they executed, against the wish of Gylippus. For he thought it would be a glorious distinction for him, in addition to all his other achievements, to take to the Lacedæmonians even the generals who had commanded against them. And it so happened that one of these, namely Demosthenes, was regarded by them as their most inveterate enemy, in consequence of what had occurred on the island and at Pylus; the other for the same reasons, as most in their interest; for Nicias had exerted himself for the release of the Lacedæmonians taken from the island, by persuading the Athenians to make a treaty. On this account the Lacedæmonians had friendly feelings toward him; and indeed it was mainly for the same reason that he reposed confidence in Gylippus, and surrendered himself to him. But certain of the Syracusans (as it was said) were afraid, some of them, since they had held communication with him, that if put to the torture, he might cause them trouble on that account in the midst of their success; others, and especially the Corinthians, lest he might bribe some, as he was rich, and effect his escape, and so they should again incur mischief through his agency; and therefore they persuaded the allies, and put him to death. For this cause then, or something very like this, he was executed; having least of all the Greeks in my time deserved to meet with such a misfortune, on account of his devoted attention to the practice of every virtue.

87. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusans treated them with cruelty during the first period of their captivity. For as they were in a hollow place, and many in a small compass, the sun, as well as the suffocating closeness, distressed them at first, in consequence of their not being under cover; and then, on the contrary, the nights coming on autumnal and cold, soon worked in them an alteration from health to disease, by means of the change. Some, too, in consequence of their want of room, they did every thing in the same place; and the dead, moreover, were piled up one upon another—such as died from their wounds, and from the change they had experienced, and such like—there were, besides, intolerable stench; while at the same time they were tormented with hunger and thirst; for during eight months they gave each of them daily only a

*cotyle*<sup>1</sup> of water, and two of corn. And of all the other miseries which it was likely that men thrown into such a place would suffer, there was none that did not fall to their lot. For some seventy days they thus lived all together; but then they sold the rest of them, except the Athenians, and whatever Sicelots or Italiots had joined them in the expedition. The total number of those who were taken, though it were difficult to speak with exactness, was still not less than seven thousand. And this was the greatest Grecian exploit of all that were performed in this war; nay, in my opinion, of all Grecian achievements that we have heard of also; and was at once most splendid for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered. For being altogether vanquished at all points, and having suffered in no slight degree in any respect, they were destroyed (as the saying is) with utter destruction, both army, and navy, and every thing; and only a few out of many returned home. Such were the events which occurred in Sicily.

<sup>1</sup> The *cotyle* was a little more than half an English pint; and the allowance of food here mentioned was only half of that commonly given to a slave. See Arnold's note.

## BOOK VIII.

1. WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for a long time they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers, who had escaped from the very scene of action, and gave them a correct account of it; not crediting that their forces could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced of it, they were angry with those of the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition; (as though they had not voted for it themselves;) and were enraged with the soothsayers and reciters of oracles, and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had put them on hoping that they should subdue Sicily. Every thing, indeed, on every side distressed them; and after what had happened, fear and the greatest consternation overwhelmed them. For they were at once weighed down by the loss which every man individually, as well as the whole state at large, had experienced, by the destruction of so many heavy-armed, and horsemen, and troops in the flower of their youth, like which they saw they had none left; and at the same time being aware that they had no competent number of ships in the docks, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for their vessels, they were at present without hope of saving themselves. They thought, too, that they should have their enemies in Sicily directly sailing with their fleet against the Piræus, especially after they had gained such a victory; and that their foes at home, then doubly equipped on all points, would surely now press them with all their might, both by land and by sea, and their own allies with them in revolt. But nevertheless it was determined, that, as far as their present resources allowed, they ought not to submit, but to equip a fleet, by whatever means they could, providing by contribution both timber and money; and to put matters on a secure footing among the allies, especially in Eubœa: and, moreover, to reform every thing in the city, with

a view to greater economy, and elect a council of elders, who should deliberate beforehand on their present measures, as there might be occasion. And through their excessive fear at the moment they were ready (as is the people's fashion), to be orderly in every thing. Having thus determined, they acted accordingly, and so the summer ended.

2. The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even if no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected severally that they might have attacked *them* also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedæmonians, on the other hand felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labors. But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer. The Lacedæmonian state was encouraged by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to their resources, would in all probability be with them in great force with the spring. And thus being on every account full of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they would both be released in future from all dangers, like that which would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if they had won Sicily in addition to their other dominion; and that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy in safety the supremacy over the whole of Greece.

3. Agis, their king, set out therefore immediately, during this winter, with some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for their fleet; and having turned in the direction of the Malian gulf, and carried off, on the ground of their long-standing enmity, the greater part of the exposed property of the Cetræans, he exacted money for the ransom of it; and also compelled the Achæans of Pthiotis, and the other



subjects of the Thessalians thereabouts (though the Thessalians remonstrated with him, and objected to it), to give both hostages and money; the former of which he deposited at Corinth, and endeavored to bring their countrymen over to the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians also issued to the states a requisition for building a hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Bœotians at five and twenty each; that of the Phocians and Locrians together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians, at ten; and that of the Megareans, Trœzenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians at ten. They were also making all other preparations, with the intention of proceeding immediately to war at the very commencement of spring.

4. The Athenians too, as they had determined, were preparing during this same winter for building ships; having contributed toward the supply of timbers, and fortified Sunium, that their corn-ships might have a safe passage round; while they also evacuated the fort in Laconia, which they had built in that country when they were sailing by it for Sicily; and with a view to economy retrenched all their other expenses, whatever any where appeared to be useless expenditure; and, above all kept their eye on the allies, to prevent their revolting from them.

5. While both parties were carrying out these measures, and engaged in preparation for the war, just as when they were commencing it, the Eubœans, first of all, sent during this winter an embassy to Agis, to treat of their revolting from the Athenians. He acceded to their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthus, to come from Sparta and take the command in Eubœa. Accordingly they came with about three hundred of the Neodamodes, and he began to prepare for their crossing over. But in the mean time some Lesbians also came to him; for they, too, wished to revolt. And as the Bœotians supported their application, Agis was persuaded to defer acting in the cause of Eubœa, and made preparations for the revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes as a commander, who was to sail to Eubœa; while the Bœotians promised them ten ships, and Agis the same number. These measures were undertaken without the authority of the Lacedæmonian state; for as long as Agis was at Decelea, and his forces with him, he had power both to send

troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy soldiers and money. And at this time the allies obeyed him, one might say, much more than the Lacedæmonians in the city: for he was feared, because he went every where in person with a force at his command. He, then, furthered the views of the Lesbians. The Chians and Erythræans, on the other hand, who were also ready to revolt, made their application, not to Agis, but at Sparta. There went with them also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was governor of the sea-coast under king Darius, son of Artaxerxes. For Tissaphernes also was inviting the Lacedæmonians to co-operate with him, and promised to furnish them with supplies. For he had lately been called on by the king for the tribute due from his government, for which he was in arrears, as he could not raise it from the Greek cities because of the Athenians. He thought, therefore, that he should both get in his tribute more effectually, if he reduced the power of the Athenians; and at the same time should gain for the king the alliance of the Lacedæmonians; and either take alive, or put to death, as the king had commanded him to do, Amorges, the natural son of Pisuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of Caria. The Chians and Tissaphernes, then, were negotiating this business in concert.

6. About the same time Calligitus son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagores son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from their country, and living at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedæmon, being sent by Pharnabazus to bring a fleet dispatched to the Hellespont; and that he himself, if possible, might for the sake of the tribute, cause the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians—the same object as Tissaphernes had in view—and gain for the king by his own agency, the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. While these negotiations were severally carried on by each party, by the emissaries both of Pharnabazus and of Tissaphernes, there was great competition between them at Lacedæmon, the one striving to prevail on them to send a navy and army to Ionia and Chios first, the other to the Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians, however, acceded with a very decided preference to the application of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades was also co-operating with them, being the hereditary and very intimate friend

of Endius, one of the ephors; for which reason also his family had a Lacedæmonian name, in consequence of this friendship; for Endius was called "the son of Alcibiades."<sup>1</sup> However, the Lacedæmonians first sent to Chios Phrynīs, one of the *Periæci*, to ascertain whether they had as many ships as they said, and whether their city corresponded with the representations of its high character: and when he brought them word back that what they heard was true, they straightway took the Chians and Erythræans into alliance, and resolved to send them forty ships, as there were already there (according to the statement of the Chians) not less than sixty. Of these they themselves at first intended to send ten, with Melancrias, who was their high admiral; but afterward, an earthquake having occurred, instead of Melancrias they determined to send Chalciæus, and instead of the ten ships to equip but five in Laconia. And thus the winter ended, and the nineteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

The following summer when the Chians straightway urged them to dispatch the fleet, and were afraid that the Athenians might get intelligence of their measures (for all parties sent their embassies without *their* knowledge), the Lacedæmonians sent three Spartans to Corinth, to haul the ships as quicky as possible across the Isthmus, from the opposite sea to that on the side of Athens, and to give orders for them all to sail to Chios, both those which Agis was preparing for Lesbos, and the rest. Now the total number of the ships belonging to the allied states that were there was thirty-nine.

8. Calligitus, then, and Timagoras, acting in behalf of Pharnabazus, did not join the rest in the expedition to Chios, or give, to forward the dispatch of the fleet, the money which they had brought with them, namely, five and twenty talents; but they intended to sail afterward by themselves with a fresh armament. Agis, on the contrary, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were determined to send to Chios first, did not himself maintain any different view, but the allies assembled at Corinth, and held a council, when they resolved to sail first to Chios, with Chalciæus as commander, who was equipping

<sup>1</sup> "That is, Alcibiades was the distinguishing family name of this Endius, borne by the members of his house in every alternate generation; so that Alcibiades was the surname to every Endius, and Endius the surname to every Alcibiades."—*Arnold*.

the five vessels in Laconia; then to Lesbos, with Alcarnenes in command (the same person as Agis intended to appoint): and, lastly, to go to the Hellespont, where Clearchus, son of Ramphias, was appointed to the command. But they determined to take only half the ships across the Isthmus first, and let these sail off immediately; that the Athenians might not attend to those which were setting out, so much as to those which were being conveyed across after them. For in this case they were making their expedition openly, as they imputed to the Athenians a want of power to oppose them, because no numerous fleet belonging to them was yet visible. And so, according to their resolution, they immediately took across one and twenty ships.

9. But when they were urgent for setting sail, the Corinthians were not disposed to accompany them before they had kept the Isthmian festival, for which that was the time. Agis expressed to them his willingness that they (according to what they urged) should not break the Isthmian truce, but that he should make the expedition on his own responsibility. When, however, the Corinthians did not agree to this, but a delay was caused in the matter, the Athenians the more easily gained intelligence of the designs of the Chians; and sending Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them with the fact, and on their denying it, commanded them to send with them some ships, as a pledge of good faith in their alliance. Accordingly they sent seven. The reason of the ships being sent was, that the majority of the Chians were ignorant of the negotiations: while the few who were privy to them were both unwilling at present to incur the hostility of their commons, before they had gained some strength, and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to come, since they had so long delayed.

10. In the mean time the Isthmian games were being celebrated, and the Athenians (the sacred truce having been proclaimed) went to attend them; and thus the designs of the Chians became more evident to them. When they returned, they immediately took measures that the fleet might not put out from Cenchrea unobserved by them. After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with one and twenty ships under the command of Alcarnenes; and the Athenians, having at first advanced against them with an equal number, then be-

gan to retreat toward the open sea. When the enemy did not follow them far, but drew back, the Athenians likewise returned; for they had the seven Chian vessels in the number of those with them, and did not consider them trustworthy. Afterward, having manned others, so as to make in all thirty-seven, while the enemy were coasting along, they chased them into Piræus in the Corinthian territory. This is a desert port on the extreme borders of Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but collected the rest, and brought them to anchor. And now, when the Athenians both attacked them by sea with their ships, and had landed on the shore, there was a great disorder and confusion; and the Athenians severely damaged most of their ships on the beach, and killed Alcamenes their commander; while some also fell on their own side.

11. After parting, they posted a sufficient number of ships to keep watch over those of the enemy, and with the rest came to anchor at the small island [opposite the mouth of the harbor];<sup>1</sup> on which, as it was not far off, they proceeded to encamp, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement. For the Corinthians, too, had joined the Peloponnesians on the day after the battle, coming to the succor of the ships; and not long after, the rest of the people in the neighborhood also. But when they saw that to keep guard over them in so desert a spot was a difficult service, they were at a loss what to do, and thought of burning the ships; but afterward they determined to draw them up on shore, and station themselves by them with their land forces, and keep guard until some favorable opportunity of escape presented itself. Agis also, on receiving intelligence of this, sent to them a Spartan, namely Thermon. Now news had first been taken to the Lacedæmonians that their ships had put to sea from the isthmus (for Alcamenes had been told by the ephors to send a horseman when that took place), and they immediately wished to dispatch their five ships, with Chalcideus in command, and Alcibiades with him. Afterward, when they had resolved on this, the news of their fleet taking refuge in Piræus reached them; and being disheartened, because they had failed in their first operations in the Ionian war, they no longer thought of sending the

<sup>1</sup> ἐς τὸ νηϊδίων.] This explanation of the article is taken from Col. Leake, as quoted by Arnold.

ships from their own country, but even of recalling some that had previously put out to sea.

12. When Alcibiades knew this, he again persuaded Endius and the rest of the ephors not to shrink from the expedition; telling them that they would have made their voyage before the Chians heard of the disaster which had befallen their fleet; and that he himself, when he had once reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt, by acquainting them both with the weakness of the Athenians and the forwardness of the Lacedæmonians; for he should be thought more credible than others. To Endius himself he also represented in private that it would be a glorious thing to have caused by his own agency the revolt of Ionia, and to have brought the king into alliance with the Lacedæmonians, instead of that honor being earned by Agis (for with him he happened to be at variance). He, then, having prevailed on the rest of the ephors as well as Endius, put out to sea with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus the Lacedæmonians, and they proceeded on their voyage with all speed.

13. About this same time also, the sixteen Peloponnesian vessels in Sicily which with Gylippus had assisted in bringing the war to a conclusion, were on their return; and after being intercepted near Leucadia, and roughly handled by the seven and twenty Athenian ships which Hippocles son of Menippus commanded, on the look-out for the ships from Sicily, the rest of them, with the exception of one, escaped from the Athenians, and sailed into harbor at Corinth.

14. With regard to Chalcideus and Alcibiades, while they were on their voyage, they seized all they met with, to prevent any tidings of their approach being carried; and after first touching at Corycus, and leaving them there, they themselves having previously had an interview with some of the Chians who were in co-operation with them, and being urged by them to sail up to the city without sending any notice beforehand, they thus came upon the Chians unexpectedly. Accordingly the greater part of them were astonished and dismayed; while it had been arranged by the few that the council should be assembled just at the time. And when speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, telling them that many more vessels were sailing up, and not acquainting them with the fact respecting their fleet being blockaded in Piræus, the Chians

revolted from the Athenians, and immediately after them the Erythræans. After this they sailed with three vessels and induced Clazomenæ to revolt also. The Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the continent, and began to fortify Polichna,<sup>1</sup> in case they might want it as a place to retreat to from the island on which they lived. They, then, having revolted, were all engaged in raising fortifications and preparing for the war.

15. News of the revolt of Chios quickly reached Athens, and considering that the danger which had now encompassed them was great and evident, and that the rest of the allies would not remain quiet when the most important state had changed sides; with regard to the thousand talents which throughout the whole war they had earnestly desired not to meddle with, they immediately rescinded, in consequence of their dismay, the penalties attaching to any one who proposed to use them, or put such a proposal to the vote; and passed a decree for taking them, and manning a large number of ships; while of those that were keeping watch at Piræus they at once sent off the eight which had left the blockade, and after pursuing those with Chalcideus and not overtaking them, had returned (their commander was Strombichides son of Diotimus), and resolved that twelve more, under Thrasyclus, should also leave the post of observation, and reinforce them shortly afterward. They also removed the seven Chian vessels, which joined them in the blockade of Piræus; and liberated the slaves who were on board of them, while the freemen they put in bonds. In the place of all the ships that had departed they speedily manned others, and sent them to observe the Peloponnesians, resolving at the same time to man thirty more. So great was their ardor; and no trivial measure was undertaken with regard to the forces they sent to Chios.

16. In the mean time Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and having added one Samian vessel to his squadron, he sailed to Teos, and begged them to remain quiet. Chalcideus also was advancing with three and twenty ships from Chios to Teos; while at the same time the land forces of

<sup>1</sup> τὴν Πολίχναν.] "This is a general name which has become a proper one by usage, like Ham, Kirby, etc., in English; or more like 'Borgo' in Italian, the full name of the place being properly τὴν Πολίχναν τῶν Κλαζομενίων, Borgo dei Clazomeni; and thence in common speech, simply τὴν Πολίχναν, Borgo."—Arnold.

the Chazomenians and Erythreans moved along the shore. Strombichides, on receiving prior intelligence of this, weighed anchor beforehand; but when out in the open sea, on observing that the ships coming from Chios were so numerous, he fled toward Samos, while they pursued him. With regard to the land forces, although the Teians were not at first disposed to admit them, yet when the Athenians had fled, they received them into the city. The troops then waited for some time, expecting Chalcideus also to return from the pursuit; but when he was long in coming, they began themselves to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the Teians; while a small body of the barbarians also, who had joined them under the command of Stages, lieutenant of Tissaphernes, assisted them in the demolition of it.

17. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into Samos, armed the seamen on board the vessels from the Peloponnese, and left them at Chios; and having manned these with substitutes from Chios, and twenty besides, they sailed to Miletus to effect its revolt. For Alcibiades, being on intimate terms with the leading men of the Milesians, wished to anticipate the ships from the Peloponnese by winning them over, and so to secure that honor, as he had promised, to the Chians, himself, Chalcideus, and Endius who had sent them out, by causing the revolt of as many cities as possible in concert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus. Having made therefore the chief part of their passage unobserved, and having arrived a little before Strombichides and Thrasyclus, who had just come from Athens with twelve ships, and joined in the pursuit of them, they prevailed on Miletus to revolt. The Athenians sailed up close after them with nineteen ships, and on the Milesians not admitting them, came to anchor at the adjacent island of Lade. And now the first alliance made between the king and the Lacedæmonians was concluded by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, immediately after the revolt of the Milesians, to the following effect:

18. "The following are the terms on which the Lacedæmonians and their confederates concluded an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes. All the country and cities which the king holds, or the forefathers of the king held, shall belong to the king: and from these cities whatever money, or any thing



else, came in to the Athenians, shall be stopped by the king, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, in common; so that the Athenians may receive neither money nor any thing else.—Moreover, the war with the Athenians shall be carried on in common by the king, the Lacedæmonians, and their confederates; and it shall not be lawful to bring the war with the Athenians to a conclusion, except both parties shall agree to it, the king, and the Lacedæmonians with their confederates.—Should any revolt from the king, they shall be considered as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; and if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall be considered as enemies to the king, in like manner."

19. This, then, was the alliance that was concluded; immediately after which the Chians manned ten more ships, and sailed to Anæa, wishing both to get intelligence of those in Miletus, and at the same time to urge the cities to revolt. But a message having reached them from Chalceus, that they were to sail back again, and that Amorges would be upon them with an army on shore, they sailed to the temple of Jupiter, and then descried sixteen ships, with which Diomedon again, subsequently to the arrival of Thrasicles, was sailing up from Athens. On seeing them they fled with one ship to Ephesus, while the rest proceeded toward Teos. The Athenians, then, took four of their ships empty, the men having escaped to shore beforehand; but the rest took refuge in the city of the Teians. And now the Athenians sailed away from Samos; while the Chians put out with their remaining vessels, and their land forces with them, and procured the revolt of Lebedos, and then again of Eræ. After this they returned to their respective homes, both the land and the sea forces.

20. About the same time, the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians that were in Piræus, which had been chased to land at the time we last mentioned them, and were blockaded by the Athenians with an equal number, having made a sudden sally against the Athenian squadron, and defeated it in an engagement, took four of the ships, and after sailing back to Cenchrea, proceeded to prepare again for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also joined them from Lacedæmon, as high admiral, to whom now belonged the command of all the naval forces. Mean-

while, after the troops had returned from Teos, Tissaphernes himself also repaired thither with an army, and further demolished the fort at Teos, whatever had been left of it, and then returned. Not long after his departure, Diomedon, having arrived with ten Athenian ships, concluded a treaty with the Teians for admitting his force, as they did the enemy's. And after coasting along to Eræ, and assaulting the city without taking it, he sailed away.

21. About the same time, too, occurred at Samos the insurrection of the commons against the nobles, in conjunction with some Athenians who happened to be there on board three vessels. The popular party of the Samians, then, put to death some two hundred of the nobles, in all, and condemned four hundred to banishment; and having themselves taken possession of their land and houses (the Athenians, moreover, having after this passed a decree for their independence, considering them now as trusty allies), they governed the city henceforth, and neither admitted the landowners to any other privilege, nor allowed any of the commons in future to give his daughter in marriage to them, nor to take a wife from them.

22. After these things, in the course of the same summer, the Chians went on as they had begun, without any falling off in their zeal; and as they found themselves, even independently of the Lacedæmonians, with a large force for bringing over the states, and at the same time were desirous that as many as possible should share the danger with them, they made an expedition by themselves with thirteen ships to Lesbos, according to the arrangement of the Lacedæmonians to go to that island in the second place, and thence to the Hellespont, while at the same time the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were there, and of the allies from the country itself, moved along shore toward Clazomenæ and Cuma; the commander of the troops being Evalas, a Spartan, and of the ships, Diniadas, one of the *Periæci*. The fleet having sailed first to Methymna, effected the revolt of the place, and four vessels were left there; while the remainder, again, effected that of Mytilene also.

23. Now Astyochnus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, set sail, as he had intended, with four ships from Cenchrea, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his coming there, the Athe-

nian ships, five and twenty in number, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had subsequently brought a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. The same day, at a late hour, Astyochus also put out, and taking one Chian vessel in addition to his own, sailed to Lesbos, to render it whatever assistance he could. Accordingly he came to Pyrrha, and thence the next day to Eresus, where he heard that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians on the first assault. For the Athenians, immediately on sailing to the place, unexpectedly put into the harbor, and defeated the Chian ships; and having landed, and conquered in a battle those who opposed them, they took possession of the city. Receiving this intelligence, both from the Eresians and from the Chian ships coming from Methymna with Eubulus, three of which fell in with him (for one had been taken by the Athenians), after being left behind at the time, and so escaping when Mitylene was taken, Astyochus no longer advanced to Mitylene, but having persuaded Eresus to revolt, and supplied it with arms, he both sent the heavy-armed from on board his own ships to Antissa and Methymna, having appointed Eteonicus to the command, and himself coasted along thither with his own ships and the three Chians; hoping that the Methymnæans would be encouraged by the sight of them, and persevere in their revolt. But when every thing at Lesbos went against him, he took his own force on board, and sailed back to Chios; while the land forces also that had been disembarked from the vessels, and were to have proceeded to the Hellespont, returned again to their several cities. After this, six of the allied ships from the Peloponnese that were at Cenchrea came to them at Chios. The Athenians, on the other hand, arranged matters again at Lesbos, and sailing thence, took Polichna, belonging to the Clazomenians, which was being fortified on the mainland, and carried them over again to their city on the island, excepting the authors of the revolt, who had departed to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ came over again to the Athenians.

24. The same summer the Athenians, who were with their twenty ships at Lade for the observation of Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, slew Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander, who had come against them with a few men, and sailing across three days

after, erected a trophy; which, as it had been raised without their having command of the country, the Milesians threw down. And now Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, advancing from the Cænussæ, the islands off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which they held in the Erythræan country, as well as from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from their ships, having as *epibatai*, some of the heavy-armed<sup>1</sup> from the muster-roll, who had been pressed into the service. Having landed at Cardamyle and Bolissus, after defeating in battle those of the Chians who had come out against them, and killing many of them, they desolated the places in that neighborhood. They defeated them again in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium, after which the Chians no longer went out to meet them; while they ravaged their country, which was finely stocked, and had continued unhurt from the Median wars down to that time. For the Chians are the only people that I am acquainted with, after the Lacedæmonians, who were at once prosperous and prudent; and the more their city increased in greatness, the more secure were their arrangements. And even their present revolt, if any think that they executed this without regard for the safer course, they did not venture to make, before they were likely to run the risk in concert with many brave allies, and perceived that even the Athenians themselves no longer denied, after their disaster in Sicily, that without doubt their circumstances were utterly bad. But if they were somewhat disappointed by the unexpected results that occur in the life of man, they found out their mistake in company with many others, who had in the same way imagined that the power of the Athenians would be quickly destroyed. When therefore they were excluded from the sea, and were being ravaged by land, a party of them endeavored to bring over the city to the Athenians. Though the magistrates detected them, they remained quiet themselves, and having brought Astyochnus the admiral from Erythræ with four ships, which he had with him, considered how they might stop the conspiracy by the mildest measures, whether by taking host-

<sup>1</sup> "The *ἐπιβῆται* were usually drawn from the fourth class, or Thetes; although on some occasions men of the higher classes seem to have volunteered to serve among them. See III. 98. 3, note. Now, however, the citizens of the higher classes were actually compelled to serve as *ἐπιβῆται*, owing to the peculiar exigency of the crisis."—Arnold.

ages, or in any other way. They, then, were engaged with this business.

25. At the close of the same summer, there sailed from Athens a thousand Athenian heavy-armed, fifteen hundred of the Argives (for five hundred of the Argives who were light-armed, were provided with full armor by the Athenians), and a thousand of the allies, in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides: these sailed into port at Samos, and after crossing over to Miletus, formed their camp there. The Milesians marched out themselves to the number of eight hundred heavy-armed, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of foreign mercenaries<sup>1</sup> with Tissaphernes himself, who was at present with his cavalry, and gave battle to the Athenians and their allies. The Argives, advancing from the line with their own wing, and despising the enemy, while they pushed forward in some disorder, as against Ionians and men who would not receive their charge, were defeated by the Milesians, and not less than three hundred of them slain. But the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians first, then beat back the barbarians and the rest of the multitude, and without engaging the Milesians (for they retreated into their city after their rout of the Argives, on seeing the rest of their army worsted), they pitched their camp, as being now victorious, close to the very city of Miletus. And it so happened, that in this battle the Ionians on both sides were superior to the Dorians; for the Athenians conquered the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Argives. After erecting a trophy, the Athenians prepared to invest the place (which stood on an isthmus), thinking that if they could win Miletus, the other towns would easily come over to them.

26. In the mean time, when it was now about dusk in the evening, intelligence reached them that the five and fifty ships from the Peloponnese and from Sicily were all but there. For from the Siceliot, who were chiefly urged by Hermocrates the Syracusan to take part in what remained for the destruction of the Athenians, there came twenty ships of the Syracusans, and two of the Selinuntines; and those from the Peloponnese, which they were preparing, [when we last men-

<sup>1</sup> ξενικόν,] i. e., foreigners to Tissaphernes, not Asiatics.

tioned them], were now ready: and both squadrons being committed to Theramenes the Lacedæmonian to take to Astyochus the admiral, put in to Lerus first, the island before Miletus. Then, on finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed thence into the Iasic gulf in the first place, wishing to know the state of affairs with regard to Miletus. When Alcibiades therefore had gone on horseback to Tichiussa, in the Milesian territory, to which part of the gulf they had sailed and brought to for the night, they heard the particulars of the battle. For Alcibiades was present at it, taking part with the Milesians and Tissaphernes; and he now advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and the whole cause, to go as quickly as possible to the relief of Miletus, and not permit it to be invested.

27. They, then, intended to relieve it in the morning. Phrynichus, the commander of the Athenians, on the other hand, when he had heard from Lerus a correct account of their fleet, and when his colleagues wished to await its arrival and give it battle, said that he would neither do so himself, nor, to the best of his power, allow them or any one else to do it. For when they might meet them hereafter with an accurate knowledge of the number of ships on the enemy's side, and with how many of their own opposed to them they would, after adequate and calm preparations, be able to give them battle, he would never run an unreasonable hazard through yielding to the disgrace of reproach. For it was no disgrace for the Athenians to retreat with a navy at a proper time; but in any way whatever, the result would be more disgraceful should they be defeated, and for the state to incur not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger. For after its late misfortunes, it was hardly expedient voluntarily for it to act on the offensive in any quarter, even with a force that could be relied upon, or even in a case of absolute necessity: how then could it without any such compulsion rush into self-chosen dangers? He ordered them therefore as quickly as possible to take up their wounded, and their land forces, with such stores as they had brought with them; but to leave behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, that their ships might be the lighter, and to sail away to Samos, and thence, when they had collected all their ships, to make their attacks upon them, whenever they had an opportunity. Having given this ad-

vice, he acted accordingly; and so Phrynichus, not on that immediate occasion more than on subsequent ones, nor in that business only, but in all that he had any thing to do with, proved himself to be a man of sound judgment. In this way, with an incomplete victory, the Athenians immediately broke up their camp, and retired from Miletus; and the Argives, in mortification at their defeat, sailed off home from Samos as quickly as they could.

28. As soon as it was morning, the Peloponnesians weighed anchor from Tichiussa, and put into Miletus after the enemy's departure; and after remaining one day, they took with them on the next the Chian vessels which had, in the first instance,<sup>1</sup> been chased in company with Chalcideus, and were disposed to sail back again for the stores which they had taken out of their vessels at Tichiussa. On their arrival, Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces, and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which Amorges their enemy maintained himself. Accordingly, having assaulted Iasus on a sudden, and while the inhabitants thought nothing but that the ships belonged to the Athenians, they took it; and the Syracusans were most distinguished in the action. Amorges, who was a natural son of Pisuthnes, and had revolted from the king, the Peloponnesians took prisoner, and delivered him up to Tissaphernes to lead away to the king, if he pleased, according to his orders. They then sacked Iasus; and the army got very large treasures, for the place was one of ancient wealth. The mercenaries serving with Amorges they took to themselves, and added to their ranks, without doing them any harm, as most of them were from the Peloponnese: while they delivered to Tissaphernes the town and all the captives, both bond and free, for each one of whom they stipulated to receive from him a Daric stater; after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus the son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedæmonians to take the command at Chios, they dispatched by land to Erythræ, with the mercenary force taken from Amorges, and appointed Philippus to remain on the spot, as governor of Miletus. And so the summer ended.

29. The following winter, when Tissaphernes had put Iasus into a state of defense, he passed on to Miletus, and distributed among all the ships a month's pay, as he had undertaken at

<sup>1</sup> τὰς—*ἐνκαταδιωχθείσας*.] See ch. 17. 3.

Lacedæmon, at the rate of an Attic drachma a man per day ; but wished in future to give but three oboli, until he had consulted the king ; should he, however, command it, he said he would give them the full drachma. When Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, objected to this (for Theramenes, inasmuch as he was not admiral, but only sailing with them to deliver up the fleet to Astyochus, was easy on the subject of pay), there was fixed, notwithstanding, a sum [for the whole fleet] larger by five ships<sup>1</sup> than three oboli a man per day. For he gave three talents a month for five ships, and to the rest, according as they had vessels beyond this number, was given in the same proportion.

30. The same winter, more ships, to the number of thirty-five, having come from home to join the Athenians at Samos, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon in command, after collecting those from Chios and all the rest, they determined, having drawn lots for their respective services, to blockade Miletus with their navel force, and to send against Chios both a fleet and army. And they did so. For Strombichides,

<sup>1</sup> *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς.*] If these words could really be interpreted "for every five ships," as Göller and Arnold think, I should then agree with the latter, that the whole passage might be allowed to remain as it stands at present. But neither of them brings forward a single instance of *παρὰ* being thus used with the distributive force commonly expressed by *κατά*; and in the absence of all such proof, it seems safer to take the proposition, as Bloomfield has done, in a sense which is recognized by the grammarians. This method renders necessary one of the two corrections which have been made by the editors in the following sentence—either the omission of *καὶ πεντήκοντα*, or the insertion of *τριάκοντα* instead of *τρία*—and though it is perhaps of little importance which is preferred, I have adopted the former, as the mistake of the copyists in that case seems more easily accounted for than in the other. See Göller's or Arnold's note. With regard to the question, why the ships should be taken in divisions of five, that number might perhaps have been fixed on for mere convenience, as the lowest which gave a round sum in talents, without any fraction. Or may we conjecture that the Lacedæmonian government had sent out five ships on the expedition, and that their quota was first considered by Tissaphernes, as a compliment to the leading state? Arnold's supposition that "it was intended to exclude any state from the higher rate of pay, whose contingent fell short of five ships, in order to encourage the allies to greater exertions," does not seem very probable; and the idea of *τοῖς ἄλλοις* referring "to those other states who had no ships at the present moment afloat, but who might at any instant be supposed ready to send some," is surely inconsistent with the indicative mood of the verb *ἦσαν*, which can only refer to such as were actually afloat at the time of the arrangement.



Onomacles, and Euctemon, having with them thirty ships, and taking in transports a part of the thousand heavy-armed that had come to Miletus, sailed, according to their lot, against Chios, while the rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, secured the command of the sea, and advanced upon Miletus.

31. Astyochus, happening at that time to be collecting at Chios the hostages taken in consequence of the conspiracy, ceased from that, when he found that the ships with Theramenes were come, and that the affairs of the confederacy were more prosperous. And taking a squadron consisting of ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian ships, he put out to sea, and after attacking Pteleum without taking it, coasted along to Clazomenæ, and commanded those of them who favored the Athenian cause to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join their party. Tamos also, who was lieutenant-governor of Ionia, united in this command. When they did not listen to it, he made an attack on the town, which was unwallèd, and not being able to take it, sailed away before a strong gale himself to Phocæa and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put into the islands adjacent to Clazomenæ, namely, Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Having staid there on account of the winds, eight days, all the property of the Clazomenians that had been secretly stowed away there,<sup>1</sup> they partly ravaged and consumed, and partly put on board their ships; and then sailed off to Phocæa and Cuma, to join Astyochus.

32. While he was there, ambassadors from the Lesbians came to him, wishing to revolt again. And as far as he was concerned, they gained his assent; but when the Corinthians and other allies were not zealous for it, in consequence of their former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios; at which place, after his ships had been dispersed in a storm, they arrived from different directions. After this, Pedaritus, who when we last mentioned him was moving along the coast by land from Miletus, arrived at Erythræ, and then passed over, himself and his forces, to Chios; where he had also

<sup>1</sup> ὑπεξέκειτο.] Bloomfield follows Hobbes in translating this, "lay without the city," altogether omitting the peculiar force of the two propositions thus meeting in composition, whether in neuter or transitive verbs. Compare I. 137, where the word occurs in exactly the same signification; I. 89, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, κ. τ. λ.; and Eurip. Hec. 6, δέϊσας μ' ὑπεξέπεμψε Τρωϊκῆς χθονός.

about five hundred soldiers who had been left by Chalcideus<sup>1</sup> from their five ships, with their arms. And when certain Lesbians made offers of revolt, Astyochus urged to Pedaritus and the Chians, that they ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt of Lesbos; for so they would either themselves gain an addition to the number of their allies, or, in case of failure, would still do the Athenians mischief. They, however, did not listen to them, and Pedaritus refused to give up to him the ships of the Chians.

33. He, therefore, taking the five of the Corinthians, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and those of the Lacedæmonians which he had come with, sailed for Miletus, to take the command as admiral, after many threats to the Chians that assuredly he would not come to their aid, should they be in any need of it. Having touched at Corycus, in the Erythræan country, he staid there the night. The Athenians also, on their passage from Samos to Chios with their troops, were only parted from them by being on the other side of a hill; and so they brought to for the night, and escaped each other's notice. On the arrival of a letter from Pedaritus in the night, to say that some Erythræan prisoners after being set at liberty, had come from Samos to Erythræa for the purpose of betraying it, Astyochus immediately weighed anchor again for Erythræa: within so little was he of falling in with the Athenians. Pedaritus also sailed across to join him; and having investigated the case of the men who were thought to be traitors, when they found that the whole story had been made up in order to effect the escape of the men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, one to Chios, the other to Miletus, as he had intended.

34. In the mean time also the army of the Athenians, while sailing round with the ships from Corycus, met with three Chian vessels of war off Arginus, and on seeing them gave them chase; when a violent storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty took refuge in the harbor. Of the Athenians, the three which had pursued most vigorously were wrecked, and thrown up near the city of Chios, the men being either taken prisoners or slain; while the remainder took refuge in the harbor under Mount Mimas, called Phœnicus, from whence they

<sup>1</sup> See chap. 17. 1.

afterward came to anchor in the port of Lesbos, and made preparations for the work of fortification.<sup>1</sup>

35. The same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, having sailed from the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan, sailed into port at Cnidus, which had now revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. When those at Miletus received intelligence of them, they gave orders for half of the vessels to keep guard at Cnidus, and the other half to cruise around Triopium, and seize the merchantmen that were approaching from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory running out from the Cnidian territory, and is consecrated to Apollo. But the Athenians, having had notice of it, and having sailed out from Samos, seized the six ships that were keeping guard at Triopium, though the crews escaped from them. After this they put in at Cnidus, and having assaulted the city, which was unfortified, were within a little of taking it. The next day they made a second assault on it; but as they did not now do it so much damage, since the inhabitants had provided better defenses during the night, and the crews which had escaped from the ships at Triopium had gone in to join them, they withdrew, and after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to Samos.

36. Astyochus having come about the same time to the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abundantly supplied with every thing in their camp. For pay was given them to a sufficiently large amount, and the great sum of money which had been raised from the plunder of Iasus was still at the command of the soldiers, and the Milesians carried on the war with spirit. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians considered that the first convention with Tissaphernes, which had been concluded by Chalcideus, was defective, and not so much for their advantage [as for his]; and, consequently, while Theramenes was yet there, they concluded another, which was to the following effect:

37. "The convention of the Lacedæmonians and the allies with king Darius, the sons of the king, and Tissaphernes, that there should be a treaty and friendship between them on these terms: Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or

<sup>1</sup> ἐς τὸν τεῖχοςμόν] i. e., for the fortification of Delphinium. See ch. 38. 2.

did belong to his father, or his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedæmonians nor the allies of the Lacedæmonians shall be permitted to proceed for the purpose of war, or for any harm: neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, exact tribute from these cities. Neither shall King Darius, or any states in the king's dominions, be allowed to proceed against the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, for the purpose of war or other injury.—Should the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, require any assistance from the king, or the king stand in need of any from the Lacedæmonians, or their allies; to whatever they may gain each other's assent, that shall be right for them to do.—Both parties shall carry on in common the war against the Athenians and their allies; and should they come to terms of peace, they shall both do so in common.—Whatever troops shall be in the king's country in consequence of the king's having sent for them, the king shall pay their expenses.—Should any of the states which have concluded this convention with the king proceed against the king's country, the rest shall prevent it, and assist the king to the utmost of their power. And should any of those in the king's country, or in all his dominions, proceed against the country of the Lacedæmonians, or of their allies, the king shall prevent it, and assist them to the uttermost of his power."

38. After this convention Theramenes gave up the fleet to Astyochus, and sailing away in a small boat was lost at sea<sup>1</sup>. The Athenians, having now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios with their army, and commanding both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place that was both naturally strong on the land side, contained several harbors, and was not far from the city of Chios. Now the Chians having been beaten in several previous engagements, and not being on very good terms among themselves, but regarding each other with suspicion, because Tydeus, son of Ion, and his party had already been executed by Pedaritus on the charge of Atticism, and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to an oligarchy; in consequence of these things they kept quiet, and thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries under Pedaritus to be a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to

<sup>1</sup> ἀφανίζεσθαι.] Or, as others render it, "disappeared from the scene of action:" but Bishop Thirlwall's interpretation of the word seems undoubtedly the correct one.

Miletus, urging Astyochus to come to their aid: and when he did not listen to them, Pedaritus sent a letter to Lacedæmon, representing him as being guilty of a misdemeanor. On this footing stood the affairs of the Athenians at Chios: while from Samos their ships kept sailing out against those at Miletus, and when they did not advance to meet them, they returned again to Samos, and remained quiet.

39. The same winter, the seven and thirty ships which had been equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, through the instrumentality of Calligitus the Megarean and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out from the Peloponnese, and sailed for Ionia, about the period of the solstice, Antisthenes a Spartan being on board in command of them. The Lacedæmonians also sent eleven Spartans as assistant counselors for Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. They were instructed on their arrival at Miletus to co-operate in the arrangement of all other affairs, as should be best, and to dispatch these vessels—either just the number, more, or fewer—to the Hellespont, to join Pharnabazus, should they think proper, appointing to the command of them Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who sailed out with them; and also, if the eleven commissioners deemed fit, to depose Astyochus from the office of admiral, and appoint Antisthenes; for they were suspicious of him in consequence of the letters from Pedaritus. Sailing therefore from Malea across the open sea the squadron touched at Melos, and there falling in with ten Athenian ships took three of them empty, and burned them. After this, being afraid that those of the Athenian vessels which had escaped from Melos might (as was the case) give information of their approach to those at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having made their voyage longer by taking this precaution, they made the land at Caunus, in Asia; from which place, considering themselves to be now in safety, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus, in order to be convoyed by them along the coast.

40. At this same time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messengers to Astyochus, notwithstanding his holding back, and begged him to succor them in their siege with all his fleet, and not to permit the largest of the allied cities in Ionia to be both excluded from the use of the sea, and wasted by forays on the land. For the slaves of the Chians being

numerous, and indeed forming the largest body there was in any one city, except that of the Lacedæmonians, and at the same time being, in consequence of their great numbers, punished more severely than usual in cases of offense, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly established, with the advantage of a fortified position, the greater part deserted to them; and these did the most mischief to the country, through their acquaintance with it. The Chians therefore represented, that while there was still a hope and possibility of stopping them, while Delphinium was still being fortified, and not yet completed, and a higher wall was being erected round their camp and the ships, it was incumbent on him to assist them. And although Astyochus, because of his threat on the occasion already mentioned, had not intended to do it, when he saw that the allies also were anxious for their relief, he set out to succor them.

41. In the mean time tidings came from Caunus that the seven and twenty ships, with the Lacedæmonian counselors, were come. And thinking every thing else of secondary importance, compared with his convoying so large a number of ships, in order that they might more entirely command the sea, and with the safe passage of the Lacedæmonians who had come to observe his conduct, he immediately gave up going to the relief of Chios, and sailed to Caunus. Having landed, as he coasted along, at Cos Meropis,<sup>1</sup> which was unfortified, and in ruins in consequence of an earthquake which they had experienced—the most violent one which I ever remember—he sacked the town, the men having fled to the mountains, and by incursions made spoil of the country, excepting the free population, whom he released. Having come from Cos to Cnidus by night, he was constrained by the advice of the Cnidians not to land his seamen, but to sail, just as he was, straightway against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals at Samos, was on the look-out for those seven and twenty ships that were approaching from the Peloponnese, and to join which Astyochus also was coasting along. For those at Samos had heard from Melos of their approach, and

<sup>1</sup> *Κὼν τὴν Μεροπίδα.*] "According to the old mythical language, 'Cos first settled by the hero Merops.' See Stephan., Byzant., Hesychius, etc. According to the interpretation now given to this language, 'Cos first settled by the people called Meropes.'"—*Arnold*.

Charminus was watching for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia; as by this time he was aware of their being at Caunus.

42. Astyochus therefore sailed immediately to Syme, before he was heard of, on the chance of finding the ships somewhere out at sea. But the rain and the cloudy state of the atmosphere which he encountered caused the dispersion of his ships during the dark, and threw them into confusion. In the morning, when his fleet had been separated, and the left wing was now in sight of the Athenians, while the rest of it was still dispersed around the island, Charminus and the Athenians put out against it with all speed, with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the vessels they were watching for, namely, those from Caunus. Having attacked them, therefore, immediately, they sank three, and severely damaged some others, and had the advantage in the action, until the larger division of the fleet unexpectedly came in sight, and they were surrounded on every side. They then took to flight, and having lost six ships, fled for refuge with the rest to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put into Cnidus, and the seven and twenty ships from Caunus having effected a junction with them, they sailed with the whole number, and erected a trophy on Syme, and then came to anchor again at Cnidus.

43. The Athenians, on hearing the particulars of the engagement, having sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme, made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, or that on them, but took their naval stores,<sup>1</sup> which were at Syme, and after touching at Lorymi on the continent, sailed back to Samos. And now all the Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were refitted, so far as they required it; and the eleven Lacedæmonian commissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes (for he had come to meet them), both respecting what had already been done, if there was aught that did not please them, and with reference to future hostilities, in what way they might be conducted most to the benefit and advantage of both parties. Lichas, more especially, kept an eye on the transactions, and

<sup>1</sup> τὰ σκεύη, κ. τ. λ.] “i. e., the masts and sails of Charminus' squadron, which, according to custom, had been left on shore at Syme, when the ships put to sea suddenly to attack the fleet of Astyochus. See chap. 42. 2.”—*Arnold*.

said, "that neither of the two treaties were properly drawn up, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that of Theramenes, but it was a shameful thing that the king should even now claim to be master of all the country over which he and his ancestors had formerly had dominion. For in that was involved the re-subjugation of all the islands, with Thessaly, Locris, and as far as Bœotia; and so, instead of freedom, the Lacedæmonians would be putting the Median yoke on the Greeks. He told them, therefore, to conclude another and a better treaty, or at any rate they would not act according to this; nor did they want any of his supplies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, being offended at this, went away from them in a rage, and without settling any thing.

44. They, in consequence of communications from some of the most powerful men there, were disposed to sail to Rhodes; hoping to bring over to their side an island which was strong both in its number of seamen and its land forces; and moreover thinking that they should themselves be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without asking Tissaphernes for money. Having sailed, therefore, immediately, that same winter, from Cnidus, and having first put in with ninety-four ships to Camirus in the Rhodian territory, they frightened away most of the inhabitants, who were not aware of their intentions, and therefore fled, especially as the town was unfortified. Then, having assembled both these and the people from the two other towns, Lindus and Ialysus, the Lacedæmonians prevailed on the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. And so Rhodes joined the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Athenians, having got notice of it, sailed at this time with their ships from Samos, wishing to anticipate them, and came within sight of the island as they lay out at sea; but being a little too late, they sailed back in the first instance to Chalce, thence to Samos, and afterward carried on the war against Rhodes by attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. The Peloponnesians levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of two and thirty talents; but in other respects lay still for eighty days, having drawn up the ships on shore.

45. In the mean time, and at even a still earlier period, before they removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were being carried on: Alcibiades being suspected by the Peloponnesians after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus,



and instructions having been sent by them from Lacedæmon to Astyochus to put him to death (for he was a personal enemy of Agis, and in other ways appeared to be unworthy of trust), he first retired in alarm to the court of Tissaphernes, and then did the greatest harm he could to the cause of the Peloponnesians with him. Being his adviser on all points, he cut down the pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma three oboli were given, and that not regularly; telling Tissaphernes to represent to them that the Athenians, who for a longer time had had experience in naval matters, gave their men but three oboli; not so much from poverty, as that their seamen might not grow insolent from abundance, and either be less able-bodied, through spending money on such things as produce weakness, or desert their ships by means of leaving their arrears of pay as a security for them.<sup>1</sup> He also gave him such instructions, that by giving money he persuaded the trierarchs and generals of the different states to concede these points to him, excepting the Syracusans; but of these Hermocrates alone opposed him on behalf of the whole confederacy. The states, too, which applied for money, he dismissed with an answer from himself, on the part of Tissaphernes, alleging by way of refusal, that "the Chians were shameless, who, though the wealthiest of the Greeks, and being protected as they were by the aid they were receiving, expected others to risk both their persons and their purses for *their* liberty." With regard to the rest of the states, which used before their revolt to lavish their money on the Athenians, he said that they were wrong if they would not now also contribute as much, or even more, for their own interests. He also represented that Tissaphernes was naturally sparing at present, inasmuch as he was carrying on the war with his own resources; but that if supplies should ever come down from the king, he would give them their full pay, and afford the states all proper relief.

46. He likewise advised Tissaphernes "not to be in too great a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; nor to be anxious, by either bringing the Phœnician fleet which he was equipping, or giving pay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer on

<sup>1</sup> ἐς ἀμνησίαν.] That is, that the larger pay was considered as a security for the men's returning to their post, when summoned, and therefore as a reason for greater indulgences in granting leave of absence than was proved by the result to be consistent with the interests of the service.

the same party the command both of land and sea; but to let them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the power at all times to lead the one party or the other against those who were annoying him. If, on the contrary, the command both by land and sea were united, he would be at a loss for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger; unless he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the contest with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a trifling share of the expense, and at the same time with security to himself. And the Athenians, he said, were a more desirable people to share the empire with him; for they were less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war with both a profession and a practice most advantageous to him, as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as the sea was concerned, to themselves and to him all the Greeks who lived in the king's country; while the other party, on the contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor was it likely that the Lacedæmonians should at the present time be liberating the Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians; unless they should ever fail in reducing the Athenians.<sup>1</sup> He urged them, therefore, to wear them both out at first, and after cutting off as much as possible from the power of the Athenians, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from his country." Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far, at least, as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but by telling them that the Phœnician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigor of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in co-operating with them.

47. Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the

<sup>1</sup> ἢν μὴ ποτε αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.] I have followed Haack's and Poppo's interpretation of this passage, "nisi si quando eos (Athenienses) non everterint," rather than Herman's, who supposes that the word *μὴ* only increases the force of the negative: "nisi hi barbari Græcos, quos sub ditione suâ tenerent, etiam delevisent."

king, while he was with them, both because he thought it best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest. And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals among them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them; but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos, were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.

48. This design, therefore, was first mooted in the camp, and thence spread to the city. Accordingly, certain individuals went over from Samos, and had an interview with Alcibiades; and when he held out that he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and then the king, in case they were not under a democratical government (for so the king would place greater reliance on them), the aristocratical party among the citizens, who also suffered most at present, entertained many hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well as of gaining the victory over the enemy. Accordingly they went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favored their views, openly representing to the people at large that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed by a democracy. The multitude, though annoyed to a certain extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because of their abundant hopes of pay from the king; while those who were for establishing the oligarchy, after they had communicated their designs to the mass of the people, again considered the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.] Dobree, Göller, Poppo, and Arnold agree in thinking that ἐν must be inserted before σφίσιν, without which the passage seems to them not fairly intelligible. But may not this be re-

the greater part of their associates. To the rest, then, they appeared advantageous and worthy of their confidence; but Phrynichus, who was still general, was not at all pleased with them, but thought that Alcibiades (as was really the case) had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, or considered any thing else but how, by bringing the state to change its present constitution, he might obtain his recall by the invitation of his associates. "What they themselves, however, should most especially look to, was," he said, "to avoid being rent by factions. That it was not for the king's advantage, when the Peloponnesians were now on an equality at sea, and held none of the least cities in his dominion, to incur trouble by siding with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, when he might have made the Peloponnesians his friends, by whom he had never yet been injured. As for the allied states, again, to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, he well knew that neither those which had revolted would any the more on that account come over to them, nor those that were left be more stanch to them; for they would not wish to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy, rather than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of government they might obtain their liberty. And with regard to the

guarded as a "dativus instrumenti?" which is certainly used sometimes with reference to persons, though less commonly than to things. One instance of it is given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 608, Obs. 3, from Soph. El. 226, *τίνι γὰρ ποτ' ἂν, ὃ φίλῳ γενέθλα, πρόσφορον ἀκούσαιμ' ἔπος*; and perhaps a second might have been added from the same play, v. 441, *εἰ σοι προσφιλῶς αὐτῇ δοκεῖ Γέρα τὰδ' οὖν τάφοισι δέξασθαι νέκυς*. Matthiæ, § 396, brings forward another undoubted instance from Eur. Heracl. 392, *ἄνδρα γὰρ χρεῶν—οὐκ ἀγγέλοισι τοὺς ἐναντίους ὁρᾶν*; and another less certain one from Xen. Cyrop. One instance may also, I think, be quoted from Thucydides himself, though I am not aware that it ever has, viz., VIII. 82. 3, *ἐννέβαινε δὲ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν Τισσαφέρνει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρην*. There seems, therefore, to be no sufficient reason why the same construction should not have been used here. If this be admitted, I would apply the same principle to two other passages of our author, of which I have before taken a different view, viz., I. 25, *οὕτε Κορινθίῳ ἄνδρι προκαταρχόμενοι*, and V. 38. 4, *οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἂ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινῶσιν*. With regard to the former, when I wrote the note on it, I had not seen the quotation with which Poppo corroborates Bloomfield's interpretation, and which puts it beyond a doubt, I think, that Arrian, at any rate, took the same view of it.

respectable classes, as they were called, they considered that the oligarchs would not cause them less trouble than the popular government, being as they were the authors and introducers of projects which were evil for the people, and from which they themselves derived the most benefit. Indeed as far as depended on *them*, they would be put to death without trial, and even by measures of violence; whereas the commons were their refuge, and the moderators of the other party. And as the states had learned these things from positive facts, he well knew that such was their opinion on the subject. For himself, then, he was pleased with none of the schemes carried on by Alcibiades at present, as before."

49. But those members of the association who had assembled acceded to the present proposals, as they had at first determined, and prepared to send Pisander and some others on an embassy to Athens, to treat for the return of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in that city, and so to gain the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians.

50. But when Phrynichus saw that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would accede to it, being afraid, on considering the opposite tendency of what had been maintained by himself, that if he were restored he would do him some mischief, as one who had impeded his plans, he had recourse to the following device. He sent to Astyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was still in the neighborhood of Miletus, with secret instructions that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by bringing Tissaphernes into friendship with the Athenians; expressly mentioning all the other matters also, and pleading that it was pardonable in him to devise evil against a man who was an enemy, even though it were to the detriment of the state. Now Astyochus did not so much as think of punishing Alcibiades—especially as he no longer put himself in his power as he used to do—but having gone up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, at once told them the contents of the letter from Samos, acting as an informer to them, and for his own private gain devoting himself, as was said, to the interest of Tissaphernes both on these and on all other matters: for which reason also he was the more gentle in remonstrating with him respecting the pay not being given in full. Alcibiades immediately sent a letter to Samos giving information against Phrynichus to the authorities there,

telling them what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus, being confounded and in the most extreme danger, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been duly kept secret, and telling him now that he was prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; describing the particulars of the way in which he could do it, as Samos was unfortified; and pleading that it was not now culpable in him, being, as he was, in danger of his life through them, to do this, or any thing else, rather than be destroyed by his bitterest enemies. Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.

51. Now when Phrynichus had discovered beforehand that he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades on the subject was on the point of arriving, he himself anticipated it by announcing it to the army, that as Samos was unfortified, and all the ships were not stationed within the harbor, the enemy intended to attack the camp: that he had certain intelligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defense. Now he was himself general, and so had full authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for the work of fortification; and owing to this Samos was the more, quickly walled, though it would have been so under any circumstances. Not long after came the letters from Alcibiades, saying that the army was going to be betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were on the point of attacking them. As, however, Alcibiades was not thought to be worthy of credit, but to have had a previous acquaintance with the plans of the enemy, and through personal dislike to have attributed them to Phrynichus, as though he were privy to them, he did him no harm, but rather bore witness to his statement by sending this intelligence.

52. After this, Alcibiades tried to bring over and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; and he, though afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with more ships than the Athenians, was still disposed to be convinced by him, if by any means he could; especially since he had observed the dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians which had been expressed at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes (for as at this time they were at Rhodes, it had

already occurred<sup>1</sup>), in the course of which Lichas had verified the observation which had before been made by Alcibiades about the Lacedæmonians liberating all the states when he said that it was an intolerable agreement that the king should be master of the cities over which, at an earlier period, either himself or his fathers had had dominion. Alcibiades then, inasmuch as he was struggling for a great object, was earnestly courting and soliciting Tissaphernes.

53. The Athenian ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been sent from Samos with Pisander, on their arrival at Athens, delivered an address before the people, giving a summary of many arguments, but most especially urging, that by recalling Alcibiades, and not being under a democratical government in the same manner as hitherto, they might both have the king for an ally, and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians. When many others opposed them on the subject of the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades at the same time exclaimed that it was a shameful thing if he were to return by doing violence to the laws; and the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces adjured them with regard to the mysteries, for which he had been banished, and appealed to the gods against their restoring him; Pisander came forward in the face of much opposition and indignant protesting, and taking aside each one of his opponents, asked him whether he had any hope of preservation for the state, since the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than themselves opposed to them on the sea, and more cities in alliance with them, while the king and Tissaphernes supplied them with money; whereas they themselves had no longer any, unless some one should persuade the king to come over to their side. When, on being thus questioned, they allowed that they had not, he then said to them plainly, "This advantage, then, can not be attained by us, if we do not adopt a more temperate policy, and put the offices into the hands of a smaller number, that the king may place confidence in us—

*ἥδη γὰρ—ἐγγέλντο.*] "That is to say, the quarrel had taken place at Cnidus (ch. 43. 2-4), and from Cnidus the Peloponnesians had moved to Rhodes (ch. 44. 1), therefore as the Peloponnesians were arrived at Rhodes when Alcibiades made his application to Tissaphernes, it was perfectly possible for Tissaphernes to be influenced in his reception of the proposals by his feeling of resentment toward the Peloponnesians, as that, having occurred while they were at Cnidus, must have been prior to his interview with Alcibiades."—*Arnold*.

(and that we may not consult so much at present about a form of government as about the preservation of the state: for we shall have power to alter hereafter whatever may not please us)—and, moreover, if we do not restore Alcibiades, who is the only man at present that can effect this.”

54. The people were at first very indignant on hearing mention made of the oligarchy; but when plainly informed by Pisander that there were no other means of preservation, being afraid, and at the same time having hopes of changing it again, they gave way. Accordingly they resolved that Pisander and ten commissioners with him should sail and conclude, as they might think would be best, the negotiations both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time, on Pisander's falsely accusing Phrynichus, the people deposed him from his command with his colleague Scironides, and sent Diomedon and Leon to the fleet as generals in their stead. For Pisander calumniated Phrynichus by saying that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, only because he did not think him favorable to the negotiations carried on with Alcibiades. Pisander likewise visited all the clubs, which had previously existed in the city for mutual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted them to unite together and by common counsels abolish the democracy; and after making all his other preparations to suit the present state of affairs, so that there might be no more delay, he himself with the ten commissioners proceeded on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

55. In the course of this winter Leon and Diomedon, having by this time reached the Athenian fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up: and having made a descent on the territory, and defeated in an engagement those of the Rhodians who went out against them, they withdrew to Chalce, and carried on the war from

<sup>1</sup> ἐλπίζων.] Ἐπελπίζων is the reading which Bekker adopts from nine of the MSS. in the sense of “building their hope on this.” But as this use of the word appears to belong to later writers only, it would perhaps be better (supposing the compound verb to be the genuine reading) to give the proposition its very common force of addition, “having, besides their conviction of present helplessness, the hope of changing hereafter what they did not like.” Compare the use of ἐπιθεραπεύων, ch. 47. 1. Or, again, it might imply the idea of a hope in reserve—an after-hope, as in ἐπίνοια and some other words: e. g., Soph. Antig. 385, ψεύδει γὰρ ἡ πύνοια τὴν γνώμην.



that place, rather than from Cos; for it was more convenient for their observing whether the fleet of the Peloponnesians put out in any direction. Xenophantidas the Lacedæmonian also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, telling them that the wall of the Athenians was now completed, and unless they succored them with all their ships their cause would be ruined at Chios. Accordingly they determined to relieve them. In the mean time Pedaritus, with his mercenaries and the Chians, made a general assault on the fortification round the Athenian ships, and took a part of it, and got possession of some vessels that had been drawn up on shore: but when the Athenians had come out to the rescue, and had routed the Chians first, the rest of the force, more immediately around Pedaritus, was defeated, he himself killed, with many of the Chians, and a great number of arms taken.

56. After these things the Chians were besieged still more closely than before, both by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. In the mean time, the Athenian ambassadors with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him respecting the convention. But as Alcibiades could not depend on the views of Tissaphernes, who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and wished still (as he had been instructed by him) to wear both parties out, he had recourse to the following plan, in order that Tissaphernes, by demanding the greatest possible concessions from the Athenians, might avoid coming to terms with them. Tissaphernes also, in my opinion, wished the same result, being himself led to do so by fear: but Alcibiades, when he saw that the satrap was not, under any circumstances, desirous of making an agreement, wished the Athenians to think that he was not incapable of persuading him, but that when Tissaphernes had been persuaded, and was willing to join them, the Athenians did not concede enough to him. For Alcibiades, speaking in person in behalf of Tissaphernes, who was also present, made such excessive demands, that the refusal of the Athenians, although for a long time they conceded whatever he asked, was still the apparent cause of their failure. For they required the whole of Ionia to be given up, and then again the adjacent islands, with other things; and when the Athenians did not object to these demands, at last, in their third interview, being afraid that he would certainly be con-

victed of inability to keep his word, he demanded that they should permit the king to build ships, and sail along his own coast, wherever and with how many soever he might please. Upon that the Athenians complied no longer, but considering that the business was impracticable, and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage, and went to Samos.

57. Immediately after these things, in the very same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them driven to absolute hostilities with him; being afraid that if they were without supplies for many of their ships, they might either be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might without his assistance attain the object of their wishes. And again, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage the continent in search of supplies. From calculating and forecasting all these things, in accordance with his wish to reduce the Greeks to a footing of equality with one another, he consequently sent for the Lacedæmonians, and gave them supplies, and concluded a third treaty with them, to the following effect:

58. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedæmon, a convention was concluded on the plain of the Mæander by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, respecting the interests of the king, the Lacedæmonians, and their allies.—That the king's country, so far as it still lies in Asia, shall belong to the king still; and that respecting his own territory, the king shall adopt such measures as he pleases.—That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not invade the king's territory, nor the king that of the Lacedæmonians or their allies, to do it any harm.—That if any of the Lacedæmonians invade the king's territory to do it harm, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall prevent it; and that if any one from the king's country proceed against the Lacedæmonians or their allies to do them harm, the king shall prevent it.—That Tissaphernes shall provide the pay for the ships now present, according to the contract, until the king's fleet has come; but that when the king's fleet has come, the Lacedæmonians and their allies

shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships, if they wish it. That if, however, they consent to receive supplies from Tissaphernes, he shall furnish them, and the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall refund to him, at the conclusion of the war, whatever sums of money they may have received.—That after the king's ships have arrived, those of the Lacedæmonians and their allies and those of the king shall jointly carry on the war, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their allies may think fit. And if they wish to terminate hostilities with the Athenians, they shall be terminated on the same footing."

59. This was the treaty that was made. And after this, Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as had been agreed, and all other things which he had promised; or, at any rate, he wished to *appear* to be thus preparing.

60. When the winter was now closing, the Bœotians took Oropus by treachery, while an Athenian garrison was holding it. There co-operated with them, also, some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For as the place was just opposite to Eretria, so long as the Athenians held it, it could not fail to do much damage both to Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Being now therefore in possession of Oropus, the Eretrians came to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. They, however, were more disposed to relieve Chios in its distress, and so put out and sailed from Rhodes with all their fleet. When they were off Triopium, they descried that of the Athenians out at sea, sailing from Chalce: and as neither side advanced against the other, they arrived, the Athenians at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, finding that it was no longer possible to go to the relief of Chios without a sea-fight. And so the winter ended, and the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

61. Immediately at the commencement of the spring of the following summer, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont, to effect the revolt of Abydus, which is a colony of the Milesians; and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how to succor them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to a naval engagement. They happened, while Astyochus was still at Rhodes, to have received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of

Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out as a passenger with Antisthenes, and twelve ships which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were Thurian, four Syracusan, one Anæan, one Milesian, and one Leon's own ship. When therefore the Chians had gone out against them in full force, and had occupied a strong position, while their ships at the same time to the number of six and thirty put out to meet the two and thirty of the Athenians, they engaged them by sea; and an obstinate battle having been fought, the Chians and their allies, who had not the worst in the action, returned (for it was now late) into their city.

62. After this, immediately that Dercyllidas had proceeded thither by land from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, as also did Lampsacus two days later. When Strombichides heard of this, he went to the rescue from Chios, as quickly as possible, with four and twenty Athenian ships, some of which also were transports carrying heavy-armed troops; and when the Lampsacenes came out against him, having defeated them in battle, taken at the first assault their city, which was unfortified, and made spoil of implements and slaves (though he restored the free-men to their dwellings), he proceeded against Abydus. When they did not capitulate, and he was unable to take the place by assault, he sailed away to the coast opposite Abydus, and appointed Sestus, a town of the Chersonese which the Medes had held at the time so well known,<sup>1</sup> as a post for the garrison, and for the defense of the whole of the Hellespont.

63. In the mean time the Chians were masters of the sea more than they had been; and Astyochus with those at Miletus, on hearing the particulars of the naval engagement, and the departure of Strombichides with his squadron, took fresh courage. And so having coasted along with two ships to Chios, he took the fleet from that place, and with all his force now united advanced against Samos. When the Athenians, in consequence of their being suspicious of one another, did not put out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus. For about this time, or still earlier, democracy had been abolished

<sup>1</sup> τόρε.] "The allusion is to the circumstance that Sestus was almost the last spot held by the Persians in Europe, and that it sustained a long and obstinate siege before it could be taken from them. (Herod. IX. 115, and seq.)."—*Arnold*.

at Athens. For when Pisander and the ambassadors came from Tissaphernes to Samos, they both secured still more strongly their interest in the army itself, and instigated the most powerful of the Samians also to try with them to set up an oligarchy among themselves, although they had been rising up against one another to avoid an oligarchical government. At the same time those of the Athenians at Samos determined, after communicating with each other, to give up Alcibiades, since he would not join them (for indeed he was not a proper person, they said, to become a member of an oligarchy), but to consider among themselves, since they were now actually imperiled, by what means their cause might escape abandonment; and at the same time to persevere in their measures for the war, and themselves to contribute with alacrity from their own private resources, both money and whatever else might be required, since they were no longer bearing the burden for any but themselves.

64. Having thus exhorted one another, they then immediately sent back home Pisander and half the ambassadors, to manage matters there; with instructions also to establish oligarchy in such of the subject cities as they touched at: the other half they sent to the rest of the places subject to them, some in one direction and some in another. They also dismissed to his government Diotrepheas, who was in the neighborhood of Chios, but had been elected to take the command of the countries Thraceward. He, on his arrival at Thasos, abolished the democratical government; but about two months after his departure the Thasians began to fortify their city, as wanting no more aristocracy in conjunction with the Athenians, but daily looking for liberty to be given them by the Lacedæmonians. For indeed there was a party of them with the Peloponnesians which had been expelled by the Athenians, and which, in concert with their friends in the city, was exerting itself with all its might to bring a squadron, and effect the revolt of Thasos. They had the fortune, then, to find what they most wished, namely, the city brought to the right side without any danger, and the democratical party deposed, which had been likely to prove an obstacle. Thus then in the case of Thasos, and, I imagine, in that of many other of the subjects, the result was the contrary of what was expected by those of the Athenians who were establishing oligarchy; for

when the states had got a moderate government, and security of action, they went on to absolute liberty, and did not value the specious advantage<sup>1</sup> of good laws which they received from the Athenians.

65. Pisander, then, and his companions, as they coasted along, abolished the popular governments in the cities, according to arrangement, and, moreover, took from some places heavy-armed troops as their allies, and so came to Athens. There they found most of the business already accomplished by their associates. For some of the younger men, having conspired together, secretly assassinated one Androcles, the most prominent leader of the commons, and who also had mainly procured the banishment of Alcibiades; and for both these reasons, on account of his being a popular leader, and because they thought they should gratify Alcibiades, who, they concluded, would be recalled, and would make Tisaphernes their friend, they were the more ready to kill him. There were some other obnoxious individuals also whom they secretly took off in the same manner. A proposal too had already been openly set on foot by them, that no others should receive pay but such as served in the war; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government, and those such as were most competent to do the state service both with their property and their persons.

66. Now this was but a specious profession for the people at large, since the same men would really hold the government as would bring about the revolution. The people, however, and the council of five hundred<sup>2</sup> still met notwithstanding, though they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, but both the speakers belonged to that party, and the points to be brought forward were previously discussed by them. Indeed no one else any longer opposed them, through fear, and from seeing that the conspiracy was extensively spread; and if any one did speak against them, he immediately came to his end in some convenient way, and there was neither any search made for those who had perpetrated the deed, nor were they brought to justice if they were suspected;

<sup>1</sup> *εὐνομίαν*.] Or "independence," according to the reading *αὐτονομίαν*, which Bekker and Poppo adopt from the majority of MSS. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> *βουλή ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κνύμου*.] Literally, "the council of the bean," so called as being elected by ballot.

but the commons remained still, and in such consternation that every one thought himself fortunate who did not meet with some violent treatment, even though he held his tongue. From supposing, too, that the conspiracy was much more general than it really was, they were the more faint-hearted, and were unable to ascertain its extent, being powerless in consequence of the size of the city, and their not knowing one another's views. And on this same ground also it was impossible for a man to bemoan himself to another in his indignation, so as to repel<sup>1</sup> one who was plotting against him; since he would either have found a person he did not know, to whom to speak his mind, or one whom he knew but could not trust. For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, supposing every one to have a hand in what was going on. For there were among them some whom one would never have supposed likely to join an oligarchy; and it was these that produced the greatest distrust in the many, and that contributed most to the safety of the few, by confirming the people's want of confidence in each other.

67. Pisander and his colleagues therefore having come at this critical time, immediately addressed themselves to the remainder of the work. In the first place, having assembled the people, they moved a resolution for electing ten commissioners with absolute powers for compiling laws, and that after compiling them they should lay before the people, on an appointed day, their opinion as to the manner in which the state would be best governed. Afterward, when the day had arrived, they inclosed the assembly in the Colonus (a temple of Neptune outside the city, at the distance of about ten stades), and the compilers brought forward no other motion, but simply this, that any of the Athenians should be at liberty to express any opinion he might please; and if any one either prosecuted the speaker for illegality, or otherwise injured him, they imposed upon him severe penalties. Upon that it was at length plainly declared, that no one should any longer either hold

<sup>1</sup> ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα.] Or, as others have taken it, "to defend himself by plotting against the enemy." But Arnold truly, I think, observes, that if that had been the meaning, Thucydides would probably have written ἀντεπιβουλεύσαντα. In addition to the passage to which he refers (III. 12. 3), compare VI. 37, where φυλάσσεσθαι is used in just the same sense as ἀμύνασθαι is here: ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεύσαι ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλάβετε.

office, or receive pay, according to the present constitution; that they should elect five men as presidents, who, again, should elect a hundred, and each of the hundred three for himself, and that these, amounting to four hundred, should enter the council-chamber, and govern as they might think best, with full powers, and should elect the five thousand also, whenever they might please.

68. Now it was Pisander who moved this resolution, and in other respects was openly the most forward in assisting to put down the democracy. But the person who devised the whole business, and the means by which it was brought to this issue, and who for the longest time had given the subject great attention, was Antiphon, a man second to none of the Athenians of his day in point of virtue, and who had proved himself most able to devise measures, and to express his views; who also, though he did not come forward in the Assembly of the people, nor by choice in any other scene of public debate, but was viewed with suspicion by the people through his reputation for cleverness, yet was most able for any one man to help those who were engaged in contest, whether in a court of justice, or before a popular assembly, whoever of them might consult him on any point. And he himself, too, when the party of the Four Hundred had subsequently fallen, and was severely treated by the commons, appears to me to have made the best defense of all men up to my time, when tried for his life on the subject of this very government, on a charge of having assisted in setting it up. Phrynichus, too, showed himself, beyond all others, most zealous for the oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades, and the certainty that he was acquainted with the intrigues he had carried on at Samos with Astyochus; for he thought that, in all probability, he would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And he showed himself, when once he had undertaken their business, by far the most capable of facing dangers. Theramenes, the son of Hagnon, was also a leader among those who joined in abolishing the democracy, a man of no small power, either of language or intellect. So that, conducted as it was by so many clever men, it was not unnatural that the business should succeed, though an arduous one. For it was a difficult matter to deprive the Athenian people of its liberty, about a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, and when it had



not only been subject to none, but accustomed also, for more than half of that period, to rule over others.

69. When the assembly had been dissolved, without contradiction from any one, and by its own ratification of the measure, then they afterward introduced the Four Hundred into the council-chamber, in the following manner: All the Athenians, in consequence of the enemy established at Decelea, were constantly under arms, either on the walls or in the ranks. On that day, then, they permitted those who were not privy to their design to go home,<sup>1</sup> as usual; while to those who were in the conspiracy directions were given to wait about quietly, not just by the arms, but at some little distance; and if any one should oppose what was doing to seize the arms and not suffer it. Moreover, some Andrians and Tenians, and three hundred Carystians, with some of the Æginetan colonists, whom the Athenians had sent to occupy that island, had come for this very purpose with their own arms; to whom directions had already been given on this subject. When these things had been thus arranged, the Four Hundred, each with a dagger concealed on his person, and the hundred and twenty Grecian youths, of whose services they availed themselves wherever any business required to be dispatched, came and presented themselves to the council of Five Hundred, who were in their chamber, and told them to take their pay and go out; themselves bringing it, for the whole of their remaining term in office, and giving it to them when they went out.

70. When in this way the council had withdrawn without speaking a word against it, and the rest of the citizens made no disturbance, but kept quiet, the Four Hundred then entered the council-chamber, and elected their prytanes by lot; and for what concerned the gods, offered prayers and sacrifices on installing themselves in their government. Afterward, however, they departed widely from the popular administration (except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades), and in other respects ruled the city by force. Some men, who appeared desirable to be taken out of their way, they put to death, though not many; others they put in prison, and others they banished. They also entered into

<sup>1</sup> ἀπελθεῖν,] i. e., "after a sort of morning parade," as Arnold expresses, "leaving their arms piled in some open space, to be ready in case of any alarm."

communication with Agis, the Lacedæmonian king, who was at Decelea, telling him that they were desirous of making peace, and that it was but reasonable that, as he would treat with *them*, and no longer with the faithless multitude, he should more readily come to terms.

71. He, however, thought that the city was not in a settled state, and that the people would not so immediately give up their ancient liberty, nor remain quiet, if they should see a large force of Lacedæmonians; and not being quite sure at present that they were no longer in a disturbed condition, he made no conciliatory answer to those who had come from the Four Hundred, but sent for a large additional force from the Peloponnese, and not long after went down himself with the garrison from Decelea, in conjunction with the troops which had joined him, to the very walls of Athens; hoping that either the people there, being thrown into disorder, would submit on his own terms, or that in consequence of the confusion which would probably be created both within and without, he could not fail to carry the long walls on the first assault, owing to the absence of troops along them for their defense. But when he approached near to the city, and the Athenians made not the slightest stir within, while they sent out their cavalry, with a division of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, and shot down some of the enemy in consequence of their near advance, and got possession of some arms and dead bodies, then indeed, finding this to be the case, he led his army back again. He and his own troops still remained in their former position at Decelea, but the newly arrived forces he sent home, after they had stayed in the country some few days. After this, the Four Hundred sent an embassy to Agis, nevertheless; and when he now received them more favorably, and advised them to that effect, they sent envoys to Lacedæmon also to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of peace.

72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to reassure the troops, and to tell them that the oligarchy had not been established for the injury of the city and the citizens, but for the preservation of the whole state; moreover, that there were five thousand, and not four hundred only, who had a share in the government; though never yet, in consequence of their expeditions and their foreign occupations, had the Athenians come to consult on a business of such importance that five thousand of

them assembled for the purpose. They gave them, too, all other instructions as to what was suitable for them to say, and dispatched them immediately after their own establishment in power, being afraid that a mob of sailors might (as was really the case) both themselves refuse to continue under the government of an oligarchy, and through the evil spreading from that quarter be the means of deposing them.

73. For at Samos the oligarchy was already made the subject of new measures, and the following events happened at the very time that the Four Hundred were conspiring. Those of the Samians who had risen up against the aristocratical party, and constituted the commons, turned round again, and being prevailed upon by Pisander on his arrival, and by the Athenians who were in the conspiracy at Samos, both bound themselves by oaths to the number of three hundred, and were prepared to attack the rest, as forming the democratical party. They also put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a base fellow, who had been ostracised, not from fear of his influence or rank, but for his villainy, and for being a disgrace to the city; acting in the matter in concert with Charminus, one of the generals, and a party of Athenians who were with them, and to whom they had given pledges of faith. They likewise perpetrated other such deeds in conjunction with that party, and had determined to make an attack on the populace. They, however, having notice of their design, revealed what was going to be done to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals (for these submitted to the oligarchy against their will, from being honored by the people), and to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former serving as a trierarch, the latter in the heavy infantry, as well as some others who had always been thought to be most opposed to the conspirators; begging them not to stand still and permit them to be ruined, and Samos to be lost to the Athenians, through whose help alone their empire had held together up to this time. On hearing this, they went to every one of the soldiers, and exhorted them not to put up with it, and especially the crew of the *Paralus*, as all on board of that vessel were Athenians and freemen, and had always been most bitter against an oligarchical government, even before there was one established. Leon and Diomedon also left them some ships for their protection, whenever they might themselves sail any where. So that when the three hundred

made an attack on them, by the aid of all these, and especially of the crew of the *Paralus*, the popular party of the Samians gained the upper hand. Of the three hundred they put to death some thirty, and banished three who were the most guilty; while with the rest they entered into an amnesty, and lived together for the future under a democratical government.

74. The ship *Paralus*, and Chæreas, son of Archestratus on board of it—an Athenian who had been forward in the revolution—were sent by the Samians and the soldiers with all speed to Athens, to carry the news of what had taken place; for they were not yet aware of the Four Hundred being in power. On their sailing into harbor, the Four Hundred immediately threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and having taken their vessel from them, and removed them into another employed as a troop-ship, they set them to keep guard round Eubœa. Chæreas, by some means or other, immediately secreted himself; and when he saw the present state of things, he went back to Samos, and took the soldiers an exaggerated report of affairs at Athens, aggravating every thing, and telling them that "they were punishing all with stripes, and it was impossible to speak a word against those who held the government; moreover, that their wives and children were outraged, and that they intended to seize and confine all the relatives of such as were in the army at Samos and not on their own side, in order that, if they would not submit to them, the prisoners might be put to death;" with many other false statements which he made besides.

75. On hearing this, they were at first strongly inclined to make an attack on those who had been the chief authors of the oligarchy, and such of the rest as had taken part in it. Afterward, however, being prevented by the men of moderate views, and warned not to ruin their cause, while the enemy were lying so near them with their ships ready for action, they desisted from it. After this, wishing openly now to change the government at Samos to a democracy, Thrasybulus, the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus (for these were the chief leaders in the revolution), bound all the soldiers, and, most of all, the oligarchical party themselves, by the most solemn oaths, that they would assuredly be governed by a democracy, and live in concord; and also that they would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians, and would be foes to

the Four Hundred, and hold no intercourse with them. All the Samians too, who were of full age, took the same oath with them; and the soldiers communicated to the Samians all the circumstances, and the probable results of their dangers, thinking that neither for them nor for themselves was there any resource that could save them, but that if either the Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus should defeat them, they would be destroyed.

76. Thus they were engaged in contention at this time, the one party wishing to force the city to a democracy, the other to an oligarchy. And the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals, and any of the trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others in their place, both trierarchs and generals; of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. They also stood up and exhorted one another, both on other topics and on this: "that they ought not to be disheartened because the city had revolted from them; for it was but the smaller party which had separated from them who were the larger, and better provided in all respects. For since they held the whole fleet at their command, they would compel the other cities under their dominion to give them money, just the same as though they were coming from Athens. For they had a city in Samos, and no weak one either, but such as, when at war with them, had been within a very little of taking away the command of the sea which the Athenians enjoyed. And as for the enemy who were defending themselves against them from the same position as before. They, then, inasmuch as they had command of the ships, were more able to provide themselves with necessaries than those at home. Nay, it was through their being stationed in advance at Samos, that those at home had before commanded the entrance to the Piræus; and now also they would be brought to such a strait, should they not consent to give them back the government, that they themselves would be better able to exclude them from the sea than to be excluded from it by them. Indeed it was but a trifling and inconsiderable degree in which the city was of use to them toward gaining the victory over the enemy; and they had lost nothing in losing those who had neither any more money to send them (but the soldiers provided it themselves), nor yet good counsel to give them, for the sake of

which a state has authority over armaments. On the contrary, even on these points the other party had done wrong by abolishing the laws of their fathers; while they themselves maintained those laws, and would endeavor to make *them* do it also. So that neither had they the inferiority as regarded those who should give good counsel. Alcibiades, too, would gladly secure them the alliance of the king, should they grant to him security of person and a restoration to his country. And what was most important, should they fail on all points, yet, having so large a fleet as they had, there were many places for them to retire to, in which they would find both cities and territory."

77. Having thus debated the matter together, and encouraged one another, they proceeded to make preparations for the war no less than before; and the ten ambassadors who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, hearing of this when they were now at Delos, remained quiet there.

78. About this time also the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were raising a clamor among themselves, about their cause being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. For Astyochus, they said, would neither fight before, while they themselves were still the stronger, and the Athenian fleet was small, nor would he now, when the enemy were said to be in a state of sedition, and their ships were not yet brought together; but they would run the risk of being worn out by delay, while waiting for the Phœnician fleet—an idle pretense, and not a reality. And Tissaphernes, on the other hand, did not bring up this fleet, and at the same time injured their own navy by not giving them supplies regularly, or to the full amount. They ought therefore to wait no longer, but to come to a decisive engagement at sea. It was the Syracusans that most especially urged this.

79. The confederates, and particularly Astyochus, hearing these murmurs, and having resolved in council to fight a decisive battle, since the disturbances at Samos were also reported to them, they weighed anchor with all their ships, amounting to a hundred and twelve, and having given orders for the Milesians to march by land toward Mycale, they sailed to the same place. But the Athenians with their eighty-two ships which were lying at Glauce in the territory of Mycale (Samos being but a short distance from the mainland at this

point, opposite Mycale), when they saw the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired to Samos, not thinking themselves sufficiently strong in numbers to risk a battle for their all. Besides, as they had had notice from Miletus of the enemy's wish for an engagement, they were expecting Strombichides from the Hellespont, to reinforce them with the ships which had gone from Chios to Abydus; for a messenger had previously been sent to him. Thus they retired to Samos; while the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and formed their encampment, with the land forces of the Milesians and the people in the neighborhood. The next day, when they were going to advance against Samos, tidings reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, and they immediately sailed back again to Miletus. The Athenians, when their squadron had joined them, advanced themselves against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when no one came out to meet them, they sailed back again to Samos.

80. The same summer, and immediately after this, since the Peloponnesians had not with their whole united fleet offered battle to the enemy, not thinking themselves a match for them, they were at a loss from what quarter to get money for such a number of vessels, especially as Tissaphernes supplied it ill; and therefore they sent Clearchus the son of Ramphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, in accordance with the original orders from the Peloponnesians. For Pharnabazus invited them to his aid, and was prepared to furnish them with supplies; and at the same time intelligence reached them that Byzantium had revolted. Accordingly, these ships of the Peloponnesians put out into the open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians during their voyage; but were overtaken by a storm, and the greater part of them put into Delos with Clearchus, and subsequently returned to Miletus (Clearchus, however, afterward went to the Hellespont by land, and entered on his command), while the rest, to the number of ten, arrived safe at the Hellespont with Hefixus the Megarean, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, when the commanders at Samos were aware of it, they sent some ships to the Hellespont to oppose them and keep guard against them; and a trifling battle was fought at sea before Byzantium. between eight vessels against eight.

81. Now the leading men at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, had all along retained the same purpose, ever since he had effected a change in the government, namely, to restore Alcibiades; and at length, in an assembly, he persuaded the greater part of the soldiers to the same; and when they had passed a decree for the return and security of Alcibiades, he sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, thinking that their only chance of preservation was his bringing Tissaphernes over from the Peloponnesians to them. An assembly therefore having been convened, Alcibiades both complained of and deplored his own calamity in having been banished, and by speaking at great length on public matters raised them to no slight hope for the future; and extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes, in order that both the members of the oligarchy at home might be afraid of him, and the clubs be the more quickly broken up; and also that those at Samos might hold him in the greater honor, and be more encouraged themselves; and that the enemy, moreover, might be as much as possible set against Tissaphernes, and cast down from their present hopes. Accordingly Alcibiades, in the most boastful strain, held out these promises to them: "that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to him, that if he could but trust the Athenians, assuredly they should not want for supplies, so long as any of his own property remained, even though he should have at last to sell his own bed; and that he would bring the Phœnician ships which were now at Aspendus to join the Athenians, instead of the Peloponnesians; but he could only place confidence in the Athenians, if Alcibiades himself were recalled to be his security for them."

82. On hearing these and many other representations, they immediately elected him general in company with the former ones, and committed to him the whole management of their affairs. And now for nothing would they have exchanged their several hopes at the moment, both of preservation and of vengeance on the Four Hundred. Nay, they were at once ready immediately to despise their enemies on the spot, on the strength of what had been said, and to sail to the Piræus. He, however, most positively forbade their sailing to the Piræus, and leaving behind them their enemies who were so much closer at hand, though many were urgent for it, and told them



that since he had been chosen their general, he would first of all sail to Tissaphernes, and arrange with him measures for the war. And so, on leaving this assembly, he took his departure immediately, that he might be thought to communicate every thing to him; at the same time that he wished to be more honored by him, and to show him that he was now elected general, and was able to do him either good or harm. And thus it was the good fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by means of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by means of them.

83. When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, though they were before distrustful of Tissaphernes, they were now far more disgusted with him than ever. For the truth<sup>1</sup> was, that in the case of the Athenians advancing against Miletus, when the Peloponnesians would not put out to meet them and give them battle, Tissaphernes became far more sick of giving them pay; and indeed that he had even before this made some progress in their dislike, on account of Alcibiades. And so the soldiers, and some of the other men of consideration also, as well as the soldiery, clubbing together as before, began to reckon up their grievances; namely, that they had never yet received their full pay; that what was now given them was deficient in amount, and not even that paid regularly; that unless they either fought a decisive battle, or removed to some station<sup>2</sup> where they might have supplies, the men would desert their ships; and that for all this Astyochus was to blame, through his humoring Tissaphernes for his own profit.

84. While they were thus reckoning up their grievances, the following disturbance also occurred about Astyochus.

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν.] If καί must be changed, as most of the editors think, into either *κατά* or *μετά*, the former would certainly appear the preferable correction. But I think that Poppo is quite right in retaining the original reading of all the MSS.; though I should rather consider the accusative τὸν ἐπίπλουν as an instance of anacoluthon (if it can not be considered as an "accusativus de quo,") than connect it with the infinitive *ναυμαχῆσαι*.

<sup>2</sup> ὅθεν τροπὴν ἐξεῖ.] Bekker appears to me to be fully justified in retaining ἐξεῖ, which has so large a majority of the MSS. in its favor, in preference to ἐξείν, which Poppo, Göller, Arnold, and Bloomfield have adopted. Would not the reason alleged by Arnold against the use of the indicative here apply with equal force to ch. 86. 7, and the passage there quoted by himself, V. 103. 1?

The Syracusan and Thurian seamen, inasmuch as they were, generally speaking, most free, applied to him also with the greatest boldness, and demanded their pay. He answered them somewhat haughtily, and threatened them; and indeed against Dorieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, he even lifted up his bâton. When the mass of the armament saw this, sailor-like, they rushed in a rage<sup>1</sup> upon Astyochus to strike him; but he saw them in time, and fled for refuge to an altar. Notwithstanding their rage, therefore, he was not struck, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took the fort belonging to Tissaphernes which had been built in Miletus, having attacked it when unobserved, and drawn out of it the garrison that was in it. And the rest of the confederates also approved of these things, and especially the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was displeased with them, and said that the Milesians and the rest of the states in the king's country ought to submit to Tissaphernes, in such things as were reasonable, and to pay him court, until they had brought the war to a happy conclusion. But the Milesians were offended with him for this, and other things of the same kind; and afterward, when he had died of sickness, they would not allow them to bury him where those of the Lacedæmonians who were present wished to do.

85. When their affairs, then, were involved in these dissensions both with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command, while Astyochus sailed away. With him Tissaphernes also sent, as an ambassador, one of his courtiers named Gaulites, a Carian who spoke two languages;<sup>2</sup> both to lay an accusation against the Milesians on the subject of the fort, and at the same time to make an apology for himself; for he knew that the Milesians were going thither chiefly to raise a clamor against him, and Hermocrates along with them, who intended to represent Tissaphernes as ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians in concert with Alcibiades, and

<sup>1</sup> ἐκπαγόντες.] Literally, "breaking out upon him;" an excellent instance of the etymological meaning of our word "rage." In illustration of *οἱ δὲ ναῦται*, compare Eurip. Hec. 604, *ἐν τοι μνηρῷ στρατεύματι Ἀκάλαστος ὄχλος, ναυτική τ' ἀναρχία Κρείσσων πύρος*.

<sup>2</sup> *Κῦρα δίγλωσσον.*] "One of those Carians who were accustomed from their childhood to speak two languages;" as in the case with the people of French Flanders, and many other such frontier districts."—*Arnold*.

pursuing a double policy. For he had always been at enmity with him about the payment of the money to the forces; and at last, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and some others of the Syracusans, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, had come to Miletus to take command of the Syracusan ships, Tissaphernes pressed far more severely than ever on Hermocrates, when he was now an exile; both laying other things to his charge, and especially, that having once asked him for money and not obtained it, he displayed his enmity to him in consequence. Astyochus, then, with the Milesians and Hermocrates, sailed away to Lacedæmon; while Alcibiades had by this time crossed over again from Tissaphernes to Samos.

86. And now the ambassadors from the Four Hundred, whom they sent at the time we mentioned to appease and inform those at Samos, arrived from Delos, after Alcibiades had come; and when an assembly had been called, they attempted to make a speech. But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out, that they should put to death those who were abolishing the democracy; afterward, however, they were with difficulty calmed down, and gave them a hearing. They then delivered to them this message: "that it was neither for the destruction of the state that the recent change had been made, but for its preservation; nor in order that it might be delivered up to the enemy (for they might have done that when they invaded the country during their government): that all in their turn should share the privileges of the Five Thousand; and that their relatives were neither being outraged, as Chæreas had slanderously reported to them, nor suffering any harm, but remained as they were, each in the enjoyment of his property." Though they made this and many other statements beside, they listened none the more favorably, but were angry, and expressed different opinions, though most generally, that they should sail to the Piræus. And on that occasion Alcibiades appeared to have benefited the state for the first time, and in a degree inferior to no one else. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent on sailing against their countrymen, in which case most certainly the enemy would have taken possession of Ionia and the Hellespont, he was the man who prevented them. Indeed on that emergency no one else would have been able to restrain the

multitude. He, however, both made them desist from the attack, and silenced with rebukes those individuals who were on their own account most angry with the ambassadors. He then dismissed them with an answer from himself, "that he did not object to the Five Thousand being in power, but ordered them to depose the Four Hundred, and to establish the council of Five Hundred as before. That if any retrenchment had been made with a view to economy, in order that those who were on service might be better provided with supplies, he entirely approved of it. In other respects, also, he urged them to stand out, and not at all to submit to the enemy. For if only the state were preserved, there was great hope of their being reconciled to one another; but if either of the two parties were once destroyed, either that at Samos, or that at home, there would no longer be any one for them to be reconciled to." There came, also, ambassadors from the Argives, with offers of assistance to the popular party of the Athenians at Samos; but Alcibiades thanked them, and desiring them to come when they should be called upon, thus dismissed them. Now the Argives came in company with the crew of the *Paralus*, who, when last mentioned, had been commanded by the Four Hundred to cruise in the troop-ship round Eubœa: and who, while taking to Lacedæmon some Athenians that had been sent as ambassadors by the Four Hundred, namely, *Læspodias*, *Aristophon*, and *Melesias*, when off Argos in their passage, seized the ambassadors, and delivered them up to the Argives, as being some of those who had been most instrumental in abolishing the democracy, while they themselves did not go to Athens again, but taking the ambassadors from Argos to Samos, arrived there with the trireme they were in.

87. The same summer, and at the very time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with *Tissaphernes*, both on other accounts, and especially because of the return of *Alcibiades*, thinking that he was now evidently Atticizing, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go to *Aspendus* for the Phœnician ships, and desired *Lichas* to accompany him; saying, that with regard to the armament, he would appoint *Tamos* as his lieutenant, to furnish the supplies while he was himself absent. The same account, however, is not given by all; nor is it easy to decide with what motive he went to *Aspendus*, and yet, after going, did not

bring the fleet. For it is certain that the Phœnician ships, a hundred and forty-seven in number, came as far as Aspendus; but why they did not come on, is a subject of many conjectures. For some think it was, that by going away he might, in accordance with his plan, wear down the power of the Peloponnesians (at any rate Tamos, who was intrusted with the charge, provided them with supplies no better, but even worse, than himself). Others, that after bringing the Phœnicians to Aspendus, he might exact money from them for their discharge (for under no circumstances did he intend to employ them on any service). Others, that it was on account of the clamor against him, which had spread to Lacedæmon—to have it said that he was not wronging them, but was certainly gone for the ships, which were undoubtedly manned for service. To me, however, it appears most evident that it was with a view to wear out the Greeks, and to keep them in suspense, that he did not bring the fleet; to weaken them, during all the time that he was going there and delaying; and to keep them balanced, in order that he might make neither party too strong by joining them. For had he wished to bring the war to a conclusion, it is surely evident that he *might* have done it without any doubt. For by bringing the fleet he would, in all probability, have given the victory to the Lacedæmonians; since even at present they maintained their opposition with their navy, on terms of equality rather than of inferiority. But what most clearly convicts him is the excuse which he alleged for not bringing the ships. For he said that they were fewer in number than the king had commanded to be collected. But surely he would have gained still greater thanks by that, through not spending so much of the king's money, and yet effecting the same object at a less cost. At any rate,<sup>1</sup> with whatever intention it might have been, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and had an interview with the Phœnicians; and the Peloponnesians, by his desire, sent Philippus, a man of Lacedæmon, with two triremes to fetch the fleet.

88. Alcibiades, on finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, sailed thither himself, also, with thirteen ships, prom-

<sup>1</sup> ἢ τινὲς δὲ γνώμῃ.] This passage affords a very good instance of the force which the conjunctions *ὁ οὖν* most commonly have, though not always; the doubtfulness being here expressed, which in most cases is only implied, when they are thus joined together. See note, p. 93.

ising the forces at Samos a sure and great benefit; for that he would either himself bring the Phœnician fleet to the Athenians, or at any rate prevent its going to the Peloponnesians. For in all probability he had long known the purpose of Tissaphernes, that he did not intend fetching them, and wished to prejudice him as much as possible with the Peloponnesians, on the ground of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be the more compelled to join the side of Athens. Accordingly he set sail and pursued his voyage upward,<sup>1</sup> straight for Phaselis and Caunus.

89. When the ambassadors sent from the Four Hundred arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered the message from Alcibiades, namely, that he begged them to hold out, and not submit at all to the enemy; and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army to those at home, and of getting the better of the Peloponnesians; they gave him much more courage to the greater part of those implicated in the oligarchy, who had even before been discontented with it, and would gladly have been quit of the business by any safe means. Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though among the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedæmon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm; and so they declared,<sup>2</sup> not that they wished to

<sup>1</sup> ἄνω,] i. e., "toward the countries on the way to the East, and the center of the Persian government."—Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> φοβούμενοι δ', ὥς ἔφασαν, κ. τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Arnold's text, being utterly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit it altogether, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some sense to it, whether the true or not. I have therefore, with Gölter, changed τοὺς into οὓς, taken away the comma after πρεσβενομένους, and substituted ἀπαλλάξειεν for ἀπαλλάξιν. With regard to the τό before that infinitive, I am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading as has been considered; but that this may be added to those instances given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 670, in which the article shows that "especial emphasis is laid on the notion expressed by the infinitive." Compare especially II. 53. 4, Καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαίπῳρῃν τῷ δόξαντι καλῶ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν; Xen. Apol. Soc. 13, τὸ προειδέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον πάντες

escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis. This, however, was but a public profession made by them in word; but it was from private ambition that most of them pursued that very method by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to be overturned. For all at once not only claim to be equal, but every one decidedly the first man. [And in such a case failure is intolerable:] whereas, when an election is made under a democracy, a man more easily submits to the result, as he does not think himself beaten on equal terms.<sup>1</sup> But what most evidently encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiades being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that the power of the oligarchy would be permanent. Each one, therefore, strove to be himself the first to take the lead of the commons.

90. But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a form of government, and who now took the lead, namely, Phrynichus (who when general at Samos had quarreled, as already mentioned, with Alcibiades), and Aristarchus, a man in the highest degree, and for the longest time opposed to the democracy; and Pisander, and Antiphon, and others who were most influential, had before—as soon as they were established in power, and afterward, when the forces at Samos revolted from them for a democracy—sent members of their body as ambassadors to Lacedæmon, and been very anxious for peace with them, and been engaged in building the fort in what is called Eetionia.<sup>2</sup> And far more than ever was this the case, after their ambassadors from Samos had arrived; seeing, as

λέγουσι. Id. Symp. III. 3, οὐδεὶς σοι, ἔφη, ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέξειν. The last two quotations prove that this construction is common after verbs of "saying;" and in the present instance I suppose the infinitive to depend upon such a verb understood from ὡς ἔφασαν in the preceding part of the paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for changing τὸ into τοί, as I was once led by the various reading τῶι to conjecture, before I knew that Gölher had done the same.

<sup>1</sup> ῥᾶον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα—φέρει.] Because, as Arnold observes, "they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing therefore to lessen the mortification of defeat."

<sup>2</sup> Ἡερωνία.] For the nature and object of this fort, see Arnold's note.

they did, that both the majority of the people, and those of their own members, who before appeared trustworthy, were now changing their views. And so they dispatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others with all speed (for they were afraid of what was going on both at home and at Samos), with instructions to make terms with the Lacedæmonians in any way whatever that was at all tolerable. And they worked with still greater earnestness at the fort in Eetionia. Now the object of the fort, as Theramenes and his party maintained, was this: not that they might avoid admitting the army at Samos into the Piræus, should they attempt to sail in by force, but rather that they might admit the enemy, whenever they pleased, both with ships and troops. For Eetionia is a mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into the harbor is straight by it. It was being fortified, therefore, in such a manner, in connection with the wall previously existing on the land side, that, with only a few men posted in it, it would command the entrance. For in the very tower standing on one of the two sides, at the mouth of the harbor, which was narrow, was the termination both of the original wall on the land side, and of the new and inner one which was being built on the side of the sea. They also built a portico, which was very large and in immediate connection with this wall in the Piræus; of which they themselves had the command, and in which they compelled all to deposit both what corn they had before and what was now brought in, and to take it out thence when they sold it.

91. On these subjects, then, Theramenes had long been murmuring; and ever since the ambassadors had returned from Lacedæmon without effecting any general arrangement for them, he did so still more, saying that there would be danger of this fort's proving the ruin of the city. For some ships from the Peloponnese, whose aid the Eubœans had invited, to the number of two and forty, including some Italian and Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, also happened to be now lying off Las, in Laconia, and preparing for their passage to Eubœa, under the command of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. These Theramenes declared to be sailing, not so much to the aid of Eubœa, as of those who were fortifying Eetionia; and that if they were not on their guard now, they would be lost before they were aware of it. And there really was some plan of this kind entertained by those



who were charged with it, and it was not merely a verbal misrepresentation. For it was the wish of that party, if possible, to retain their dominion over the allies with an oligarchical government; if not, to retain their independence, with the possession of their ships and walls; but if excluded from that also, at any rate not to perish themselves under the restored democracy before and above all others, but even to call in the enemy, and without walls and ships to make peace with them, and retain the government of the city on any terms whatever, if they had only security for their persons.

92. For this reason they were also diligently raising this fortification, with both posterns and entrances, and facilities for introducing the enemy, and were desirous to have it completed in time. Now what was said of them was previously advanced in small parties only, and with greater secrecy: but when Phrynichus, on his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, had been designedly stabbed in the full market by a man who served in the *peripoli*,<sup>1</sup> and after proceeding but a short distance from the council-chamber, expired immediately, and the assassin escaped; while his accomplice, who was an Argive, though seized and tortured by the Four Hundred, mentioned no one's name as having instigated him to it, nor any thing else, but that he knew many men assembled in different houses, both that of the commander of the *peripoli* and others; then indeed, when no disturbance arose from this, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and all the rest of the Four Hundred, as well as of those out of doors who held the same views, proceeded with greater confidence to the execution of their measures. For at this same time the ships had now sailed round from Las, and after coming to anchor at Epidaurus, had overrun Ægina; and Theramenes remarked, that it was not probable that, while on their passage to Eubœa, they should have run into the bay, and be lying again at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited, and come for the purposes with which he had all along been charging them; and therefore it was not possible any longer to remain quiet. At length, after many more seditious speeches and suspicions had been uttered, they now proceeded to business in real earnest. For the heavy-armed who were in the Piræus, building the wall in Eetonia, among whom, also, was Aristocrates, a taxiarch,

<sup>1</sup> τῶν περιπόλων.] See note, p. 266.

with his company, arrested Alexicles, who was a general on the side of the oligarchy, and very favorably inclined to the associates, and taking him into a house confined him there. There were others who assisted them in this, and particularly one Hermon, commander of the *peripoli* stationed in Munychia; and, what was of most importance, the mass of the heavy-armed were in favour of these measures. When this news reached the Four Hundred (who happened to be sitting together in their council-chamber), immediately, with the exception of such as did not approve of the present government, they were prepared forthwith to arm themselves<sup>1</sup>, and threatened Theramenes and those with him. He, however, said in his defense that he was ready to go at once and assist in rescuing Alexicles; and taking with him one of the generals who held the same views with himself, he proceeded to the Piræus; while Aristarchus and some young men of the cavalry went to the rescue. The tumult, then, was great and alarming: for those in the city thought that the Piræus was already taken, and the general under arrest put to death; while those in the Piræus believed that the men in the city were all but attacking them. But when the elder men stopped those in the city who were running about, and rushing to the stands of arms; while Thucydides the Pharsalian, the Proxenus of the state, was also present, and earnestly opposed the several parties, calling upon them not to destroy their country while the enemy were still waiting to attack them; they were with difficulty quieted and forbore from attacking one another. Now when Theramenes came into the Piræus (for he too was one of the generals), as far as shouting went, he was angry with the soldiers; but Aristarchus and those who were opposed to the popular party were in a violent rage. Most of the soldiers however joined in the work, without changing their purpose, and asked Theramenes, whether he thought that the wall was being built for any good, or would be better demolished. He said, that if they thought right to demolish it, he also agreed with them. Upon that both the soldiers and many of the men in the Piræus immediately mounted, and began to pull down the forti-

<sup>1</sup> ἐς τὰ ὄπλα λέναι.] "To run to the spears and shields" (which in the present circumstances of the city were always kept piled in the open spaces in different parts of the town), "and so to arm themselves for battle. See ch. 69. 1, 2; VII. 28. 2."—*Arnold*.

fiction. And the cry for the encouragement of the multitude was this: "that whoever wished the Five Thousand to rule instead of the Four Hundred, must go to help in the work." For they continued, notwithstanding, to conceal their real views under the name of the Five Thousand, so that whoever wished the commons to hold the government did not expressly mention that word; fearing that the Five Thousand might really have been elected, and that so by saying something to one [who belonged to that body,] he might, through his ignorance of the fact, commit himself. And, indeed, for this reason the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to be elected, nor to have it known that they were not; thinking, on the one hand, that to install so many partners with them would amount to a downright democracy; and, on the other hand, that uncertainty on the subject would strike them with fear of one another.

93. The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, assembled nevertheless in their council-chamber; while the soldiers in the Piræus, after releasing Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolishing the fortification, came to the temple of Bacchus close to Munychia, and having piled their arms, held an assembly there out of the usual place;<sup>1</sup> and in accordance with a resolution made by them, proceeded straightway to the city, and piled their arms in the Anaceum.<sup>2</sup> But when certain chosen deputies from the Four Hundred came to them, they conversed man with man, and such as they saw to be men of moderate views they persuaded both to remain quiet themselves, and to restrain the rest; telling them that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from these the Four Hundred should be elected in rotation, in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit: but, in the mean time, they begged them by no means to destroy the city, or drive it into the hands of the enemy. So the whole body of the soldiers, when such addresses were made by many and to many, were more pacified than before, and most alarmed for the whole state; and they agreed to hold, on an appointed day, an assembly in the temple of Bacchus, with a view to restoring concord.

<sup>1</sup> ἐξεκκλησίασαν.] Or simply, "held an assembly," according to Bekker's reading, ἐξεκλήσιασαν.

<sup>2</sup> ἐν τῷ Ἀνακείῳ,] i. e., the temple of Castor and Pollux, to whom the title of ἀνακοί "the princes," was given, according to Eustathius.

94. When the day for holding the assembly was come, and they had all but met, news were brought that the two and forty ships with Agesander were advancing from Megara along the coast of Salamis; and every one of the soldiers in general considered this to be the very thing which had so long been asserted by Theramenes and his party, namely, that it was to the fort that the ships were sailing; and it appeared to have been thrown down to good purpose. And it *might*, perhaps, in some measure have been by appointment that Agesandridas lingered about Epidaurus and that neighborhood; though it is also probable that he staid there in consequence of the present sedition among the Athenians, in hope of coming up at the moment favorable for action. But the Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving this intelligence, immediately ran down in full force to the Piræus, considering that a war with the enemy, of greater importance than that among themselves, was threatening them at no great distance, but close to their harbor. Some of them therefore went on board the ships that were already afloat; others launched additional ones; and some others ran to the defense of the walls and the mouth of the harbor.

95. But the Peloponnesian ships, after sailing by and doubling Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiæ, and subsequently went to Oropus. So the Athenians were compelled to go to sea in a hurry and with untrained crews,<sup>1</sup> inasmuch as the city was in a state of sedition, and they were anxious with all speed to go to the rescue of what was their most important possession; (for since Attica had been closed against them, Eubœa was every thing to them;) and accordingly they sent Thymochares in command of some ships to Eretria. When they arrived there, they amounted, with those that were in Eubœa before, to six and thirty; and they were immediately forced to an engagement. For Agesandridas, after his men had dined, put out from Oropus; which is distant from Eretria about sixty stades by sea. When, then, he was advancing against them, the Athenians straightway prepared to man their ships, supposing that their

<sup>1</sup> ἀσυνκροτήτοις.] Literally, "not hammered together;" i. e., not blended into one body, like two pieces of metal welded together by the hammer. To the examples of this metaphorical use of the verbs quoted by Arnold may be added Demosth. 23. 3 (Reiske), θαναστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου; 520. 12, συγκροτεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν τὸν χορόν.

men were near their vessels. They, however, were purchasing provisions for their dinner, not from the market-place (for by an arrangement of the Eretrians there was nothing on sale there), but from the houses in the outskirts of the town, in order that the enemy, while the Athenians were long in manning their ships, might attack them by surprise, and compel them to put out just as they might happen. Moreover, a signal had been raised at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus of the time when they should put to sea. The Athenians then, having put out with such scanty preparations, and fought a battle off the harbor of Eretria, held out against them, notwithstanding, for some little time, and were then put to flight and pursued to the shore. And now such of them as took refuge in the city of the Eretrians, as being friendly to them, fared worst of all, for they were butchered by them; but those who fled to the fort in the Eretrian territory, which the Athenians themselves occupied, were saved; as also were all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, having taken two and twenty of the Athenian vessels, and either killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. And not long after they effected the revolt of the whole of Eubœa, excepting Oreus (which was held by the Athenians themselves), and arranged all other matters thereabout.

96. When the news of what had happened at Eubœa reached the Athenians, a greater consternation was felt by them than had ever been before. For neither had the disaster in Sicily, though it appeared a great one at the time, nor any other event, ever yet alarmed them so much. For when, after their army at Samos had revolted from them, and they had no more ships nor men to go on board them, while they were in a state of sedition, and did not know when they might break out into conflict with one another; [when, I say, under such circumstances] so great a calamity had befallen them—one in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was most of all, Eubœa, from which they derived more advantages than from Attica—how could their dejection be unnatural? But what especially and most immediately alarmed them, was the thought that the enemy would venture, on the strength of their victory, to sail straightway to the attack of their port Piræus, while it had no ships for its protection; and they supposed that they were already all but there. And indeed,

if they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by lying near it, or if they had remained and blockaded it, have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the whole city; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been theirs, with Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Eubœa, in a word, the whole empire of Athens. But it was not on this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedæmonians proved themselves most convenient people for the Athenians to be at war with. For by being very widely different in character—the one people being quick, and the other slow; the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous—they presented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval empire. A proof of this was given by the Syracusans; for they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most successful in carrying on war with them.

97. On receiving therefore this news, the Athenians, notwithstanding, manned twenty ships, and called an assembly; one immediately, which was summoned to meet on that occasion for the first time in what was called the Pnyx (where they had been accustomed to meet in other days), and in which they deposed the Four Hundred, and resolved that the government should be put into the hands of the Five Thousand; that in that body should be included all who furnished themselves with heavy armor;<sup>1</sup> and that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office; or if any one did, they declared him to be accursed. Many other assemblies were also held subsequently, in which they appointed persons to frame a code of laws, and every thing else requisite for the government. And during the first period of this constitution the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best polity they ever did, at least in my time; for the blending together of the few and the many was effected with moderation; and this was what first raised the state up again after the disastrous occurrences which had taken place. They also passed a decree for the recall of Alcibiades, and some others with him; and

<sup>1</sup> εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.] "We must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible into the number of the Five Thousand; whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the whole number of the Five Thousand. See ch. 93. 2."—*Arnold*.

sending to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to attend diligently to their interests.

98. On this change being made, the party of Pisander and Alexicles, and all who were most devoted to the oligarchy, withdrew privily to Decelea; while Aristarchus alone of them, happening to be in office as general, took with all haste some of the most barbarous among the archers, and proceeded to Cœnoë. This was a fortress belonging to the Athenians on the borders of Bœotia, and in consequence of a blow that had been inflicted on them by the garrison, by cutting off a party of men on their return from Decelea, it was being besieged by the Corinthians, who had volunteered for the service, and had called the Bœotians also to their aid. After communicating therefore with these, Aristarchus deceived those in Cœnoë, by telling them that their countrymen in the city had made a general surrender to the Lacedæmonians, and *they* must give up the place to the Bœotians; for that such were the terms of the capitulation. They therefore, believing him, inasmuch as he was one of the generals, and knowing nothing that had happened, in consequence of their being blockaded, evacuated the fort under truce. It was in this manner that the Bœotians took and occupied Cœnoë, and that the oligarchy and sedition at Athens came to an end.

99. About the same period of this summer the Peloponnesians at Miletus also executed the following measures. When none of those who were intrusted with the business by Tissaphernes, at the time that he went to Aspendus, afforded them supplies, and neither the Phœnician ships nor Tissaphernes made their appearance hitherto, but Philippus who had been sent with him, as well as another Spartan named Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus the admiral, that the ships would not join them, and that they were being wronged by Tissaphernes in every respect; and when again Pharnabazus was calling them to his aid, and was desirous to get the ships in his turn, like Tissaphernes, and cause the remaining cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby; under these circumstances, I say, Mindarus, with great regularity, and with orders suddenly given, to escape the observation of those at Samos, weighed anchor from Miletus with three and seventy ships, and sailed for the Hellespont. (Sixteen ships had at an

earlier period of this same summer entered that sea, and over-run some parts of the Chersonese.) But being caught in a storm, and compelled to do so, he put in at Icarus, and after remaining there through stress of weather five or six days, arrived subsequently at Chios.

100. When Thrasyllus heard of his having put out from Miletus, he himself also set sail straightway from Samos with five and fifty ships, hurrying on to prevent his sailing into the Hellespont before him. But on finding that he was at Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts both in Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that in case of the ships stirring in any direction they might not do so unobserved; while he himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders for preparing meal and other necessaries, with a view of advancing from Lesbos to attack them at Chios, if any length of time should be spent there. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against and take it, if he could. For some exiles of the Methymnæans, and those the most influential, having carried over from Cuma about fifty heavy-armed men who had been associated with them, and hired others from the continent, with three hundred in all, of whom Alexander, a Theban, took the command on the strength of his connection with them, made an attack on Methymna first; and when beaten off from the attempt by means of the Athenian garrison troops which had advanced from Mytilene, and again repulsed in an engagement outside of the town, made their way over the mountain, and procured the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus therefore sailed against it with all his ships, intending to assault it. Thrasybulus, too, had arrived there before him with five ships from Samos, on receiving tidings of the exiles thus crossing over; but being too late, he went to Eresus, and lay at anchor before it. They were also joined by two vessels on their return home from the Hellespont, and by those of the Methymnæans; and so there were present, in all, seven and sixty ships, with the troops of which they made their preparations for taking Eresus by storm, if they could, with the aid of engines, or in any way whatever.

101. In the mean time Mindauros and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, after being victualled for two days, and receiving from the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the



third day put out with all speed from the island, not into the open sea, to avoid falling in with the fleet at Eresus, but sailing to the continent with Lesbos on their left hand. After touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocæan territory, and dining, they proceeded along the coast of Cuma, and supped at Argennusa on the mainland, over against Mytilene. Thence they still coasted on, though it was late in the night, and arrived at Harmatus on the continent, just opposite Methymna, and after dinner passing quickly by Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnight to Rhœteum, and so were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum, and other places in that neighborhood.

102. Now the Athenians were at Sestos with eighteen ships; and when their friends gave them notice by fire signals, while they also observed the fires on the hostile shore suddenly appear numerous, they were aware that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont. Accordingly that same night, sailing as quickly as they could, and keeping close under the shore of the Chersonese, they coasted along toward Elæus, wishing to escape from the enemy's fleet into the open sea. And they eluded the observation of the sixteen ships at Abydus; although orders for keeping guard had been before given by their friends who went to them, that they might be on the alert against the Athenians in case they should sail out. But descrying those with Mindarus in the morning, and being immediately chased by them, they had not all time to escape, but the greater part of them did, to Imbros and Lemnus; while four of the ships, which were sailing last, were overtaken off Elæus. One of these, which was stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus, they took together with its crew, and two others without their crews; while the remaining one they burned, after it had been deserted, close to Imbros.

103. After this, with the vessels which had joined them from Abydus and the rest, amounting in all to eighty-six, they besieged Elæus that day, and when it did not surrender, sailed back to Abydus. As for the Athenians, they had been deceived by their scouts, and did not imagine that the passage of the enemy's fleet could ever escape their vigilance, but were leisurely assaulting the walls of Eresus. When, how-

ever, they were aware of it, they immediately left Eresus, and proceeded with all haste to the defense of the Hellespont. And they took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which having on that occasion put out into the open sea more boldly than the rest, fell in with them. The next day they arrived and cast anchor at Elæus, and bringing in from Imbros such ships as had taken refuge there, they were five days making preparations for the battle.

104. After this they fought in the following manner. The Athenians, drawn up in column, were sailing close along shore toward Sestos; while the Peloponnesians, observing this from Abydus, put out on their side also to meet them. When they found that they were on the eve of an engagement, they extended their flank, the Athenians along the Chersonese, from Idacus to Arrhiana, with seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, from Abydus to Dardanus, with eighty-six. On the side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself and the fastest sailing vessels; on that of the Athenians, the left was held by Thrasyllus, the right by Thrasybulus; while the other commanders took their position as might severally happen. It being the object of the Peloponnesians to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenians' right with their own left to exclude them, if they could, from sailing out of the straits, as well as to drive their center on to the shore, which was at no great distance; the Athenians, aware of this, extended their own wing also where the enemy wished to hem them in, and had the advantage over them in sailing; while their left had by this time passed the headland called Cynossema. But in consequence of this, they had to form their center with weak and scattered ships, especially as they had the smaller number at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a sharp and angular projection, so that what was doing on the other side of it was not visible.

105. The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their center, drove the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their attack, having had a decided advantage in the action. To assist their center was neither in the power of Thrasybulus on the right, owing to the superior number of ships that were pressing on him, nor of Thrasyllus on the left; for it was concealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover,

the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with no inferior numbers prevented his doing it: until the Peloponnesians, from pursuing; in the security of victory, different vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater disorder in one part of their force. Thrasybulus therefore, observing this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to him, and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the enemy's line, handled them roughly in their scattered condition, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the victory to Thrasybulus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when they saw the rest doing so likewise.

106. The rout having thus been effected, and the Peloponnesians having most of them taken refuge at the mouth of the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydus, though the Athenians took but few ships (for the narrow breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of refuge at a little distance), yet the victory which they gained in this sea-fight was most opportune for them. For whereas they had before been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of losses in detail, as well as of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased to think disparagingly of themselves, and to consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea. However, they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one Leucadian, Lacedæmonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively; while they themselves lost fifteen. After erecting a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring the enemy their slain under a truce, they then dispatched a trireme to Athens with the news of their victory. On the arrival of the vessel, and on hearing of their unexpected good fortune, after the disasters which had recently befallen them in Eubœa, and through their own sedition, they were much encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly prevail, if they supported it with vigor.

107. On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians at Sestos having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. And despoiling the eight ships<sup>1</sup> from Byzantium lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus,

<sup>1</sup> ὀκτὼ ναῦς.] See ch. 80. 4.

they attacked them, and took the vessels, after defeating in a battle those who came to help them on shore. On their arrival also at Cyzicus, which was unfortified, they got possession of it again, and levied a contribution from it. In the mean time the Peloponnesians also sailed from Abydus to Elæus, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound condition (the rest having been burned by the inhabitants), and then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch the squadron that was there.

108. About this same time, too, Alcibiades returned to Samos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, bringing word that he had prevented the Phœnician ships from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes a more decided friend to the Athenians than before. Having then manned nine ships in addition to those he had already, he levied large sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After executing these measures, and placing a governor in Cos, it being now toward autumn, he sailed back to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, when he heard that the Peloponnesian squadron had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he set out again from Aspendus, and proceeded to Ionia. Now while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians (of Æolian extraction), conveyed by land over Mount Ida some heavy-armed troops from Abydus, and introduced them into their city, in consequence of being ill-treated by Arsaces the Persian, Tissaphernes' lieutenant. This same man, pretending to have a quarrel which he had not yet avowed, and offering service to the chief men among them, had induced the Delians, who had settled at Atramyctium, when driven from their homes by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying Delos, to go out as though on terms of friendship and alliance with him; and then, having watched when they were at dinner, had surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down. Since therefore they were afraid, on account of this deed, that he might some time or other commit some outrage on themselves too, and since he also imposed upon them burdens which they could not bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

109. When Tissaphernes heard of this act also on the part of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus and that at Cnidus (for there too his garrisons had been driven out), con-

sidering that he must have incurred their violent displeasure, and fearing that they might do him still further mischief, and, moreover, being vexed to think that Pharnabazus, by receiving them, might in less time and at less expense be more successful in his measures against the Athenians, he determined to go to them at the Hellespont, that he might both complain of what had been done at Antandrus, and defend himself as plausibly as he could against their charges respecting the Phœnician fleet, and all other matters. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus, and offered sacrifice to Diana.

[When the winter following this summer shall have terminated, the twenty-first year will be completed.]

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